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The present thesis aims to elucidate the relatively neglected Book III 
of Iōannēs Kantakouzēnos’ Histories by offering an English translation of, 
and commentary on, the first 30 of its 100 chapters. The translation of such 
an important text is intended to provide a convenient resource for other 
scholars studying fourteenth-century Byzantium and to highlight the 
significance of this section of the Histories. 
The thesis is divided into two Parts (I-II). Part I comprises the 
Introduction in five Sections (1-5). Section 1 briefly describes the manuscript 
tradition and previous translations, and then explains the aims, scope and 
approach of the thesis and the principles adopted regarding translation and 
transliteration. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the author’s life and 
times before summarising and reviewing the previous scholarly literature 
concerning the Histories. Section 3 outlines the content and structure of the 
complete text. Section 4 discusses Kantakouzēnos’ historiographical method, 
concentrating on the sources of the Histories, his handling of chronology and 
his literary approach. Section 5 analyses Kantakouzēnos’ portrayal of the 
major protagonists, including himself, in the translated chapters, examining 
how he wished the outbreak of the 1341-1347 civil war to be understood and 
how he assigned responsibility for the conflict.  
Part II of the thesis comprises an English translation of 
Kantakouzēnos’ Histories, Book III, Chapters 1-30, with an accompanying 
Commentary, which is presented in the form of endnotes. The Commentary 
elucidates the text and the translation, placing the passages under 
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Part I: Introduction 
 
1.1. Manuscript tradition, editions and previous translations 
The complete text of the Histories is preserved in seven manuscripts.1 
Among them Seragliensis gr. 28 (S), Laurentianus IX, 9 (L), Bononiensis 2212 
(B), and Parisinus Coislinianus 144 (P) belong to the 14th century, while 
Mutinensis 224-225, Monacensis 106 and Matritensis gr. 4712 are dateable to 
the 16th century. The first group of manuscripts was produced during 
Kantakouzēnos’ lifetime and possibly under his supervision. It is probable 
that all four originated from the same scriptorium.2 The completion of 
Laurentianus IX is dated by a colophon to 7 December 1369. The 16th-century 
manuscripts derive from the earlier four. A small fragment of the text is 
preserved in another 16th-century manuscript, Ottobonianus gr. 75.3 
A Latin translation of Monacensis 106, by Jacob Pontanus, was 
published in 1603.4 The first edition of the text was prepared from Parisinus 
Coislinianus 144 by an unnamed editor for the Byzantinae historiae scriptores 
varii, or Paris Corpus, and published in 1645, with Latin notes by Jacob 
Gretser and Pontanus’ translation. This edition was subsequently used as the 
basis for Louis Cousin’s literary and somewhat abridged French translation 
which was published in 1685.5 Edward Gibbon went out of his way to 
denounce ‘palpable and essential errors’ in Cousin’s rather hurried 
                                                 
1 So far the fullest description of the MSS is Miller, Cantacuzenus, 7-31. 
2 This is convincingly argued on the basis of palaeographical evidence by Miller, 
Cantacuzenus, 27-30, and accepted by Schönauer, ‘Italian Journey’, 1. 
3 MSS Matritensis gr. 4712 and Ottobonianus gr. 75 were unknown to Miller. See 
Schönauer, ‘Italian Journey’, for the relationship between the earlier and later MSS. 
4 On the early editions and translations, see Miller, Cantacuzenus, 32-5.  
5 This work, not mentioned by Miller, is most easily viewed on the website of the late 
Philippe Remacle, <http://remacle.org/bloodwolf/historiens/cantacuzene/histoire.htm>, last 
accessed 26 March 2012.  
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translation, concluding ‘Put not your trust in translations!’6 In 1729 the Paris 
text was reprinted in Venice, with changes to the punctuation and a small 
number of corrections, once again accompanied by Pontanus’ translation and 
Gretser’s notes. In 1828-32, Ludwig Schopen re-edited the text for the Corpus 
Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae (CSHB), or Bonn Corpus. Although the first 
volume, encompassing Histories, Books I-II, was simply a corrected edition of 
the Paris Corpus, the subsequent two volumes, encompassing Books III and 
IV, respectively, include some corrections and variant readings from 
Monacensis 106. Once more, Pontanus’ Latin translation was published with 
the edition. The superior Bonn edition was ignored by Migne in his later 
Patrologiae Graeca edition, which relied upon the Venice edition. The 
Histories, with Potanus’ translation, comprises volumes 153 and 154 of this 
corpus, published in Paris in 1866. 
During the 20th century, the first third of both Books I and IV were re-
edited, using all four of the 14th-century manuscripts, and translated into 
English, respectively by Robert Trone, in 1979, and Timothy S. Miller, in 
1975; both scholars also provided historical commentaries. Georgios 
Fatouros and Tilman Krischer, relying upon the Bonn edition, published a 
German translation of Book I in 1982 and of Book II in 1986. Subsequent to 
the commencement of the present thesis, the same scholars published their 
translation of Book III, in 2011. The first volume is preceded by a short 
introduction detailing the author’s career and literary works and all three 
volumes are accompanied by detailed notes which demonstrate particular 
interest in linguistic issues but are sometimes rather traditional in terms of 
historical analysis. The notes to the third book become distinctly less detailed 
                                                 
6 Gibbon, Decline and Fall III, 775, n. 24. 
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as the volume proceeds, most probably as a consequence of the scale of the 
task, as the authors hint in their foreword.7  
A new French translation of the entire Histories was recently 
discovered among the unpublished papers of the eminent Byzantinist 
Rodolphe Guilland (d. 1981). A project to publish this translation with a new 
commentary began in October 2012, and was apparently completed in 
August 2016, although publication of the final text is still awaited at time of 
writing.8 Finally, a new edition and study of all the known manuscripts, as 
mentioned above, is under preparation by Sonja Schönauer and is expected 
to be published in the Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae (CFHB) in 2018.9 
The present thesis is a contribution to the continued study of the Histories 
and its remarkable author.  
                                                 
7 FK III, vii. 
8 Further details at <http://www.jeanvi.fr/>, last accessed 14 September 2017. 
9 S. Schönauer, personal communication, 19 March 2016. 
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1.2. Aims, scope and approach of the thesis 
The present thesis aims to elucidate the relatively neglected third 
book of Iōannēs Kantakouzēnos’ Histories by offering an English translation 
of, and commentary on, the first 30 of its 100 chapters; the entire book is too 
lengthy to fit within the constraints of a doctoral dissertation. The thesis 
relies upon Ludwig Schopen’s CSHB (Bonn) edition, as the new CFHB 
edition by Sonja Schönauer currently remains under preparation. 
The section of the Histories under consideration has been chosen for its 
importance within the work as a whole. Kantakouzēnos relates the period 
between the death of Andronikos III and his own acclamation as emperor – 
roughly five months, June to October 1341 – in no less than 27 chapters, or 
162 pages, in the Bonn edition. This is by far his greatest expenditure of 
effort on any comparable chronological interval and demonstrates his 
intense concern for explaining the outbreak of the ruinous 1341-7 civil war. 
These explanations are most frequently expressed through speeches, which 
historians have tended to relegate to a level of lesser importance than the 
search for historical ‘facts’. However, they form an integral part of his work 
and, by examining speeches and narrative together, it is hoped that 
Kantakouzēnos’ purpose in composing the Histories may be better 
understood. The Introduction therefore considers, in addition to 
Kantakouzēnos’ literary form and historiographical methods, how 
Kantakouzēnos wished the conflict to be understood and how he assigns 
responsibility between the protagonists. 
The Translation very closely follows the Greek, attempting even to 
replicate Kantakouzēnos’ sentence structure where this does not produce 
unreadable English. One reason for this approach is to facilitate 
understanding of the Greek text; translation is not an exact science and any 
historian working seriously with translated texts will have some recourse to 
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the original. Another goal of such close translation is to minimise 
unnecessary distortion of Kantakouzēnos’ tone and meaning, with the 
intention of enabling readers to assess Kantakouzēnos’ claims for 
themselves. Sometimes the text is studiously vague and the author’s 
language or meaning is ambiguous; the translation generally preserves this, 
with clarification provided where necessary in the commentary. Obscure 
paraphrases and the frequent repetition of certain words and phrases are 
retained; the opportunity to consciously ‘improve’ or vary Kantakouzēnos’ 
vocabulary is declined. An unfortunate trait of Kantakouzēnos’ style is a 
marked preference for referring to individuals by pronouns rather than by 
name; owing to this, even allowing for the greater flexibility of Greek over 
English pronouns, passages can be often difficult to follow. Names are 
therefore added, where deemed necessary, within square brackets as a 
convenience to the reader. Words in angle brackets lack direct equivalents in 
the Greek but clearly implied by it. Kantakouzēnos also often employs an 
unusual technique of beginning to relate speeches indirectly before 
switching abruptly into direct speech. This quirk has been preserved in the 
translation but double quotes have been added at the points where these 
transitions seem most natural; such punctuation is frequently absent from 
the edition.  
The Commentary is primarily historical rather than philological; for 
the latter aspects, the reader is referred to the thorough notes of Fatouros and 
Krischer, and to the forthcoming CFHB edition. This commentary is 
therefore intended, first, to situate the peoples, individuals, institutions, 
places and events mentioned in the text in their historical context, drawing 
upon a wide range of scholarship. The focus is heavily weighted towards 
political considerations, reflecting the primacy of political concerns in the 
Histories. Second, the notes endeavour to place the passages under 
consideration in the context of the whole Histories. The Histories is a complete 
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literary work of considerable length and remarkable homogeneity; 
Kantakouzēnos clearly intended it to be read in sequence and often refers to 
matters he mentioned previously or simply assumes readers’ knowledge of 
them. Furthermore, his presentation of people and events would necessarily 
have been influenced by subsequent developments and attitudes 




1.3. Transliteration and referencing 
Passages in the Histories (= Kant.) are identified by reference to the 
volume number, page number, and often line number, in the Bonn edition. 
The present translation comprises Kant. II, 11.1-190.22. In the translation 
itself the corresponding page number in the edition is indicated within 
obliques (e.g., /12/). Commentary entries are numbered sequentially within 
each chapter and referred to in the form ‘Ch.1:11’ (i.e., Chapter 1, note 11).  
The transliteration scheme adopted (see Appendix II) aims at 
orthographic rather than phonological precision. However, as vowel length 
is indicated, the reader may reproduce contemporary pronunciation, which 
is generally accepted as having been close to Modern Greek. Greek names 
are transliterated, not Anglicised, e.g., ‘Geōrgios’ rather than ‘George’. Non-
Greek names are also transliterated, for all that Kantakouzēnos sometimes 
struggles to render them into Greek, with a more commonly academically 
accepted form provided in the commentary. The only exceptions are for 
names of persons in classical Antiquity, where the English forms are so well 
established that transliterating them would only cause confusion, e.g., 
‘Constantine the Great’ rather than ‘Kōnstantinos the Great’. Toponyms 
observe a similar principle but rather more exceptions are made for names 
familiar in English, e.g., ‘Thessaly’ not ‘Thessalia’. Ethnonyms are translated 
to their established English forms but are otherwise unchanged, e.g., ‘Persai’ 
are ‘Persians’, not ‘Turks’. ‘Rhōmaioi’ is likewise translated as ‘Romans’ 
throughout; following Kantakouzēnos’ usage, ‘Byzantines’ indicates the 
inhabitants of Constantinople only. Court titles are generally provided in 
italicised transliteration, e.g., parakoimōmenos. The only routine exceptions to 
this are for the two titles which occur constantly throughout the text: ‘Grand 
Domestic’ for megas domestikos and ‘Emperor’ for basileus. Occasionally other 
terms are transliterated rather than translated when English substitutes 
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might have misleading connotations, e.g., oikeios. Kantakouzēnos’ usual term 
for his anonymous enemies, sykophantai, is translated as ‘sycophants’ but is 
primarily intended in its Greek meaning as ‘false accusers’. 
14 
 
2.1. Iōannēs Kantakouzēnos and his Histories 
Iōannēs Angelos Komnēnos Palaiologos Kantakouzēnos was one of 
the leading personalities of the Byzantine world in the fourteenth century.10 
As soldier, statesman and later emperor, he played a prominent role in the 
brief recovery and subsequent catastrophic collapse of the Empire of the 
Romans. As emperor and theologian, he exercised a decisive influence on the 
greatest Orthodox theological controversy of his time and, as historian, he 
produced one of the longest historiographical works in Greek, central to the 
study of his age. 
Kantakouzēnos was born around 1295. His father, who is not securely 
identified, died young, possibly even before his son was born. 
Kantakouzēnos inherited the names of Angelos and Palaiologos from his 
mother, and was occasionally addressed as Komnēnos too.11 His early life is 
largely unknown but he seems to have been intimate with Andronikos 
Palaiologos, later Andronikos III (r. 1328-1341), from an early age.12 
Andronikos was disinherited by his imperial grandfather, Andronikos II (r. 
1282-1328), in October 1320, which soon caused him to openly revolt.13  
At this time, Kantakouzēnos held the rank megas papias14 although, in 
the Histories, he refers to himself anachronistically as megas domestikos. He 
was in charge of a military force stationed at Gallipoli and had previously 
been part of Michaēl IX’s entourage at Adrianople.15 Kantakouzēnos was, 
from the outset of the revolt, one of the young Andronikos’ leading 
                                                 
10 The following summary relies largely upon Nicol, Family, 35-103, no. 22. See also PLP 
10973; FK I, 1-14. Nicol, Reluctant Emperor, is useful but less careful than the earlier work. 
11 Nicol, Family, 35-6. For Kantakouzēnos’ father, see Nicol, Family, 27-30, no. 20. For his 
mother, Ch.9:18. 
12 Kant. I, 19.12-21; Greg. I, 301.15-17. 
13 For Andronikos II, see Laiou, Andronicus II; Nicol, Last Centuries, 93-147; PLP 21436. For 
Andronikos III, see Ch.1:2. 
14 Greg. I, 301.7-9. 
15 Kant. I, 24.15-23, 38.6-8. 
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partisans. The struggle between grandfather and grandson was protracted, 
with short bouts of open warfare separated by periods of truce and varying 
levels of co-operation between the rival emperors. Ultimately, Andronikos II 
was deposed in 1328. By then Kantakouzēnos had been promoted to megas 
domestikos, or Grand Domestic, and was one of the most important figures in 
Andronikos III’s court.16 
After the extensive territorial losses of Andronikos II’s reign, 
Andronikos III oversaw a period of stabilisation and even advancement in 
the political fortunes of the Empire. In the Histories, Kantakouzēnos makes 
great play of Andronikos’ military ventures and his own prominent role in 
them. Although Andronikos was forced to accept the loss of the remaining 
imperial territories in northern Anatolia, and encountered mixed success 
against the rival Balkan states of Serbia and Bulgaria, he re-asserted direct 
control over the wealthy Aegean islands of Chios and Lesbos, forced migrant 
Albanian tribes to recognise his authority, and finally annexed Thessaly and 
Epiros, both largely independent of Constantinople since the Fourth 
Crusade. On the whole, Andronikos appears to have avoided financially 
overstretching himself, defeated rebellions quickly, and made sincere efforts 
to reform the judicial system. The security of the Empire was strengthened as 
a result of his military successes and his fortification efforts; despite the 
chronic vulnerability of its long frontiers, there was no immediate existential 
threat or intimation of internal collapse.  
Andronikos III’s sudden death in June 1341 created a political 
vacuum; his heir, Iōannēs V Palaiologos, was still a child. Kantakouzēnos 
quickly secured control of the government, effectively exercising imperial 
power. However, he underestimated the determination and ability of his 
political opponents. When they moved against him in October of the same 
                                                 
16 See further Ch.1:9. 
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year, he was essentially unprepared despite being in command of a sizeable 
army. His political countermove, declaring himself both basileus and also 
protector of Iōannēs V, mainly provoked hostility and his military efforts 
soon foundered.17 By mid-1342 his party controlled almost no territory 
besides the city of Didymoteichon, most of his army had deserted, and he 
enjoyed little open support among the aristocracy or common people; he was 
on the verge of total defeat. Following an appeal to the Serbian king, he 
obtained sufficient military aid to remain in contention but had no prospect 
of victory until he secured the support of the powerful Turkish ruler, Umur 
of Aydin. Subsequently, Kantakouzēnos would secure the backing of a 
number of Turkish warlords, most significantly the Ottoman ruler Orhan, to 
whom he married his daughter Theodōra. These Turkish forces allowed him 
to conduct a grinding war of attrition and economic devastation in Thrace 
until elements of the regency government finally contrived to open the gates 
of Constantinople to him in February 1347. Kantakouzēnos’ dependence on 
largely foreign military forces to achieve victory highlighted the difficulties 
he would face as emperor, both from a lack of domestic political support and 
material resources. 
The Empire had been devastated by the war and was further 
depopulated by the ensuing great plague epidemic, now popularly known as 
the Black Death. Furthermore, neighbouring powers, particularly Serbia, had 
conquered substantial territories during the conflict; the Empire was reduced 
to Thrace and a few enclaves scattered around the Aegean. Kantakouzēnos 
attempted to accommodate the ambitions of his adult sons, Matthaios and 
Manouēl, as well as Iōannēs Palaiologos, to whom he married his daughter 
Helenē, by providing them all with portions of the diminished imperial 
territory to administer. This was strikingly unsuccessful; Palaiologos became 
                                                 
17 These events are encompassed by the present translation. 
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the focus for popular opposition to Kantakouzēnos’ rule, while many of his 
own partisans, viewing Kantakouzēnos’ conciliation of Palaiologos as a 
betrayal of their sacrifices during the war, sided with his eldest son, 
Matthaios. These tensions became increasingly irreconcilable as his reign 
progressed. Although Kantakouzēnos avoided further serious territorial 
losses, his lack of resources necessitated continued reliance on increasingly 
powerful and increasingly uncontrollable Ottoman allies. The ongoing 
political turmoil prevented Kantakouzēnos’ diminished military power from 
being concentrated against external dangers; as a result, he achieved no 
better than exhausting stalemates in his conflicts with the Serbs, Turks and 
Genoese. In 1352 civil war erupted openly again and, in December 1354, 
Iōannēs V finally forced his father-in-law to abdicate. Kantakouzēnos 
assumed the monastic habit under the name Iōasaph.18 Whether one accepts 
his claim that he had already decided to abdicate and become a monk before 
his son-in-law’s revolt or not, he was clearly dispirited by the strife and his 
inability to arrest the Empire’s dire decline.19 Iōannēs V recognised the 
dangers of taking vengeance on his deposed rival who was, after all, his 
father-in-law. He accepted Kantakouzēnos’ assistance in finally convincing 
Matthaios, in December 1357, to surrender his own claims to rule.  
Thereafter, Kantakouzēnos enjoyed not only an unusual degree of 
autonomy for an ex-emperor but also a position of unusual respect and 
influence for a monk. A competent theologian, his settlement of the Palamite 
controversy, in two councils held in 1351, endured and he remained an 
active protector of Palamism against its critics. Iōannēs V seems to have 
                                                 
18 This took place on 10 December 1354. For the circumstances of Kantakouzēnos’ 
abdication, see Nicol, ‘Abdication’. 
19 E.g., Kant. III, 308.17-19: ἀπαγορεύσας τὸ μὴ ἄν ποτε δυνήσεσθαι Ῥωμαίους ὀρθὰ 
φρονήσειν καὶ λυσιτελοῦντα ἑαυτοῖς, (‘he despaired that the Romans would ever have the 
ability to understand what was right and beneficial for themselves’). For the circumstances 
of his abdication, see Nicol, ‘Abdication’. Kantakouzēnos’ reign is summarised in Nicol, 
Family, 64-86; Nicol, Last Centuries, 209-250.  
18 
 
surrendered much of his management of ecclesiastical affairs to his father-in-
law, assigning him the task of negotiating with the papal legate, Paul, over 
the issue of Church union in 1367. The latter apparently compared him to a 
spit: when he moved, others would necessarily turn with him.20 
Kantakouzēnos exercised a lasting influence over Church affairs and his 
prestige and unquestioned Orthodoxy were probably a major factor in 
preventing renewed schism when Iōannēs V made his personal conversion 
to Roman Catholicism.21  
Kantakouzēnos, as the monk Iōasaph, had retired first to the Mangana 
in Constantinople and later to the Charsianitēs Monastery.22 He also spent 
intervals in the Peloponnese, which was still ruled by his sons. In 1379-1381, 
the aged monk was held hostage in Galata as part of the conflict between 
Iōannēs V and his grandson, Andronikos IV (r. 1376-1379). Following his 
release, he retreated to Mistra in the Peloponnese. He died there on 15 June 
1383.23 A number of his works written during his monastic life survive: 
refutations and condemnations of anti-Palamites, Jews, and Muslims; a 
treatise on the light of Tabor, and the work for which he is best known, his 
Histories, completed at some point between October 1364 and December 
1369.24 The latter have an obvious apologetic intent, seeking to justify the 
author’s participation in – or precipitation of – the numerous civil wars, 
defend his record as ruler, and distance himself from his former Turkish 
allies who had by then conquered most of Thrace. 
                                                 
20 Meyendorff, ‘Concile Oecuménique’, 174.174-175: σουβλίῳ καὶ γὰρ ἔοικας ἐν ᾧ 
πάντες ὥσπερ κρέα ἀνήρτηνται, καὶ ὅθεν ἂν σὺ κινηθείης, κἀκεῖνοι σὺν σοὶ στρέφονται. 
21 On the significance of Kantakouzēnos’ activities after abdication, see Maksimović, 
‘Political Role’; Meyendorff, ‘Concile Oecuménique’, 149-152 (Meyendorff’s commentary); 
idem, ‘Religious Problems’. 
22 Nicol, Family, 94; Nicol, ‘Abdication’, 279-281. 
23 CBB I, 69-70, no. 7/24. 
24 For a list of surviving works see FK I, 12-14; Nicol, Family, 99-100. A few of these have 
subsequently been edited; see Nicol, Reluctant Emperor, 188. The Histories must date to the 
interval between the last mentioned event and the colophon of MS Laurentianus IX; see 
below, Section 3.1. 
19 
 
The Histories, despite its unavoidable partiality, is one of the most 
important sources for the history of the Byzantine world, comprising the 
southern Balkans and the Aegean seaboard, in the early and mid-fourteenth 
century. As such, it has been widely employed by scholars. However, the 
first major monograph study of the Histories, and of Kantakouzēnos himself, 
was that of Valentin Parisot in 1845.25 This remained the only dedicated work 
until Donald Nicol’s prosopographical study of the Kantakouzēnoi in 1968, 
which was dominated by an extended biography of the family’s most 
famous son, naturally relying heavily upon his Histories.26 Günter Weiss’ 
study, published the following year, concentrated not on biography or 
historiography but rather sociological analysis, particularly of 
Kantakouzēnos’ clientele following or gefolgschaft.27 In 1980, Alexander 
Kazhdan published an innovative lexical analysis of the Histories, which, 
among other observations, made a strong case that Kantakouzēnos’ choice of 
vocabulary betrayed somewhat less elevated concerns, particularly a concern 
for money and gain, than are apparent at the semantic level.28 Although only 
a journal article, Kazhdan’s piece remains the most wide-ranging and 
original literary analysis of the Histories. In 1996, Nicol returned to 
examination of Kantakouzēnos by publishing a dedicated study of his life. 
While not wholly uncritical, Nicol largely accepted Kantakouzēnos’ 
testimony, judging him to be ‘a great and much-maligned and 
misunderstood man’.29 Yet the Histories are an apologia and not a confession; 
Kantakouzēnos does not admit to personal misjudgements and mistakes, 
and consistently portrays the negative consequences of his own actions as 
regrettable but unavoidable responses to situations created by his 
                                                 
25 Parisot, Cantacuzène. 
26 Nicol, Family. 
27 Weiss, Kantakuzenos. 
28 Kazhdan, ‘L’Histoire de Cantacuzène’, esp. 294-7. 
29 Nicol, Reluctant Emperor, 2. 
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opponents’ malice and greed. Many scholars understandably have found 
Kantakouzēnos’ smoothed testimony, and absolute denial of his own faults 
or self-interest, provocative. Correspondingly, they have been rather less 
sympathetic than Nicol, viewing Kantakouzēnos as essentially self-seeking, 
insincere and manipulative of both his contemporaries and his readers.30  
Ultimately, close, critical readings of the Histories can be used to 
support either positive or negative characterisations of Kantakouzēnos, 
although scholars favouring a critical view tend to implicitly privilege the 
testimony of Nikēphoros Grēgoras’ contemporary Roman History over 
Kantakouzēnos’ own. This can be equally problematic as Grēgoras was 
certainly no less opinionated and his assessment of Kantakouzēnos changes 
from being extremely favourable, before and during the 1341-1347 civil war, 
to deeply hostile when their theological differences became apparent during 
Kantakouzēnos’ reign. However, despite Kantakouzēnos’ obvious ability 
and lack of personal vindictiveness, it is undeniable that his political legacy 
was divisive and destructive. In short, there is no path to a positivist, 
‘correct’, understanding of Kantakouzēnos and he will remain a 
controversial figure, as he so clearly was during his lifetime.   
                                                 
30 Gibbon, Decline and Fall III, 768, expresses this view with elegant sarcasm. Many 
scholars, including Parisot, have found Kantakouzēnos’ self-justifications impossible to 
accept; Bosch, Andronikos III, 185, goes so far as to call him a ‘dämonischer… Schurke’ 
(‘demonic villain’); her chief arguments against Kantakouzēnos are outlined at 176-193. De 
Vries-van der Velden, L’Elite Byzantine, 115, sarcastically stresses her patience in the face of 
Kantakouzēnos’ ‘mémoires tout à fait mensongères’ (‘entirely false memoirs’) and ‘trouble 
mental’. A more recent, and considerably more nuanced, examination with a similar 
perspective is Tinnefeld, ‘Power Politics’. 
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3.1. Content and structure 
The main body of the Histories is prefaced by an exchange of letters 
between Neilos and ‘Christodoulos’, Kantakouzēnos’ nom de plume.31 Neilos 
first bemoans popular ignorance regarding the wars between Andronikos II 
and Andronikos III and implores Christodoulos to reveal the truth of what 
happened during this conflict and afterwards. Christodoulos accedes to 
Neilos’ request, states his determination to tell only the truth, and proceeds 
to briefly outline the succession of the Palaiologoi emperors before beginning 
the first chapter of his narrative proper. Book I, comprising 59 chapters in the 
Bonn edition, commences with the premature death of Michaēl IX 
Palaiologos, on 12 October 1320.32 It concludes with the entrance of the 
victorious younger emperor into Constantinople on 24 May 1328.33 Book II 
(40 chapters) follows on by relating Andronikos III’s reign, ending with his 
death on 15 June 1341.34 At the start of Book III (100 chapters), Christodoulos 
states that he has fulfilled his ‘initial purpose’35 by relating the conflict 
between the Andronikoi, and the subsequent reign of the younger emperor, 
and goes on to explain that the cataclysm that followed the latter’s death 
necessitates that he continue to narrate the ensuing civil war.36 Book III 
concludes with Kantakouzēnos’ entry into the Blachernai Palace on 8 
February 1347.37 The beginning of Book IV (50 chapters) states that the 
account will continue by relating the reign of the Emperor Iōannēs 
                                                 
31 Kant. I, 7-12 (trans. Trone, Kantakouzenos, 105-110). The letters are most probably 
Kantakouzēnos’ exclusive composition but Neilos (PLP 20015) has been conjectured to be 
either Neilos Kabasilas (PLP 10102) or the monastic name of his nephew Nikolaos (PLP 
30539). See FK I, 208-9, n. 1; Trone, Kantakouzenos, 213-4. 
32 Kant. I, 12.13-22; for the date, I, 13.20-14.4. For Michaēl, see Ch.14:19. 
33 Kant. I, 306.6-11 states the date, known from a number of chronicles, incorrectly as 19 
May. This has been explained as a copyist’s error; see FK I, 311, n. 443.  
34 Kant. I, 560.14-18. 
35 Kant. II, 12.2-3: πρόθεσις ... ἐξαρχῆς. 
36 Kant. II, 11.1-12.18. 
37 Kant. II, 614.23-615.3. 
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Kantakouzēnos and the discord with Iōannēs V Palaiologos.38 The latter goal 
demands the narrative continue beyond Kantakouzēnos’ abdication in 1354, 
until the resolution of the rivalry between his eldest son, Matthaios, and 
Iōannēs V, his son-in-law. The narrative remains detailed until Matthaios’ 
capture in 1356, and is then followed, in the final chapters of the Histories, by 
a few scattered events relating to the apparent reconciliation of the 
Kantakouzēnoi and Palaiologoi. The final event related is the reinstatement 
of the Patriarch Philotheos on 8 October 1364, symbolically ending the 
divisions within the Church which were created by Matthaios’ acclamation 
as emperor in 1353.39 In the following peroration the author once again 
addresses Neilos and states that his task, which he defines as expounding the 
civil wars, is complete.40 
Kantakouzēnos thus explicitly takes the civil conflicts over the rule of 
the Roman Empire as his overall theme and justification for writing. Within 
this theme, he seeks to justify and explain his own actions and ultimately 
transfer blame for the Empire’s catastrophes onto others. He provides very 
little information from outside the chronological boundaries of the events he 
is concerned with, chiefly the years 1320-1356. While Kantakouzēnos’ 
selection of material favours matters in which he was personally involved, it 
is strongly subordinated to his declared theme; the Histories cleaves closely 
to its stated purpose of narrating the period of the civil wars.41 Such thematic 
unity is rarely found in earlier Byzantine historiography, which is usually 
                                                 
38 Kant. III, 8.1-10 (trans. Miller, Cantacuzenus, 147).  
39 For Philotheos, see PLP 11917. For the date (not given by Kantakouzēnos), see CBB I, 
94, no. 9/17. Philotheos had been appointed by Kantakouzēnos when the Patriarch Kallistos 
abandoned his post, having refused to crown Matthaios Kantakouzēnos at the expense of 
Iōannēs V. Following his father-in-law’s abdication, Iōannēs deposed Philotheos and 
reinstated Kallistos. Iōannēs V’s acceptance of Philotheos’ return after Kallistos’ death 
precluded any further schism over the legitimate Patriarch. 
40 Kant. III, 363.24-365.8. For translation, see Appendix I. 
41 The strong thematic structure of the Histories is highlighted by Kazhdan, ‘L’Histoire de 
Cantacuzène’, 324-27. Kantakouzēnos’ corresponding lack of interest in the affairs of other 
countries is noted by Laiou, ‘Italy’, 82-3. 
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concerned with relating a continuous chronological span, generally 
segmented into imperial reigns, without any clear endpoint other than the 
author’s interest or endurance.42 Grēgoras’ historical work exemplifies this 
approach; it follows a broadly annalistic structure and political events are 
freely interspersed with monstrous births, astronomical observations, 
geographic and moralistic digressions.43 In contrast, when Kantakouzēnos 
offers the reader a rare digression ‘for the sake of amusement’,44 concerning 
the prophetic powers of Hilariōn, metropolitan of Didymoteichon, the 
interlude serves to impress on the reader the holiness and credibility of 
Hilariōn, all of whose subsequent pronouncements are politically supportive 
of Kantakouzēnos.45 Similarly, Kantakouzēnos’ detailed accounts of court 
ceremonies have made the Histories one of the major sources for Palaiologan 
ceremonial but his interest in ceremony always serves his political concerns: 
descriptions of such events as the coronations of Andronikos III, himself, and 
his son have clear legitimising goals.46 Even when his motive is not so 
apparent, ceremonies are integrated into the narrative and always illustrate 
his broader themes: Andronikos II shows bad faith by accepting his 
grandson’s ceremonial homage before turning against him;47 Andronikos III 
breaks protocol to show, despite their differences, his reverence for his 
grandfather;48 the Grand Domestic Kantakouzēnos refuses to participate in 
ceremony which would cast him as emperor.49  
                                                 
42 Kazhdan, ‘L’Histoire de Cantacuzène’, 324. Kazhdan surprisingly overlooks the Alexias, 
with its clearly stated biographical focus, as an exception to this general rule. 
43 Guilland, Grégoras, 242-4; Kazhdan, ‘L’Histoire de Cantacuzène’, 325. 
44 Kant. II, 171.23-4: ῥᾳστώνης χάριν διηγήσομαι. 
45 See Ch.27.11. 
46 Kant. I, 196.8-204.3; III, 29.12-30.23, 269.7-14. See also Macrides, et al., Pseudo-Kodinos, 3-
5; Hunger, Hochsprachliche, 472. 
47 Kant. I, 76.16-24. 
48 Kant. I, 167.17-168.6 
49 Kant. I, 78.20-79.8. 
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Book II, which relates the reign of Andronikos III, provides an 
apparent reprieve from civil war, but it is necessary both to continue a 
coherent narrative and to present the foundations for Kantakouzēnos’ 
subsequent claims on sovereignty in the 1341-7 conflict. He does not in fact 
attempt to provide a comprehensive account of Andronikos III’s reign; for 
instance much of the final Turkish conquest of Bithynia is concealed behind 
Kantakouzēnos’ account of the battle of Pelekanos, where he was present 
and Andronikos was injured.50 This is not to imply Kantakouzēnos was 
attempting simply to play down the loss of Asia Minor, the notable failure of 
Andronikos III’s reign; he does not hide that the battle was a defeat and the 
loss of the region would have been known to all. Rather, Kantakouzēnos is 
primarily concerned with demonstrating his close relationship to 
Andronikos III, shown by such joint campaigns, and with accentuating his 
own endeavours on behalf of – to take a frequently-used phrase – ‘the 
common good’.51 Events in which Kantakouzēnos played no part and which 
do not contribute to his persuasive goals are simply omitted. On first glance, 
then, while the Histories may appear to be a traditional history of imperial 
reigns, highlighting significant political, military and diplomatic events, it is 
actually quite selective. The effect of this selectivity is to advance the author’s 
arguments and emphasise his own importance: we do not hear of initiatives 
taken by Andronikos in which Kantakouzēnos was not directly involved. 
Throughout the Histories, Kantakouzēnos never strays far from his central 
concerns.  
                                                 
50 For instance Nikaia, the Laskarid capital, is never mentioned by Kantakouzēnos at all, 
although its loss attracted the attention of numerous contemporaries, see CBB II, 238; Greg. I, 
458.12-14. For the battle of Pelekanos, see Kant. I, 341-363; Ch.9:13. The eventual capture of 
Nikomēdia, which Pelekanos was fought to protect, goes unmarked. 





The principal source for the Histories is undoubtedly its author’s own 
recollections. Kantakouzēnos mentions very few events pre-dating his 
starting point of October 1320. While he very briefly summarises the 
succession of emperors from Theodōros I Laskaris to Michaēl IX Palaiologos, 
and follows this with a few details of Michaēl’s life, these details could easily 
be considered general knowledge.52 Thereafter Kantakouzēnos holds a 
central role in most events he describes.  
Kantakouzēnos makes forthright claims for the value of his testimony, 
contrasting it with other, less reliable, sources. In the letter of ‘Christodoulos’ 
to Neilos that precedes the very first chapter, he states: 
Moreover, I have not heard these things by hearsay from older men or by 
attending to rumours and myths, which hold nothing sound, [and] by which 
many historians happen to be led astray from the truth. Rather, being myself 
present at all times and so knowing the actual truth about everything – if 
indeed anyone can – I will thus compose my narrative about these matters 
having placed the truth above all else and honoured it over every other 
responsibility.53  
Similar statements, emphasising that he, unlike others, had a uniquely 
privileged viewpoint and does not need to rely on hearsay, are repeated at 
greater length at the opening of Book III.54 Furthermore, although he avoids 
directly stating that he was one of the protagonists, in order not to shatter his 
persona as Christodoulos, he affirms that he was privy to secret information 
that others could not know:  
                                                 
52 Kant. I, 11-13 (trans. Trone, Kantakouzenos, 109-111). 
53 Kant. I, 10.11-18: ἔτι δὲ οὐδ’ ἀκοῇ ταῦτα πρὸς τῶν παλαιοτέρων παρειληφὼς ἢ 
φήμαις προσέχων καὶ μύθοις ὑγιὲς οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν, ἐξ ὧν συμβέβηκε τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν 
συγγραφέων ἀποπλανηθῆναι τῆς ἀληθείας, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς ἐφ’ ἅπασι παρὼν καὶ ὡς ἔνεστι 
μάλιστα τἀληθῆ περὶ πάντων εἴπερ τις εἰδὼς, οὕτω δὴ ποιήσομαι τὴν περὶ αὐτῶν 
διήγησιν, τὴν ἀλήθειαν προστησάμενος καὶ πάσης ἄλλης αἰτίας αὐτὴν προτιμήσας. 
54 Kant. II, 12.18-13.15. 
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It is natural that I am ignorant of nothing, not only of what was done but 
also of the confidential plans, stratagems and plots and, in short, of 
everything, both the conspicuous deeds and the secret preparations.55  
The accounts of others – who could not be as well informed as he – 
are thus dismissed. This disdain is expressed even more clearly at the 
beginning of Book III: 
For all others, if indeed there are certain persons who wrote about this war, 
know nothing clear about what happened; either they were entirely absent 
from these events, or they accepted whatever they heard – whatever the 
common mob spreads about or certain others have reported – and they 
passed such things on to later generations, caring nothing for the truth.56 
While he shares with Thucydides this disdain for (unidentified) 
alternative narratives, the emphasis on autopsy is Kantakouzēnos’ own.57 It 
is worth emphasising that while Kantakouzēnos was strongly impressed by 
Thucydides stylistically, as discussed below, he does not attempt to imitate 
the ancient writer’s historical methodology.  
Kantakouzēnos claims to write without being influenced by hatred or 
friendship.58 While this does not need to be accepted at face value, his 
portrayals of individuals are surprisingly reserved, even bland; 
Kantakouzēnos is indeed sparing with words of praise or blame. Grēgoras 
heaps praise on Kantakouzēnos’ supporters such as Tarchaneiōtēs or his 
wife, Eirēnē, whereas Kantakouzēnos himself is more laconic regarding their 
virtues.59 Conversely he often recognises the merits of those who betray him, 
                                                 
55 Kant. II, 13.12-15: εἰκὸς μὴ τῶν πραττομένων μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ βουλευμάτων 
ἀποῤῥήτων καὶ δόλων καὶ ἐπιβουλῶν καὶ ὅλως πάντων καὶ τῶν πραττομένων φανερῶς 
καὶ τῶν ἀφανῶς κατασκευαζομένων ἀγνοεῖν μηδέν. 
56 Kant. II, 12.19-13.2: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι πάντες, εἰ δή τινες εἶεν οἱ συγγραψάμενοι περὶ 
τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου, ἢ παντάπασιν ἀπόντες τῶν πραγμάτων, ὅσα ἢ ὄχλος ὁ δημώδης 
διεθρύλλει ἤ τινες ἕτεροι ἀπήγγελλον, οὐδὲν σαφὲς εἰδότες περὶ τῶν γινομένων, οἷα 
παρεδέξαντο ταῖς ἀκοαῖς, τοιαῦτα καὶ τοῖς μετέπειτα ἐξέδωκαν μηδὲν φροντίσαντες τῆς 
ἀληθείας. One of these ‘others’ was certainly Grēgoras; see Section 4.1.2., below. 
57 Thuc. 1.20-22. 
58 Kant. I, 10.8-10; III, 364.7-8. 
59 See Ch.10:57 for Tarchaneiōtēs; Ch.27:4 for Eirēnē. 
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such as Chrelja and Batatzēs.60 On the surface, Kantakouzēnos usually allows 
individuals’ actions to speak for themselves, without authorial comment. 
The major exception to this is his portrayal of Apokaukos who, 
consequently, is the strongest presence in Book III of the Histories, besides the 
author himself. 
Little is known about the circumstances of the composition of the 
Histories, but its homogeneity suggests that it was written continuously 
rather than in intervals. Neilos’ letter to Christodoulos implies that his 
retirement from public affairs had taken place some time ago.61 Although 
Book III begins with a second proem, this sets the stage for a change in 
theme and pace rather than demonstrating that there were two distinct 
phases of composition.62 Therefore, assuming a continuous composition and 
the previously mentioned terminus ante quem of 1369, the Histories would 
have been drafted during the 1360s. Consequently, Kantakouzēnos may at 
times have been recalling events that took place over 40 years earlier. 
Accordingly his statements regarding time and numbers are often vague; 
phrases such as ‘shortly after’63 and ‘not a few’ are very common.64 On the 
                                                 
60 See Ch.11:15 for Chrelja; Ch.29:1 for Batatzēs. 
61 Kant. I, 8.10-12. 
62 Angelou, ‘Word and Deed’, 70-72, argues that Book I may have been written when 
Andronikos II was still alive. The idea is interesting but the arguments presented are not 
convincing. Angelou gives great weight to the idea that Book III’s proem can be read as 
explaining an extension of the Histories beyond their original scope but he ignores the fact 
that the opening letters of Book I are addressed to Kantakouzēnos in his monastic, post-
abdication, persona, long after Andronikos’ death. However, it remains a possibility that 
these letters were composed long after the first book was initially completed. Angelou 
hypothesises further that Kantakouzēnos’ lack of rancour towards Andronikos II may 
indicate that the old emperor was still alive at time of writing. This is unpersuasive: 
Kantakouzēnos avoids or moderates criticism of the imperial family throughout the 
Histories, consistent with his claims to be upholding the legitimacy of the Palaiologoi after 
1341. Finally, Angelou argues that Apokaukos is portrayed positively, or at least neutrally, 
in Books I-II, suggesting that he had not yet betrayed Kantakouzēnos. This overlooks 
Kantakouzēnos’ early allegation that Apokaukos was the source of Syrgiannēs’ proposal to 
murder Andronikos II (Kant. I, 43.5-12), which Kantakouzēnos strongly denounces for its 
‘cruelty and inhumanity’ (Kant. I, 43.14: ὠμότητος καὶ ἀπανθρωπίας).  
63 ὀλίγῳ ὕστερον: Kant. II, 78.19, 83.19, 184.7, 188.1. 
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basis of the occasional precision of certain statements, such as dates and 
numbers, Hunger suggested that Kantakouzēnos kept some form of diary.65 
Conversely, Kazhdan argued that the frequency of round numbers and 
certain figures such as 300 indicates that such precision is usually for literary 
effect and intended to convey an air of truthful authenticity rather than being 
evidence of historical accuracy.66 It is noticeable that whenever Grēgoras 
provides numbers for the same incident, they nearly always conflict.67 Even 
in regard to dates, there are occasionally surprising errors: Andronikos III 
victoriously entered Constantinople on 24 May 1328, not 19 May,68 and 
Kantakouzēnos mis-dates his own second coronation.69 If indeed 
Kantakouzēnos kept some sort of personal record, he presumably did not 
always update it in a timely fashion. The inescapable impression is that he 
often wrote from memory and that, in any case, his argumentative goals 
were foremost; literary impact takes much greater precedence than historical 
precision. Kantakouzēnos was neither chronicler nor archivist. 
4.1.2. Grēgoras  
As Kantakouzēnos limited his account to the events of his own life, 
there was little need for him to use the accounts of other historians. The 
obvious possible exception was the Roman History of the renowned scholar 
                                                                                                                                          
64 οὐκ ὀλίγους: Kant. II, 58.16, 59.16, 132.5, 180.11, 181.8. 
65 Hunger, Hochsprachliche, 469. 
66 Kazhdan, ‘L’Histoire de Cantacuzène’, 307-308.  
67 E.g., Kant. I, 477.1-2, mentions 84 ships, Greg. I, 524.23, says 20; Kant. II, 138.7-8, 
mentions 42 fugitives, Greg. II, 608.19, has over 60; Kant. II, 187.16-24, has Angelos 
command 1,000 cavalry, Greg. II, 621.5, gives 80. This is not to imply that Grēgoras’ numbers 
are necessarily more accurate. 
68 Kant. I, 306.6-11. The correct date is recorded by Greg. I, 427.10-11, corroborated by two 
short chronicles. Schreiner (CBB II, 234) plausibly argues that Kantakouzēnos took his own 
preceding statement that the conflict had lasted seven years and a month too literally; 
therefore, as it began on 19 April 1321, he calculated that it must have ended on 19 May 
1328. The mistake once again suggests that it is unlikely Book I was composed shortly after 
the events it describes. 
69 See Ch.27:8. 
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Nikēphoros Grēgoras, which relates events from 1204 until 1359 and thus 
overlaps with Kantakouzēnos’ own work.70 For events which took place in 
his own lifetime, Grēgoras’ account is far more immediate than 
Kantakouzēnos’. Indeed, it is probable that composition of the Histories 
commenced only after Grēgoras’ death, which occurred no later than 1361. 
Grēgoras is therefore an obvious potential source for the Histories, but the 
personal relationship of the two authors must first be considered. 
Kantakouzēnos and Grēgoras had been friends but their relationship 
was irrevocably soured by their theological differences, which developed 
during Kantakouzēnos’ reign. This development is reflected in Grēgoras’ 
work, which eulogises Kantakouzēnos in its early books but turns to 
increasingly bitter criticism following his installation in Constantinople as 
emperor.71 For his part, Kantakouzēnos mentions Grēgoras only in relation to 
a witticism he made at court in the 1320s and his opposition to Palamas in 
the council of May-June 1351.72 Kantakouzēnos’ account of the latter incident 
then continues into a lengthy denunciation of Grēgoras’ subsequent refusal 
to accept the outcome of the council, and his continued attacks on Church 
doctrine and Kantakouzēnos himself.73 In particular, he accuses Grēgoras, 
having failed to win the theological arguments, of resorting to attacking him 
politically to blacken his name and discredit the council:  
Since he could not defeat the Emperor through his own arguments, he took 
the war of the Palaiologan emperors against each other as the subject of his 
work; and, partly through ignorance of events, partly through love of 
distorting the truth and telling lies contrary to all authority, as if writing 
                                                 
70 For Grēgoras, see PLP 4443; Guilland, Grégoras; Hunger, Hochsprachliche, 453-465; Van 
Dieten, Gregoras, 1-62. The section of Grēgoras’ history which corresponds to the present 
translation is Greg. II, 571-628 (trans. Van Dieten, Gregoras III, 37-73). 
71 For specific examples, see Kazhdan, ‘L’Histoire de Cantacuzène’, 292-293. 
72 Kant. I, 55.6-13; III, 168.20-2. 
73 Kant. III, 171.15-185.14. For detailed, if somewhat uncritical, treatment of this section, 
see Dräseke, ‘Urteil’. 
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fiction, he then also continued, according to sequence, to the war roused 
against the Emperor Kantakouzēnos, as <witnessed> by us.74  
Kantakouzēnos probably had Grēgoras in mind when, in the opening 
pages of Book III, he condemned unreliable informants who did not have 
first-hand knowledge of the events of the civil war. Owing to this bitterness, 
it is perhaps unlikely that Kantakouzēnos had a copy of his rival’s work kept 
to hand when writing the Histories, or that he consciously borrowed 
anything from Grēgoras’ work, even regarding the period when they were 
still friends. In any case, Kantakouzēnos would naturally have felt little need 
to cross-check accounts of incidents which he had witnessed and Grēgoras 
had not. Even for events where Grēgoras may be expected to have been 
better informed, such as those taking place in Constantinople during the civil 
war, there is no clear indication that Kantakouzēnos used Grēgoras as a 
source. For example, Kantakouzēnos’ detailed account of the imprisonment 
and death of his mother names his probable informant, Theodōra 
Palaiologina.75 Grēgoras, relating the same incident, is more concerned with 
prophetic dreams Theodōra Kantakouzēnē herself is said to have 
experienced than with the circumstances of her death.76 While the outlines of 
their accounts are often broadly comparable, at least concerning the outbreak 
of the civil war, there are frequently significant differences in matters of 
detail and the structure of their narratives.77 Where other corroborating 
sources are lacking, these differences are often irreconcilable. 
Kantakouzēnos makes it clear that he became aware of Grēgoras’ 
historical narrative following his own abdication but preceding the other’s 
                                                 
74 Kant. III, 173.1-7: βασιλέως δὲ ἐπεὶ μὴ αὐτοπροσώπως εἶχε καταφέρεσθαι, τῶν τε 
Παλαιολόγων βασιλέων πρὸς ἀλλήλους πόλεμον ἐνστησάμενος ὑπόθεσιν τοῦ λόγου, 
καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀγνοίᾳ τῶν πραγμάτων, τὰ δ’ εὐνοίᾳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παραφθείρας, καὶ κατὰ 
πᾶσαν ἐξουσίαν ὥσπερ ἐν πλάσματι καταψευσάμενος, ἔπειτα καὶ καθ’ εἱρμὸν ἐπὶ τὸν 
ἐφ’ ἡμῶν πρὸς Καντακουζηνὸν τὸν βασιλέα πόλεμον κεκινημένον προϊὼν. 
75 Kant. II, 219.22-222.14. For Theodōra, see Ch.2:18. 
76 Greg. II, 617.1-620.4. 
77 E.g., Guilland, Grégoras, 251-3; also see comments on numbers above, Section 4.1.1. 
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death.78 Therefore he was familiar with Grēgoras’ historical compositions, in 
whole or part, before he began to write the Histories. However the only 
occasion where Kantakouzēnos openly acknowledges Grēgoras’ work and 
makes any direct attempt to refute it is the aforementioned extended 
denunciation in Book IV. He furthermore explains that when Grēgoras’ 
writings first came into his hands, he had them read before a gathering of 
notables to ‘make known the lies and absurdities he had written’.79 This may 
account for the fact that, throughout the rest of the narrative, the Histories 
makes no overt attempt to acknowledge or rebut specific criticisms by 
Grēgoras; Kantakouzēnos had already discredited Grēgoras, at least to his 
own satisfaction, and rather than compose a detailed line-by-line refutation, 
he instead chose to produce an entire alternative, ‘correct’, narrative.  
4.1.3. Informants 
Despite emphasising his importance as an eyewitness, Kantakouzēnos 
often describes scenes at which he was not present. These fall into two main 
categories. The first is narrative reports of events happening elsewhere, such 
as the Albanian raids, or Apokaukos’ flight to Epibatai.80 As there is usually 
no reason to doubt that the incident in question took place, Kantakouzēnos 
does not break the flow of his narrative to explain his apparent omniscience 
or identify the informant. More rarely, as in the case of the arrest of his 
supporters in 1341, he explicitly identifies his source, stating that fugitives 
from Constantinople told him what happened, thereby emphasising the 
momentous or controversial nature of the report – in this case, so 
controversial that Kantakouzēnos states that he initially refused to believe 
it.81 As another example he explicitly states, following a particularly bitter 
                                                 
78 Kant. III, 185.8-11. 
79 Kant. III, 183.18-19: ψευδῆ καὶ ἀπίθανα συγγεγραφέναι ἀπεδείκνυεν ἐκεῖνον. 
80 Kant. II, 15, 71. 
81 Kant. II, 139. 
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episode where Iōannēs V attempted to seize power from Kantakouzēnos and 
his son Matthaios, that he later compared accounts with Iōannēs.82 
The second, more dubious, category comprises reported 
conversations between individuals which typically allow the participants to 
reveal their motivations and justify their decisions. Speeches of such a type, 
often presented in direct speech as if the speakers’ words were recorded 
verbatim, are of course one of Thucydides’ most controversial legacies to 
historiography, debated from antiquity until the present day.83 Although 
Kantakouzēnos offers no comment on his own frequent use of this device, 
the obvious question is to what extent Kantakouzēnos, pace Thucydides, kept 
‘as closely as possible to the overall sense of what was actually said’.84 Such 
speeches are particularly abundant in the present translation but 
Kantakouzēnos liberally applies the technique elsewhere, for example to the 
conversation between Chrelja and Stefan Dečanski, where the latter explains 
his decision not to attack Andronikos III.85 In this case, Kantakouzēnos 
plausibly had opportunity to find out about this incident, following Chrelja’s 
entrance into imperial service a number of years later. In contrast, the 
sequence of speeches in Chapters 17-19 of the present translation portray the 
formation of a conspiracy against Kantakouzēnos; they can be assumed to 
have taken place in secrecy and the common interlocutor, Alexios 
Apokaukos, was killed before Kantakouzēnos had opportunity to interrogate 
him. In one case, that of Apokaukos and Gabalas, it is possible that both 
parties died before Kantakouzēnos’ victory, which would suggest that he 
lacked even a theoretical opportunity to learn what they discussed unless 
                                                 
82 Kant. III, 268.16-269.6. 
83 For an overview, see Walbank, ‘Speeches’. 
84 Thuc. 1.22.1: ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων. 
85 Kant. I, 278-284. For Chrelja, see Ch.11:15; for Dečanski, Ch.2:16. 
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they had subsequently confided in third parties.86 Such conversations run 
contrary to Kantakouzēnos’ claim to authority as an eye-witness. The issue of 
how he might have acquired some of these apparent insights is addressed 
only in Book IV’s peroration: he explicitly states that he questioned his 
surviving opponents during his reign, naming in particular the brothers of 
Alexios Apokaukos, Iōannēs and Nikēphoros, as his sources.87 The reader is 
left to assume that they would have been privy to their brother’s secrets and 
naturally were only too willing to seek favour by sharing them with the 
victorious emperor. Any questions about the likely unreliability of such 
informants, eager to minimise their own responsibility for the conflict, are 
not addressed.  
The conversations depicted in Chapters 17-19 are absolutely central to 
Kantakouzēnos’ attribution of responsibility for the outbreak of the civil war 
to a conspiracy formed by a uniquely deceptive and evil man, Apokaukos. 
This section of the narrative is dramatically compelling and often 
psychologically convincing. However, given how easily the doubts and 
uncertainties of some conspirators are overcome, it is not always very 
persuasive in its historical context. Moreover, all the speeches neatly accord 
with Kantakouzēnos’ overall argumentative goal of shifting chief 
responsibility for the war on to Apokaukos alone. It is clear that they were 
imaginatively reconstructed to the benefit of the author. 
4.1.4. Documents 
Kantakouzēnos draws upon documents, mostly letters and diplomatic 
communications, throughout the Histories.88 The purported contents are often 
summarised or paraphrased, probably from memory. As an example, the 
                                                 
86 Kant. II, 118-120. Gabalas’ death is unrecorded but he is not attested after the war, see 
Ch.19:4. 
87 See Appendix I. For Iōannēs, see PLP 1186; for Nikēphoros, PLP 1192. 
88 For a list, see Kazhdan, ‘L’Histoire de Cantacuzène’, 305-7. 
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letter sent by the Latin lords of the Peloponnese in 1341 is presented as if 
addressing Kantakouzēnos in the second person.89 However the text is not 
stylistically distinct from the surrounding narrative, the content is vague, 
and Kantakouzēnos himself suggests it is in fact paraphrased.90  
In other instances, the text of communications does appear to have 
been copied from originals. A well-known example is the letter received 
from the Mamluk sultan in 1349, which Kantakouzēnos claims to 
reproduce.91 It opens with an extremely flattering salutation which, with 
reference to Mamluk chancery manuals, has been convincingly 
demonstrated to be genuine; the letter bears at least a strong resemblance to 
an original communication and the entire text may well be an accurate 
reproduction.92 Kantakouzēnos’ motive for including such a complimentary 
missive from a distant and powerful monarch is easy to understand. 
More questionable are two letters of 1347 by Bartholomew of Rome, a 
Latin emissary in Constantinople, one to the Pope and the other to the 
Dauphin of Vienne, which again Kantakouzēnos claims to be reproducing.93 
The style once more appears distinct from the rest of the Histories, 
incorporating frequent Scriptural quotations and references. However the 
letters present obvious difficulties: the originals would have been written in 
Latin, they should not have passed through Kantakouzēnos’ hands, and the 
content is encomiastic. It is probable, if indeed these letters are derived from 
Latin originals, that the original translator or Kantakouzēnos himself 
modified them, rendering them as eulogies rather than diplomatic 
                                                 
89 Kant. II, 75.14-76.10. See also Ch.11:4. 
90 Kant. II, 76.10-11: τὰ μὲν οὖν γράμματα ἰδίᾳ τε ἑκάστῳ καὶ πᾶσιν ὁμοῦ τοιάδε ἦν. 
91 Kant. III, 94.1-2: ἔπεμπε δὲ καὶ πρὸς βασιλέα γράμματα οὕτως ἔχοντα ἐν λέξει. For 
the text of this letter, see Kant. III, 94.2-99.9 (trans. Miller, Cantacuzenus, 227-31). 
92 Korobeinikov, ‘Diplomatic Correspondence’, 61-4; Canard, ‘Lettre’, esp. 45-52; Miller, 
Cantacuzenus, 381-7. 
93 Kant. III, 13.6-7: ἃς ὥσπερ εἶχον προσεθήκαμεν τῇ διηγήσει. For the text of these 
letters, see III, 13.8-20.5 (trans. Miller, Cantacuzenus, 152-7). 
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communications. At the very least, some level of ideological translation has 
evidently occurred as a Latin churchman would not have designated 
Kantakouzēnos as ‘Emperor and Autokratōr of the Romans’ in a 
communication to the Pope.94 These letters have not yet been intensively 
studied but if they are fabrications by Kantakouzēnos, he made deliberate 
efforts to differentiate them from his narrative.95 It is of course also possible 
that the victorious emperor bribed or intimidated Bartholomew to produce a 
positive report to forestall possible Latin moves against him, which would 
have been prudent in the circumstances.  
Another example, of an official document rather than correspondence, 
is the chrysobull which Kantakouzēnos granted to Iōannēs Angelos in 1342.96 
Kantakouzēnos states he has reproduced this text97 and it employs noticeably 
different terminology to elsewhere in the Histories, for example referring to 
the area entrusted to Angelos as ‘Blachia’, which Kantakouzēnos otherwise 
classicises as ‘Thessalia’.98 Hunger’s study of the passage found that it 
resembled other chrysobulls known to have been issued by Kantakouzēnos99 
but persuasively argued that Kantakouzēnos elaborated the chrysobull when 
adding it to his memoirs, interpolating his familiar themes of friendship for 
Andronikos III, his loyalty to Empress Anna and Iōannēs V, and denigrating 
Apokaukos as the cause of the conflict.100 Thus Kantakouzēnos appears not 
to have been above amending material to conform with his dominant 
rhetorical purposes even when he claimed to be simply reproducing it. 
                                                 
94 Kant. III, 15.8.9: βασιλέως καὶ αὐτοκράτορος Ῥωμαίων. 
95 Miller, Cantacuzenus, 254, suspects they are fabricated by Kantakouzēnos owing to 
mistakes in the text, although an error by a translator is equally possible. 
96 Kant. II, 312.15-322.15. 
97 Kant. II, 312.15: ἐπὶ λέξεως εἶχεν οὕτως. 
98 Kant. II, 320.3, 320.20, 321.7, 321.21, 321.23, 321.24, 322.8. 
99 Hunger, ‘Chrysobullos Logos’, 107-8. 
100 Ibid., 110ff. 
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It appears, therefore, that Kantakouzēnos made some efforts to 
consult surviving informants, and a variety of documents, to supplement his 
own recollections in the process of writing his Histories. At least some of the 
documents he claims to have copied appear to be genuine, in part or whole. 
However these efforts do not constitute part of any systematic historical 
methodology and there is nothing to suggest Kantakouzēnos engaged in 
comprehensive archival research. Rather he sought, naturally enough 
considering his circumstances, not to discover an ‘objective’ truth but to 




The Histories does not adopt any kind of formal schema to indicate 
when events took place. Absolute dates are provided very rarely, apparently 
to emphasise the significance of an incident, although events which are 
unarguably significant are often undated. In the present translation, 
Kantakouzēnos provides only the date he finally left Constantinople before 
the war began and the month in which the war broke out, omitting even the 
date of his own acclamation.101 Such lack of concern for explicit dating is not 
unusual in Byzantine classicising histories, and Kantakouzēnos usually 
indicates the passage of time by relative statements. These can take two main 
forms: specific statements such as ‘on the following day’, ‘for twelve days’, 
or ‘for six years’; and vague statements such as ‘shortly before’, or ‘not long 
after’.102 The latter type may be very variable indeed regarding the length of 
time indicated, with ‘shortly before’ indicating around four years in one 
case103 and ‘after a little time had passed’ indicating a period which may be a 
few months or as long as two years.104 Often Kantakouzēnos mentions the 
passage of seasons, naturally of great importance for military campaigning, 
using phrases such as ‘during the winter’, or ‘at the beginning of spring’, 
which aid in building a chronology but he does not do so consistently in the 
manner of Thucydides.105 This lack of clear chronological signposts can lead 
the casual reader astray and dates generally have to be calculated from the 
                                                 
101 Kant. II, 104.2-3, 137.1-2. 
102 Kant. II, 52.4 (εἰς τὴν ὑστεραίαν), 188.7-8 (δυοκαίδεκα... ἡμέραις), 111.7 (ἐπ’ ἔτεσιν 
ἓξ ἤδη), 64.13 (ὀλίγῳ πρότερον), 76.17 (οὐ μετὰ πολὺ). 
103 Kant. II, 93.1-2 (ὀλίγῳ πρότερον); see Ch.14:20. 
104 Kant. I, 495.4: Ὀλίγου δὲ παρελθόντος χρόνου. The phrase in question links 
Andronikos’ return from the Lesbos campaign, at the start of winter 1335, to the incidents 
which provide the casus belli for the Epiros campaign which took place in either 1337 or 
1338. See Ch.11:6 for the dating of the latter. Trone, Kantakouzenos, 251-2, highlights Kant. I, 
13.11-12, where ὀλίγον τινα χρόνον indicates four years and I, 13.14-15, where χρόνον τινὰ 
συχνόν indicates eight years. 
105 Kant. II, 186.17-18 (τοῦ χειμῶνος); I, 458.17 (ἦρι ἀρχομένῳ). 
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summation of such relative markers, unless corroborated by another source. 
The looser statements simply mark transitions between narrative episodes 
rather than offering any measurable indication of time passing. The reader 
moreover has to assume that the Histories preserves events in their correct 
order. This is not always the case though; a lengthy section in Book II was 
apparently placed out of sequence during the original compilation of the 
text, and was only fully identified through close analysis by Loenertz.106 
While the chronology generally advances sequentially with the 
narrative, Kantakouzēnos frequently refers to episodes he has already 
related and occasionally foreshadows later events. Remarkably, he uses an 
extended narrative flashback sequence to summarise Apokaukos’ career and 
relationship with his benefactor, Kantakouzēnos.107 This links a number of 
incidents previously described – including Apokaukos’ initial defection to 
Andronikos III, Andronikos’ first serious illness in 1330, and Apokaukos’ 
naval venture in 1340/41 – all of which Kantakouzēnos proceeds to elaborate 
further, demonstrating their relevance to the matter at hand. For example, 
although Andronikos III’s illness was previously recounted in considerable 
detail,108 the flashback focuses on the hostility of the Empress Xenē towards 
Kantakouzēnos, in order to present Apokaukos as an instigator of Xenē’s 
enmity and adds previously unmentioned details, such as Glabas’ 
involvement in the affair.109 Kantakouzēnos’ sophisticated use of this 
uncommon technique, combined with the dearth of clear chronological 
markers, can confuse unwary scholars: it has occasionally been assumed that 
Glabas’ mission to Xenē took place in 1341.110 
                                                 
106 The affected passages are Book II, chapters 22-28, discussed in Loenertz, ‘Ordre et 
désordre’.  
107 Kant. II, 88.17-102.14. Kantakouzēnos also uses flashback elsewhere, e.g., Kant. I, 26.14-
32.4. 
108 Kant. I, 391.7-411.19. 
109 Kant. II, 91.3-95.10. 
110 E.g., PLP 91682. See also Ch.14:16. 
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Kantakouzēnos, furthermore, sometimes discusses events preceding 
the position they would ‘correctly’ occupy if the Histories maintained strict 
chronological order. This is particularly notable in his treatment of the 
religious controversies which gathered in force during the 1341-1347 civil 
war. Andronikos III’s last major act as emperor was to oversee the Church 
council of 10 June 1341 which condemned Barlaam of Calabria.111 Following 
this, but before relating Andronikos’ death, Kantakouzēnos explains that a 
second council took place ‘not much later’ which condemned the monk 
Akindynos.112 This council met in either July or August and was presided 
over by Kantakouzēnos in place of the deceased emperor, a fact that he 
omits.113 Had the Histories followed strict chronological order, the second 
council would have formed part of Kantakouzēnos’ account of his activities 
in Constantinople following Andronikos’ demise and therefore contributed 
to the impression that he was already effectively acting as emperor. By 
adding the second council as a brief narrative addendum to the first, 
Kantakouzēnos effectively depoliticises it. This appears to have been his 
intention; he returns to the doctrinal controversy only shortly before the end 
of Book III, summarising the persecution of Palamas and his adherents by 
Akindynos and the Patriarch, which took place throughout the war, in order 
to explain Kalekas’ deposition from office.114 Kantakouzēnos does not omit 
the turmoil in the Church during the civil war, but he deliberately separates 
                                                 
111 Kant. I, 543-555.21. On the councils of 1341, see Meyendorff, Palamas, 42-62; 
Akindynos, Letters, xvi-xxii (Hero’s Introduction). 
112 Kant. I, 556.3-557.9. 
113 The council has long been dated to August, e.g., Meyendorff, Palamas, 57-60; Nicol, 
Family, 43. This was revised by Loenertz, ‘Chronique’, 61, to July and accepted by Schreiner 
(CBB II, 231), Darrouzès (Regestes, 2212-2214) and Hero (Akindynos, Letters, xviii, n. 58). 
However Fatouros and Krischer strongly argue that the evidence is circumstantial and 
observe that none of contemporary sources concerned with the council definitively support 
one month over the other: FK II, 263, n. 404. 
114 Kant. II, 602.9-607.2. 
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it from the secular political and military struggle by recounting it outside 
chronological sequence.  
The confident handling of selected matters outside their chronological 
order, as well as the numerous cross-references to earlier and later parts of 
the narrative, strongly suggest that the Histories was conceived as a single 
unified work, probably drafted over a relatively short period of time and 
subjected to careful revision. In contrast to Grēgoras’ work, the selection and 
organisation of material for the Histories clearly serves argumentative rather 
than annalistic goals.115 Kantakouzēnos was evidently greatly concerned 
with composing consistent explanations for who made things happen and 
why, but had limited interest in relating precisely when. 
                                                 
115 Kazhdan, ‘L’Histoire de Cantacuzène’, 325, perhaps plays down the generally 
sequential organisation of the narrative too much by claiming the Histories ‘est une oeuvre 
strictement organisée par le sujet’.  
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4.3. Literary aspects 
4.3.1. Authorial persona 
After his abdication, Kantakouzēnos continued to style himself, at 
least in official correspondence, as both emperor and monk.116 In the 
Histories, he superficially discards both identities and adopts the pseudonym 
of ‘Christodoulos’, an identity he also employed in his theological treatises.117 
It is as Christodoulos that he makes all authorial interventions in the 
narrative. Other than the statements which he makes when beginning a new 
book or finishing the entire work, as discussed above, his first-person 
interventions are nearly always limited to functional statements intended to 
guide the reader and clarify the narrative structure. Readers are reminded of 
matters already related with statements such as, ‘as we have said’,118 ‘just as 
was previously narrated by us’,119 or slightly more specifically, ‘we briefly 
mentioned this at the very beginning of our history’.120 Less frequently, he 
also indicates topics that ‘we will mention later’.121 Christodoulos usually 
maintains a neutral tone befitting his avowed character as an impartial 
narrator, leaving overt denunciations to direct or reported speech. This 
contrasts strongly with Grēgoras’ frequent judgemental narrative 
interventions. However there are some rare exceptions where Christodoulos 
openly takes sides, for instance when introducing the lengthy digression on 
Apokaukos’ career, ‘so that the generosity of [Kantakouzēnos]… as well as 
                                                 
116 See Darrouzès, ‘Lettre inédite’, 21, for the signature preserved in Vatopedi 434: 
Ἰωάννης ἐν Χριστῷ τῷ Θεῷ πιστὸς βασιλεὺς καὶ αὐτοκράτωρ Ῥωμαίων ὁ 
Καντακουζηνός, ὁ διὰ τοῦ θείου καὶ μοναχικοῦ σχήματος μετονομασθεὶς Ἰωάσαφ 
μοναχός. See also Nicol, Family, 88-9. 
117 Trone, Kantakouzenos, 215. 
118 Kant. II, 77.5: ἔφημεν; Kant. II, 99.6, 102.14, 161.19-20: ὥσπερ ἔφημεν. 
119 Kant. II, 98.19-20: ὥσπερ δὴ καὶ πρότερον ἱστόρηται ἡμῖν. 
120 Kant. II, 90.6-7: ὧν καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἀρχὰς τῆς ἱστορίας μάλιστα ἐπεμνήσθημεν 
συντόμως. 
121 Kant. II, 173.13-14: ὡς ὕστερον ἐπιμνησόμεθα. 
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the ingratitude of the parakoimōmenos and the perversity of his ways may 
become clear to us.’122 This statement conforms to Christodoulos’ central 
argument, as stated in his conclusion, that the miseries of the Romans were 
caused by ‘the schemes and villainies of the megas doux [Apokaukos]’,123 but 
it is very unusual for him to express his opinions so openly in his narrative 
voice.124 In general, Kantakouzēnos’ judgements are expressed most clearly 
through the speeches of himself and others, or more subtly through reported 
actions – for example, a person shown repeatedly acting in a treacherous and 
underhand way is clearly a bad person – but not through direct narratorial 
commentary. 
There were established precedents for works written about oneself ‘as 
if by another person’, although generally limited to adopting the third-
person; for instance, it is plain in Patriarch Grēgorios II’s autobiography that 
the anonymous other was simply a polite invention.125 Kantakouzēnos was 
however writing explicitly in the historical tradition, where, from the 
eleventh century onwards, direct, first-person authorial intervention had 
become an accepted element.126 Despite this, Kantakouzēnos decided to 
present his work as Christodoulos, a decision that can be explained by the 
unprecedented degree to which the author was an active participant in the 
events he narrates. While a number of previous historians, including Psellos, 
Chōniatēs and Akropolitēs, were occasionally directly involved in the events 
they describe, all of them – even Psellos (if only formally) – remained 
                                                 
122 Kant. II, 88.21-89.1: ἵν’ ἐκ τῶν διηγημάτων κατάδηλος γένηται ἡμῖν ἥ τε τούτου 
πρὸς τὰς εὐεργεσίας φιλοτιμία […], καὶ ἡ παρακοιμωμένου πρὸς τὰ καλὰ ἀχαριστία καὶ 
τῶν τρόπων ἡ σκαιότης. 
123 Kant. III, 364.21-2: ταῖς μεγάλου δουκὸς ἀπατηθέντες μηχαναῖς καὶ πανουργίαις. 
See Appendix I. 
124 The other major exception is his tirade against Grēgoras, mentioned above, Section 
4.1.2.  
125 Geōrgios Kyprios, Autobiography, 20. His narrative is introduced as περὶ τοῦ καθ’ 
ἑαυτὸν βίου ὡς ἀπ’ ἄλλου προσώπου. 




secondary to the emperors; imperial reigns provide the framework of their 
narratives. Kantakouzēnos shared this narrative structure but faced the 
unprecedented historiographical challenge, and conflict of interest, of being 
one of the emperors.127 But if the author is not to be the Emperor 
Kantakouzēnos, Christodoulos is forced to explain how he knows so much. 
Thus he explains that he was present as a privileged witness throughout the 
events of the Histories yet, it is implied, was not actively involved in them.128 
This makes Christodoulos something more than a simple penname but he 
remains less than a realised character, which would introduce an overt 
fiction into the account.  
It should not be supposed that Kantakouzēnos actually expected his 
persona to be accepted at face value, although he is remarkably consistent in 
maintaining it. Knowledge of the author’s true identity overshadows any 
reading of the Histories; in fact it is his status as the central character that 
lends authority to his account and interest to his judgements. 
Kantakouzēnos’ use of the humble persona of, literally, ‘a servant of Christ’ 
was not therefore intended to hide his identity but rather to advance his 
claim to Christian humility and, furthermore, to distance his imperial 
persona from his narrative. This enabled him to adopt a detached, 
unemotional, Thucydidean narrative voice, lulling the reader into accepting 
the account whereas a first-person narration would constantly invite the 
reader to challenge it.129 If he had written openly as the ex-emperor Iōannēs 
Kantakouzēnos, his repeated claims of impartiality would have seemed 
unconvincing. Moreover, writing as an emperor would invite comparison 
and conflict with the reigning emperor, his son-in-law, risking re-opening 
                                                 
127 Imperial authors were of course not unprecedented, but imperial authors self-
consciously writing history were. 
128 Kant. II, 12.18-13.15. 
129 Hunger, Hochsprachliche, 469-470, draws the obvious comparison with Caesar, 
although the use of a named persona goes further than Caesar. 
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the very wounds Kantakouzēnos sought to heal. Although Kantakouzēnos 
had by then become the monk Iōasaph, and was thus theoretically beyond 
worldly concerns, Iōasaph was publicly inseparable from the ex-emperor, as 
evinced by his signature. Thus ‘Christodoulos’ became a necessary pretence, 
affording the author a depersonalised mask and allowing him to steer the 
narrative away from simple autobiography and the settling of scores, 
permitting a claim to impartiality. Indeed, the mask allowed him to neatly 
sidestep any discussion of his own bias, in contrast to the pained disavowals 
Anna Komnēnē periodically felt obliged to include in her own work.130 In the 
Histories, Kantakouzēnos frequently calls upon God as his witness131 and his 
choice of pseudonym is surely a deliberate reminder of this, that a true 
servant of Christ serves also the Truth.  
4.3.2. Genre 
Kantakouzēnos was, as he declared, writing history. He self-
consciously placed his work within the Greek historiographical tradition, not 
least through his imitation of Thucydides, and indeed it undoubtedly 
belongs there. However it is now generally considered an apologetic political 
memoir, not unreasonably given Kantakouzēnos’ reliance on autopsy. 
Despite this his sources, as outlined above, are somewhat more varied and, it 
will be argued, his concerns are somewhat wider than a narrow 
interpretation of this term may suggest. Ultimately any attempt to define the 
Histories exclusively as either history or memoir is not particularly fruitful; it 
contains elements of both.132  
A more interesting question, given the centrality of the author in the 
narrative and the heavy reliance on autopsy, is whether the Histories is a 
                                                 
130 See Macrides, ‘Historian in the History’, 218-220. 
131 E.g., Kant. II, 25.15-16, 54.23, 85.18, 140.23-24, 147.4-5, 173.21-23. 
132 As also argued by Angelou, ‘Duplicity’, 263-4. 
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disguised autobiography. Autobiography in the recognised modern sense 
was not a feature of medieval Greek literature, which lacked any term for 
it.133 Despite this, a good deal of autobiographical writing was in fact 
produced, within the framework of texts which held a notionally different 
purpose, such as monastic typika, hagiographies, and indeed histories.134 
Although Kantakouzēnos speaks almost continuously about himself, it is 
notable that he omits a great deal which he might reasonably have been 
expected to include if his intention was only to relate and glorify his own 
life.135 He does not offer a complete account of even his own public career, 
which clearly began some years before the opening events of Book I but is 
referred to only vaguely. There is almost no information regarding his father 
and his lineage which, given Kantakouzēnos’ aristocratic background, is 
surprising.136 Following his abdication, the focus of Kantakouzēnos’ 
narrative turns to the activities of other members of his family, in particular 
his son Matthaios, until the strife with Iōannēs V is resolved.137 Therefore, 
although Kantakouzēnos’ work exhibits strong autobiographical 
characteristics, it speaks to somewhat wider concerns than the life of its main 
protagonist exclusively. Insofar as Kantakouzēnos states his purpose, it is to 
relate the civil wars rather than his own career. The use of an authorial 
persona is not simply a framing technique, or false modesty, alone but 
facilitates an external examination of Kantakouzēnos’ public life as opposed 
                                                 
133 Hinterberger, ‘Autobiography and Hagiography’, 139-141.  
134 For an overview, see A. Kazhdan, ‘Autobiography’, ODB I, 234; Angold, 
‘Autobiographical Impulse’; Hinterberger, ‘Autobiography and Hagiography’; Hunger, 
Hochsprachliche, 165-170; Irmscher, ‘Autobiographien’. The most extensive study is 
Hinterberger, Autobiographische Traditionen; for Kantakouzēnos, see esp. 316-331. 
135 This is not to deny that Kantakouzēnos ascribes a wide range of virtues to himself, see 
Kazhdan, ‘L’Histoire de Cantacuzène’, 288-92; Hunger, Hochsprachliche, 470. Tinnefeld, 
‘Power Politics’, 411, not unfairly observes that there are ‘”auto-hagiographical” tendencies 
throughout the whole work.’ 
136 This is noted by Angold, ‘Autobiographical Impulse’, 254-5, but his attempt to argue 
that this omission actually strengthens the autobiographical nature of the Histories is rather 
strained.  
137 Kant. III, 309-363. 
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to his private or interior life. Kantakouzēnos is not interested in creating a 
complete portrait of himself as a person but a selective portrait of himself as 
a public political actor. The Histories presents a completely sympathetic 
platform for its hero but it does so from an emphatically exterior perspective. 
This perspective helps mask the extent to which the portrait is an 
idealised one. Despite the apparently detached narratorial voice, the 
presentation of events is frequently dramatic and Kantakouzēnos sketches 
characters and scenes with skill and surprising vividness: the bickering of 
the senate; the soldiers harassing the Patriarch being silenced with a look by 
the Grand Domestic; the Empress relentlessly surrounded by liars until her 
loyalty to Kantakouzēnos falters.138 Although Kantakouzēnos’ dramatic 
tendencies had occasionally been acknowledged in passing,139 Kazhdan 
viewed drama as central to Kantakouzēnos’ approach; his seminal analysis 
argued that the Histories presented its protagonist as a tragic hero, whose 
flaw was his trusting and forgiving nature, and invented a new ‘poetry of 
heroic defeat’.140 While the literary and apologetic aspects of the Histories do 
not completely overwhelm its historiographical aspect, not least because the 
narrative continues beyond the fall of its hero, Kantakouzēnos certainly 
employed techniques perhaps more readily expected in fiction. Going 
beyond such familiar historiographical elements as imagined speeches, his 
protagonists – not least himself – consistently fulfil the dramatic roles 
assigned to them.141 Beneath the oft-praised ‘simplicity’ of Kantakouzēnos’ 
language, the Histories is not a simple work and defies simple categorisation. 
 
                                                 
138 Kant. II, 20.13-22.4, 83.19-85.6, 125.11-136.13. 
139 E.g., Parisot, Cantacuzène, 6. 
140 Kazhdan, ‘L’Histoire de Cantacuzène’, 287: ‘Bref la poésie de la défaite héroïque a été, 
dans la littérature byzantine, inventée par Cantacuzène’. 




The Histories is written in classicising high-style, appropriate to a 
literary history written by an educated writer for an educated audience.142 
Kantakouzēnos routinely utilises periodic structure (principally in speeches), 
the infinitive, the perfect, Attic spellings,143 and occasionally the dual.144 He 
employs archaic ethnonyms, such as Persians, Mysians and Triballi, and 
classicising but imprecise toponyms, such as Akarnania and Lydia.145 He 
rhetorically refers, on a number of occasions, to an underworld which is 
clearly the classical Hades rather than the Christian Hell.146 Moreover, 
appropriately for an author strongly concerned with ruinous internecine 
conflict, Kantakouzēnos adopted Thucydides as his stylistic paradigm for the 
Histories, following the established literary practice of mimesis, or imitation.147 
Although he does not mention his model by name, the abundance of 
speeches – and their frequently convoluted syntax – calls Thucydides to 
mind, even though Kantakouzēnos’ speeches, typically explanatory or 
apologetic rather than analytical, are used in an only superficially similar 
way. Furthermore, he directly borrows phrases from the Athenian author; 
his descriptions of civil strife and, later, the outbreak of plague recall the 
famous descriptions of the stasis on Kerkyra and the plague in Athens 
respectively.148 Although classicising writers have been suspected of twisting 
their observations to match classical exemplars, leading to Mango’s 
                                                 
142 On Byzantine high style, see Bartusis, ‘Archaizing’; Hunger, ‘Mimesis’ (esp. 30-31 for 
common linguistic features); Ševčenko, ‘Levels of Style’ (esp. 291). 
143 E.g., φυλλάττω and θάλαττα (although θάλασσα is far more common). 
144 E.g. Kant. II, 172.6: ἐπὶ τὼ χεῖρε δέξασθαι. 
145 See Ch.11:6, Ch.9:7, respectively.  
146 E.g., Kant. II, 111.8, 152.6, 153.23.  
147 For this technique, see Hunger, ‘Mimesis’; for Kantakouzēnos’ application of it, 
Hunger, ‘Beobachtungen’. 
148 Kant. II, 177.6-178.11 (stasis); Kant. III, 49.15-53.1 (plague). FK III, 447, n. 268-n. 275 




memorable characterisation of their literary works as a ‘distorting mirror’,149 
detailed studies have convincingly demonstrated that Kantakouzēnos very 
skilfully adapted Thucydides’ prose to fit contemporary realities, rather than 
vice-versa.150 If the Histories is a distortion of the events it reports, it is not 
chiefly because of an inflexible classicism on the part of its author. 
Kantakouzēnos is however quite austere in his classicism, especially 
when compared with the ostentatious displays of learning affected by the 
other fourteenth century historiographers, Pachymerēs and Grēgoras. 
Kantakouzēnos quotes ancient literature very sparingly and indicates the 
source even more rarely.151 He does not Atticise the names of the months, as 
Pachymerēs does. When dealing with places he knows well, he generally 
prefers contemporary names over classical equivalents: unlike Grēgoras, 
Kantakouzēnos does not employ Adrianople’s ancient name of Orestias, 
Peirinthos is only once preferred over Hērakleia, and he uses non-classical, 
apparently even informal, toponyms such as the Thracian Chalkidikē.152 
References to classical or mythical figures are few and far between, with 
none appearing in the present translation.153 While antiquity is occasionally 
acknowledged,154 Kantakouzēnos rarely seizes opportunities to overtly 
display his learning, with the notable exception of his mimesis of the stasis. 
Kantakouzēnos’ classicism is inconsistent and, as Kazhdan observed, largely 
                                                 
149 Mango, ‘Mirror’. 
150 See Hunger, ‘Beobachtungen’ and, more generally, Reinsch, ‘Adaptations’, esp. 775-6. 
Miller, ‘Plague’, explicitly and persuasively defends Kantakouzēnos against Mango’s 
hypothesis, but goes too far in attributing a more general concern for ‘exactness’ to the 
Histories; see Miller, ‘Plague’, 394.  
151 E.g., Euripides is the ‘certain person’ quoted at Kant. I, 24.23; Homer is acknowledged 
at Kant. I, 18.7-8.  
152 Peirinthos: Kant. II, 175.18; Ch.28:2. Chalkidikē: Kant. II, 161.13-14; Ch.26:3. He does 
once refer to Adrianople as τὴν ἐν Ὀδρυσοῖς ἐπώνυμον Ἀδριανῷ πόλιν, ‘the city among 
the Odrysoi named after Adrian’ (Kant. I, 35.9-10). His few references to the Odrysians all 
appear in Books I and II. 
153 For a non-exhaustive list of references throughout the Histories, see Kazhdan, 
‘L’Histoire de Cantacuzène’, 309. 




incidental and does not constitute a deliberate literary instrument.155 In fact, 
compared to his lexiphanic contemporaries, Kantakouzēnos’ vocabulary is 
restricted and often repetitious. He makes little apparent effort to find 
synonyms but seems, conversely, to embrace repetition. An example is his 
fondness for the word λυσιτελεῖν and its derivatives:156 in one passage, some 
form of the word is employed four times within the space of eight lines.157 
When compared to the delight in diverse and obscure vocabulary more 
typical of Byzantine literature, it is indeed possible to view Kantakouzēnos’ 
vocabulary as impoverished.158 
This literary restraint, however, has proven far more to the taste of 
modern readers than the elaborate shows of erudition more commonly 
encountered in Byzantine historiography.159 Parisot praised Kantakouzēnos’ 
style, finding it even reminiscent of Cicero; Kazhdan described the Histories 
as a literary monument, and Treadgold suggested it was perhaps the only 
literary masterpiece of the Palaiologan era.160 Matters of taste aside, why 
Kantakouzēnos chose to write in such a style is an interesting question. 
Although the prime of his life was taken up by political and military 
demands and he therefore had rather less opportunity to polish his literary 
                                                 
155 Kazhdan, ‘L’Histoire de Cantacuzène’, 309. 
156 FK III, 444, n. 235, observes that he has a ‘particular weakness’ for the word. Its 
extensive use is catalogued by Kazhdan, ‘L’Histoire de Cantacuzène’, 328-329. 
157 Kant. II, 18.2-12: ὁ μέγας δὲ δομέστικος οὐκ ἀνίη βιαζόμενος, ἀλλ’ ἐδεῖτο τῶν μὲν 
τοιούτων λόγων ἀποσχέσθαι, αὐτῷ δὲ πείθεσθαι, ὡς λυσιτελοῦντα καὶ δίκαια 
βουλευομένῳ. καὶ ἔπεισέ γε βιασάμενος, οὐδ’ οὕτω μὲν πεπεισμένον, ὡς λυσιτελῆ τὰ 
πραττόμενα εἴη, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐξαρχῆς ἐχόμενον γνώμης, διὰ δὲ τὸ δοκεῖν ἐκείνῳ 
λυσιτελεῖν καὶ ἄκοντα πεπεισμένον. καὶ τὸν πατριάρχην μετακαλεσάμενος καὶ ὅσοι 
τῶν ἀρχιερέων ἐν Βυζαντίῳ τότε παρῆσαν, καὶ ὅσα ἦν εἰκὸς διαλεχθεὶς περὶ τοῦ 
πράγματος καὶ τὴν γνώμην φανερὰν ποιήσας, ὡς αὐτῷ μὲν οὔτε ἀναγκαῖον, οὔτε 
λυσιτελὲς δοκεῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα. 
158 As argued by Kazhdan, ‘L’Histoire de Cantacuzène’, 313-16. 
159 Kazhdan, ‘L’Histoire de Cantacuzène’, 280-84, reviews the many scholars, from Parisot 
onwards, who have praised the ‘simplicity’ of Kantakouzēnos’ style, noting that most 
scholarly praise is essentially negative: an absence of rhetoric, redundancy and complexity. 
160 Parisot, Cantacuzène, 6; Kazhdan, ‘L’Histoire de Cantacuzène’, 327; Treadgold, 
Byzantine State, 830. 
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style than Grēgoras, for instance, Kantakouzēnos’ subtle reworking of 
Thucydides suggests a deep understanding of ancient literary style and his 
occasional references to other classical works serve as a reminder that he 
could have, if he chose, written in a more decorative manner than he actually 
adopted. 
It is improbable that Kantakouzēnos intended to appeal to a wider 
potential audience; there is nothing demotic about his style or any evidence 
that the Histories circulated widely. The four manuscripts of the Histories 
predating the fall of the Empire appear to have been copied under 
Kantakouzēnos’ personal supervision and Doukas, the only subsequent 
historian who relates the civil wars in any detail, clearly relied on alternative 
– albeit largely sympathetic – sources.161 Most likely is that Kantakouzēnos 
sought, through a lack of pretension and wordplay, to produce a tone of 
simple veracity and honesty, in keeping with the humble persona of 
Christodoulos. By declining to draw excessive attention to his words in 
themselves, he directs the reader towards engagement with their meaning. 
Deliberate contrast with Grēgoras also seems probable; by seeking to 
impress through unadorned arguments rather than literary élan, 
Kantakouzēnos avoided any endeavour to out-classicise his rival, which 
would have been bound to fail. Furthermore, a simpler style was in keeping 
with Kantakouzēnos’ position as a leading defender of the Palamites. 
Palamas himself, although once a pupil of Theodōros Metochitēs, had 
rejected taking his ‘profane’ studies to the highest level in favour of his 
monastic vocation and was sharply critical of classical philosophy.162 Overly-
abundant Atticism, so typical of Palamas’ determined opponent, Grēgoras, 
would have sat somewhat uncomfortably with Kantakouzēnos’ monastic 
status and his own determined Palamism. By demonstrating history could be 
                                                 
161 Doukas, History, V-IX (ed. Grecu, 41-63; trans. Magoulias, 63-75). 
162 Meyendorff, Palamas, 28-31, 128-131. 
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written in a learned but unelaborate style, he aligned it more closely with the 
plainer style favoured by monastic authors.  
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5.1. Portrayal and interpretation of main protagonists 
One of the most distinctive features of the Histories is the number and 
density of speeches, made by diverse individuals. These are particularly 
abundant in the present translation. Through these speeches, Kantakouzēnos 
often seeks to explain others’ behaviours and motivations, and, crucially, to 
justify his own actions. This technique is central to Kantakouzēnos’ 
approach; he usually avoids making direct judgements on people and events 
in his narratorial voice. It is also subtle and sophisticated; Kantakouzēnos 
deliberately records criticisms and insults against himself without providing 
direct rebuttal, and does not always hide his failures. Conversely, his 
enemies often condemn themselves, for example through the baseness of 
their insults or by swearing sacred oaths then proceeding to break them. 
Kantakouzēnos thus clearly shows their vulgarity, unfaithfulness and 
impiety without necessarily needing to say so explicitly. The words and 
deeds of individuals together thus amount to consistent depictions of 
character, playing an understated but important role in shaping readers’ 
attitudes to the individuals concerned.  
This approach is, within the context of medieval literature, extremely 
unusual.163 Kantakouzēnos displays great skill in sustaining his reserve 
throughout such a lengthy and personal work. He moreover demonstrates 
considerable psychological insight and explains conflict as the result of the 
clashing interests of individuals who are themselves frequently acting on the 
basis of incomplete or misleading information. The often repetitious 
statements of central characters should be considered not as poor narrative 
style but as deliberate attempts to emphasise key arguments and control the 
reader’s assessments of the individuals concerned. 
                                                 
163 Kazhdan, ‘L’Histoire de Cantacuzène’, 303-5, discusses the uniqueness of his approach 
within the Byzantine historiographical tradition.  
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In contemporary terms, Kantakouzēnos’ work might be more usefully 
considered ‘spin’ – an intentionally selective picture of events interpreted in 
a favourable way to advance the interests of the narrator – rather than 
outright fabrication and deliberate misinformation. Unfortunately the 
competing, pro-regency, narrative for the 1341-7 civil war is largely lost to us 
and cannot be reliably reconstructed from the accounts of its opponents; the 
only other extensive surviving narrative, that of Grēgoras, is strongly 
sympathetic towards Kantakouzēnos, at least until his victory. Therefore, as 
the evidence to determine to what extent Kantakouzēnos’ interpretation is 
‘correct’ is frequently lacking, it is often more instructive to analyse what 
Kantakouzēnos wanted readers to believe and how he attempted to 
persuade them rather than accepting or dismissing specific statements 
according to their relation to a largely unknowable objective truth. 
The four principal characters in Book III of the Histories are the 
Empress Anna, the Patriarch Kalekas, Alexios Apokaukos and 
Kantakouzēnos himself. The interplay of these four individuals is 
fundamental to the explanation offered for the outbreak of war and 
assignment of blame, therefore the messages Kantakouzēnos intended to 
convey will be considered in some detail for each. The following discussions 
do not pretend to be exhaustive and focus upon Kantakouzēnos’ principal 
concerns in the translated chapters, namely responsibility for the outbreak of 
war and the legitimacy, or illegitimacy, of the main claimants to the rule of 
the Empire. However, these concerns must be examined within the context 
of the entire of the Histories and considerable reference is necessarily made to 




5.1.1. Iōannēs Kantakouzēnos  
A central objective of the Histories is to exculpate its author, and main 
protagonist, for the outbreak of a conflict which, as he correctly observes, 
‘overturned and ruined nearly everything’.164 This is particularly the case for 
the early chapters of Book III, which relate the outbreak of the war. 
Kantakouzēnos’ main preoccupation is to establish his own legitimacy as 
regent for Iōannēs Palaiologos and, concomitantly, to show that there were 
no other legitimate claimants. The legitimacy of the Empress herself as 
sovereign is never questioned but nor is it ever questioned that she was 
unable to rule in her own right. Kantakouzēnos’ conception of the imperial 
office seems to have rested strongly on the assumption that the emperor was 
also a soldier and led his armies, where possible, in person.165 Women and, 
for that matter, churchmen were thus incapable of fulfilling the role 
adequately.166 The reason that Kantakouzēnos works so hard to demonstrate 
his legitimacy in the Histories is of course the awkward reality that 
Andronikos did not explicitly designate him as regent or successor. If he had, 
Kantakouzēnos would undoubtedly have said so. Instead, the closest he gets 
is Andronikos’ purported last words, in a speech given by the Empress, 
where Andronikos exhorts her not to dismiss him.167 Faced with this 
difficulty, Kantakouzēnos argues, in effect, that it was so obvious that 
                                                 
164 Kant. II, 12.7: ὃς ὀλίγου δεῖν πάντα ἀνατέτραφε καὶ διέφθαρκε. 
165 Kantakouzēnos’ account of both Andronikos III’s and his own reign are dominated by 
military actions led or commanded by the emperor. Regarding the importance he attributed 
to martial virtue, see further Kyriakidis, ‘Warfare and Propaganda’. 
166 Kant. II, 470.17-23, states that of the regency, only Apokaukos has any capacity to 
defend the cities of Macedonia: Iōannēs V is too young and his mother cannot on account of 
‘feminine weakness’ (γυναικείαν ἀσθένειαν). Kant. II, 47.20-48.11, scorns the sykophantai as 
cowards who avoid the battlefield and compares them to women. On the importance of 
martial values among the aristocracy generally, see Kyritses, Byzantine Aristocracy, 257-60.  
167 Kant. II, 35.19-36.3. Greg. II, 614.21-615.2, however, implies that Kantakouzēnos did 
actually claim to have been willed the regency and guardianship of Iōannēs V by 
Andronikos. Grēgoras often goes further in his defence of Kantakouzēnos in this period than 
Kantakouzēnos himself does, but whatever the truth, it is clear there was no unambiguous 
evidence to support such a claim. 
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Andronikos intended him to act as regent that he did not actually need to 
say so. This line of reasoning rests on three main arguments: first, that 
Kantakouzēnos and Andronikos were uniquely close friends and trusted 
each other completely, above all others; second, that Kantakouzēnos had in 
effect exercised imperial power during Andronikos’ reign, and that 
Andronikos had often pressed Kantakouzēnos to become co-emperor; and 
third, that Andronikos had previously appointed him regent when facing 
death in 1329/1330.168  
Kantakouzēnos’ friendship with Andronikos is a constant theme 
throughout the previous books of the Histories, and, on occasion, the two 
men discuss the strength of their relationship at length.169 Kantakouzēnos 
wishes that he had died in Andronikos’ place;170 the Empress recognises the 
strength of their friendship, which has endured since childhood,171 and even 
that it took precedence over Andronikos’ relationship with her.172 They were 
so close and Andronikos trusted him so deeply that it was ‘as if he was 
another of himself’.173 Their friendship is comparable with those of legend,174 
it is so strong that it is a model for all other friendships.175 It is a kind of 
spiritual brotherhood which allows Kantakouzēnos, after being acclaimed 
emperor, to present himself precisely as being Andronikos’ brother.176  
This intense friendship naturally extended into a partnership in 
matters of government. Kantakouzēnos repeatedly states that Andronikos 
                                                 
168 The theme of their friendship and its role in legitimising Kantakouzēnos’ position has 
been widely noted, e.g., Hinterberger, Autobiographische Traditionen, 325-9; Tinnefeld, ‘Power 
Politics’, 401-2.  
169 Kant. I, 329.16-332.19, 363.11-366.7. 
170 Kant. II, 25.15-19. 
171 E.g., Kant. II, 27.13-15, 32.22-33.13, 45.16-20. 
172 Kant. II, 33.11-13: καὶ βασιλέως δὲ ἦν ἀκούειν πολλὰ πολλάκις φθεγγομένου, ὡς 
καὶ φιλτάτων καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ συμπάντων, ὡς εἰπεῖν, χρημάτων τὴν εἰς σὲ φιλίαν 
προηγοῖτο. 
173 Kant. II, 28.22: ὥσπερ ἄλλος ὢν αὐτὸς. 
174 Kant. I, 365.8-11. 
175 Kant. II, 33.3-10. 
176 Kant. II, 167.6-12.  
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urged him to put on the imperial insignia and be declared co-emperor.177 
Although he continually refuses the offer, apparently from modesty, he 
informs the reader that he nevertheless exercised most of the imperial 
prerogatives, with Andronikos’ encouragement, in private:  
The entire administration of public affairs was subject to him and he signed 
the Emperor’s prostagmata with red markings no less than the Emperor 
himself, and those produced by him held the same and equal force as those of 
the Emperor, and all else that was the Emperor’s business was also 
permitted to him. For he slept on the Emperor’s mattress, if ever on 
campaign his own baggage carriers were not present, and he was allowed on 
the Emperor’s bed, which even the Emperor’s son was not, unless he had 
been permitted. He lay on it unhindered in the Emperor’s presence or 
absence alike, he used the imperial slippers more fearlessly than his own 
whenever he passed a night with the Emperor, and he did everything in an 
imperial manner.178 
This remarkable passage, and the other claims that Andronikos 
wished to elevate him as co-emperor, rather undercut Kantakouzēnos’ 
apparently modest demurrals of these offers: he wants the reader to know 
that he had no ambitions in this respect but also that he was effectively 
already an emperor. Although the truth of the situation cannot be 
reconstructed, Grēgoras echoes the idea that Andronikos wanted to make 
Kantakouzēnos co-emperor.179 However it must be noted that these debates 
appear in the Histories mainly before Andronikos actually had a son. If such 
                                                 
177 E.g., Kant. I, 365.1-370.9; II, 39.23-40.2, 94.5-9. On the various scholarly interpretations 
of these offers, see FK II, 183, n. 74a. 
178 Kant. I, 369.12-23: ἥ τε γὰρ διοίκησις τῶν πραγμάτων πᾶσα ὑπ’ αὐτῷ ἦν, καὶ τὰ 
βασιλέως προστάγματα οὐχ ἧττον ἢ αὐτὸς βασιλεὺς ἐρυθραῖς ὑπεσημαίνετο 
ὑπογραφαῖς, καὶ ἃ ἐξεφέρετο παρ’ ἑαυτοῦ, τὴν ἴσην καὶ ὁμοίαν δύναμιν τοῖς βασιλέως 
εἶχεν, καὶ τἄλλα ὅσα βασιλέως ἔργα ἦν, καὶ αὐτῷ ἐξῆν. στρώμασί τε γὰρ ἐφύπνωττε 
βασιλέως, εἴ ποτε στρατευομένῳ συνέβαινε τοῖς αὐτοῦ σκευοφόροις μὴ παρεῖναι, καὶ τῇ 
βασιλέως κλίνῃ, ᾗ μηδὲ υἱῷ καὶ βασιλεῖ, εἰ μὴ ἐπιτραπείη, ἔξεστιν, αὐτὸς ἀνεκλίνετο 
ἀκωλύτως ὁμοίως τε ἀπόντος καὶ παρόντος βασιλέως, ἐμβάσι τε ἐχρῆτο ταῖς βασιλικαῖς 
ἀδεέστερον ἢ ταῖς ἰδίαις, ὁπότε συνδιανυκτερεύσειε βασιλεῖ, καὶ πάντα ἔπραττε 
βασιλικῶς. 
179 Greg. II, 578.5-9. Tinnefeld, ‘Power Politics’, 402, is however correct to observe that 
Grēgoras’ source was quite possibly Kantakouzēnos himself. 
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an offer was ever made, it was probably in the context of the insecurity of 
Andronikos’ early years in power and his lack of an heir. In this case, 
Kantakouzēnos’ presentation of it is wilfully anachronistic. Despite this, the 
notion of a strong friendship between Kantakouzēnos and Andronikos 
cannot be simply dismissed as self-constructed. In a letter composed during 
Andronikos’ lifetime, Grēgoras used remarkably similar imagery, depicting 
Kantakouzēnos as striving with the Emperor for virtue, as did Patroclus with 
Achilles or Antigonus with Alexander.180 In a 1332 treaty with Venice, 
Andronikos names him the ‘much-beloved relative of my majesty, the megas 
domestikos, kyr Iōannēs Palaiologos Kantakouzēnos’.181 Their exact blood 
relationship is uncertain, and it was not so strong that either Kantakouzēnos 
himself or his partisans openly identified him as Palaiologos, but it was 
clearly a mark of favour that Andronikos accepted him as such. Similarly, 
the office of megas domestikos was given special privileges while 
Kantakouzēnos occupied it.182 More open to question is whether their 
friendship was quite as all-consuming as Kantakouzēnos presents it and 
whether it changed over time. Kantakouzēnos portrays it as constant, as 
intense at the moment of Andronikos’ death as it is at the start of the 
Histories. However he mentions at least two occasions when Andronikos was 
displeased with Kantakouzēnos promoting individuals he saw as unworthy, 
Syrgiannēs and Apokaukos.183 The latter incident, the only time 
Kantakouzēnos shows the Emperor as openly angry with him, occurred 
within the last year of Andronikos’ life. It is possible that they were not on 
such intimate terms when Andronikos died as they had been formerly. 
                                                 
180 Grēgoras, Letters, 209.1-4 (ep. 84). 
181 MM III, 111.2-3: τοῦ περιποθήτο γαμβροῦ τῆς βασιλείας μου, τοῦ μεγάλου 
δομεστίκου, κυροῦ Ἰωάννου Παλαιολόγου τοῦ Καντακουζηνοῦ. 
182 See Ch.1:9. 
183 Kant. I, 411.23-412.3, 541.2-13. 
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The incident of Kantakouzēnos’ appointment as regent during 
Andronikos’ near fatal illness of 1329/30 was clearly a public event.184 
Kantakouzēnos re-tells the episode again while relating Apokaukos’ career, 
ensuring it remains fresh in the reader’s mind.185 Andronikos was seriously 
ill and he, and all those around him, believed that he was dying. His 
decisions at that time were therefore an attractive template for 
Kantakouzēnos regarding Andronikos’ putative intentions in 1341. 
Andronikos, in what he expected to be his final speech, explicitly appoints 
Kantakouzēnos ‘leader and protector instead of me’.186 In the oaths that are 
subsequently sworn by those present, which are identified as those oaths of 
loyalty usually following an emperor’s death,187 the arrangement is set out in 
detail: 
The Empress Anna, having supreme authority and command over public 
affairs, acquiesced to keep her faith pure and unadulterated and to be 
completely persuaded by the Grand Domestic and not to contradict 
whatever was ordered by him. So the oaths were made in this manner, sworn 
by everyone in turn. And he administered public affairs as seemed best to 
him.188 
After the oaths are sworn, Kantakouzēnos refuses the imperial 
insignia which the senate and army attempt to push upon him.189 Although 
Andronikos recovers shortly after, and Kantakouzēnos returns peaceably to 
his former station, Kantakouzēnos apparently assumed that exactly the same 
                                                 
184 Kant. I, 391.7-411.19. For the date, see Ch.14:12. 
185 Kant. II, 91.3-95.10. 
186 Kant. I, 393.22-24: ἔπειτα δὲ ἡγεμόνα καὶ προστάτην ἀντ’ ἐμοῦ τὸν μέγαν 
δομέστικον ἀφίημι ὑμῖν. 
187 Kant. I, 395.24-396.2: ὅρκους προσέταξε γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ ἐπικρατῆσαν ἐξ ἀρχῆς 
ἔθος ἐπὶ τῇ βασιλέως τελευτῇ. 
188 Kant. I, 396.2-8: στέργειν Ἄνναν τὴν βασιλίδα, κυρίαν καὶ δεσπόζουσαν τῶν 
πραγμάτων, καὶ τὴν πίστιν αὐτῇ καθαρὰν καὶ ἄδολον τηρεῖν· πείθεσθαι δὲ πάντα καὶ 
μεγάλῳ δομεστίκῳ καὶ τὰ κελευόμενα ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ μηδὲν ἀντιλέγοντας ποιεῖν. οὕτω μὲν 
οὖν ἐγίνοντο οἱ ὅρκοι, πάντων ὀμνυόντων ἐφεξῆς. αὐτὸς δὲ τὰ πράγματα διῴκει ᾗ αὐτῷ 
ἄριστα ἐδόκει. 
189 Kant. I, 396.9-14. 
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arrangement should take force in 1341 as it did in 1330. He similarly suggests 
that he has no wish, nor any need, to take up the imperial office on the 
second occasion either. Nor did he see any need for another to share 
authority with him: just as there was no need for Xenē in 1329/30,190 there 
was no role for the Patriarch in 1341.  
Kantakouzēnos deliberately ignores any differences between the two 
situations. In 1341, there was no possibility that Andronikos would make a 
miraculous recovery and, sooner rather than later, the status of the de facto 
ruler would have to be recognised formally; higher ranking members of the 
imperial family could hardly accept being commanded by a megas domestikos. 
Another crucial difference was that, as mentioned above, in 1330 Andronikos 
did not yet have a son. By passing power to Kantakouzēnos, Andronikos 
would protect his loyal followers from reprisals by his grandfather’s party 
after his death. They would have been anxious to press such a measure upon 
him. He may also have wished, after so many years of bitter rivalry, to 
prevent his grandfather or any of his other possible successors, such as his 
uncles Kōnstantinos or Dēmētrios Palaiologos, taking power.191 Indeed, 
Kantakouzēnos rapidly moved against possible rivals, although he presents 
himself as forestalling their deaths at the hands of more junior but more 
fearful followers of Andronikos III.192 However, after the birth of Iōannēs V, 
there was no question regarding the identity of his successor and 
Andronikos may well have thought placing imperial power in the hands of 
even a close friend was to risk creating a temptation too great to be resisted. 
He did, after all, have the example of his own great-grandfather, Michaēl 
VIII, who usurped and blinded his ward, Iōannēs IV Laskaris, in 1261. It is 
                                                 
190 Kant. II, 91.15-95.10. 
191 Kōnstantinos (PLP 21499) had been Andronikos II’s intended heir if he had 
successfully disinherited Andronikos III. For Dēmētrios’ attempted coup in 1335, see 
Ch.17:6. 
192 Kant. I, 396.15-399.20. Kantakouzēnos took measures to secure Kōnstantinos, despite 
him being already tonsured and under guard in Didymoteichon, see Kant. II, 396.15-399.4. 
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therefore likely that his lack of formal provision for Kantakouzēnos reflected 
a commitment to retaining power within his family; sovereignty would 
reside with his wife until his son was of sufficient age to inherit it and she 
would have to decide how best to accommodate Kantakouzēnos.  
The number of Kantakouzēnos’ arguments is, in itself, a sign that he 
lacked any indisputable claim. He therefore doubles-down and continually 
mentions diverse qualities which indicate his suitability for controlling 
public affairs, which complement his general portrayal of his own virtue.193 
He spends freely of his own money to support the state,194 implicitly 
contrasting with the familiar pattern of functionaries enriching themselves at 
state expense, as do Patrikiōtēs and Apokaukos.195 He successfully leads the 
army against the foes gathering after Andronikos’ death, while Apokaukos 
fails to play his part.196 His firm resolve is enough to deter the Albanians 
from revolt and the Bulgarians from war. He is honestly concerned for the 
wellbeing of the Emperor’s children, protecting them from harm and 
suggesting Iōannēs be crowned.197 If he had any evil intentions, he had 
ample opportunity to indulge them when the imperial family were in his 
power during the days after Andronikos’ death, but he sought only to 
protect them.198 
The issue of legitimacy is so crucial to Kantakouzēnos not because of 
any abstract argument over whether he sought to usurp Iōannēs V’s rights 
but because, if he was acting justly, it was not he who bore the guilt for 
starting the utterly ruinous civil war. This, he tells us would be ‘worse than 
                                                 
193 Kazhdan, ‘L’Histoire de Cantacuzène’, 288-91, outlines Kantakouzēnos’ conformity to 
traditional imperial virtues, such as benevolence, wisdom and concern for justice. 
194 E.g., Kant. II, 44.12-13, 65.21-24, 68.1-5, 83.10, 146.20. 
195 See Ch.8:3 and Ch.9:3, respectively. 
196 Kant. II, 69.3-70.17, 77.4-14. 
197 Kant. II, 14.9-17, 64.8-10. 
198 Kant. II, 40.2-10, 147.7-17. 
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any death’.199 He had no desire to rule over the unwilling.200 He certainly had 
no desire to be emperor, as he had not when urged by Andronikos during 
his own reign.201 He was fully prepared to lay aside his position and enter a 
monastery, if he had not been begged to remain.202 He would have willingly 
resigned his commands and stood trial as long as he was sure it would be 
fair.203 Even if this could not be guaranteed, he would face death in an unfair 
trial rather than provoke civil war.204 However this resolution would have 
spelled ruin for his followers as well; they explain that they would fight on 
their own account even if he sacrificed himself, collaborating if necessary 
with the Bulgarians or Serbians.205 War would come even if he refused to 
lead them, they explain, so his determination to avoid responsibility and to 
refuse to lead them is selfish.206 The decision to avoid war, consequently, lay 
not with Kantakouzēnos but with his opponents, the sykophantai.207 With 
deliberate, self-serving, and wicked calculation, they chose war. And they 
would not cease to choose it until they were eventually forced to desist. 
Whether Kantakouzēnos specifically sought to make himself emperor 
is impossible to know. He is emphatic that he had no desire for the imperial 
office and presents his declaration as basileus as an action forced upon him by 
the attacks of his enemies. This argument cannot be dismissed out of hand. 
Although Kantakouzēnos’ undeclared regency would certainly have had to 
be formalised in some way if it was to endure, he was surely aware that 
simply taking the crown without any thought for Iōannēs V’s rights would 
                                                 
199 Kant. II, 24.22-3: παντὸς οἰόμενος θανάτου ἐπαχθέστερον τὴν αἰτίαν τῶν δεινῶν 
παρασχεῖν αὐτός. 
200 Kant. II, 24.17-18: οὐ γὰρ ἠβούλετο ἀκουσίων ἄρχειν. 
201 Kant. II, 39.23-40.2. 
202 Kant. II, 25.10ff. 
203 Kant. II, 50.11-14, 140.7-13. 
204 Kant. II, 151.19-152.2. 
205 Kant. II, 153.13-154.8. 
206 Kant. II, 153.13-156.16. 
207 Kant. II, 160.5-20. 
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cause extreme difficulties. It would have provoked enormous ecclesiastical 
and popular opposition, let alone the hostility of the Palaiologoi and other 
factions of the aristocracy. Consequently, when forced by circumstance to 
declare himself basileus, he attempted to portray himself as protector of the 
legitimate emperor (Iōannēs V) and empress (Anna), giving them precedence 
as senior emperors.208 This policy was maintained far too long to be 
dismissed as a simple piece of cynical opportunism, particularly once the 
popular revolts against him in 1341/2 revealed that it had no effect on his 
public image.209 Whether Kantakouzēnos originally intended to become 
basileus or not, it is obvious that he was not planning to make such a 
declaration in October 1341. As he argues himself, it would have been foolish 
to leave much of his wealth in Constantinople if he had been planning to 
start a war against the Empress.210 Indeed, if he had wanted to launch a coup, 
it would have been far more sensible to do so by first bringing his forces into 
the capital rather than arranging to be acclaimed at Didymoteichon. 
Although Kantakouzēnos’ contention that he was only persuaded to declare 
himself by his followers is a cliché, it is believable, albeit not verifiable.211 His 
supporters in Didymoteichon were aware that the government in 
Constantinople had already attacked and arrested many of Kantakouzēnos’ 
relatives and oikeioi.212 If he had negotiated with the regency, or even – as he 
claims to have been willing to do – simply backed down to avoid civil strife, 
he would probably have had to enter a monastery. The future prospects of 
his relatives and his close oikeioi would thus have been blighted, and many 
would have faced loss of status, confiscation of property, and possibly 
                                                 
208 Kant. II, 166.11-14. On this aspect of Kantakouzēnos’ self-legitimation generally, see 
Dölger, ‘Legitimist’. 
209 Regarding these uprisings, see Chapter 28 and Ch.22:5. Kantakouzēnos explicitly 
states that the rioters claimed to be acting against him in favour of Iōannēs V. 
210 Kant. II, 148.9-149.3. 
211 Kant. II, 158.4-160.2. 
212 See Chapter 22. For the concept of oikeioi, see Ch.5:1. 
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worse. They were unwilling to surrender without a fight and, by 
proclaiming their patron basileus, they raised the stakes: they agreed to fight 
for Kantakouzēnos but, in exchange, he – as emperor – could hardly offer, or 
expect to be offered, a trial or a compromise peace any longer. For there to be 
peace, the Empress would at least have had to accept him as co-emperor, 
thereby formalising his political ascendancy and guaranteeing the current 
and future prosperity of his partisans.  
Despite the effort Kantakouzēnos expends on his self-portrait in the 
Histories, it fails to convince and not simply because it is suspiciously 
flawless. In pursuing his legitimising goals so strongly, Kantakouzēnos 
makes some awkward narrative compromises. The humble persona he 
constructs is undermined by the assertiveness with which he takes control of 
government immediately after Andronikos’ death. It is impossible to escape 
the impression that he thought he deserved to rule; his sense of entitlement 
is apparent however he clothes it in the garb of public service and concern 
for the imperial family. Even if Kantakouzēnos was a reluctant emperor, he 
does not appear to have been a reluctant regent at all. By so seamlessly 
‘taking care of affairs as usual’213 after Andronikos’ death, he comes close to 
implying that the Emperor was simply an adornment to his own government 
in the first place. His offer to resign, even as he tells it, appears as a strategy 
to force the Empress to give him a free hand.214 Kantakouzēnos’ 
acknowledgement of himself as ‘the first’ and awareness of his political 
strength215 may reflect a Thucydidean realism and lend force to his 
identification of envy as the prime motivation of his enemies,216 but it also 
creates the impression that he was overconfident and prone to 
underestimating his opponents, thereby undermining his self-presentation as 
                                                 
213 Kant. II, 14.17-18: συνήθως ἐπεμελεῖτο τῶν πραγμάτων. 
214 See particularly his closing speech to the Empress, Kant. II, 39.9-45.2. 
215 E.g., Kant. II, 25.7-9, 109.4-6, 170.10-15. 
216 Kant. II, 12.11-14. 
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a prudent leader. Yet Kantakouzēnos attempts to twist even this in his 
favour through suggesting that, by challenging him, his enemies 
demonstrated their own foolishness in failing to understand his strength.217 
However, having denigrated their abilities so greatly in order to demonstrate 
their unworthiness to lead, he is forced to explain how they were so able to 
successfully outmanoeuvre him. But to this question, Kantakouzēnos had 
prepared an elegant answer, which is that they employed one tool not 
available to him: lies.  
                                                 
217 Kant. II, 43.5-14. 
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5.1.2. Alexios Apokaukos 
In the Histories, Kantakouzēnos clearly depicts himself as the hero and 
Alexios Apokaukos as the villain.218 In his account of the outbreak of the civil 
war, Kantakouzēnos unambiguously portrays Apokaukos as the prime 
mover behind the disastrous conflict. At the conclusion of the entire Histories, 
the ‘the schemes and villainies of the megas doux’ are once again on the 
author’s mind.219 Superficially, Apokaukos may appear an unlikely choice 
for the part of chief adversary; although present throughout the first two 
books of the Histories, he is mentioned infrequently and he died in mid-1345, 
roughly twenty months before the end of the civil war. However, the 1341-7 
civil war is the dominant conflict in the Histories and Kantakouzēnos was 
determined to demonstrate that blame for it did not lie with him but 
elsewhere. None of Kantakouzēnos’ other opponents are condemned in such 
an overt fashion or treated with so little sympathy. There is a noticeable edge 
to Kantakouzēnos’ condemnations of Apokaukos, which is largely absent 
from his criticisms of other enemies.220 Syrgiannēs and Iōannēs Batatzēs 
switched their loyalties more readily and frequently than Apokaukos but are 
never condemned with such vehemence, despite the severe dangers they 
posed to Kantakouzēnos at various times.221 Whatever the truth of the 
relationship between the two men, or the degree of Apokaukos’ 
responsibility for the conflict, Kantakouzēnos’ sense of betrayal appears 
genuine.  
The Apokaukos of the Histories is, as Kazhdan observed, virtually an 
anti-Kantakouzēnos, mirroring the hero’s virtues with their corresponding 
                                                 
218 For the details of Apokaukos life, see Ch.9:3. 
219 Kant. III, 364.21-22: ταῖς μεγάλου δουκὸς ἀπατηθέντες μηχαναῖς καὶ πανουργίαις. 
See also Appendix I. 
220 The most obvious other exception is Grēgoras, who is also condemned as a liar. See 
above, Section 4.1.2.  
221 For Syrgiannēs and Batatzēs, see, respectively, Ch.14:9 and Ch.29:1. 
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vices.222 Kantakouzēnos’ birth is noble, Apokaukos’ is common; 
Kantakouzēnos is motivated by honour and concern for the common good, 
Apokaukos pursues power from greed and self-aggrandisement; 
Kantakouzēnos spends freely, Apokaukos hoards money; Kantakouzēnos is 
magnanimous, Apokaukos is ungrateful; Kantakouzēnos is truthful, 
Apokaukos is perfidious. Apokaukos’ lies are his strongest weapons, for 
through these he builds the conspiracy which turns the Empress against 
Kantakouzēnos, and initiates the tragedy of the war. At every opportunity, 
Apokaukos is shown to be sly and deceptive. He swears oaths freely but it is 
clear that he has no regard for their worth and breaks them just as freely.223 
He happily uses religious oaths and sacred objects to add weight to his lies, 
lacking any fear of God.224 As he lectures the Patriarch, the most important 
thing is to win and lies are simply another means of achieving this.225 Yet, 
those he corrupts come to regret it; by the end of the war, many of his 
erstwhile supporters have in turn been betrayed and imprisoned by 
Apokaukos.226  
Although Kantakouzēnos himself is repeatedly deceived by his 
enemy, who uses his own honest trust and magnanimity against him, he is 
never corrupted by him. That so many otherwise respected individuals, such 
as the Empress, are persuaded by him is not so much a sign of their 
weakness as of Apokaukos’ diabolic cunning. In Chapters 17-19, where he 
forges the conspiracy against Kantakouzēnos, Apokaukos displays 
                                                 
222 Kazhdan, ‘L’Histoire de Cantacuzène’, 317. 
223 E.g., Kant. II, 119.22-23: παρακοιμώμενος δὲ τοῖς εἰωθόσιν ὅρκοις ἢ ταῖς ἐπιορκίαις 
μᾶλλον ἐχρῆτο (‘The parakoimōmenos proclaimed his usual oaths, or rather perjuries’). 
224 E.g., Kant. II, 96.10-17, 108.21-22, 120.9-10, 122.5-6, 124.23-125.1. 
225 Kant. II, 109.20-110.1. 
226 Of the seven conspirators Kantakouzēnos identifies by name as Apokaukos’ recruits in 
Chapters 17-19, Andronikos Asanēs (Ch.14:4), Kōnstantinos Asanēs (Ch.19:1), Iōannēs 
Gabalas (Ch.19:4), and Geōrgios Choumnos (Ch.2:24) are all arrested during the course of 
the war, seemingly on Apokaukos’ orders. The Patriarch is imprisoned just before the end of 
the war by Anna and the fate of Artōtos is unknown. Only Isaakios Asanēs prospers. 
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exceptional understanding of human psychology, playing on the vanities 
and insecurities of his interlocutors, offering the temptations of future 
rewards – power, high office, marriage alliances – while implanting fears 
regarding Kantakouzēnos’ intentions, which he heightens either through 
outright lies or subtle reinterpretation of words and actions already familiar 
to the reader.227 It is a performance worthy of a Shakespearean villain; an 
Iago. No wonder that Kantakouzēnos’ followers in Didymoteichon compare 
Apokaukos to Satan himself, The Prince of Lies.228 The fight against a man of 
such unusual depravity was therefore a righteous duty and required a man 
of unusual virtue. This lends the Histories, as Kazhdan argued, an almost 
universal or cosmic aspect.229 Although the Histories is a work that generally 
shuns prophecy, it is perhaps no wonder that the saintly archbishop of 
Didymoteichon prophetically warns Kantakouzēnos against Apokaukos.230 
Of the many adversaries Kantakouzēnos faces in the Histories, Apokaukos is 
the only one whom the author clearly suggests is motivated not simply by 
self-interest but by conscious evil.231  
                                                 
227 For instance, Apokaukos suggests to Choumnos that Kantakouzēnos seeks revenge for 
Choumnos’ verbal attack on him before the senate (Kant. II, 120.17-121.7). As 
Kantakouzēnos quotes Choumnos’ attack twice and offers to resign over the incident, 
Apokaukos’ allegation that it was playing on his mind seems extremely persuasive. It is left 
to Choumnos himself to express surprise that Kantakouzēnos would ever be so petty, before 
Apokaukos finally convinces him (Kant. II, 121.7-17). Similarly, Apokaukos exploits the 
Patriarch’s fear of Palamas, which is probably ahistorical but would have seemed plausible 
to any 14th century reader of the Histories, see below, Section 5.1.3. 
228 In the course of a short but decidedly unflattering letter to Apokaukos, they state that 
his father is the devil (Kant. II, 278.18: τῷ σῷ πατρὶ τῷ διαβόλῳ), compare his rebellion 
against his benefactor to that of Satan against God (Kant. II, 279.19-20: ὥσπερ ὁ Σατὰν κατὰ 
Θεοῦ), and that like Satan he attacks the best while ignoring the worst (Kant. II, 280.5: 
ὥσπερ ὁ Σατανᾶς τοῖς μάλιστα Θεῷ προσῳκειωμένοις […]). Satan is named nowhere else 
in the Histories. 
229 Kazhdan, ‘L’Histoire de Cantacuzène’, 287-8, 319. 
230 Kant. II, 170.1-171.14. 
231 Greg. II, 577.16-20, similarly mourns that if Apokaukos had used his gifts for truth and 
justice, he would have been famous among the Romans but ‘he was not a good man’ 
(ἄνθρωπος δ’οὐκ ἀγαθός). He also claims that Apokaukos had often thought to murder 
Andronikos III and Kantakouzēnos in order to place his own candidate on the throne (Greg. 
II, 577.5-11). How Grēgoras might know this is never explained. 
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This evil would engender the civil war as, when he left 
Constantinople in September, all Kantakouzēnos’ political differences with 
the Empress and Patriarch had been settled decisively in his favour, at least 
according to his own account.232 Apokaukos was confined in his fortress, 
Epibatai, following an outrageous plot to kidnap Iōannēs V.233 On his way to 
Didymoteichon, Kantakouzēnos forgave Apokaukos for his latest 
misadventure, in exchange for pledges of good behaviour, and sent him back 
to Constantinople.234 Apokaukos then proceeded to overturn 
Kantakouzēnos’ settlement and, within a few days, had persuaded the 
Empress to open hostilities with Kantakouzēnos.235 The civil war therefore 
grew out of a tragic mistake committed by Kantakouzēnos, a consequence of 
his generous and trusting nature. 
Although Kantakouzēnos’ decision to leave Apokaukos at large seems 
foolhardy even to a casual reader of the Histories, Kantakouzēnos explains 
that he had long been Apokaukos’ patron. Apokaukos first entered 
Andronikos III’s service through Kantakouzēnos’ recommendation, which 
he made as a favour to Apokaukos’ then-patron, Syrgiannēs.236 It later 
transpires that Apokaukos was in danger of being prosecuted by 
Andronikos II for fraud.237 By 1328, after the final triumph of Andronikos III 
over his grandfather, the entirety of Andronikos’ administration and 
finances had become concentrated in Kantakouzēnos’ hands. Seeking to 
divest himself of some of this burden, he obtained Andronikos’ permission 
                                                 
232 Grēgoras also overtly assigns primary responsibility for the civil war to Apokaukos. 
However he portrays the Empress and Patriarch as being much more receptive to 
Apokaukos’ scheming than Kantakouzēnos does, therefore effectively diluting Apokaukos’ 
responsibility to an extent.  
233 If Kantakouzēnos’ description of this plot has any basis in fact, it was probably greatly 
distorted. See Ch.10:7. 
234 Kant. II, 104.14-105.4. 
235 These events are the subject of Chapters 17-22. 
236 Kant. I, 25.3-10. It is never explained why Syrgiannēs, then high in Andronikos’ 
favour, felt unable to recommend Apokaukos himself. 
237 Kant. I, 118.2-7. 
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to delegate to a subordinate; Kantakouzēnos selected Apokaukos for the 
role, but the latter still had to refer important decisions to Kantakouzēnos or 
Andronikos.238 During Andronikos’ severe illness of 1329/30, Apokaukos 
disgraced himself by supporting the claims of the Empress Xenē against 
Kantakouzēnos, but was soon restored to favour after a show of 
repentance.239 In 1340, Apokaukos approached Kantakouzēnos with a 
scheme to raise a fleet to check Turkish piracy; Kantakouzēnos persuaded 
the Emperor to support the plan, despite the latter deriding Apokaukos’ 
martial ability and warning Kantakouzēnos of his dishonesty. Although 
Apokaukos met with some success, his efforts to take all the credit for 
himself infuriated the Emperor, who dismissed him from public office.240 Yet, 
immediately after Andronikos’ death, Kantakouzēnos appointed Apokaukos 
mesazōn. However, Apokaukos soon overreached himself by demanding 
control of the treasury and Kantakouzēnos dismissed him.241 Despite this, 
shortly later, another show of repentance, and the Patriarch’s intervention, 
secured him command of the fleet once again.242 Apparently unable to help 
himself, Apokaukos launched the plot which resulted in his hurried retreat 
to Epibatai. Despite the Empress’ instinctive distrust of Apokaukos – who 
had, after all, just been exposed as planning to kidnap her son – 
Kantakouzēnos persuades her to release him without punishment with a 
vague but insistent proposal that they ‘make use of him, for whatever might 
seem expedient’.243 
                                                 
238 Kant. I, 337.21-339.16. Apokaukos was appointed to supervise the imperial 
administration and finances, see Ch.14:11. Kantakouzēnos initially states simply that 
Andronikos consented to the appointment, in contrast to his later recap of events where he 
relates that Andronikos was extremely reluctant (Kant. II, 90.11-91.1). 
239 Kant. II, 92.7-98.19. Kantakouzēnos does not mention Apokaukos at all in his initial 
account of Andronikos’ illness. 
240 For the entire episode, see Kant. I, 535.1-541.13 and Ch.15:2. 
241 Kant. II, 99.9-101.20. 
242 Kant. II, 102.8-13. 
243 Kant. II, 88.10-11: πάλιν χρῆσθαι, ὅπῃ ἂν δοκῇ συμφέρειν. 
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The only way to understand this cycle of betrayal and forgiveness in a 
manner that is compatible with Kantakouzēnos’ virtue is to assume, first, 
that Apokaukos was indeed extremely competent – and thus useful to the 
common good – when he actually set his mind to his duties and, second, that 
Kantakouzēnos was basically naïve and allowed his noble magnanimity and 
his belief in Christian forgiveness to be exploited. This approach was 
adopted by Nicol, who concluded that Kantakouzēnos was a poor judge of 
character.244 Kantakouzēnos himself elevates his shortcoming to a tragic flaw; 
the destruction of the civil war was a consequence of his trust and kindness 
when applied to man of wicked ruthlessness. He repeatedly contrasts his 
generosity with Apokaukos’ ingratitude.245 In a society where patron-client 
relationships were extremely important, such ingratitude was itself an 
outrageous violation of social norms and an indication of low moral 
character. However, Kantakouzēnos can hardly have emphasised his 
patronage of Apokaukos so much only to demonstrate the latter’s base 
conduct: simple ingratitude pales into insignificance alongside his impieties, 
oath-breaking, calumnies, let alone the atrocities attributed to his stirring up 
of the demos during the war. It could therefore be suggested, less charitably 
to Kantakouzēnos, that he cynically supported Apokaukos, despite his 
unruly behaviour, because Apokaukos was in reality Kantakouzēnos’ most 
effective agent and, following Andronikos III’s death, he had particular need 
for him. Both Kantakouzēnos and Grēgoras state that Apokaukos urged 
Kantakouzēnos to declare himself basileus after the Emperor died.246 The 
difficulty with this interpretation is that, if the main reason for 
Kantakouzēnos’ apparent indulgence of Apokaukos was to further his own 
ambitions, it would have been more logical for Kantakouzēnos to attempt to 
                                                 
244 Nicol, Reluctant Emperor, 169-70. 
245 This is the main theme of Chapters 14 and 15, which summarise Apokaukos’ career 
and his ingratitude. 
246 Kant. I, 557.21-559.11; Greg. II, 578.5-15. 
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distance himself from Apokaukos in the Histories than to insist on his 
sponsorship of him. 
It is possible, however, to interpret their relationship in a different 
light by examining Apokaukos’ career again. Apokaukos was one of the 
earliest adherents of Andronikos III, joining his circle as he planned his 
revolt against his grandfather. Kantakouzēnos asserts that Apokaukos was 
outside Andronikos’ inner council, but admits that Apokaukos – uniquely 
for one outside the core group – was important enough to know all 
Andronikos’ plans.247 In contrast, Grēgoras placed Apokaukos on the same 
level as Kantakouzēnos and Synadēnos from the outset.248 Apokaukos served 
Andronikos loyally throughout his struggle for the throne, and was trusted 
with important missions such as securing Selymbria or attempting to subvert 
Thessalonike.249 His loyalty contrasts with the treachery of Syrgiannēs, 
originally the most prominent of Andronikos’ supporters, whom 
Kantakouzēnos tends to characterise as impulsive and wayward rather than 
actively evil. During Andronikos III’s reign, Apokaukos was, as Andronikos’ 
mesazōn, effectively in charge of the day-to-day business of government and 
held control of the treasury as well. Although he was allegedly closely 
supervised in these offices by Kantakouzēnos, it is hard to see how this could 
have been the case in practice; Kantakouzēnos’ repeated absences on 
campaign with Andronikos III would often have left Apokaukos to rely on 
his own initiative. In fact, it is reasonable to assume that Andronikos would 
have wanted a particularly trustworthy individual in such a post, as he knew 
he would frequently be absent. Moreover, Andronikos appears to have 
avoided any full-blown financial crises and, as his reign progressed, money 
seems to have been increasingly available, since he was apparently able to 
                                                 
247 Kant. I, 61.22-62.1. 
248 Greg. I, 301.5-12. 
249 Kant. I, 258.21-259.2, 268.2-16. 
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invest large sums in fortifications and fleet construction.250 Apokaukos must 
have held significant responsibility for this. Finally, Andronikos permitted 
Apokaukos to take full military command of a new fleet despite his lack of 
aristocratic pedigree or experience. Arguably, therefore, Apokaukos was one 
of the most important figures in the imperial government and indeed a 
treaty signed by Andronikos III identifies him as the Emperor’s oikeios, with 
his name following Kantakouzēnos’ in the list of witnesses.251 Accordingly, it 
can be assumed that Apokaukos would have expected a leading role in any 
regency government. In fact, his lack of an aristocratic pedigree may have 
made his (re-)appointment as chief minister extremely attractive to the 
Empress; it was unlikely that a novus homo could ever secure consent of the 
leading families to place himself on the throne, in contrast to the 
domineering figure of Kantakouzēnos. 
When Apokaukos is considered in this light, the overwrought 
portrayal of the relationship between Kantakouzēnos and Apokaukos in the 
Histories can be explained as a comprehensive attempt to demolish any 
notion that Apokaukos possessed any autonomous right to be involved in 
government. Kantakouzēnos therefore emphasises that the imperial family 
had nothing but scorn for Apokaukos. Andronikos II calls Apokaukos ‘an 
insignificant man from an insignificant family, who was hardly yesterday a 
treacherous undersecretary of the public taxes.’252 Andronikos III defends his 
employment of Apokaukos as simply one of his lowest servants 
(φαυλοτάτοις τῶν οἰκετῶν) and makes clear that he uses him only to gratify 
                                                 
250 Kant. I, 540.5-6 (100,000 hyperpyra for the fleet); I, 541.16-542.23, for the building or 
rebuilding of Arkadioupolis, Gynaikokastron, Sidērokastron, Amphipolis, Peritheōrion, and 
Dipotamos. 
251 MM III, 111.3-5: τοῦ οἰκείου τῇ βασιλείᾳ μου, παρακοιμωμένου κυροῦ Ἀλεξίου τοῦ 
Ἀποκαύκου. 
252 Kant. I, 117.24-118.1: Ἀπόκαυχον, ἄσημον μὲν ὄντα καὶ ἐξ ἀσήμων, καὶ οὔπω χθὲς 
καὶ πρώην τοῖς τῶν δημοσίων φόρων πράκταις ὑπογραμματεύοντα. Since all of 
Andronikos III’s followers have in fact betrayed Andronikos II, Apokaukos is apparently 
singled out largely because of his low social origins.  
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Kantakouzēnos.253 The latter thereafter often shields Apokaukos from 
punishment by Andronikos III,254 who makes his suspicion of Apokaukos’ 
naval proposal clear and warns Kantakouzēnos ‘I am no less your enemy 
than he is your friend’.255 The Empress Anna regards Apokaukos as ‘a man 
full of villainy and treachery’ and points out his numerous betrayals of 
Kantakouzēnos.256 Kantakouzēnos, therefore, not only emphatically inserts 
himself at every step of Apokaukos’ career, but he also shows himself to be 
protecting his protégé against the justified disdain and perceptive scepticism 
of the Palaiologoi. As Kantakouzēnos generally seeks to present himself as 
being in harmony with the Palaiologoi, his determination to disregard their 
many warnings for the sake of a man he apparently regards with contempt 
strikes a jarring note. 
It therefore appears probable that Kantakouzēnos systematically 
exaggerated the depth of his patronage of Apokaukos and sought to quash 
any idea that Apokaukos was an independent participant in Andronikos III’s 
inner circle, let alone one who remained allied with him from the outset of 
his struggle for power until the end of his reign. This is not to imply that 
Apokaukos had any form of strong personal relationship or friendship with 
Andronikos – there is no indication that he did – or that he was in any way 
of greater importance than Kantakouzēnos, since his lower ranking in the 
court hierarchy suggests otherwise. However, if Apokaukos was a 
prominent servant of Andronikos III in his own right, then he did not 
necessarily have a lesser claim to advise the Empress after Andronikos’ 
death than Kantakouzēnos did. Kantakouzēnos, by emphasising Apokaukos’ 
dependence on his benefactor, even to the extent of making himself appear 
                                                 
253 Kant. I, 118.24-119.6. 
254 Kant. II, 90.21-91.1. 
255 Kant. I, 538.15-16: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἧττον ἐγώ σοι πολέμιος, ἢ ἐκεῖνος φίλος. 
256 Kant. II, 88.16-17: ἄνθρωπον πανουργίας καὶ ἐπιβουλῆς μεστὸν. 
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foolish, renders Apokaukos not a peer competitor but an errant servant.257 
He is depicted not as the oikeios of Andronikos III but rather of 
Kantakouzēnos himself. Even the encouragement that Apokaukos gives to 
Kantakouzēnos to seize the throne after Andronikos’ demise reinforces this 
notion: it is the advice of a henchman to his master; he will rise in 
importance only if his master does. Kantakouzēnos, of course, rebuffs the 
suggestion fiercely. The emphasis on Apokaukos’ lowly origins serves a 
similar purpose, emphasising that his upbringing is not that of the ruling 
class but the servile classes.258 However it is difficult to believe that 
Andronikos, who had a great deal to fear from plots to remove him, would 
have placed such power – including the administration of his treasury – into 
the hands of one he did not trust simply to indulge his friend 
Kantakouzēnos. Moreover, the Empress’ reconciliation with Apokaukos is 
never explained. She is persuaded to turn upon Kantakouzēnos by other 
members of the conspiracy whom Apokaukos has corrupted. Yet the 
moment they succeed, she immediately allows Apokaukos to be placed in 
charge of Constantinople and the efforts to round up Kantakouzēnos’ 
partisans, despite having allegedly attempted to kidnap her son a few weeks 
before.259 By the time that Kantakouzēnos is able to send emissaries to her, 
she is already deferring to Apokaukos and largely under his spell.260 The 
speed and thoroughness of this change suggests that she was not perhaps as 
initially hostile to Apokaukos as Kantakouzēnos relates. 
In many ways, Kantakouzēnos’ attribution of responsibility for the 
civil war to Apokaukos was, to borrow two frequently occurring concepts 
from the Histories, not only necessary (ἀνάγκη) but advantageous 
                                                 
257 Kantakouzēnos follows a similar approach, albeit to a lesser degree, in his portrayal of 
the Patriarch, see below, Section 5.1.3.  
258 Kantakouzēnos does not in fact disparage lowly social origins as a matter of course, 
but does so selectively depending on his attitude to the individual concerned, see Ch.14:2. 
259 Kant. II, 136.22-137.1. 
260 Kant. II, 143.15-17. 
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(λυσιτελής). The other leading personalities of the regency government were 
the Empress Anna and the Patriarch Kalekas. Holding either of them 
strongly responsible for the conflict was politically difficult, for reasons 
explained in the following sections. Apokaukos, on the other hand, did not 
spring from a powerful aristocratic clan who may have wished to defend his 
memory. His surviving relatives owed their continued prosperity to 
Kantakouzēnos’ decision to avoid reprisals after the war. Moreover, 
Apokaukos had died while the war was at its peak. He was never forced to 
come to terms with Kantakouzēnos, unlike other leading opponents such as 
Andronikos Asanēs, and therefore Kantakouzēnos had no need to reconcile 
with him or his memory. This is not to deny that Kantakouzēnos genuinely 
believed Apokaukos was to blame for the war. Indeed, if Apokaukos was in 
fact a legitimate rival, contrary to Kantakouzēnos’ portrayal, it is just as 
likely that he was responsible for mobilising the opposition to 
Kantakouzēnos. Alexios Apokaukos may have been a sociopathic 
personality, or simply an unusually able representative of a governing class 
which was marked by a strongly competitive and self-serving ethos. 
However, for the victors and vanquished to stand any chance of 
reconciliation after such a long and bitter conflict, recrimination had to be 
minimised and an acceptable explanation found for the tragedy. Apokaukos 
was not only dead and largely friendless, but had been undoubtedly a 
leading protagonist. He offered a mutually convenient scapegoat and, in 
death, played a unifying role that he had never achieved in life. However 
Kantakouzēnos goes further than simply blaming Apokaukos for the war. By 
destroying his credibility as an independent political actor, Kantakouzēnos 
defends his own assumption of the regency before the war by suggesting 
there were no other legitimate candidates. Neither the Empress nor the 
Patriarch could fulfil the full duties of the imperial office, particularly its 
military responsibilities. However, there was no insurmountable 
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impediment to Apokaukos acting as regent. Kantakouzēnos therefore 
emphasises Apokaukos’ low birth and paints his story in the blackest terms.  
Whatever the true circumstances of his life were, Apokaukos was 
defeated. Although the adage that history is written by the winners may be 
questioned, it is certainly true of the Histories. 
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5.1.3. The Patriarch Kalekas 
The Patriarch was the lynchpin of opposition to Kantakouzēnos; in 
both Grēgoras’ and Kantakouzēnos’ accounts, it is he who first openly 
opposes the Grand Domestic’s assumption of power.261 Ultimately he was 
also the most obdurate of Kantakouzēnos’ opponents and never reconciled 
with Kantakouzēnos after his victory. Following his deposition, he continued 
to insist his removal was unjust but refused to testify before the synod. His 
continued plotting was apparently only ended by his death.262 Kalekas’ 
stubbornness seems to have rested on a conviction that his political stance 
was justified by a responsibility to safeguard Andronikos’ children. Insofar 
as Kantakouzēnos concedes that the Patriarch had any responsibility for 
Andronikos’ children, he implies this responsibility was pastoral, not 
political: he calls him φύλαξ (protector/guardian), not ἐπίτροπος (regent).263 
Even this was too much for him and later in the war he states disapprovingly 
that the Patriarch ‘proclaimed himself father and guardian of the young 
emperor’.264  
Kantakouzēnos explains that the presumed basis for this 
guardianship was the responsibility the Patriarch had been given to 
excommunicate anyone threatening the children’s safety if their father died 
before they were of age.265 The resolution was, of course, passed at 
Kantakouzēnos’ request and he explicitly states that he was considering a 
situation where both Andronikos and he himself had fallen in battle, i.e., it 
was only if Kantakouzēnos had also died that the Patriarch should be 
                                                 
261 Kant. II, 16.17f; Greg. II, 579.3f. For Kalekas’ life and circumstances of his appointment 
as Patriarch, see Ch.1:16. 
262 Kant. III, 20.20-25.3. 
263 Kant. II, 18.19: οἷα δὴ τῶν βασιλέως παίδων φύλαξ. It is not completely clear whether 
Kantakouzēnos acknowledges that the Patriarch was actually guardian in a limited sense or 
simply that he thought himself to be such. See also Ch.2:6.  
264 Kant. II, 421.2-3: ἑαυτὸν πατέρα καὶ κηδεμόνα τοῦ νέου βασιλέως ἀνακηρύξας. 
265 Kant. II, 16.17-18.23. 
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assumed to be guardian and that the children required the protection of the 
Church.266 As Andronikos resisted the excommunication resolution and was 
only ‘unwillingly persuaded’,267 it follows that he could not have been keen 
to empower the Patriarch. However it seems that Kantakouzēnos somewhat 
obfuscated the basis of Kalekas’ claims: Grēgoras states that the Patriarch 
brandished a document issued by Andronikos which formally appointed 
him regent and guardian of the imperial family during Syrgiannēs’ revolt.268 
Kantakouzēnos’ purported response to this claim, in Grēgoras’ account, is 
however the same as he gives in the Histories, or even more direct: it related 
to the specific situation in which both he and Andronikos were absent on 
campaign against Syrgiannēs and risked not coming back.269 Kantakouzēnos 
otherwise held exclusive responsibility for the state and the greatest concern 
for Andronikos’ children. Kalekas’ opposition to Kantakouzēnos’ claim was 
informed by the obvious, disturbing, precedent of the last imperial minority, 
when Iōannēs Laskaris was usurped and blinded by Michaēl Palaiologos. He 
saw himself in the role of the earlier Patriarch Arsenios, who had sought to 
protect Laskaris, but was determined not to fail as his predecessor had.270  
Kantakouzēnos did not believe that the Patriarch held a legitimate 
claim to lead the government, particularly as it unavoidably conflicted with 
his own. The need to de-legitimise Kalekas explains Kantakouzēnos’ 
emphasis on his own role in the Patriarch’s election, even though the 
negotiations he describes show him securing Kalekas’ selection – against the 
                                                 
266 Kant. II, 17.8-9: καὶ οὐδὲν εἶναι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, εἰ καὶ ἀμφοτέροις αὐτοῖς συμβαίη 
περὶ μίαν μάχην πεσεῖν. 
267 Kant. II, 18.8: ἄκοντα πεπεισμένον. 
268 Greg. II, 579.3-10. For Syrgiannēs, see Ch.14:9. 
269 Greg. II, 582.20-583.15. 
270 Greg. II, 579.13-22, 759.7-9. Kantakouzēnos himself avoids mentioning how Michaēl 
Palaiologos obtained power, simply remarking ‘the Empire passed to Michaēl Palaiologos’ 
(ἐπὶ Μιχαὴλ τὸν Παλαιολὸγον ἡ βασιλεία μετέβη): Kant. I, 11.8-9. For the Patriarch 
Arsenios Autōreianos, see PLP 1694. For a recent bibliography of the schism, see Shawcross, 
‘Palaiologan Usurpation’, 208, n. 29.  
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evident wishes of the synod – by sophistry, trickery and political pressure 
rather than his usual appeals to reason or morality.271 Kantakouzēnos risks 
showing himself behaving in a less than elevated manner not simply to 
present himself as Kalekas’ benefactor, in order to demonstrate the latter’s 
subsequent ingratitude, but – most importantly – to portray Kalekas as his 
own choice instead of the Emperor’s and therefore lower in the ladder of 
potential successors. However Kantakouzēnos could not have bullied the 
synod into accepting Kalekas if the bishops had not known that Andronikos 
III wished his election. Nor is it likely that an emperor in a dangerous 
political position – as Andronikos certainly was in early 1334, during 
Syrgiannēs’ revolt – simply delegated the choice of Patriarch, to whom he 
intended to trust his family, to Kantakouzēnos. Within the Histories there is 
little hint of this, though; after Andronikos’ death, Kantakouzēnos shows 
Kalekas as eventually acquiescing to his rule before he leaves Constantinople 
in September 1341. The Patriarch’s determined hostility after this point is 
explained as growing from his fear, encouraged by Apokaukos, that he 
would be deposed in favour of Grēgorios Palamas.272 The allegation that 
Kantakouzēnos wished to depose Kalekas in favour of Palamas is almost 
certainly a deliberate but plausible-sounding anachronism to obscure 
Kalekas’ deeper reasons for opposing Kantakouzēnos. Grēgoras – a 
determined enemy of Palamas – has Kalekas justify himself exclusively in 
terms of his own ambitions and desire to protect Iōannēs V.273 Assuming 
Kantakouzēnos had been declared basileus with Kalekas’ acceptance, he 
would have paid a steep political price to force the Patriarch from office 
simply for the sake of promoting a friend, which makes the accusation seem 
highly improbable. Certainly Kalekas would have feared for his position, in 
                                                 
271 Kant. I, 431.20-435.20. Notably, he admits ‘he thought how to beguile assent from 
them’: ᾤετο ὑποκλέψειν τὴν πειθὼ αὐτοῖς (Kant. I, 433.17). 
272 Kant. II, 107.4-9, 438.20-23, 456.11-15, 602.13-15. For Palamas, see Ch.17:1. 
273 Greg. II, 579.3-22, 758.12-760.19. 
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the case of an eventual Kantakouzēnist victory, once the war had started, but 
there is no clear evidence that he was hostile to Palamas before the war.274 
Indeed, he had just overseen two councils which condemned opponents of 
Palamas. However, Kalekas’ hounding of Palamas during the war would 
have made the allegation seem superficially plausible and repeating it 
provided an unambiguously selfish motive for Kalekas as well as reminding 
the reader he had persecuted a monk who would soon be accepted as a saint. 
Despite Kantakouzēnos’ dismissal of the Patriarch’s claims, it was 
clear that if the Patriarch was acting beyond the authority of his office, then 
so was the Grand Domestic. Neither man possessed an unambiguous 
mandate from the deceased emperor. Therefore Kantakouzēnos undermines 
Kalekas’ legitimacy further by casting doubt on both his holiness and his 
character. Kantakouzēnos’ personal attacks on Kalekas are subtle but 
manifold. Following his usual method, he never judges Kalekas directly 
through his role as narrator. Instead, he builds up a picture of Kalekas as a 
self-important man of questionable judgement, who is inconsistent and 
easily swayed. Where Kantakouzēnos mentions Kalekas either neutrally or 
positively, it is when he performs his ‘correct’ role of governing the Church, 
not the state.275 He has only faint praise for Kalekas’ abilities, which are 
spoken of only in relation to his priestly office: he is ‘suitable’ (ἔχειν 
εὐφυῶς), ‘competent’ (ἱκανός), and ‘fitting’ (ἁρμόζων).276 So while 
Kantakouzēnos is aware that Kalekas is scheming with courtiers, he 
seemingly regards his efforts as posing little serious threat, adding the 
slightly absurd image of the Patriarch returning home only under the cover 
of darkness.277 The Patriarch’s attempted intervention in foreign policy is 
                                                 
274 Meyendorff, Palamas, 58-9, 64-6. 
275 E.g., during the councils of 1341 (Kant. I, 550.8-557.9) and the memorial service for 
Andronikos III (Kant. II, 16.6-9). 
276 Kant. I, 432.4, 433.5. 
277 Kant. II, 18.23-19.7. 
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openly derided by Kantakouzēnos, causing Kalekas to immediately reverse 
his position.278 His assertion of higher ceremonial status than Kantakouzēnos 
– to which he was actually entitled – leads to outcry and public 
humiliation.279 He swears to uphold Kantakouzēnos’ rights – with the 
implication that he has accepted his political subordination to 
Kantakouzēnos.280 The oaths are not openly described as perjuries, as is often 
the case with Apokaukos’ scheming. Thus it is implied Kalekas intended to 
follow his oaths when he swore them but was easily convinced by 
Apokaukos, through appeals to his personal insecurity and self-interest, to 
disregard his own most solemn undertakings.281 Even then, his attempt to 
traduce Kantakouzēnos before the Empress nearly ends in disaster for his 
cause and he has to be saved by the intervention of Andronikos Asanēs.282 
When challenged to hold a fair trial by Kantakouzēnos’ ambassadors, he 
cannot think of an objection and remains silent, leaving Apokaukos to 
destroy the proposal.283 After the coronation of Iōannēs V, Kalekas begins to 
sign documents in blue ink and has a new hat made from gold instead of 
white material, thereby imitating the skaranikon of high courtiers, an 
innovation which makes his vanity and ambition clear but undermines the 
dignity of his office.284 After the war he first agrees to stand trial before the 
synod, as if to make a principled defence of his actions, but then simply fails 
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to appear or offer any explanation.285 Even his death is a result of his worldly 
vanity: ‘Being unable to bear so great a change (for the reversal took him 
from the height of good fortune to the complete opposite), first he fell ill, 
then he took leave of his senses’.286 The portrayal is certainly unflattering, but 
not overtly abusive. Compared to Apokaukos, the relative lack of 
condemnation reserved for Kalekas’ character and motives suggests 
Kantakouzēnos simply held him in contempt; his reported actions suggest 
that such contempt was well deserved. 
Kalekas’ religious devotion, unquestioned during Andronikos’ reign, 
is subjected to similar assault as it withers in the face of his earthly 
ambitions. He cynically speaks of God’s providence while convincing the 
Empress to start a war.287 He swears grave and holy oaths to uphold 
Kantakouzēnos’ rights, yet knowingly disregards them.288 He allows a monk, 
sent as a peace emissary, to be maltreated.289 The members of an independent 
monastic delegation from Mount Athos are bribed, imprisoned or 
dismissed.290 He excommunicates Kantakouzēnos and his followers for 
political reasons;291 Kantakouzēnos explains in detail that this is contrary to 
canon law.292 Kantakouzēnos draws a clear moral contrast between his own 
desire for peace and the Patriarch’s rejection of any discussion of it; he warns 
                                                 
285 Kant. III, 23.1-24.2. 
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83 
 
that God will judge him for the spilling of blood if he stays silent.293 After the 
war, he reproaches Kalekas for this above all, telling him his greatest fault 
was that ‘he had no compassion for those being destroyed’.294 Moreover, the 
Patriarch relentlessly persecutes Palamas and brings strife to the Church, 
simply from fear for his own position. He even ordains Akindynos – a 
condemned heretic – despite being prohibited from doing so by the 
Empress.295 It is this that finally brings his deserved downfall: the Empress 
calls a synod which deposes Kalekas.296 
This contemptuous characterisation of the Patriarch further 
diminishes any notion that Kalekas had any legitimate or unselfish concern 
for Iōannēs V’s rights. Kantakouzēnos insinuates that Kalekas had 
deliberately misunderstood his responsibilities and that his true motivation 
for opposing Kantakouzēnos was unseemly personal ambition. 
Kantakouzēnos could have emphasised Kalekas’ complicity with the 
offences the regency committed against his family and followers but 
Kalekas’ blustering ineffectiveness is a deliberate contrast to Apokaukos’ 
potency: affording much agency to Kalekas would undermine that of 
Apokaukos. Instead the primary responsibility is assigned to a single 
mastermind, a single betraying Judas; it is Apokaukos who persuades the 
Patriarch to forget his oaths and Apokaukos’ ruthlessness which sets the 
tenor for the regency’s actions. This is a simpler message and more 
dramatically satisfying than a villainous diarchy. It was also much more 
politically expedient. Kalekas had been, after all, Patriarch of Constantinople 
and head of the Church. If his elevation had been in any way irregular, it 
was because of Kantakouzēnos’ own part so he was not easily able to suggest 
Kalekas was inherently unsuitable for the role. While it is difficult to know 
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whether Kalekas retained any affection within the priesthood by the time the 
Histories was published, he had not been immediately abandoned by the 
entire hierarchy after Kantakouzēnos’ victory. For example, the official 
patriarchal record of the synodal tomos of 1347, which confirmed Kalekas’ 
deposition and condemned his attacks on Palamas and his part in the civil 
war, was selectively defaced by an unknown supporter to delete all mentions 
of his removal.297 Kantakouzēnos mentions, but does not name, three bishops 
who were supporters of Kalekas and opposed his exile.298 His deposition did 
not mean that all the bishops necessarily now supported either Palamas or 
Kantakouzēnos.299 Some may have come to regret Kalekas’ fall. Although, 
after the Council of 1351, Palamas’ theology was accepted in its entirety as 
wholly Orthodox and Palamas himself would soon be canonised after his 
death, limited intellectual opposition to his theology persisted, witnessed by 
the excommunication of Prochoros Kydōnēs in 1368.300 Even when the 
Histories was published, it is highly unlikely that Kantakouzēnos wished to 
risk reigniting and re-politicising dispute within the Church by strongly 
attacking the Patriarchate’s role in the civil war; time would ensure the 
victory of Kantakouzēnos’ ecclesiastical policy without crude settling of 
scores with Kalekas.  
Consequently, Kantakouzēnos is scrupulously careful, in the Histories 
and earlier, to follow the judgement of Anna’s synod and insist that the 
reason for Kalekas’ deposition was his doctrinal offences.301 Kantakouzēnos 
even pretends that, had Kalekas not already been expelled, he would have 
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allowed him to remain in office as long as he had defended himself against 
distorting Orthodoxy.302 The synod of 2 February 1347 – composed of 
bishops loyal to the regency, not to Kantakouzēnos – saved Kantakouzēnos 
from having to remove the Patriarch for overtly political reasons, which 
could have allowed Kalekas to position himself as a second Arsenios, having 
endeavoured to protect a young emperor against an usurper, and therefore 
to risk creating a schism. Alternatively, it saved Kantakouzēnos from 
sponsoring Kalekas’ dismissal for doctrinal reasons, which would have 
unavoidably strengthened the identification of Palamism with 
Kantakouzēnism, undoubtedly retarding or endangering Palamism’s 
acceptance. Kantakouzēnos acknowledges his good fortune in being saved 
from putting the Patriarch on trial himself, knowing that he would be seen as 
revenging himself upon Kalekas.303 Ultimately, Church unity would be more 
effectively protected by minimising the intrusion of politics and attempting 
to preserve the debate over Palamism as a theological matter, where the 
relevant arguments had been officially already settled by the time the 
Histories was published. Grēgoras’ vehement attacks on Kantakouzēnos and 
Palamas in his own history were a reaction to his own total defeat. 
Kantakouzēnos’ distortions in his portrait of Kalekas were considered a price 
worth paying to safeguard his most lasting achievement, his settlement of 
the Church. 
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5.1.4. The Empress Anna 
A central element of Kantakouzēnos’ self-legitimation was that he was 
upholding the rights of his deceased friend’s wife and heirs. Consistent with 
Kantakouzēnos’ designation of the deceased Andronikos III as his brother, 
he referred to Anna as his sister both before and after his abdication.304 The 
inescapable reality that Andronikos’ wife was the declared leader of the 
party opposed to him throughout such a bitter civil war presented severe 
difficulties to maintaining and justifying this ideal, both during the war and 
in the Histories. Kantakouzēnos resolved this apparent contradiction by 
utilising the familiar topos of the ‘good monarch surrounded by evil 
advisors’.305 In other words, the Empress had been maliciously misled and 
misinformed by his enemies, who were themselves motivated by envy. 
Accordingly, Kantakouzēnos’ enemies at court are collectively styled oi 
sykophantai, ‘the false accusers’. It is her ears into which they pour their 
accusations. In the Histories, Kantakouzēnos is not only consistent in 
maintaining this image of the innocent Empress who is manipulated by the 
men around her, but he employs considerable skill in his attempt to render 
this image convincing. 
Kantakouzēnos does not conceal some initial tensions in their 
relationship. After Andronikos’ death, the Patriarch works tirelessly to 
position himself as the Empress’ main advisor while Kantakouzēnos is 
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absorbed in the pressing matters of actually governing.306 Accordingly, when 
the diplomatic crisis with Bulgaria erupts, Anna allows Kalekas a privileged 
role in the assembly called to discuss the government’s response, much to 
Kantakouzēnos’ chagrin. Moreover, when Kantakouzēnos is openly insulted 
by a junior senator in front of the assembly, no reprimand is forthcoming.307 
When he threatens to resign over the issue, however, she reacts immediately. 
She is ‘distressed and astounded’,308 and explains her tolerance of the insult 
by claiming she simply did not hear it.309 She prevails on him to stay in office, 
calling upon him to remember his friendship with Andronikos and to have 
pity upon a widow and her orphans.310 Most strikingly, it is only in her 
speech that we hear of her husband’s final words, warning her that 
Kantakouzēnos’ dismissal would destroy the Romans.311 She argues that it is 
his duty ‘just as when the Emperor was alive, to take control of public affairs 
in accordance with the Emperor’s own commands’.312 She says that she needs 
to be freed of such worries to fully mourn her husband.313 Thus her initial 
independence concludes with her tearfully begging him to remain. 
The implication is that the Empress’ previous apparent ambivalence 
about allowing Kantakouzēnos a free rein in public affairs was due to her 
inexperience, the emotional turmoil of her husband’s death, and the 
ambitions of the Patriarch. The latter is now forced into acquiescence 
through Anna’s acceptance of Kantakouzēnos’ continued dominance of 
government. Harmony reigns thereafter, until Kantakouzēnos departs 
Constantinople in September. He now sketches an idealised relationship 
                                                 
306 Kant. II, 18.18-19.12. 
307 Kant. II, 20.10-21.8. 
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between the two. It is undeniably one of tutelage: he governs wisely in her 
name, affording her all appropriate honour and explaining his decisions for 
her ex post facto approval.314 He upholds her authority through the device of 
encouraging her to publicly reproach his rowdy partisans but not to actually 
punish them.315 The incident demonstrates not only the level of their 
cooperation but also the degree of her subordination to Kantakouzēnos. It is 
not suggested that he actually consults the Empress or seeks her permission 
before making decisions; they are not ruling together but rather power has 
simply been delegated to him. This is most obviously displayed when 
Apokaukos attempts to appeal over Kantakouzēnos’ head, pointing out that 
court titles are bestowed on her authority, not on that of the Grand 
Domestic.316 Kantakouzēnos, observing propriety, remains silent: to do 
otherwise would be to openly usurp imperial prerogatives. The Empress 
responds that Apokaukos was granted his titles by Kantakouzēnos, who 
informed her afterwards and who ‘persuaded me [Anna] to consent to his 
decision’.317 Kantakouzēnos reports only a single request which Anna denies 
him and it is unarguably her own right: to crown her son, Iōannēs. This 
refusal eventually damages Kantakouzēnos, though he explains that later he 
discovered that it was Apokaukos who swayed her.318 Apart from this, 
Kantakouzēnos essentially exercises the imperial office de facto while 
acknowledging Anna holding it de jure. He seems – not unsurprisingly – to 
be content with this situation but depicts her as being content with it as well. 
This ideal relationship is, not by coincidence, essentially the same as that 
which existed during Andronikos’ illness of 1330. There was no reason in 
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Kantakouzēnos’ mind that this arrangement, which had been apparently 
harmonious at that time, should not suffice eleven years later. 
In 1341, however, there was no explicit mandate from Andronikos. 
Moreover, Anna had much more political experience and, unlike the earlier 
occasion, she was now sole empress and the mother of the imperial heir. She 
had fewer reasons to accept political tutelage and almost certainly viewed 
the sons of any all-powerful regent as potential competitors to her own, not 
unwisely given the precedent of Michaēl Palaiologos’ rise to power. 
Kantakouzēnos represented an established family with ties to the imperial 
line and two of his sons were already old enough to hold military 
commands. Dispersal of power among a wide circle of courtiers would have 
suited her more readily. Kantakouzēnos shows no sign that he 
acknowledged or even recognised these concerns, in fact – by way of his 
threat to retire – he reacts strongly against her efforts to consult more widely 
and bluntly warns her that this could lead to war.319 It is in this context that 
Anna’s offer to marry Iōannēs to one of Kantakouzēnos’ daughters can be 
understood.320 By tying their two families together, she could accommodate 
the predominance of Kantakouzēnos while ensuring that he had a strong 
reason to safeguard the succession. His failure to immediately consent 
would have been profoundly worrying to her.  
Following Kantakouzēnos’ departure from Constantinople, the 
situation changes rapidly. The whole episode of Apokaukos’ construction of 
the conspiracy and the conspirators’ subsequent efforts to turn the Empress 
against Kantakouzēnos is one of the most detailed and dramatic episodes in 
the Histories, occupying the entire of Chapters 17-21. Kantakouzēnos is 
concerned to show that Anna, unlike the Patriarch and the other named 
conspirators, did not change her mind easily. She is worn down only by a 
                                                 
319 Kant. II, 40.23-45.2. 
320 Kant. II, 104.3-14. Regarding this proposal, see also Ch.16:10. 
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continual procession of sykophantai. On the first day, two separate 
approaches by conspirators provoke her to anger when they slander 
Kantakouzēnos.321 On the following day, the initial group is dismissed with a 
warning that she might inform the Grand Domestic of their words.322 Finally, 
Apokaukos sends to her the Patriarch and Kantakouzēnos’ own father-in-
law, Andronikos Asanēs. She hears the Patriarch out but is shocked by his 
speech.323 Ultimately, it is Asanēs who saves the conspirators: his argument 
that Kantakouzēnos wishes to kill Anna and her children, combined with his 
willingness to sacrifice his own daughter for the sake of the imperial family, 
cause her resolve to crumble. Even then, Anna is still unable to believe their 
accusations can be altogether true and bursts into tears.324 Asanēs’ most 
persuasive argument is Kantakouzēnos’ failure to accept the marriage 
proposal. In some ways it is surprising that Kantakouzēnos reports the offer 
at all, in view of his calamitous handling of it. However, by doing so he seeks 
to repudiate the alternative tradition, recorded by Grēgoras – namely, that he 
sought the marriage and was rebuffed325 – and additionally seeks to 
demonstrate that the Empress was, at that moment, still well disposed to 
him. Immediately after the war he ‘corrected’ his error by marrying Helenē 
to Iōannēs. 
Although Anna clearly turned against Kantakouzēnos and sanctioned 
the attacks on his supporters, he continually minimises her responsibility 
and endeavours to show that her personal wish was for a negotiated peace. 
Shortly after the war begins, she addresses her female attendants and 
bewails that she has been deceived, hoping that the war can be ended by the 
                                                 
321 Kant. II, 125.16-126.14. 
322 Kant. II, 127.2-7. 
323 Kant. II, 129.11-16. 
324 Kant. II, 135.12-136.12. 
325 See Ch.16:10. 
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marriage of Iōannēs and Helenē.326 However, one of her ladies informs 
Apokaukos of her words and the Patriarch makes her swear an oath, on pain 
of excommunication, that she will not make peace without the consent of her 
‘protectors’, who have much to lose from peace.327 Soon afterwards, Anna is 
convinced by the peace mission from Mount Athos, but then feels 
constrained by the oaths she has been deceived into swearing.328 She tries on 
her own account to persuade her ministers to make peace, but they arrange 
for a succession of spies to attest that they have overheard Kantakouzēnos 
boasting of the punishments he will inflict on his enemies when he wins.329 
When some regency loyalists bridle at Kantakouzēnos’ suggestion that the 
Empress is controlled by her archons, he tests their assertions by sending an 
emissary with orders to deliver a message to her alone. When the messenger 
is beaten and denied private audience, he concludes finally that peace is 
impossible.330 Anna is his only hope for reason to prevail.  
In other matters, Kantakouzēnos similarly excuses Anna from 
participation in the worst outrages of the regency government. She is 
angered by Apokaukos’ mistreatment of ambassadors.331 Although she 
ordered the arrest of Kantakouzēnos’ mother, she swears oaths that she 
knew nothing of the abuse which led to Theodōra’s death.332 The Empress 
was unaware of Apokaukos’ attempts to violate the sanctity of confession in 
order to gain intelligence from imprisoned Kantakouzēnists.333 Similarly, she 
was kept misinformed regarding the doctrinal turmoil which the Patriarch 
stirred up within the Church but acted immediately when some bishops told 
                                                 
326 Kant. II, 202.20-203.16.  
327 Kant. II, 203.18-208.8. 
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329 Kant. II, 224.1-21. 
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her the truth.334 The picture is consistent, and a Franciscan envoy from 
Constantinople explains that ‘she was in no way responsible for the war, but 
the Patriarch and the others who advise her do not allow her to make peace, 
convincing her that […] you will immediately kill her and her children.’335 
While Anna’s hostility to Kantakouzēnos becomes more determined 
until – at the end of the war – she is still willing to fight on, even though 
Apokaukos is long dead, she remains an innocent. Her moral failing, despite 
the terrible consequences, is ultimately forgivable. This is because, in 
Kantakouzēnos’ view, her weakness and her essential morality have the 
same source: her femininity. He tells the reader, in a speech which 
foreshadows her deception by the conspirators, that the female mind is 
irresolute. He fears that this ‘weakness of female nature’336 will leave her 
vulnerable to persuasion by the sykophantai. This is not to say that some 
women, such as his mother, cannot transcend their gender but in doing so, 
they are wholly remarkable.337 The Empress is not one of these extraordinary 
women and she confesses her own ‘feminine weakness’.338 However, her lack 
of resolution is clearly anticipated and therefore excusable, unlike the 
determined hostility of her male ministers. Far greater blame is placed on the 
Patriarch, who swore to protect the Empress from accusations against 
Kantakouzēnos but instead abetted them.339 Just as the Empress reigns well 
when under Kantakouzēnos’ beneficent guidance before the war, 
subsequently she rules badly when under the malign surveillance and 
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control of Apokaukos and Kalekas. Even then, her disposition reveals her 
essential goodness: the conspirators are forced to go to extreme lengths to 
persuade her to abandon Kantakouzēnos in the first place, and even after 
this she remains in favour of peace for a long time. Alone of the regency 
party, she is unaware of the true reason for the war: their greed and envy of 
Kantakouzēnos. Instead she opposes Kantakouzēnos not because of her vices 
but because her great virtue – the fierce concern of a mother for the 
protection of her children – has been twisted by lies. If she had not been 
misled into believing there was danger where in fact there was none, her 
motives would be praiseworthy. It is this conviction that explains her refusal 
to surrender even when her palace is finally besieged by Kantakouzēnos’ 
soldiers. When Kantakouzēnos victoriously entered the palace, ‘he found the 
Empress standing with her children before the icon of the Mother of God 
Hodēgētria’.340 The symbolism was clear and Kantakouzēnos immediately 
prostrated himself before the icon.341 His acceptance of the Palaiologan 
succession and of her maternal imperative towards safeguarding it, despite 
its perversion by the sykophantai, is the basis for their reconciliation. After the 
scales are removed from Anna’s eyes, their relationship is again harmonious. 
So thorough is their reconciliation that Kantakouzēnos sends Anna to 
Thessalonike in 1351 to persuade her son to abandon his alliance with Stefan 
Dušan which threatens the loss of the city and a new civil war. She first 
reproaches him for leaving Iōannēs V there at all, against her advice,342 but 
then sails to Thessalonike as requested and persuades her headstrong son ‘to 
honour his parents [i.e., Kantakouzēnos and herself] and to obey them in 
every way’, just as would be expected from a good mother.343  
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Even before the war, Kantakouzēnos depicts Anna as opposed to his 
forgiveness of Apokaukos and already willing to offer the eventual post-war 
settlement by betrothing her son. On these two issues, it is apparent that the 
disastrous misjudgement belonged to Kantakouzēnos, not Anna. 
Kantakouzēnos never confesses his errors but he does record them and by 
allowing her to identify his mistakes, he extends his forgiveness for his own 
faults to hers too. As already mentioned, Anna’s tragic flaw is her femininity 
but this is ultimately a laudable weakness: she fell victim to the plotters’ lies 
not because of stereotypical female vices such as vanity or inconsistency but 
because of a powerful female virtue, the intense concern of a mother to 
protect her children. Once convinced they face deadly peril, she is resolute 
and determined.  
The civil war, as presented by Kantakouzēnos, is a tragedy and its two 
opposed principals are fundamentally tragic characters because both fight 
from noble motives for the same legitimate goal, to protect the young 
emperor. It therefore took the actions of a truly evil and perverse figure to 
bring them into conflict. The Histories is generally recognised as an apologia 
for its author. Much less acknowledged is the extent that it is an apologia for 
Anna Palaiologina. Kantakouzēnos’ forgiving portrayal of her, despite the 
injuries they had dealt each other, is in many ways unsurprising: she was 
mother of the reigning emperor and, when the composition of the Histories 
began, it was likely that she was still living and ruling in Thessalonike. Any 
denunciation of her would have pointlessly stirred up bitterness and would 
have made both his wartime claim to be upholding her rights and his 
respectful treatment of her thereafter seem absurd. Moreover, they now had 
shared grandchildren. Perhaps also, in their private thoughts, they had 
similar cause to reflect on how they had misjudged each other and the 
terrible costs which their errors had incurred. After war, there is peace.
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Chapter 1 
/11/ What concerns then the Palaiologoi emperors1 – both their 
struggle for power against each other and what the younger accomplished 
by himself during his rule, after the elder was deposed from power, /12/ by 
waging war against the barbarians and governing his own people – ends at 
this point and our initial purpose has reached its fulfilment, having reported 
everything with accuracy and with truth as it happened. 
Since after the death of Andronikos the younger2 the bitterest war of 
the Romans against each other ever in memory erupted, which overturned 
and ruined nearly everything, and proved that the prosperity and greatness 
of the Roman Empire had reached its weakest point – just as if a shadow of 
its former self – I considered it necessary to set forth what happened during 
this war as well, not only in order that those hereafter should know envy is 
the cause of such great evils – utterly destroying not only those envied but 
also the enviers, just as rust destroys the iron it is begotten from – but also 
that you, who are present now, may be able to know the truth of these 
matters and not be led astray by the rumours coming from abroad into 
believing that which is not, nor pay heed to the babblers from each of the 
factions, whether flattering themselves or slandering their opponents. 
It is important to pay careful and not cursory attention to me. For all 
others, if indeed there are certain persons who wrote about this war, know 
nothing clear about what happened; either they were entirely absent from 
these events, or they accepted whatever they heard – whatever the common 
mob spreads about or certain others have reported – /13/ and they passed 
such things on to later generations, caring nothing for the truth. Or else, even 
if they campaigned with either of the two emperors – but doubtlessly not 
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participating in their counsels – they were neither confidants in the more 
confidential matters, nor were they otherwise present at every action, since 
the war was continuous and long – for it lasted five years.3 In my case, 
however, no one could hold me responsible for any such thing. For being 
present myself with the authors of the actions, I know these things on my 
own account; I have accurate knowledge of these events, related by those 
involved, because I endured the many and continuous changes throughout 
the entire course of the war. As a result, it is natural that I am ignorant of 
nothing, not only of what was done but also of the confidential plans, 
stratagems and plots and, in short, of everything, both the conspicuous 
deeds and the secret preparations. Indeed, as I have said from the 
beginning,4 I will value nothing above the truth but I will report the events 
as they took place, except I will deliberately omit in some cases certain 
matters which, should they be said, would cause reproach or offence to 
certain people. For it does not please me to speak ill of certain persons, even 
if this is common knowledge. If ever I disclose something in the course of my 
narrative which is not as the public believes, it is not necessary to be 
surprised. For if I do not avoid the chatter of the common folk, I will write 
what is untrue, but if I report matters as they are, /14/ I will bid farewell to 
the opinions of the many, as these are erroneous. 
So, following the death of the young Emperor Andronikos, his wife, 
the Empress Anna,5 remained for three days in the Monastery of Hodēgōn.6 
Subsequently, arriving in the palace, she mourned for nine days, while 
everyone was attending her in the palace every day; not only the senators7 
and the military officers but also all the Byzantines8 who were lamenting the 
departed Emperor, in their thoughts and publicly. 
From the day the Emperor died the Grand Domestic9 did not 
withdraw from the palace10 at all but, having five hundred of his own and 
imperial <soldiers>,11 he appointed them as a guard for the palace as he was 
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making all effort and haste to blunt the impulses of possible rebels. After the 
ninth day, once the customary services for the dead were performed, he 
discharged the majority of the guard from the palace, appointing a small 
number, as many as were customary before. He went home, taking care of 
affairs as was usual: he advised through letters those appointed as governors 
of the provinces and the cities to stay calm and by no means to rebel, as in 
this way they would deservedly receive both the benefits of their goodness 
and the rewards of being in the Emperor’s favour, and conversely – if any 
were to attempt rebellion – they would pay the penalty. Also he ordered 
those entrusted with the collection of the public taxes not to act corruptly 
concerning the money for, no less than /15/ when the Emperor was alive, 
they would be held to account for this. And in this way, sending letters to 
each – over five hundred in the greater part of thirty days – he established 
good order and ready obedience in all the territory subject to the Romans, so 
that it seemed nothing unusual had happened, but it was as if the Emperor 
was still alive and presiding over affairs. For nothing new, either great or 
small, was set in motion, except only the Albanians12 dwelling throughout 
Thessaly13 who, having heard of the Emperor’s death, ravaged the cities 
there and seized a small amount of booty. Learning of this, the Grand 
Domestic swiftly sent messengers to the Albanians, telling them either to 
return the plunder and not to rebel any longer or, if they would not obey, to 
expect him to treat them as enemies. And they, cowering before the threat, 
not only restored the booty to those they had wronged, but also promised to 
keep quiet henceforth, if only they could receive pardon for their 
wrongdoings. But these matters happened a little later.  
After the Grand Domestic returned to his home from the palace, 
heralds went to the cities and towns around Byzantion14 at his orders, 
summoning all clergy to the city of Constantine on a stipulated day, in order 
to perform the services for the deceased Emperor. Such a large number of 
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priests assembled, that the church of the Wisdom of God,15 although the 
largest in size among all under the sun, seemed smaller than needed, 
because it was filled entirely by the multitude of priests. When /16/ the day 
appointed for the services was at hand, they performed without clamour and 
in such an orderly manner that the participants seemed to be few and easy to 
count. For no indistinct noise was heard, of the sort the multitude love to 
make, but an extraordinary musical concord and harmony, all of them 
singing holy hymns in succession. This was not only surprising but also the 
spectacle gave pleasure, seeing so many of the clergy together with the 
hierarchs, adorned with their sacred vestments and performing one rite, 
marshalled under one leader, the Patriarch.16 On account of the abundance of 
candles and the other extravagances of preparation it surpassed those 
celebrations which were praised in the past. The expenses of this and the 
wages of the priests, granted to each with particular generosity according to 
his rank, were provided by the Grand Domestic from his own resources. 
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Chapter 2 
So the service happened in such a way. He had control of the 
administration just as before, holding no one in suspicion about anything. 
For the Patriarch, however, it was not satisfactory to remain with things as 
they were before but he considered it necessary to cling on to the governance 
of public affairs as belonging to him for a particular reason. When the 
Emperor was still alive, not a little time before his death, the Grand Domestic 
used to advise him to persuade the Patriarch to threaten a penalty and 
separation from the Church of the faithful [excommunication] if anyone, /17/ 
after the Emperor’s death, might plot against his children1 and unjustly take 
the Empire away from them. Attempting to persuade the Emperor, he used 
to assert that in such a case they would be doing nothing wrong and would 
have accomplished nothing unreasonable, but would also render no little 
benefit to the children through this, if something of this kind did happen to 
them. For it is unknown to anyone when the end, death, will come; 
especially to those always involved in battles and dangers. And it was not 
impossible that both of them [Andronikos and Kantakouzēnos] could 
happen to fall on account of a single battle.2 If this occurred, it would follow 
that the children are left wholly unprotected, being neither able to defend 
themselves because of their youth, nor having anyone else as a genuine and 
honest champion. 
The Emperor was not easily persuaded, being of a gentle mind and 
thinking it proper for the hand of the Almighty to hold the hopes for his 
children’s safety than to look towards the feeble assistance which comes 
from human invention, being aware that such contrivances by the emperors 
before them had been of no benefit.3 He said that either God, reaching out 
His protecting hand from on high, or the power of those friendly to us could 
prevail over our opponents, preventing the attacks of those wishing to do 
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harm. Oaths, censures, and all similar such things would cause no alarm to 
those who deliberately choose to take advantage. For this reason they should 
refrain from any such action, as not only would it be of no benefit to us, but 
also /18/ would be able to cause no significant harm to others, just as 
additional punishment is due for theft even to those separated from God. 
The Grand Domestic would not give up pressing the issue, but he 
asked him [the Emperor] to desist from such arguments and to be persuaded 
by him, as he was providing useful and just counsel. And indeed, having 
pressed hard, he [Kantakouzēnos] persuaded him, not that he [the Emperor] 
was fully convinced, as he would not concede that the arrangements might 
be useful, but kept hold of the opinion he had from the beginning, yet he was 
unwillingly persuaded because this seemed useful to him [Kantakouzēnos]. 
And having summoned the Patriarch and as many of the archpriests as were 
present in Byzantion at that time,4 and having debated as much as was 
reasonable about the matter, he expressed his opinion openly, namely that 
the proposal seemed neither necessary nor useful (for it would not hinder 
the attacks of the plotters). But so that he would not seem to be persuaded by 
only his own reasoning but also to concede to other people advising him and 
be persuaded by them and trust them, he ordered an excommunication to be 
pronounced against those who would unjustly attack his children after his 
death. So the Patriarch did as the Emperor ordered.5 
Because of these things then, after the Emperor’s death, the Patriarch 
deemed it necessary, since he was evidently protector of the Emperor’s 
children6 and especially because the Emperor’s son, the Emperor Iōannēs,7 
was still a little child, engaging at that time in boyish pursuits (for he was 
nine years old),8 to lay his hands on public affairs and assist in preserving the 
Empire for the young emperor. Nevertheless he took hold of them while 
attempting to escape notice as much as possible and he was establishing 
himself little by little in /19/ power, for he was afraid of openly opposing the 
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Grand Domestic. And he was doing other things which were not pleasing to 
him [Kantakouzēnos], even organising a faction among the senators and 
persuading them with many promises to join him, as he would procure them 
the greatest benefits if the command of public affairs fell to him. He 
continuously busied himself in the palace, retiring home only in the middle 
of the night. From this, the Grand Domestic guessed the Patriarch’s intention 
and, moreover, certain of those who shared his [the Patriarch’s] secrets were 
reporting the cause of these events to him. He was annoyed, as was natural, 
and these goings-on caused him anger. Despite this, he bore it in silence, 
keeping watch over wherever the plan would turn out for him. 
Meanwhile something else also happened, which took hold of the 
Grand Domestic’s heart to no little degree.9 For the Emperor10 of the 
Mysians,11 Alexandros,12 sent an embassy to the Empress and the Romans, 
demanding the fugitive Sismanos,13 son of the previous ruler of the Mysians, 
Michaēl,14 who was living with them and who was born to him [Michaēl] by 
[Anna] the sister15 of Stephanos,16 ruler of the Triballi,17 who herself ruled the 
Mysians after his death. Prior to this, while he [Michaēl] was still alive, she 
was divorced by him and he married the sister of the young Emperor 
Andronikos [Theodōra].18 After a short while, having being conspired 
against by her most powerful dynasts, she [Anna] was again driven from 
power. She took Iōannēs19 – the other of their [Anna’s and Michaēl’s] sons – 
and returned to her brother, the Kralēs,20 while Sismanos, /20/ the remaining 
son, went to the Scyths21 as an exile. Indeed after spending no little time 
among them, he later willingly came to the Romans after the Emperor’s 
death. Alexandros then demanded this man, through those he sent, because 
he was his greatest enemy. He said there were two options: either hand over 
Sismanos to be put to death, or to prepare for war, as it was not possible for 
him to be a friend and ally to the Romans while his greatest enemy was 
supported by them. He also sent the oaths which were sworn to him by the 
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Emperor Andronikos to make peace.22 So the embassy of Alexandros took 
this course.  
It was necessary for the senate, meeting together with the Empress, to 
deliberate if they must hand over the deserter or wage war against the 
Mysians on his behalf. So they assembled in the palace.23 The Grand 
Domestic was also present among them, together with the Patriarch. When 
this decision was put before the assembly, all the others kept quiet, turning 
their eyes towards the Grand Domestic and whatever he would advise 
concerning the matter set before them. 
Geōrgios Choumnos,24 the epi tēs trapezēs,25 spoke ignorantly and 
insolently, before anyone could utter anything, ”It has been written ‘if ever 
something is revealed to the last, let the first be silent.’26 Therefore, if it is 
possible that one who is considered among the last of us has something 
better to say, concerning the matters on which we are now deliberating, it is 
necessary for the first to accept it.” 
Truly, the Grand Domestic was immediately disturbed by this speech, 
exasperated by the audacity /21/ and effrontery of the man. Yet he bore it in 
silence, thinking that the Empress or the Patriarch (for this man had already 
appointed himself over the council) would angrily expel Choumnos from the 
council-chamber or rebuke his inappropriate idle speech with words. As 
nothing of what was needed was said by either of them, he was yet more 
disturbed, as the speech constituted clear evidence of disorder and anarchy, 
if it was possible to give offence to all great men without fear. 
However, Dēmētrios Tornikēs27 could not bear this outrage. “What 
then?” he said, “Is it necessary to make the Empire of the Romans a 
democracy, so that anyone at all is allowed to give advice and to say 
whatever he may fancy, concerning greater and lesser matters, and to 
impose upon those who are better the necessity to accept decisions by votes? 
And what manner of absurdity would be lacking in such extremism?” 
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As they had already begun to quarrel with each other about these 
matters, the Empress halted proceedings, ordering them to refrain from such 
untimely arguments and to discuss what was necessary. The Grand 
Domestic feigned a stomach pain, which struck him by churning his innards, 
and he kept silent as he was not able to speak because of the pain. They [the 
senators] were in disorderly uproar, each preferring the solution that 
occurred to him. For some said it was necessary to protect Sismanos, who 
had become a suppliant of the Empire of the Romans, and not to betray him, 
even if it was necessary to endure some difficulties for his sake. Others 
would rather preserve the country and their own property and not /22/ 
throw themselves into manifest danger for the sake of a barbarian fugitive. 
And with other similar views, they argued against each other and filled the 
palace with shouting, all wanting to put forward opinions and proposals for 
the sake of the common good. As the rivalry continued further and there 
were conflicting opinions, the Patriarch, as though he had devised 
something great and marvellous, said, “It seems to me Sismanos has taken 
refuge in the church of the Wisdom of God.28 Since it has been revered as an 
asylum by all of those who have ruled over the Romans, this allows us to 
give a legitimate excuse to Alexandros’ ambassadors, because it is not 
permitted to drag away a suppliant of God and hand him over to be 
slaughtered; this sacrilege is considered by the Romans, of the present day 
and ancient times, the most impious of all.” 
Certainly, many of those present marvelled at this counsel as the best 
and most intelligent, strong enough to send away Alexandros’ ambassadors 
empty-handed, even themselves immediately understanding the necessity of 
the matter. As the Grand Domestic made no sound, the Empress first 
criticised the untimeliness of his affliction, which occurred at such a crucial 
moment and when she had need of his advice. Then she said to him that, if 
the counsel of the Patriarch seemed correct to him, just as clearly as it also 
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seemed good to the others and to her, he could nod his assent of what they 
had said and put an end to the council. If another way seemed better and 
/23/ more profitable to him, although she would dissolve the assembly at the 
current time on account of his illness, when he had recovered they would 
again deliberate concerning these matters.29 
After a short pause he said, “You appear to me not to have reached a 
decision concerning the matters about which you have deliberated. For at 
this moment the question is not about legitimate justifications but whether it 
is necessary to fulfil the demands of Alexandros, or whether to make war on 
him. But, having neglected the matters you were appointed to deliberate on, 
you discuss what is lawful and just among the Romans, as if someone was 
forcing Alexandros to obey the laws of the Romans. Perhaps he [Alexandros] 
might say, ‘These laws apply not to me but to the Romans: for me there is 
one law, to seek my own advantage in every possible way. As for you, 
though it is possible to conceal Sismanos in holy sanctuaries, you certainly 
cannot hide the cities and towns in such places as well, nor herds of cattle 
and flocks of sheep and the other wealth of the fields, from which it is 
possible for me to take compensation for this injustice.’ Therefore the need is 
to deliberate on these matters, not on legitimate excuses. But now I must find 
some fault with myself also, because your arguments in these matters have 
in some way or another persuaded me as well. For it was said at the 
beginning and ratified by everyone – since no-one said anything against it – 
that if ever something is revealed to the last, the first is to keep silent. If, then, 
one is not numbered among the last, /24/ but rather among the first and, it 
seems, especially those leading the senate in these matters, and as it was 
approved as advantageous by you all, it befits even myself to agree and to 
meddle no further in state affairs.” 
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With the Empress above all urging him on and attracted to his 
arguments, <he added,> “Although these words were few, I did not say them 
willingly.” 
The Patriarch, immediately discharging himself from responsibility in 
respect to such matters, said, “But I am first and I myself agree the proposal 
is not what is being asked about. For Alexandros will not be concerned about 
fine words and answers of such a kind but about whatever he proposed at 
the beginning, and if he is able to bring it to accomplishment. For this reason 
I say we should not take counsel about excuses but about this.” 
At once, all the rest approved the same idea. When the Grand 
Domestic stood, the others also rose at the same time, and the assembly was 
dissolved. The Grand Domestic, observing the Patriarch’s earlier desire for 
control of public affairs, did not wish to stop the attempt by force; for he did 
not wish to rule over the unwilling, but much rather over those wanting and 
knowing the benefit of his rule. Above all, fearing this would provide a 
pretext for strife and civil war, by which it seemed probable that the rule of 
the Romans would be destroyed, and thinking his responsibility for allowing 
such horrors would be worse than any death (for which reason, while the 
Emperor was still /25/ alive, he did not want to become emperor, although he 
was invited a great many times), he thought to lay aside his former authority 
and to live the remainder of his life in retirement considering, just as I have 
said, anything whatsoever more tolerable than himself being responsible for 
instigating the ruin of the Romans. When, during the assembly, Choumnos 
had wilfully and presumptuously argued against him (for it was considered 
that the speech alluded to him in particular; at that time he was considered 
as – and was – first among all of the Romans), nobody had censured him, nor 
did they complain of his inappropriate boldness. Because he considered this 
proceeding as the start of civil strife, he hastened to resign his office sooner 
than he had wished. 
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Chapter 3 
So then, the day after the assembly, when he and the Patriarch were 
present in the palace, he used him [the Patriarch] as a messenger to the 
Empress and disclosed these matters to her through him, namely that if the 
choice had really been set before him by God (may He be a witness that what 
was said was true) when the Emperor was alive, he [Kantakouzēnos] would 
have chosen his own death instead of his [Andronikos’]; he would have 
preferred – by every reckoning and with all eagerness and willingness – to 
die for the sake of his life. “Since He who weighs out the measure of life and 
death to each was resolved on this course [i.e., that Andronikos should die], 
while it is fitting to give thanks to Him for His wise arrangement towards us, 
every man should consider whatever may be appropriate and advantageous 
to himself. And having carefully considered these matters concerning 
myself, /26/ it seems to me that I must withdraw from public affairs, to spend 
the remainder of my life in retirement, in whatever manner I am able, living 
by myself.1 So this is my judgement; now I make it clear to you also.” 
When the Patriarch inquired about the reason which prompted him to 
say such things to the Empress, he said that even previously he had turned 
over such considerations in his mind and thought it necessary to have done 
with public affairs. “What convinced me to reveal my plan so soon, was 
nothing other than, during the assembly on the day before, Choumnos’ 
inappropriate and unheard of outspokenness and his ‘if ever something is 
revealed to the last, let the first be silent’. Neither the Empress nor yourself 
were vexed at his impudence, nor was he punished for his mindless 
drivelling, but you passed over what he said in silence, just as if he was 
saying nothing unusual.” 
And the Patriarch said, “If there is some other reason that has led to 
words of this sort, you yourself would know. But if, having been provoked 
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only because of this man, bearing anger towards me as well as the Empress, 
you have decided to give up the administration of public affairs, then you act 
neither justly nor befittingly to yourself. For I insist that I did not hear these 
words and it is right that I expect to be believed by you. I think that the 
Empress will also say the same as me. For neither could she bear it in silence, 
if she had happened to hear these words and thought them to be addressed 
to you. And for this reason /27/ I beg you to withdraw your words to the 
Empress; they will be a not insignificant increase to our troubles.” 
He [Kantakouzēnos] did not give up, but he urged [the Patriarch] to 
report now, asserting that the speech alone had created the problem, 
although perhaps something else lay buried in his heart. Immediately, 
therefore, the Patriarch did what he had been urged to do and he reported to 
the Empress all that the Grand Domestic had discussed with him. Having 
received these words – which were without hope and beyond expectation – 
into her hearing, she was distressed by what had been said and astounded at 
what the Grand Domestic believed, at these things that he had taken to heart 
and said to her. 
However, having recovered herself, she declared to him [via the 
Patriarch] that such words as these were entirely unbefitting of him, neither 
were they worthy of his intelligence, or of his friendship with the Emperor, 
“which even from childhood until this very day you have preserved with 
one another, honest and pure. Therefore I am not persuaded that because of 
one man’s madness you have been led into such great anger and distress. I 
confess I neither heard this man speaking, nor, if I had happened to be 
informed of it, would it be useful to punish the speaker. For you yourself 
have no less power than I to punish and grant forgiveness to those giving 
offence, as you may wish. So if you are exasperated because of those words 
alone, it is more appropriate for him to receive punishment from yourself 
than from me. If there is something else that you want, /28/ which is 
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unknown to me until now, then speak boldly, as there will be no difficulty 
on my part – whatever it may be that you desire – unless it is completely 
impossible.” In such a way the Empress replied to the words of the Grand 
Domestic.  
He said [to the Patriarch] that he [the Patriarch] had completely failed 
to understand the meaning of his words and that the Empress was very far 
from understanding what was happening. “In order that you yourself know 
that I deliberate in a just way, and explain it to the Empress, listen to what I 
consider concerning these matters. The friendship the Emperor and myself 
towards each other was unsurpassed from childhood; you, naturally, may be 
ignorant of this, and the Empress was living in her homeland. However, 
throughout the war against his grandfather the emperor, at the outset and at 
the end, while everyone else was submitting to the constantly changing 
circumstances, and all were ranged against him [Andronikos III], he was 
driven close to the uttermost desperation. I willingly fought along with him, 
not sparing my body, or my money, or anything else of mine, but at the most 
pressing times when one needs true friends, I was everything to him and left 
nothing necessary undone. After he came to power over public affairs, I was 
collaborating closely with him and assisting in toils and dangers for his sake 
against so many external enemies – I speak of both Hellenes2 and barbarians 
– and against the plotters within, just as if I were another of him /29/ (for I 
permit myself to speak thus of the administration of affairs, as I myself was 
undertaking every labour, making his rule painless and effortless for him). 
All the Romans may know this and would bear witness for me since the facts 
speak loudly and clearly for themselves. The Empress especially, above all 
others, was taught clearly not only by the facts but by the Emperor himself, 
about our harmony with one other, which entirely surpassed, it seems to me, 
the friendships celebrated both by those in the past and the present. In 
addition to this, not only did we happen to benefit each other, but we also 
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lived our livesa until the present day most honourably. Therefore it is absurd, 
when formerly there was never any pretext at all given for dishonour by 
myself, now to do willingly things deserving abuse and blame. For if – 
having ignored such kindsb of evils entering into public affairs – I bring 
disgrace to myself, and am the cause of dangers and ruin to the rest of the 
Romans, I will be unable justly to beg forgiveness before myself as judge. If, 
knowing this, as I clearly understand [the situation] already, I am rendered 
soft by fear of appearing to resign power in dangerous times, I deserve not 
only reproach but even the ultimate penalty [death], because, despite 
knowing this beforehand, I willingly tolerate being viewed as craven and do 
not do what I know is necessary for the times and the situation. 
“Because of this, I determined /30/ to free myself from these dangers 
and from dishonour. And indeed it would not be possible to provide any 
assistance to the Empress or to the Emperor’s children in consequence of 
such disgrace and dangers. This consideration, surely, will be no of little 
consolation [to me]. So that I might not seem to shun toils and dangers on 
behalf of the Emperor’s children, then for now – in these times of peace and 
when there is no war, or any expectation of troubles – let the Patriarch and 
senate together with the Empress guide the state: good and honour will be 
the fruit of this. Yet if ever a war happens to break out, with danger 
menacing the children of the Emperor, then immediately I will willingly put 
myself into danger, and either I will help to restore the state to them or I will 
fall fighting for them. Thus, if I prevail, the toils and the risks to me would 
result in the enjoyment of public affairs for you and for you to enjoy them in 
full, with no cause for trouble. 
“That is the chief point of my words, as it is not advisable to hold 
control of affairs just as before. I can also make what I say quite clear by my 
                                                 
a II, 29.11: βιβιωκέναι amended to βεβιωκέναι. 
b II, 29.14: οἷ amended to οἵων (following P). 
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deeds: having risen from my accustomed seat, I will sit down on a different 
one, so that the Empress and all of you will know that there is now no 
obstacle for you to establish someone else, whoever you may wish, over state 
affairs.” Having spoken thus, he changed place just as if he were 
surrendering his authority to another by his deed. 
Having seen and heard all of this, the Patriarch said, “Your speech is 
harsh /31/ and very able to touch the heart of the Empress.” 
“You speak the truth,” he [Kantakouzēnos] said, “and nothing of this 
sort must be said or done. But now, although above all else I wish to say to 
her many words of consolation and relief from the many sufferings which 
have come to the Empress because of the death of the Emperor, I am driven 
by such great necessity to do completely the opposite, for two reasons. For 
either I am constrained to be completely idle or to rule badly, insofar as it is 
not befitting. Therefore, either I do nothing – and the Empress may 
acquiesce, thinking the state will be administered as it was yesterday and the 
day before by me – leading to total ruin, or, alternatively, I rule badly and 
not in accordance with what is needed, leading the same way again to 
destruction. Besides, I would deserve punishment for my incompetence not 
only from others but from myself. Consequently, on both accounts it is 
advantageous that these things become known to the Empress, even if they 
must cause her trouble and distress. For it is better that, having learned 
about these circumstances, you and the others deliberate as to what is 
necessary for the state rather than being ignorant for a while longer and then 
to become angry, not only because of these matters, but also because of the 
harm that will come about.” 
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Chapter 4 
So the Patriarch reported everything to the Empress. She heard what 
would never have crossed her mind, nor was she convinced by what the 
other was saying. At first, because of her distress, she was /32/ unable to 
respond; then, having silently spilt many tears from her eyes for long 
enough, she said, “It would be easier to persuade a mountain it was able to 
move, than to change the mind of the Grand Domestic in a short time. Since 
it is just now that I have heard about these matters concerning him, I could 
not have reflected upon them at any point; I am at a loss for an appropriate 
reply. However, because these things closely touch my heart, I will make a 
beginning to my defence. Therefore I say to him: ‘Just now, having roused 
my mind as if from either a deep torpor or sleep, you have brought me into 
awareness of the troubles surrounding me. For before, indeed even though I 
obviously knew the Emperor was dead, despite this, when you came to me, 
it seemed that he too, just as was his habit, came in with you and departed 
with you, and I almost thought he spoke when you spoke to me, and I 
considered the troubles that befell and surrounded me somehow bearable. 
Now, just as if a curtain has been raised, everything within is revealed: thus, 
having deprived us of our hopes by which we were deceived, you have 
prepared me to look upon matters as they are and to think of my children 
bereft of their father, of myself in widowhood and afflicted by its evils. 
“But what might anyone say or even think about you? Perhaps you 
forget your close partnership and /33/ that remarkable friendship the 
Emperor bore towards you which, by reason of its magnitude, the masses 
could not believe? But I cannot think it would be possible, even if you greatly 
wanted this. For I think if someone wanted to understand absolute 
friendship between men, then he would want to look to an example from 
which it would be possible for himself and others to recognise its power; he 
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would overlook you two alone, as having surpassed even the limits of 
friendship, you sought out those that remained – whatever they might be – 
to be the first to test them. You were not only such firm friends but also 
established the very model of friendship hereafter. And this I was able to see 
not only from your behaviour, but also to hear the Emperor saying many, 
many times, that his friendship towards you took precedence over his most 
beloved ones and his wife and the whole of his property, so to say.  
“Or indeed, is it not possible to say, in the most slandering manner, 
that you have forgotten the friendship of the Emperor, because you 
remember even the Emperor’s children ungratefully, repaying him after his 
death in the very opposite way than is appropriate?a But this is not you, just 
as the first <proposition> was not either. Furthermore your words to me, 
which you let flow on every occasion while the Emperor was alive, are not of 
equal worth to your current opinions. For of course you have not forgotten 
that you were confident that, when the moment demanded, you would steel 
yourself to stand firm, fully prepared for many struggles and dangers and 
even death, if it is possible to say this, to be of assistance to myself and my 
children. /34/ This time is now at hand; if it is acceptable to you to be judged 
on the basis of your actions, it is for you to say. Yet I am not aware of 
anything that would cause me to take offence at you, but from the moment I 
arrived in the imperial residence I lacked nothing that I was provided by my 
brother the Count1 [of Savoy], neither goodwill nor honour. Rather there was 
more by far, inasmuch as his death did me no harm nor did benefit attend 
me while he was alive, as we lived so far apart; but while living you could 
bestow the greatest benefits on me and the affairs of the Romans, and no less 
ruin them by dying. 
                                                 
a II, 33.16: ἐναντίας ᾗ προσῆκεν amended to ἐναντίας ἤ προσῆκεν (following Fatouros, 
‘Textkritische’, 192). 
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“Although I could add much and prove through these arguments that 
what you have decided is neither beneficial nor just, I will say this alone, 
leaving aside all the rest: if someone passing along a road happened to meet 
a woman of noble birth, acquainted with widowhood and the troubles that 
arise from this, clinging on to her orphaned children and having nobody as a 
protector and because of these circumstances fearing many dangers, and she 
asked [this person] to take pity on their misfortunes and to champion her 
and her children – putting forward nothing else as a good reason other than 
her nobility and her undeserved misfortune – is it not necessary for you and 
any man at all like you, having no other concerns, to provide as much care as 
you are able to for the woman and to consider labours for her sake 
worthwhile, for the purpose of your own glory /35/ and righteousness? 
Therefore, if this alone would be sufficient inducement, what convincing 
excuse can you offer if, with this same inducement and many other stronger 
ones at hand, you appear unmerciful? 
“For this reason, I ask you to leave aside your plan and not to forsake 
me and my young children because of a trivial pretext, just as if a helmsman 
were to abandon his ship in the middle of the sea. But either you have first 
reflected on these matters, and believe in your untimely plan which is filled 
with countless evils, or you were persuaded by someone else’s advice. That 
person is not one of your friends but is to be considered most hostile towards 
your glory and honour, while plotting against us in respect to our own safety 
and, I will add, against all the interests of the Romans in common. If I cannot 
see what I ought to do by myself – since there is no other certain salvation for 
everyone than for you, just as when the Emperor was alive, to take control of 
public affairs in accordance with the Emperor’s own arguments, which he 
made many times to me concerning you, especially shortly before his death – 
then it is necessary to understand what will be beneficial. For, resting <his 
head> on my knees, in your presence, he said, ‘The time of my death has 
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arrived. You must see to it once I have departed that you do not, having been 
deceived by certain thoughts or by the arguments of some people, dismiss 
this man and favour someone else. For if this happens, /36/ nothing remains 
thereafter for you and the children and the entire Empire of the Romans 
other than to be destroyed; pay heed to him, you should consider what is 
best for yourself and for public affairs.’2 If then I have been instructed in such 
a way by the Emperor and I perceive matters similarly for myself, what 
reason could there be for you to be persuaded and me to willingly accept 
what you have resolved, unfairly and contrary to what ought to be done? 
Therefore if you recognise how great the absurdity of this matter is from 
what I have said, refrain from deciding and saying such things. By taking 
hold of affairs, just as you are accustomed, you will do whatever is of benefit 
to the Romans in common, assisted by the hand [of God] from above, 
permitting me some quiet to lament and mourn my misfortunes (for this 
alone would be my consolation and abatement of my suffering), and you will 
do what is both correct and advantageous, as well as befitting to yourself.  
“If, having rejected and set aside everything, you become one alone 
by holding firm to your decisions, bidding farewell to all, I will make clear to 
you what I will do. Laying aside all shame and feminine weakness and 
turning away from thoughts of discretion under the magnitude of these 
evils, going to the middle of the City and standing myself on a platform, so 
that my voice is able to reach into the midst of everyone, I will cry out very 
loudly and shrilly, ‘Romans! Indeed all Hellenes and barbarians as well! You 
know well that everything is destroyed and /37/ ruined and that there is no 
gratitude for friendship among men, and there is no concern for truth and 
righteousness: uprightness has vanished from the considerations of men and 
in short everything that is good, if it is that the Grand Domestic, just as if 
having emerged from a contrary wind as the worst opponent of himself, and 
forgetting the Emperor’s friendship, has neglected the truth and 
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righteousness and the ambition for all that is good which becomes him; he 
thought to live the remainder of his life in idleness, although I and my 
children need much solicitude at the current moment, he departed and 
abandoned us as if we are a useless burden, as if he did not recognise us, if 
indeed once he perceived our appearance or heard report of matters 
concerning us.’ Having thus exposed the unfriendliness, instability and 
uncertainty of your judgement, if ever this happens, I will even gladly die, 
having received from you justice enough for me. I ask you again, in regard to 
all this, not to trouble me but to put aside these words of yours and to do 




The Empress replied in such a way from her deeply grieving and 
distressed heart. The Grand Domestic felt ashamed of himself, as she had 
spoken fairly as well as appropriately, and he had no argument against such 
a clear demonstration of the truth. He said nothing to the Patriarch but, 
taking him along, they went to the Empress. /38/ As soon as she saw them 
she was overcome by distress, she shed tears and lamented until she had had 
enough. Her tears offered clear evidence of the pain she felt inside. When she 
had finished, the Grand Domestic began speaking with her in this fashion: 
“It is the habit of good men, whenever anybody uses them as mediators, 
either to their friends and oikeioi1 – if ever they were at odds about some 
matter with them – or even to their worst enemies, to veil in silence and pass 
over the severity of their replies, particularly those which have the power to 
end peace and provoke the listener to anger. Conversely, regarding those 
words which are kind and gentle and sufficient for reconciliation, he should 
report no less than what he heard and add some of his own. On the other 
hand, just as the wicked choose the means of bringing men into conflict with 
each other, they also report in addition those words which cause anger, 
while those fitting for reconciliation and agreement they keep silent. At the 
present moment, having used the Patriarch as a messenger for my words 
and in turn having learned through him about the response made by you, I 
fear that he said these things gently and kindly, wishing to relieve and calm 
my heart, which is swelling up and burning with pain. But he did not 
preserve my words to you unaltered and, furthermore, he did not in turn 
report to me exactly the response which he obtained from you. But having 
/39/ said other things instead, he would now reconcile us for the moment but 
a little later he would make our disagreement greater and more severe. 
Because of this then, if such things were really said by you, I must 
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understand them accurately, so I may know how it is necessary to shape the 
remainder of my words.” And having related everything which the Patriarch 
had told him, he asked her if this was the way she had spoken. 
Once she agreed that everything which had taken place was correct 
and truthful, he said, “Therefore if I appear to put forward what follows 
harshly and thoughtlessly, I ask that you do not accuse me of vulgarity or 
stubbornness and audacity in my behaviour, but if anybody believes my 
words are disorderly, take into account beside this the force of 
circumstances, and forgive me since I am compelled by this. I consider that 
anybody at all who intends to observe well the character of a man and the 
manner of the passions he holds in his heart, neither pays heed to those 
superficial things said about him, nor examines him by himself in those 
situations in which he is not able to bring what he has recommended into 
action, but at a time when it is most possible for him to use his abilities. For 
if, at that time, he appeared to be doing nothing of this sort, that is, if 
someone thought this of him, then he might perhaps choose to turn to a life 
of leisure hereafter. Accordingly I will speak freely concerning myself, as I 
did not previously desire to change my present rank for that of emperor, 
although /40/ I was invited many, many times by the Emperor of blessed 
memory, when he was still alive, nor do I desire it now. For if such 
ridiculous desires had happened to seize me, what obstacle was there when 
the Emperor died? Having taken his children, I put the palace under guard 
with them secured inside and, of all those outside, some were well-disposed 
to me, while others cowered before my power and did not dare to complain 
– <what obstacle was there> to me bringing to light the lurking evil, or to 
fulfil the desire in the almost total absence of anyone who could prevent me? 
Yet now, not only do I appear not to be doing such a thing, or even wanting 
to, but entirely the opposite. For having maintained the Emperor’s children 
and you in complete safety until the ninth day from the Emperor’s death, 
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after this time I withdrew the guard, which I had established myself, from 
the palace. Having set another guard, as many as I myself judged sufficient 
to prevent the attacks of probable conspirators, I then returned home, taking 
care of affairs just as when the Emperor was alive – advising everyone, 
providing counsel, scaring off threats – not at all to rebel, but to keep pure 
and honest my goodwill and service to you, and similarly to your children, 
and it is obvious that I would impose punishment on rebels and undertake 
war on your behalf. 
“So why would someone say that at the time when I had the power, I 
did not want to <revolt>, /41/ yet now I <supposedly> want to, without 
having the same power to do so? But if I contend that I am no less powerful 
than I was at that time, then you would agree with me; therefore neither 
before nor now did I refrain from wicked acts from a lack of power but 
evidently from a lack of desire, and from thinking such a change to be one of 
the very worst things. So if I was visibly planning nothing of this sort, 
neither then nor now, and yet was able to accomplish it easily, it is 
appropriate to have confidence in me about the future and not to attend to 
the sycophants and the many fabrications they produce against me. For they 
will slander me not concerning some slight and contemptible matters but 
they will present fears for your life, or otherwise that you will not live well 
and fittingly but instead shamefully, meanly and subserviently, which itself 
is a reason for pain not at all secondary to death for those accustomed to 
rule. That there are many who are naturally of such a [slanderous] 
disposition, it is possible for us not to guess, but to know very clearly. For 
when the Emperor himself was master of public affairs, he was not subject to 
any scrutiny of his actions by anyone; he was able, if ever he wished, to 
willingly favour certain men, while equally he could neglect others. For now 
no such behaviour will be possible for anyone but I will order all men /42/ to 
do their duty towards all with reason and diligence, not only because of 
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concern for you – so that the authority which I have received is not lessened 
but so I can return it even greater and more improved, when the moment 
calls – but also for the sake of my honour and reputation and that which is 
greater and more fearful to me than all of these concerns: the subsequent 
examination of my actions and the accounts which I will have to render 
before the fearsome judgement [of God], concerning whether affairs have 
been administered well or badly. Such proceedings, as is quite clear, would 
not be tolerable to those accustomed to neglect and to misappropriate public 
property and to increase their own property by corruption, so they will 
naturally act to put the person who imposed this constraint on them out of 
the way quickly. This would otherwise be impossible for them unless, 
having first fabricated many lies and false accusations, they make us fight 
each other. The extent of absurdity our affairs will be driven to if such a 
thing happens, you yourself, being an intelligent woman, can understand, 
but I will explain to you even more clearly. For either it is necessary to 
condemn me to death contrary to all right thought, a deed which would have 
arisen from calumny and slander; I am a man who, on fair examination, was 
not only friendly to the Emperor and to those of you related to him2 for a 
very long time, but who also administered the affairs of the Romans honestly 
and selflessly; who, if by some chance came to be wasting his life among the 
barbarians far from the land of the Romans, you would be justly be worthy 
of many reproaches and accusations if you did not order him with all /43/ 
haste to be brought back and recalled, so that you can employ him in an 
appropriate way. Or, if I do not willingly choose death, but I wish to think 
myself worthy of care and do not want to abandon my safety to their [the 
sycophants’] whims, it is necessary for me to abandon you and save myself. 
When this happens, because most of the Romans follow me, there will be 
savage civil war and uprisings in the cities and destruction of myriads of 
fortunes and the total dissolution, so to say, of the Roman Empire; I think 
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that absolutely anyone cannot be ignorant of this, anyone who has even a 
shred of sense. For this, He who will judge all the living and the dead,3 will 
inflict punishment on both of us before that dread court, as we will be 
responsible for all of this, or rather it will be you alone for not understanding 
what ought to be done on your own account, and for not wanting to learn 
what is being explained by me. For I myself am confident, placing my hand 
beside that from above [i.e., of God], that I will in no way go beyond what is 
needed, and there is no-one who will persuade me to provide him with a 
pretext for war.a Therefore, if you have thus persuaded yourself never to 
think badly of me, but also to consider that everything I do or think is for the 
sake of you and the emperor your son [Iōannēs V]; not only will you not be 
persuaded to believe the slandering sycophants and their common hatred, as 
they never speak the truth, but you will not lend an ear to their false 
accusations in the first place. /44/ It is just, for yourself and for me alike, that 
you deliberate on what is advantageous to the affairs of the Romans in 
common, and that I am persuaded to take charge of the administration of 
public affairs. If you are unable to look into your heart about these matters 
and have doubts about me, why is it necessary to offer the government to 
them [the sycophants] as well as me? Since they are not persuaded by my 
advice as to what is best, permit me my choice to stay quietly at home in 
retirement from public life, while you, together with the Patriarch and the 
others, who are many and good, do what is beneficial to the Romans in 
common. For I am not so stupid or so far out of my mind so as to throw 
myself into manifest danger and, while intending to do this, to be 
contributing not only my own money for the common benefit of the Romans 
but, if there will be a need (and certainly there will often be a need), not even 
sparing my life itself and to demand no other reward than toils, and dangers, 
                                                 
a II, 43.16-17: οὐδ´ ἔστιν ὅ με πείσει, amended to οὐδ´ ἔστιν ὅς με πείσει.  
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and so many expenses. Rather, <I demand> first, to be kept free from these 
evils [i.e., the plots of the sycophants] and, second, the glory and honour of 
the good deeds, regarding which <merely> not to be defeated is the 
preference not of the most brilliant and respected, but of those who live 
meanly and dishonourably and no better than the masses. So according to 
my consideration, it seems such matters are to the benefit of myself 
personally and each and all of us alike. It is appropriate that you reflect on 
these matters both together with the others and in private, /45/ to choose 




After the Grand Domestic had recounted these matters to the Empress 
with frankness and without concealing anything, she praised his words as 
they were spoken not bitterly or harshly, just as he had said at the beginning, 
but they possessed the truth, righteousness and frankness appropriate to a 
true friend. Therefore, concerning both before and now alike, she agreed that 
he seemed, above all others, most clearly able to protect the Empire of the 
Romans by himself, if he was willing. Regarding what he had asked, she 
trusted that he had the power to uphold not only what he had asked but also 
much more. And if all men would join together in speaking against him, they 
did not have the power to make him hostile but he would preserve his 
friendship untouched and inviolate, if for no other reason than having 
remembered the words of the Emperor, who often said regarding him 
[Kantakouzēnos], that if he [the Emperor] saw that man [Kantakouzēnos] 
advancing against him with a sword drawn to kill him, he would not even 
then be able to hate him but would preserve the same goodwill for him and, 
having accomplished this, even his friendship.1 She said that while 
employing such a teacher who so greatly exceeded her intelligence and 
experience of state affairs, she would attempt to value him and cherish him 
to an equal degree. And she encouraged him not to suspect anything ignoble 
concerning her but to be /46/ firmly convinced, as there was nothing so 
powerful that it would be able to overturn her reasoning and make her think 
badly of him. 
Following this, the Grand Domestic thought the agreement of the 
Empress was sufficient proof that there was nothing preventing him from 
choosing, if he wished, to be perceived as wicked but most importantly he 
was able to freely choose what was good and just. Then, having thanked the 
Empress for her exemplary goodness and affection towards him, he took up 
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the argument again, saying that because of this certainly neither she nor the 
Patriarch should suspect that the words said by him were devious, so that by 
having provided an amnesty for him in advance, if someone spoke the truth 
about him and showed he was acting criminally, then they should not have 
an opportunity to put the charge and accusation against him. For this was 
not what his words meant, rather that if certain people accused him of such 
crimes at just any time, such accusations would refute themselves as they are 
calumnies and slanders; they should make no argument against these but 
hate the liars. “Yet if these are plausible to such an extent as to cause 
uncertainty, if there is a need to believe or to entirely disbelieve them, do not 
immediately convict me by default when I am away, but summon me to 
court and, if I am convicted of injustice, I will not beg any pardon from the 
assigned punishment for my crime.” 
The Empress brushed aside his talk about justice and, if something 
happened, such thoughts about him would be furthest from her mind, that 
they would even need court cases against /47/ him. He said he would not be 
content unless she was also persuaded by him about this, on account of the 
others rather than her, as, by means of all this, their tongues would be 
stopped and they would not get any pretext from this for wickedness and 
slander. Since she was dismissive and was not willing to be persuaded, he 
prevailed upon her, saying a great deal, as it was a matter of absolute 
necessity. Although she was unwilling, as she was determined such 
investigations were not required, she was finally persuaded for his sake. 
Following these discussions, he was pleased and put aside all doubts 
about her reasoning; he said he would be delighted to take over the 
government from her immediately, if what had been said would also be 
made secure by oaths. And oaths were at once made by both of them in the 
presence of the Patriarch.2 Since there was no longer anything lacking 
regarding their reconciliation, the Empress remained at home, while the 
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Grand Domestic, now holding complete authority securely, left together 
with the Patriarch. And they went to the church of the Great Martyr 
Dēmētrios which was built inside the palace,3 and the Grand Domestic 
conversed with the Patriarch for a long time. For he [Kantakouzēnos] said, “I 
am fully convinced that the Empress has such intentions as she expressed in 
her words. But I am once again not a little troubled, knowing the weakness 
of female nature – since it is so easily changed because of timidity – and fear 
that, as I may always be compelled to serve abroad for long periods because 
of wars against the neighbouring barbarians, the sycophants idling at home 
may persuade her /48/ to change her mind at some point, which we may 
observe corresponds also with men who do not dare to enter battle because 
of their cowardice. For although they are reproached and insulted by their 
oikeioi and endure every sort of complaint, as they are not ready for battle, 
they often boast and puff themselves up and give oaths that they will never 
turn their faces from their enemies but resist them courageously. Yet 
whenever they see them draw close and they hear the trumpet signalling the 
engagement, such men do not wait any longer for the marshalling of the 
ranks but they shamefully and ignobly flee, caring little for their oaths and 
their previous bragging. I hear a Persian proverb speaks very correctly and 
wisely concerning the nature of women. For they say that even if the head of 
a woman reaches as high as the clouds, she would be fixed to the earth no 
less than before; signifying by this statement, I think, that even if a woman 
attained the highest degree of wisdom and magnanimity and courage, she is 
a woman no less than before, subject to feminine nature and passions.4  
“Recalling all of this worries me and causes great turmoil in my heart 
from fear that, should the Empress be afflicted by something in her female 
nature, not only I but all the Romans will have to deal with many troubles 
and fall into extreme dangers. Because of this then, I remind you of the many 
good things accrued by you from me, and which you have probably not 
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forgotten, as you came into this glory and honour by means of my resources 
and friendship and diligence, not /49/ only having been selected for the 
imperial clergy, out of deep obscurity, and being thought worthy of great 
solicitude not just from my own resources but also the imperial <treasury> 
and when the opportunity came,a remember that it was me who first 
persuaded the Emperor to raise you to the patriarchal throne but also, 
brushing aside the unanimous opinion of all the archpriests, used great 
eagerness and effort towards them so as to convince them to entrust this 
exalted and contested See to you, and finally when you were at risk 
concerning this and intended to withdraw, only I helped you escape from 
your misfortunes.5 
“I have recounted these matters just now not to reproach you with 
having provided these favours (for such a thing would not be welcome to me 
even if they were greater and more numerous) but so that I may 
demonstrate, since I was disposed in a friendly manner towards you from 
the beginning, and have provided many proofs of my affection towards you, 
that it is fair that you, given the circumstances, can now show gratitude to 
one who has previously been observed to be your friend without expecting 
anything in return, and duly repay his earlier kindnesses. Yet it is not only 
because of these considerations but because you are the common spiritual 
father: you owe as much care to me as you do to each of your flock, or rather 
you owe me many times more or nearly the whole of it, inasmuch as 
everyone experiences their share of the benefit or harm that is visited upon 
me.6 
“It is this which I ask of you: that whenever I am constrained to 
engage in campaigns abroad (for it is not becoming for me, /50/ nor useful to 
you all, to sit quietly here while overlooking the enemies who plunder our 
                                                 
a II, 49.3: οὐ omitted before καλοῦντος (following P). 
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fields and besiege our cities and enslave those who happen to live there), 
give no space to the sycophants and traitors and public enemies by staying at 
the Empress’ side at all times, since they are able to contrive calumnies 
against me and to dedicate themselves, as if they were counselling her 
correctly and beneficially, to convincing her to consider me an enemy who is 
plotting against her rule. Instead, standing up for justice on my behalf, put 
an end to their schemes and render their deceptions and tricks unavailing, by 
persuading the Empress of nothing else other than not to condemn me in my 
absence but, having summoned me to trial and provided an opportunity for 
a defence, for me either to dismiss the accusations, if I am able, or to punish 
the crime, if I am convicted of perjury. For this great effort and zeal you will 
receive rewards not only from God – as one who has endeavoured for the 
sake of peace and public security, and for justice – but also I will look upon 
you with great favour and all reasonable men will praise you for acting as 
the champion and protector of souls, who has shown by these deeds that he 
is a disciple of the Peacemaker and resembles Him in this respect, in so far as 
one can, having removed every pretext for civil war.” The Grand Domestic 
talked to the Patriarch in such a way. /51/  
He [the Patriarch] agreed with him that the favours of which he spoke 
were greater than all others and that he was his benefactor, and he was 
obliged to him, and he [Kantakouzēnos] should be confident about the 
future. He suggested that there would be no difficulties for him 
[Kantakouzēnos], at least so far as he [the Patriarch] was concerned, but, if 
such a thing happened, he would attend to it with great diligence and 
goodwill for him [Kantakouzēnos], doing nothing less than he 
[Kantakouzēnos] would for his own sake if he were present there, holding 
out until things turned out justly for him. 
Since the Patriarch had willingly promised these things, the Grand 
Domestic then said that nothing remained other than to make these promises 
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secure and unambiguous in a form of which he could be certain, so that there 
was no doubt at all hereafter but that he would be perfectly convinced, no 
less than if he were present, that there would be no power to the sycophants’ 
slanders. 
He [the Patriarch] at once stood up from his seat and said, “Blessed be 
God, Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who is eternal, because I will deceive 
you neither now nor later, but I will make every thought and effort for the 
sake of your rights and I will overlook nothing, at least as far as it concerns 
me, not any thought or word or deed, so that no harm at all comes to you 
from calumny and slander.” In addition to this, having recited the Trisagion7 
hymn and having said one of the holy prayers over the Grand Domestic’s 
head – praying for much glory and peace for him and streams of other good 
things – since the time was already almost nearing late afternoon, the 
Patriarch departed for home, while the Grand /52/ Domestic took hold of 





On the following day, he ordered Alexandros’ ambassadors to come 
to the palace and report concerning the matters they had come about. They 
arrived, holding the oaths the Emperor had made to Alexandros for peace, 
and demanded that Sismanos be handed over to them, as he was an enemy 
to their own emperor [Alexandros], or to take back the oaths, as there would 
no longer be peace. For it was neither right nor tolerable to them to be firm 
and steadfast friends and allies to the Romans, while they were violating the 
treaty by welcoming their greatest enemies among them. So the ambassadors 
spoke in this fashion, filled with self-importance and presumption and 
thinking the Romans would not argue but would immediately hand over 
Sismanos, for fear of war being waged against them. 
The Empress had ordered the Grand Domestic to negotiate with them 
and to respond regarding their demands. He first censured them, as their 
arrival was unbefitting given what they wanted to achieve, “For your 
emperor, being a friend and the father of the son-in-law of the deceased 
emperor of the Romans, should not wage war against his children and 
attempt to dissolve the treaties for reasons that are unjust. But if he 
[Alexandros] had any earlier pretext for disagreement with him, he should 
abandon this now and observe the treaty more firmly than before /53/ and be 
an ally of the Emperor’s children against their enemies, if there are any, 
especially at this very time when they stand in need of support from their 
friends. Yet he seems to follow the impulse of the many, who pay court to 
the powerful while they live, but are friends not so much to them than to 
opportunity and their power. Whenever they [the powerful] die, the reasons 
for friendship are dissolved in the same way; they [the flatterers] are easily 
carried away into hatred of those who had previously seemed to be their 
friends, disregarding them because of their powerlessness.” 
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Then, in response to their demand, he made a defence as follows, as it 
is not customary for the emperors of the Romans to betray to their enemies 
those who have taken refuge with them: “Since, from the times of 
Constantine the Great until the Roman emperors of the present age – who 
are greater and more notable than the kings or dynasts of each of the nations 
– many neighbouring rulers, having happened upon misfortune and been 
deposed from their authority, have become suppliants, some begging to be 
restored to their own authority, and others to obtain some care and security. 
And they [the emperors] succoured them all in their misfortunes, since they 
are saviours of all in common and protectors of those suffering hard fortune. 
To some they restored their authority, returning them with a mighty helping 
hand, while to others they showed great kindnesses and made them forget 
their homelands by the extravagance of their gifts; they persuaded them to 
stay with them for life, [the fugitives] considered their service beside the 
emperor much better and more wonderful than the rule of /54/ their own 
people. 
“So now, in the same way, Sismanos has also become a suppliant of 
the Empire of the Romans, not begging to return to his own country, but to 
enjoy some comfort as he has fallen upon hard times and been banished 
from his kingdom. Your emperor Alexandros, so it seems, considers the 
affairs of the Romans to have been utterly crippled by the death of the 
Emperor and that there is no-one to take hold of the regency, demanding his 
[Sismanos’] dispatch with great insolence, expecting his order to be carried 
out without question. But the situation is the opposite of what you 
yourselves thought. For while the Emperor was still alive he punished those 
wishing to do wrong, making use of us [the Romans], and now, since he has 
left his mortal life, having being appointed by the emperor his son, we will 
defend ourselves on our own behalf if someone attacks us, and we will keep 
our country safe from harm, and we will eagerly make war upon you for the 
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sake of honour, as has befitted the Romans from the most ancient times. For 
this, the arrival of the fugitive here with us, is no triviality and neither is it an 
inconsequential subject held in contempt by us whether, on the orders of 
yourselves or others, to hand him over to be put to death. 
 “Therefore, having put aside the absurdity of what you seek, if you 
wish to keep the peace and to abide by the treaties and the oaths which you 
agreed with the Emperor, we will endeavour not to disturb the existing 
situation. But should you begin war first, we choose God as witness of the 
offence, that /55/ you perjure yourselves by breaking the treaty, and we will 
teach you not to get ideas above your station. Having established Sismanos 
in Bidēnē1 with triremes2 via the Istros [Danube] and kindled civil war 
among you (for you yourselves surely know that many of the Mysians will 
side with him on account of their old friendship and their common kinship), 
either we will depose Alexandros from power altogether or, failing that, we 
will cause him damage beyond measure. If this does not seem to be the case, 
as the allied force which rises up is less than is required, then I myself, 
having at the same time the Roman army and Sismanos, will march against 
you and I will fight you most readily, not only for having broken the treaty 
with me, but also to help the one who has been wronged [i.e., Sismanos], and 
in addition they [the Mysians] will rise in revolt against yourselves as some 
of those currently devoted to Alexandros would happily free themselves and 
desert to Sismanos – which I think will certainly not be to your advantage. 
There is also a different kind of war, by which your property will be ruined 
by us and it is possible to preserve our own [property]; I do not conceal this 
so you will understand that responsibility for certain pernicious events 
during the war is not ours but yours alone. 
“For the most powerful of the Asian satraps,3 Amour, the son of 
Aitinē4 – of whom you could not fail to have heard report – having learned 
of the death of the Emperor and, considering that he could easily despoil the 
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Romans because their defender was no more, having filled two hundred and 
fifty ships,5 he made /56/ all haste to ruin our country. When I was informed 
that there would be an invasion by the Persians, I sent an embassy to him, as 
he is counted among the greatest of my friends. I urged him to turn back and 
to abandon the venture, as he would be marching against no-one other than 
myself. He accepted the embassy and at once turned back in the middle of 
his journey. But now, having sent an embassy back here to me, he asked me 
not to overlook the army which had been assembled by him in vain but, if 
someone was waging a war against us, to make use of it so the army could 
profit from the enemy’s spoils and he would not be spending so much 
money without reason but he would benefit just the same, by spending for 
the sake of a friend.6 
“It is not necessary to doubt these words, thinking them to be 
fabricated for the sake of bombast and hollow boasting. For, beyond the fact 
that pretences and lies are not easy for us, it is possible for you yourselves to 
investigate and discover that it is true. Therefore, thinking that peace is 
much better and more profitable to us both, I welcome it and advise you to 
maintain it. For this reason, I do not give up on the maintenance [of peace] 
towards you just now, but, having returned as quickly as possible to the one 
who sent you, announce that he must never expect Sismanos to be handed 
over. If, because of this, it seems to him that he must go to war against us, 
you will be able to return within twenty days to declare war. In the 
meantime, I am prepared to delay the ambassador of Amour here, so that if 
war /57/ is declared, I will by letters permit his arrival here. In any case, it is 
easy for you to foresee that he must come here more eagerly than before he 
turned back from his campaign, having been persuaded by my words. If you 
carelessly miss the deadline, it will no longer be safe for me to be at rest, so I 
will ready what is needed for war from my own resources, and I will lead 
our fully-prepared Persian allies here, and you would not wish for what 
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comes after. It will be easier to settle the war with me now, not only because 
of the money spent on the preparation for war – which will necessarily be 
recovered from your own country – but also because it is necessary that the 
barbarians who will come as an allied force will not return to their home 
with empty hands but having gathered booty from their enemy’s country. 
For these reasons it is absolutely necessary for you to make haste on your 
journey and, once your emperor has learned about our intentions, to report 
back as quickly as possible what he thinks fit.” So such are the things he said.  
The ambassadors of Alexandros, as if forgetting their former bluster 
and arrogant talk in response to these speeches, changed; they became 
suppliants, pleading to be given a later deadline. For they declared they 
would show all haste on their journey, but their emperor might be spending 
time on the furthest borders of his realm; there would not be sufficient days, 
they would need more than it seemed to accomplish their journey. And since 
it seemed that their demand /58/ was fair, they were granted thirty days, in 
which they must return, either confirming the peace and the treaties, or to 
declare war. 
So Alexandros’ ambassadors, having received these answers from the 
Grand Domestic, returned home. The Empress and the entire senate admired 
his sagacity and were most thankful because they had feared them [the 
ambassadors] on the previous day and had not provided even a superficial 
defence to them, but he had thus instilled such fears that they were bowed 
by perplexity on every side, so that they asked about the deadline without 
care for anything else. But enough on these matters. 
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Chapter 8 
The Grand Domestic ordered the soldiers throughout the cities, via 
letters, to prepare themselves, as, if necessary, he would go to war against 
the Mysians. Seeing that many, not only of the military register but also not a 
few others,1 were neglecting everything regarding their military service and 
depriving the public of their benefit, on the pretext that the payments which 
had been granted to each of them by the Emperor were incomplete, he 
considered from what source he could deliver them from their pressing 
difficulties, supplying the shortfall in the pronoia2 provided by the Emperor 
to each of them, and whether he could provide to each according to need, 
having proclaimed that all ought to contribute something to the common 
good. 
So while he was thinking about these matters to himself, /59/ 
Patrikiōtēs3 came forward, who had been occupied with the taxation 
registers for a very long time and possessed great experience in such matters. 
He said that he had heard that he [Kantakouzēnos] wanted to equip 
everyone for their military service without delay, making up the amount 
outstanding from their appointed incomes from the public money, or even 
increasing them. Such matters as these could not be managed better than by 
he [Patrikiōtēs], as even he himself [Kantakouzēnos] would know, nor 
indeed was there anyone else at all with greater experience. Although he had 
not been summoned but had approached him first, requesting to be 
entrusted with the tax survey, it would not be fair to be suspicious.4 For it 
was not from a desire for profit that he put forward such proposals, but 
rather his wish to contribute to the common good, making effort in every 
way to render the Empire of the Romans greater and more glorious. He tried 
to provide clear proof of this not by words but by deeds. For having been 
involved in such matters for not a few years already, he was able to gather 
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quite a lot of money, although while trying very hard to profit neither by 
force, nor by every means possible.5 Later this would not allow him to find 
peace, but many considerations stirred in his heart; that he should not bury 
<his money>, but spend it upon doing good works for some men, as through 
this he would be able to cleanse himself of the stain of his sin. So now he 
determined to found a monastery for those men who devote themselves 
absolutely to God, /60/ and through the beneficence to them he would beg 
the divinity for mercy for himself, by using those who have particular power 
as mediators in these matters to effect this [i.e., the monks]. Then presently 
he thought to spend his money on the beggarly poor.  
“Nevertheless, either the former or the latter may not be able to use 
the money as they ought to,6 or other men will furnish themselves with it by 
theft and injustice and become corrupted. Since you alone are appointed 
over public affairs and I perceived your purpose, as if you intend for the 
sake of the common good to give up not only money but even your life, if 
such a thing is needed, and knowing already that your character is noble, I 
realise it is necessary to entrust the money to you, as it will be spent not only 
well, but also sensibly and honestly, for the benefit of the Romans in 
common, since it was also gathered from them. For these reasons, then, I 
have come, to hand over everything for whatever purpose that might be 
useful to you.  
“Therefore it is possible for everyone to admit this is clear proof that I 
will not profit from the survey, although I have come begging to be 
appointed to this task. For having what I have already acquired, it is possible 
to take no further trouble for such matters, but I desire to show myself of use 
to you and able to contribute greatly towards the restoration of the ancient 
prosperity of the Romans, because this causes great and constant concern to 
you.” 
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He [Kantakouzēnos] approved of these words happily. Concerning 
the money, he said he [Patrikiōtēs] should know of his great gratitude to 
him, not only for providing these contributions for the sake of the common 
good, /61/ but also for entrusting their administration to him, having been 
rightly convinced that they would be spent justly too. For to be appointed to 
any public office without increasing one’s property, but to let go of great 
sums which one possessed, as much as one clung to previously, and to be 
seen as putting oneself altogether above money, is not just difficult but 
nearly impossible. But for one who has obtained this wealth already, and 
without suspecting any danger will come from this, then to choose 
deliberately to lay aside that which he gathered wrongly, is not <the action> 
of common men, but of those wanting to be saved and who believe 
absolutely that they will give accounts of their entire lives after passing 
away.  
“Although it is better not to sin in the first place, nor to besmirch the 
soul with many stains, if this then happens it is the starting point of a second 
innocence, namely not just to cease from evil deeds, but also as 
compensation to display the works of good. For these reasons, therefore, I 
commend you for your change and for taking no other path than to wish to 
contribute the money for the sake of the common good. Because you were 
not summoned but first came forward yourself, asking to equalise the means 
of living of the soldiers from public money, I refrain from criticising you to 
any extent, since previously I was beginning to do the same from my own 
resources. Now instead you have convinced me, because of your experience 
of these matters, to entrust this service to you and to think that you will 
administer these matters better and more correctly. For /62/ he who promises 
a lot and he who promises nothing will not take the same care about the 
fulfilment of their promises. So, I grant the administration of such matters to 
you. And it is appropriate for you to consider that you do not pursue some 
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small and contemptible matter, of such a type which provides great benefit 
to the public even when not managed well, or equally does not cause harm if 
done carelessly and wickedly. For what the judge is to civic affairs, the fiscal 
assessor7 can be to public property. For as one provides good order to the 
cities, justly regulating them and compelling obedience to the laws, then the 
other, if he wishes to do what is just and beneficial for the common good, 
will take from some if they profit more than is fair, and will give to those 
who have less, thus preparing them all readily for their military service, 
preserving discipline and the greatest obedience to their generals. Therefore, 
as he [the assessor] has been entrusted with great undertakings and 
contributions of the highest importance to the government of the whole 
[state], it is therefore necessary to obey and demonstrate fitting care and 
commitment towards these tasks.” 
He [Kantakouzēnos] spoke to him in such a way, making his response 
regarding what he [Patrikiōtēs] had requested. Then he inquired how great 
the sum of money might be. When the other replied that there was 100,000 in 
gold,8 and goods and vessels made from gold and silver, worth 40,000 in 
gold, and declared that he held all these ready to be handed over right now, 
he [Kantakouzēnos] summoned one of his servants /63/ and said “Then go 
and hand over these things to this man.” 
As he [Patrikiōtēs] went to carry out the order without any hesitation, 
before he left, the Grand Domestic commanded him to turn back. Though he 
praised him for his eagerness, he ordered him to keep the money safe, as 
currently there was no need of it. But if ever his [Kantakouzēnos’] private 
resources were spent and he was in need of this money, only then would he 
take it – when this wealth surpassed his own – and spend it, wherever it 
might seem the expenditure provided the greatest advantage to the public. 
But he [Patrikiōtēs] refused the guardianship of the money, declaring that it 
 137 
was not pleasing to him to retain possession of it further. However, having 
been commanded, he necessarily obeyed.  
After this, the Grand Domestic, summoning one by one those of the 
senate, and the others distinguished by their high birth, and then the 
soldiers, inquired after the sum of the pronoia granted to each by the 
Emperor, and if they now possessed less than had been assigned. When each 
replied, stating however much he held, he ordered Patrikiōtēs to replenish 
the entitlements of which they had been deprived and to add besides this a 
bonus, however much that seemed good to him, in proportion to the rank of 
each man. To those who held incomes from the Emperor without any loss, he 
similarly commanded that they were to be given others in addition to those 
they held. And in a full sixty days9 from the beginning of the redistribution, 
to those holding less [than their allocation] he bestowed the shortfall 
together with an additional bonus, and the bonus also accrued to those 
lacking nothing. And /64/ when all considered that their incomes were 
satisfactory,10 they expressed their deep gratitude to the Grand Domestic and 
were ready to fight against the enemies of the Romans in any land 
whatsoever. And polishing their arms, they prepared themselves and 
procured horses, more numerous and better than before.11 In short, they even 





After these matters had been successfully managed by him, he 
advised the Empress to anoint her son, the Emperor Iōannēs, with holy 
myron1 and to adorn his head with a crown. And he persuaded her to 
deliberate carefully on these suggestions. But some of those related by blood 
to the Emperor were advising her that it was not right for the son to celebrate 
when his father the Emperor had died shortly before (the parakoimōmenos2 
Apokaukos3 suggested they say this; as became clear from what happened 
later, he was preparing the strife that took place and did not want the 
Empress to secure faithful pledges of goodwill towards her and her son from 
the Grand Domestic).4 The Empress delayed the task to a later date, blaming 
the complaint by certain people who, having heard this, might accuse her, 
declaring that it was not a fitting time for this event, celebrating and 
performing the greatest royal festival at a time when it was necessary to 
mourn and lament. 
But he [Kantakouzēnos] said their objections were entirely devoid of 
sense and nor /65/ did they consider this: the proclamation of children by 
many of the emperors had taken place as they were dying; nobody criticised 
their inappropriate timing but all – just as was right – considered it 
particularly fitting in such times, not because of luxury and pleasure, but to 
allow the masses no pretext at all for civil strife and disorder, for all would 
already be completely obedient since they would be subject to an emperor 
and they would pay the penalty for their madness if they attempted to 
revolt. He advised her to be glad to have done with the arguments of those 
men, while they should proceed with the deed, as it would be useful and just 
at the same time.5 
She said it was not necessary to busy herself about it but to let it be for 
now, because of the opinions of the masses, and to do it a little later, at a time 
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when it might be possible to escape their censure. The Grand Domestic said 
nothing against the Empress’ objection, but he was vexed that she would not 
be persuaded for the better by him, but by others advising her unhelpfully. 
So in such a way, this [the coronation] was prevented. 
A little later it was reported that Sarchanēs,6 the satrap of Lydia,7 and 
Giaxēs8 were preparing to cross over into Thrace,9 plundering the Romans 
from ships. The Grand Domestic was not negligent but at once called for 
triremes, as many as he deemed sufficient, to be fully equipped for war 
against the barbarians.10 As for the expense of the triremes, he ordered the 
treasurers to provide part from the public treasury,11 and he provided part 
from his private resources. When the triremes were manned, he appointed 
/66/ the parakoimōmenos Apokaukos as their commander, and, having issued 
as many commands as were necessary and ordered him to take care of the 
rest of the venture, he himself sent an embassy to Orchanēs,12 the satrap of 
eastern Bithynia,13 asking for peace. For it seemed necessary to him, when he 
was intending to campaign to the west, not to leave a war in the Romans’ 
rear. When the peace with that man was concluded, he prepared his 
expedition. For already the army around Didymoteichon14 and the city of 
Adrian15 was gathering, as he had ordered. 
On the day he intended to set out from Byzantion, being alone, he 
took the Patriarch aside in private and went to the church of the martyr 
Dēmētrios myroblytes in the palace. “You are not ignorant,” he said, “of the 
discussions that took place between me and the Empress. For not only were 
you present beside both of us while we were speaking, but also you were the 
one who conveyed what was said by each of us in private before that.16 It 
would be in no way remarkable or unreasonable, if, after that, it occurred to 
the Empress to speak about me for a certain reason; perhaps she is imagining 
that something great will be achieved by me and, as regards my current 
deeds, that these matters will not turn out according to her hopes; perhaps a 
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certain regret about what is happening has come into her mind. If, therefore, 
just as I said, she has been treated in a disagreeable way concerning some 
part of what is happening, and she is no longer willing to be content with 
what was proposed, I ask her to speak openly and not to veil <her words> 
with respect. For just as before, I am just as ready as ever to excuse myself 
from government. If, however, she has resolved to be content until fulfilment 
of what was decided, and /67/ to keep the oaths which she swore, then I 
myself will not neglect to do anything, in so far as it may benefit her and her 
children, and the Romans in common.” 
The Patriarch censured the unfitness of his words, as such were not 
befitting to him, either to say that he had these in mind or to speak them: for 
the Empress considered nothing of this sort about him, “but she thought that 
the Emperor [Andronikos III] was alive and that the Empire of the Romans 
was governed in the same way as under him, having remembered your 
words, which you recounted in full to her, at the time when you made the 
agreement.” 
“It is necessary therefore,” the Grand Domestic said, “to be convinced 
thus concerning her, just as you assert. Concerning yourself, whatever is it 
possible to think? Will you abide by the agreements – by the oaths, rather – 
which you made towards me?” 
He immediately stood up once more and said, “Blessed be God and 
Father of our Lord Jesus Christ! Because I stand by the very thing I said both 
now and before, and I will neglect none of your rights, but I will stand my 
ground with all my strength, not only as one repaying his benefactor 
through good works but also as one concerned for his spiritual son.” 
The Grand Domestic, having given many thanks to him for this and 
having bid farewell, left the Patriarch behind and went to the Empress. 
When she saw him at once she declared her great gratitude to him, because 
what he had previously promised in words, was now shown to be true by 
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his deeds; he was toiling by night /68/ and day for the common good, 
sparing neither his body nor his money (for the Grand Domestic was not 
only spending a great deal of money from his private resources on the 
expense of the triremes, but also on many other matters, which were 
intended to benefit all in common, as he was spending very generously and 
liberally after the Emperor’s death). She advised him not to do so as it would 
not be sufficient for the tasks for long, but to take care of himself and to be 
sparing of his money, by making use of public money. 
And he said he would rather enjoy labours benefiting society than to 
be like others who turn to relaxations and pleasures. The expenditure of his 
money was not a loss but to be considered more agreeable than any profit, so 
long as he may see, with the help of God, the Roman Empire raised towards 
greatness and prevailing over all enemies. It was to be hoped that after a 
short time, if no particular hindrance occurred, it would be of such great help 
to the Romans that seeing this she [the Empress] would give thanks to God, 
who has a hand in everything good. For it was not some small matter he 
intended to prepare during the winter since, as soon as it was spring, he 
would show that many peoples who were previously insolent to the Romans 
would acknowledge they were tributaries and servants of the emperor of the 
Romans. 
Having said much else of this sort in addition, all that he intended to 
do – and he knew the Empress listened with pleasure – and having bid his 
final farewells, he departed from Byzantion together with the army and 
many of the nobility.17 He left his mother18 /69/ there, as she would offer 
great consolation to the Empress concerning her misfortunes. 
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Chapter 10 
When he came to Didymoteichon, he started doing everything 
necessary to make the senators and the army living among the cities of 
Thrace do their military service for these campaigns without excuses, just as 
the Byzantines had also done already. And he achieved this within a few 
days. Then, having been told that Alexandros, the emperor of the Mysians, 
had encamped with his army at Stilbnos1 – a city subject to the Mysians 
founded on the borders of his empire and the Roman Empire – he 
[Kantakouzēnos] knew that he ought to send an embassy to him 
[Alexandros]. And, having sent it, he made it known that he was waiting in 
Adrianople and wished to know if his choice was war, or peace. For the 
deadline, which he had presented to his [Alexandros’] ambassadors when 
they were in Byzantion, had already passed. 
Alexandros saw that the Romans were not cowering, as he had 
supposed, but were ready to defend themselves against those choosing to act 
unjustly and neither the threats relayed through his ambassadors, nor his 
preparations for war had the power to persuade them to act according to his 
judgement. Thinking it unprofitable to go to war, he came to terms. And 
having renewed the previous treaty and oaths again, Alexandros withdrew 
to his palace in Tirnobosa. 2 
The Grand Domestic advanced to Chersonesos3 with the army, having 
heard that Persian infantry forces were about /70/ to invade the Chersonesos, 
having arrived from Pergamon,4 of which Giaxēs was satrap. At the same 
time as the Romans arrived in Chersonesos, the Persian army was also 
present. A battle resulted, and the Persians were not nearly strong enough to 
withstand the Romans but, defeated by their might, some fell during the 
                                                 
a ΙΙ, 69.22: Τρίνοβον amended to Τίρνοβον (as at I, 175.15). 
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battle, while others were captured. Those who were able to escape, having 
embarked on their ships, sailed for home. Not many days later a second 
army also crossed over from the same country, to avenge the previous 
defeat. The Romans, having engaged them, defeated them and killed the 
majority. Since Giaxēs had been struck twice in succession and lost a large 
and valiant army, having despaired of making war on the Romans, he 
proceeded to make peace. And the Grand Domestic established a peace 
treaty with him. When he had swept aside the menace expected from the 
Persians, having returned once again to Didymoteichon, he prepared for the 
expedition in the west and reorganised the army, which he intended to 
accompany him.5 
While he was accomplishing these things, the parakoimōmenos 
Apokaukos, his heart set on revolutionary acts and endeavouring in every 
possible way to transfer control of public affairs to himself, considered that – 
since he had been appointed general of the fleet against the Persians, and 
had an abundance of naval power – he should put the young Emperor 
Iōannēs into one of the triremes, while his mother the Empress was unaware, 
/71/ and carry him to the tower called Epibatai6 close to Byzantion, which 
had been built by him previously and was extremely strong, having tall and 
strong walls. Guarding the emperor in that place, with the aid of his relatives 
and his closest oikeioi, he would establish a treaty with the Empress, so that 
he and his relatives and his other accomplices could enjoy the foremost 
honours among the Romans and become lords of estates and cities, 
whichever might seem good to them, and lack no cause for prosperity. The 
emperor was not merely to be ransomed from the fortress but, just as if being 
detained as a hostage, was to take one of his daughters in marriage. So he 
intended to do these things and was already starting to realise them. But one 
of his accomplices reported to the Empress; after this a guard was posted 
around the emperor forthwith. He [Apokaukos] realised that he had been 
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found out and left in flight to Epibatai, escaping from the danger arising 
from these actions, just as was natural.7 
When the Grand Domestic learned of these happenings, although he 
was preparing for the campaign, he nevertheless sent Manouēl 
Tarchaneiōtēs – also called Kourtikēs8 – with a few soldiers. He ordered him 
to encamp outside Epibatai to keep watch, until he could come himself. 
Having also sent <a messenger> to Apokaukos, he [Kantakouzēnos] inquired 
if the rumours about him were true. He [Apokaukos] said that he had been 
falsely accused but, fearing lest he would first be destroyed by slander before 
close examination revealed the truth, he had locked himself in his fortress to 
provide security insofar as it was in his power. /72/ He advised him 
[Kantakouzēnos] to take from him [Apokaukos] the example of how 
unexpectedly affairs can change. For previously he had spoken to him, 
suggesting such a thing and, if he had not persuaded him then, despite 
advising him of what was most advantageous, then even now he advised 
him [Kantakouzēnos] to do no less, having proof from these events of the 
usefulness of what he had said, namely that having selected the most 
suitable one of the strongholds placed under his control (and there were 
many), which has the best situation by land and sea, to make it very strong 
by further preparations, so that if something unexpected happened, he 
would have a retreat and a refuge from dangers.9 It was necessary to believe 
him now, even if he had not before, since he [Apokaukos] was well-disposed 
towards him, and not to disdain his advice. For right now, insofar as he was 
concerned, and although the things being said against him were lies, there 
was no other cause for his salvation than the tower into which he fled, 
escaping the danger. And if the things that were said happened to be true, 
either he could engage in the enterprise or, having being discovered, be 
saved from death. So Apokaukos advised him in such a way.  
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The Grand Domestic, having sent to him again, said that as concerned 
what was being said against him [Apokaukos] in particular, he also wanted 
it not to be true, exactly as he himself insisted. For in this way he would 
demonstrate himself to be well-disposed to the emperor and the sycophants 
likewise would prove that was exactly what they were. If perhaps he had 
been deceived by empty hopes, /73/ as has happened to many people, having 
turned away from what was proper, and had intended something neither 
possible nor appropriate to him, it was not necessary because of these 
matters to choose to wage war against the emperor [Iōannēs V], placing his 
confidence in walls, from which he will gain nothing more. But having 
blamed himself for the preceding events, because he was advised badly, 
from now on he should improve himself and defend the proper order and 
beg to obtain forgiveness for his sins. For it is better not to sin in the first 
place but, if it does happen, it is second best for such a person, keeping away 
from further wrongdoing, to correct himself. Since such a thing had not yet 
come about and he [Kantakouzēnos], whom he [Apokaukos] was 
accustomed to call his doctor, held many medicines, each countering its 
correspondinga disease, the cure of his injuries will be easy, at least if he 
[Apokaukos] wants. For indeed the parakoimōmenos, in addition to other 
ways he greeted the Grand Domestic, was also accustomed to call him his 
doctor, because he had often rescued him [Apokaukos] from many of the 
dangers surrounding him and had cured his grievances.10 
As regards the advice, which he [Apokaukos] gave him concerning 
the preparation of a fortress for himself, so that it would be a refuge against 
the vicissitudes of events, he [Kantakouzēnos] thanked him for his 
earnestness and goodwill concerning his welfare, yet he did not greatly 
desire to secure himself through such means. But he would be pleased to 
                                                 
a II, 73.12: κατ’ ἄλληλα amended to κατάλληλα (following FK III, 427, n. 85). 
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converse with those in Hades from that day /74/ on which he trusted his 
safety to timbers, stones and calculations which have no value, having 
neglected – after the hope that comes from the hand [of God] above – the 
security which comes from friends and from their hearts, as if they were 
citadels protected by the most steadfast guard, that is friendship. For the 
foremost happiness and ultimate good for men is to converse with God and 
to be entirely devoted to Him throughout the ascent through purity towards 
Him, as he himself [Apokaukos] knew. Second, after that, is intimacy with 
firm and faithful friends, in the first place those few who exceed the many in 
intelligence, next, after them, to enjoy also goodwill from the multitude, 
because all are attentive to those who are of excellent character. And this is 
thought to be not only the most impregnable of all towers, but also more 
valuable than money and glory and every honour and higher than kingship 
itself, in terms of happiness. For this reason he was not persuaded by such 
things as he [Apokaukos] advised, but he preferred this way to preserve his 
own security, from the beginning until the end, “and just as certainly as you 
do by means of watchtowers and fortresses.”11 
Thus the parakoimōmenos Apokaukos was kept under watch in this 
manner, confined in Epibatai. 
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Chapter 11 
While the Grand Domestic was spending time in Didymoteichon, 
busying himself with the preparation of the army, ambassadors from the 
Peloponnese1 came to him, the Bishop of Koronē2 and Sidēros Dziouan,3 
having been despatched by the leaders of the /75/ cities which were subject 
to the Latins. The embassy’s proposal was: to place under the emperor all of 
the cities which they held, while they would remain as governors, but to 
assign to the emperor all the public taxes which they gave to their prince, 
and to display all respect and servitude beside, and to have a commander 
from the emperor, under whom they would voluntarily be subjected.4 So 
such was the embassy from the Latins of the Peloponnese. 
They had also sent a letter to the Grand Domestic, which is set forth as 
follows: all of them, as if on a prearranged signal, when the Emperor was 
still alive, had resolved to come over to him – having revolted against their 
prince – and they were already in the attempt of doing what they had 
decided. When they learned of the Emperor’s death, despairing of the 
attempt, they were quiet again. 
‘But Paganos Depistogia,5 a close associate and friend to 
ourselves, arrived from Byzantion a short while before, and 
having reported that complete control of public affairs and 
political supremacy had been achieved by you, all of us 
assembled again to confirm what we had previously decided – 
not only because of the nobility of your character and your 
ability to defend us, should anybody attack, but also because 
for a long time now, even though we have not yet met, we were 
friendly and well-disposed to you. For when you were 
campaigning with the Emperor in Akarnania,6 you yourself 
came to speak with those among us who had arrived in 
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Thōmokastron,7 according to our alliance with Nikēphoros the 
son of the despotēs.8 You convinced them to become friends 
instead of /76/ enemies and, from that time on, they have 
always maintained a favourable disposition towards you and 
they, recounting many remarkable things concerning you, 
persuaded us to acquire the same and equal goodwill towards 
you, by which we have now been convinced to make this 
current embassy. So the ambassadors who come before you will 
put forth our request. Should the Empress and yourself accept 
this, there is no further hindrance for us to be subject to the 
Empire of the Romans, just as we promised, only if you 
yourself will come to us, receiving our cities and their 
government, administering them in whatever way seems best 
to you.’ 
 
So the letter, from each one personally and all of them in common, 
stated such things. Having received this, the Grand Domestic was utterly 
delighted and treated the ambassadors very generously and honourably. 
And he conveyed his great gratitude to those who had sent them for their 
goodwill to him and he promised to fulfil the other things, all those they had 
requested, and to come to them as soon as it was spring. For at this time it 
would not be easy to transport the army for such an expedition abroad; it 
would be winter not long after (for the season then was autumn). He 
presented to them Iakōbos Broulas,9 who was one of his closest oikeioi, as 
surety of what had been said, for him to stay with them over the winter, 
demonstrating his [Kantakouzēnos’] favour towards them, that already he 
provided for them as for his own people. At the same time, if any 
disaffection also still remained amongst those in the Peloponnese, he 
[Broulas] would bring them over through his own efforts, so that there 
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would be no difficulty when he [Kantakouzēnos] came there but he would 
lead everyone over to /77/ the emperor. Having generously rewarded the 
ambassadors and those who had sent them with gifts, he dispatched Broulas 
together with them, having also promised to come in person at the right 
time. 
Having equipped the triremes in Byzantion, those armed against the 
attack of the Persians, as we have mentioned, the parakoimōmenos – who had 
been appointed their commander – having then become disaffected with the 
Empress, ran away to Epibatai. The Grand Domestic, having sent to the epi 
tou stratou10 Senachēreim,11 now appointed him. He, sailing off at once, broke 
up the Persian army, astounding them with the speed of his preparations. 
And, having greatly damaged the territory of Sarchanēs and seized one of 
his coastal towns by storm, he reduced them to slavery.12 Having done 
everything else that a good general must, he returned to the city of 
Constantine. 
After the death of the Emperor, the prōtostratōr13 Synadēnos,14 
governor of Thessalonike; Chrelēs;15 Kōnstantinos Palaiologos, the uncle of 
the Emperor;16 the pinkernēs17 Iōannēs Angelos, cousin of the Grand 
Domestic;18 the megas papias19 Tzamplakōn;20 and all those who were in office 
as governors of cities in the west, negotiated with each other and came to an 
agreement. While the majority stayed behind, administering their offices, 
they sent the pinkernēs Angelos, Kōnstantinos Palaiologos and Tzamplakōn 
to the Grand Domestic, to set forth the opinions they all held in common. 
/78/ 
While still on their way, having sent a herald ahead of them, they 
made it clear in a letter to the Grand Domestic that he was to change none of 
the established arrangements concerning himself, or do anything, whether 
these resolutions seemed better or worse, if they were not also present 
themselves. In any case they would be there in no time. It was right to be 
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persuaded by them, not only because they ranked among his foremost 
friends, but also since they came from others who were likewise. Once they 
arrived he might do those things which he thought to be of benefit to all in 
common. 
When they were near Didymoteichon, again sending another 
<herald>, they made their arrival known and they urged him to go out to 
meet them. To him their demand seemed foolish. For it is not proper to force 
one to honour those coming to petition him but for those arriving to decide 
who is judged worthy of honour. Examining the matter by himself, because 
this expected absurdity seemed just that, it came to him that they were not 
demanding such things for the sake of their honour, but so that if he met 
them, they, dismounting from their horses, would render him the greatest 
[i.e., imperial] honours. Thus, having understood this matter, he stayed at 
home. 
Since he did not enable them to bring their plan into action, they kept 
an eye out for an opportunity shortly afterwards and when they met with 
him out riding, having dismounted from their horses, they performed 
proskynesis.21 Next, joining him in his home, they did not enter the courtyard 
with him on their horses, according to their previous custom, but leaving 
them outside, they ran alongside him on foot. He was exasperated beyond 
measure with each one of them. Then, having come around to himself, he 
accused them /79/ of innovation and advised them not to do such things but 
to maintain their previous customs. If they would not be persuaded, he 
angrily threatened to expel them. When he needed to mount his horse again, 
he ordered it to be brought outside the gate. Then, as he was in the 
courtyard, he proceeded to the gate on foot. They, who had caused this 
innovation, observed it, and fearing his threat, maintained their previous 




At about the same time the Kralēs Stephanos,1 ruler of the Triballi, 
dissolved his treaty with the Emperor when he learnt he had died. He 
overran Macedonia,2 although bypassing Thessalonike,3 and, plundering all 
other parts, he came as far as the so-called ‘Village of the Cretans’.4 
Thereafter he retired, having not gained much booty before the livestock and 
the people could be shut up in the cities and the fortresses, because his 
approach had been betrayed. 
When these events were reported to the Grand Domestic, having 
called an assembly, he consulted with those holding office and the 
commanders of the army concerning whatever it was necessary to do in 
response to the assault of the Triballi. So each of them advised whatever 
seemed to be of advantage regarding the current situation. To the Grand 
Domestic, a swift response to the Kralēs – so that either they would persuade 
him to choose peace or they would go to war because of his audacity – 
seemed necessary. /80/ Yet it seemed to be much more pressing and more 
beneficial to make preparations for the expedition to the Peloponnese once it 
was spring and not to throw away this opportunity, which offered a 
foundation for great achievements.5 
“For if, with the help of God, it comes to pass that the Latins living in 
the Peloponnese join us,” he said, “then through necessity the Catalans 
living in Attica and Boiotia6 will come over to us, either willingly or by force. 
When this happens, and from the Peloponnese continuously as far as 
Byzantion has come under the sovereignty of the Romans, just as in former 
times, it is possible to see that it will be no great labour to demand 
satisfaction from the Triballi as well as the other neighbouring barbarians for 
their hubris, which they have directed against us for so long now. Therefore, 
as great hopes have shown themselves from that quarter, it is appropriate to 
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act in this way so this opportunity does not escape us. For this reason, I 
believe it is correct for us to return to Byzantion right now, for we need a 
naval force suitable for the Peloponnese, which must be prepared during the 
winter. 
“Therefore, if, having neglected these matters at the present time, we 
turn to the west, believing that we will return quickly after restoring matters 
there, my fear is that we become entangled by wars and certain other 
necessities and, having being unable to prepare ourselves, we lose the chance 
of success while returning. If, however, we were in Byzantion now, first we 
would appoint naval commanders and a general, who would take charge of 
fitting the ships and selecting the sailors and hoplites7 who will embark. /81/ 
Then we would examine financial matters, from whatever source it would be 
possible to obtain what is needed for the preparation of the fleet. In addition 
to this, it is also necessary to appoint administrators of the public revenues, 
lest, having been gathered in a disorderly and haphazard manner, some 
scandal arises regarding the public money, which is increased by no small 
amount, not by raising the customary taxes, but from some different means 
and innovations. Whenever these matters happen to receive the appropriate 
care and attention, I intend to send an embassy to the ruler of the Triballi, 
both to investigate how great his strength is and, at the same time, if he is 
ready for reconciliation, make progress towards a truce. For I believe it is not 
presently to our advantage to willingly choose war, when there is a 
possibility to maintain peace with the neighbouring peoples.  
“I, after spending a few days in Byzantion, will gather the army’s 
mercenary force and the strongest of those holding incomes from villages, 
and I will march to the west during winter,8 thus joining with the western 
army, while permitting the others to spend time at home and to prepare 
themselves for the campaign at the start of spring. And, having despoiled the 
Albanians who graze their herds around Pogonianē9 and Libisda,10 imposing 
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a just punishment for their injustice (for of course you know that, while the 
Emperor was alive and after his death, they greatly afflicted many of the 
cities of Akarnania and /82/ Balagrita11 with their daily raiding and 
plundering), I will attempt, if I am able – and I think I am – to celebrate the 
festival of Christ’s birthday in Byzantion, not only on account of the army, so 
that it will not remain in foreign parts in winter, but also so that the 
coronation of the young emperor may be performed. For it seems good to us 
that it should be so.  
“The moment spring starts, the triremes and the whole army having 
been prepared for the voyage, we will attack the Peloponnese 
simultaneously from land and sea. For, if we subjugate them, it will be no 
little gain to the Romans. A secondary purpose of the expedition is to scout 
out the harbours and rivers of Ionia12 in which the Persians anchor their 
ships and to burn them with fire – for it has been thus agreed by Alēserē,13 
the satrap of Kotyaeion14 and myself, that he would come to help from the 
mainland with an army of both infantry and cavalry. Having been delivered 
from the damage and worry which they cause, we will proceed towards the 
struggle lying before us, having settled all domestic affairs well.” 
Such was the counsel of the Grand Domestic and, since the others 
approved and applauded his advice, they immediately chose ambassadors to 
the ruler of the Triballi. They, having attended him and talked about peace, 
persuaded him to be reconciled and they established treaties just as they 
were before.15 
The Grand Domestic commanded the army to muster, while he went 
to Byzantion. When he drew near, the senators present in Byzantion came 
out to meet him; /83/ dismounting from their horses, they welcomed him. He 
rebuked them as it was improper for them to do this.16 Then, having gone to 
the palace, he greeted the Empress and offered consoling words; she was 
distressed not only by her misfortunes but also she was being tended for a 
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bodily illness. And he described all that he had achieved since going to 
Didymoteichon, and what he had promised to the ambassadors from the 
Peloponnese, and what sorts of things he intended to do about them and 
about other matters. He encouraged her to expect great things and to have 
confidence in him as, for the sake of benefit to her and her children and the 
Romans in common, he would spare neither body nor money but would 
show every effort and enthusiasm. For now it was not easy to demonstrate 
the increase in the army and the public income through words, but when 
spring arrived, if he was still in this life, words would not be needed as 
proof: the benefit would become clear from their deeds. Then, having 
imparted those matters for which he had come, she approved his plan, since 
it also seemed profitable to her; he took charge of the work and was 
managing everything as it had been planned. 
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Chapter 13 
Shortly after that, during a day in the palace when he was discussing 
public affairs with the Empress and they were deliberating together 
concerning what it was necessary to do, noise from a crowd outside was 
heard, mingled with shouting around the palace. When the Empress asked 
him what this might be, he said that he knew nothing for certain but 
supposed /84/ that this clamour arose from some people arguing with each 
other about a trial.1 Later, he also affirmed that he had supposed nothing else 
in the beginning, for he knew nothing about what was happening. Then, as 
the commotion became much louder and carried on longer, having 
considered it might be a rebellion, he rose to his feet and went out, to learn 
the cause of what was happening. 
He saw the courtyard of the palace was full of men, who were not 
only of the military register but also youths distinguished by their noble 
lineage, and the Patriarch was standing in the middle of them and 
contending strongly against those who were quarrelling with him. The cause 
of their argument was that they thought the Grand Domestic rightfully 
deserved to have greater honour and should not have to enter the courtyard 
of the palace on foot just like the masses2 – he, who now not only held 
control over the whole of public affairs but also, when the Emperor was 
alive, was ruling beside him and had often been called upon by him 
[Andronikos III] to share the imperial office. They were holding the Patriarch 
responsible for these matters, because he completely disregarded them and 
would not advise the Empress of what was appropriate. These things, then, 
were said by them. They did not all hold the same opinions: one of them 
held goodwill towards him [Kantakouzēnos], he was earnest and spoke 
equally sincerely, while others courted opportunity and the Grand 
Domestic’s power; there were also those who were annoyed about the 
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arguments and would gladly have prevented them, if it was possible. 
Nevertheless, they pretended to agree with the others from fear, thinking 
that he [Kantakouzēnos] was aware and /85/ had prepared secretly to have 
these things said. The Patriarch was opposing their arguments and saying it 
was not necessary for them to raise a disorderly uproar, but rather to obey 
the decisions of the Empress and Grand Domestic.3 
Although they were engaged in this quarrel, once he [Kantakouzēnos] 
made his presence known, they stopped. As if growing angry, he said 
nothing to the others, but he censured the Patriarch, because by paying 
attention to the words of ignorant men, he had stirred up a war of words 
with them and provoked uproar. He advised him to go home and not to 
argue with them now, as on the following day he would talk with him [the 
Patriarch] about what these men had said. He escorted him as far as his 
horse, deferring to him because of the reprimand he had dealt him. He had 
never done this before but was overturning his customary practice in the 
imperial dwellings.4 Returning to the Empress again, the Grand Domestic 
explained the cause of the uproar, and how, having reprimanded the 
Patriarch for his untimely contentiousness, because he took heed of the 
unsound words of foolish men, he had advised him to return home. He 
called upon God as his witness and asserted that he knew nothing about 
what they had said, but that it was stirred up by the foolish stubbornness of 
certain uneducated people. 
While the Empress commended his suppression of the uproar, the 
Grand Domestic said, “I advised him [the Patriarch] to depart, without 
adding anything to what had been said, knowing this was a way to easily 
terminate the controversy that had arisen, particularly as it concerned me. 
But to you, I advise that you do not suffer this audacity to go /86/ 
unpunished but, having summoned <those responsible>, to chastise them 
with words for their impertinent language. I would advise you to make plain 
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the full measure of your anger towards them, if I did not intend to depart 
from here, taking the greater part of them with me. On this account, after 
upbraiding them sufficiently, grant them pardon, blaming the necessity of 
their march.” 
Having been convinced by him, the Empress summoned the men and 
chided their lack of discipline: “While having been brought up in the laws of 
the emperors and lived with them from childhood, you are disposed no 
better than uncivilised barbarians, making lawless uproar about everything 
that occurs to you. For you must consider how far you have now plunged 
into folly. First you openly gainsay the emperors in their palace; second, you 
have argued with the Patriarch, who is spiritual father of all in common and 
is worthy of the greatest respect and honour, far more than your physical 
parents. And third, because you supposedly made these arguments for the 
sake of the Grand Domestic, proclaiming through them – so far as you are 
concerned – that he needs help from you in the fulfilment of his goal, if there 
is something he needs from us. That this is nothing other than utterly absurd, 
you may judge yourselves. For not only now, when authority over 
everything has come to him, but also while the Emperor was alive, this man 
[Kantakouzēnos] came forward for you all, /87/ in those matters where you 
wanted something from the Emperor, but none of you came forward for 
him. Therefore, from the past and from the present, it is necessary for you to 
understand that he does not need help from yourselves. For there is nothing 
at all which he wants, either for himself or for others, that he is not also able 
to accomplish. If this is so, and nobody will deny it, there is no need for you 
to create uproar and cause trouble in vain. Because of this you do not 
deserve kindness but punishment by him. And I demanded the chastisement 
appropriate for your insolence, until he begged me, pleading on your behalf 
that you must instead prepare for the campaign, on which, then, I think it is 
appropriate for you proceed gladly, not bemoaning your lot. Because of this, 
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then, I grant pardon for your misdeeds. I exhort you to be well-disciplined 
hereafter and never to interfere in the affairs of those greater than you but to 
submit to those for whom the proper management of such matters is 
permitted, and to support them if ever something causes them to stumble.” 
The Empress reasoned with them in such a way, reproving them 
because of the tumult. They expressed their gratitude for her kindness and 
lenience, and the Grand Domestic did so even more than all the others, then 
they withdrew. Having been left alone once again, the Grand Domestic, 
together with the Empress, deliberated about matters of necessity. 
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Chapter 14 
Having happened upon the subject of the parakoimōmenos Apokaukos, 
and considering in what manner it would be necessary to deal with him, the 
Empress said that /88/ she demanded no other penalty for his scandalous 
acts than that to which he had condemned himself: to sit idle at home, 
without leaving or being able to administer any part of public affairs.  
And he [Kantakouzēnos] said that he believed exemplary justice was 
appropriate for his recklessness. However, to leave behind anything 
requiring correction was against his judgement when he would be departing 
to foreign parts with the expedition to the west. On account of this he had 
established treaties with the neighbouring Persians and Alexandros, the 
emperor of the Mysians, so that, when he left, she [the Empress] would not 
be disturbed by troublesome wars. And because of this it was appropriate to 
consider the parakoimōmenos worthya of pardon, to make use of him again, in 
whatever way might seem expedient. 
But she shook her head, pointing out his [Apokaukos’] ill-will on 
many occasions, not only against herself and her children but also against 
him. Above all, a short while before, that man had behaved towards him 
arrogantly and harshly in her presence.1 She asked, “If he was most clearly 
proved to be plotting against us both, why is it necessary to so confidently 
leave him behind, a man full of villainy and treachery, when you are away?”  
It is worthwhile to remember what was said by Apokaukos to the 
Grand Domestic in the presence of the Empress, and still older frauds which 
he had committed against the Grand Domestic, who had done him great 
kindnesses, so that the generosity of this man [Kantakouzēnos] in his 
benefactions, and his willingness to pardon those sinning against him – as 
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well as the ingratitude of the parakoimōmenos towards these good deeds /89/ 
and the perversity of his ways – may become clear to us from these accounts. 
So this man, the parakoimōmenos, originated from Bithynia and was of 
obscure descent from commoners.2 At first he was under-secretary to a 
number of those who collect the public revenues for a little pay,3 then he was 
employed by the Emperor’s uncle, Andronikos Asanēs.4 Then, deserting him, 
he approached Stratēgos,5 the Domestic of the Western Themes,6 at that time 
overseeing the public salt revenues.7 Appearing naturally clever and eager in 
service, he [Apokaukos] was trusted with money by him, for him to go to the 
emperor (this was Andronikos the first [Palaiologos]) so he could persuade 
him to entrust the organisation of the salt-works to Stratēgos for the 
following year too. But, presenting the money to the emperor as if it were his 
own and promising that he would bring in to the imperial treasury double 
the amount offered by Stratēgos, he persuaded the emperor to prefer him 
and to grant him control of the salt-works. And thus, having deposed that 
man [Stratēgos] from office with his own money, he [Apokaukos] was by 
now illustrious and foremost among tax collectors.  
Soon, since he owed a great deal of money to the public treasury,8 he 
was expecting to be imprisoned and reformed not to commit such crimes. He 
thought about revolt against the emperor, for there was no other way to 
escape the ills he would suffer. Perceiving from the state of affairs that the 
young Emperor Andronikos was necessarily <soon> going to be at odds with 
his grandfather, he begged Syrgiannēs,9 who was one of his closest friends, 
to bring him before the young Emperor. /90/ And he [Syrgiannēs] (for the 
war between the emperors was already being set in motion) asked the Grand 
Domestic to take Apokaukos on: not only was he naturally gifted at 
gathering the public taxes, but also he had plenty of money, which he saw 
would be useful to them in the war; we also mentioned this briefly at the 
very beginning of our history.10 Having being introduced to the young 
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Emperor through him [Kantakouzēnos], since the war between the emperors 
was breaking out, he immediately revolted against the older emperor in 
favour of the younger, fleeing the suspected danger because of the money he 
owed rather than from goodwill. He was made treasurer of the imperial 
money by the Grand Domestic.  
When Victory looked upon the young Emperor and the rule of the 
Romans was completely subject to him, he [Apokaukos] was appointed to be 
the mediator of public affairs,11 again by him [Kantakouzēnos], almost 
without the Emperor’s approval, for he did not judge the office to be suitable 
for him [Apokaukos]. Except it was not the entire public administration that 
was turned over to him, but all of the more necessary matters were referred 
to the Grand Domestic; he [Apokaukos] had the meaner duties, from which 
no harm to the common interest could be expected, whether managed well 
or badly. However he was flattered by many people. Meanwhile, he was at 
odds with the Emperor on many occasions because of his love of deceit and, 
when he was about to be given punishment, he was delivered from the 
Emperor’s anger by the Grand Domestic’s /91/ entreaties. 
Having risen out of deep obscurity into such a conspicuous position, 
he [Apokaukos] looked carefully to see if he was able to repay his benefactor 
in the most contrary way. For when the young Emperor Andronikos suffered 
from that violent illness and came near to death,12 he left the sovereignty to 
his wife the Empress, who had not yet become the mother of his child but 
was pregnant.13 To the Grand Domestic, he left the administration of public 
affairs and the obedience of all, and nobody was to contradict him in any 
matter at all. Just as was the custom when emperors are dying, he wished to 
secure from his subjects goodwill and firm fidelity towards those he was 
leaving behind; having set forth oaths he ordered everyone to ratify their 
allegiance through these. The oaths committed the Romans to each maintain 
their honest allegiance to the Empress Anna, and the child borne by her, and 
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their obedience to the Grand Domestic. The Empress Xenē,14 the Emperor’s 
mother, was not mentioned at all: the Emperor had decided this was 
necessary since it was not possible for two, especially two women, to govern 
one realm.15 At the time she certainly found this hard to bear, as did certain 
of those who had sympathy for her, although she was not neglected or 
ignored by the Grand Domestic. For, since he suspected the matter was able 
to cause upset to the empress [Xenē], he hastily sent Glabas16 the megas 
dioikētēs17 to her, along with a cross of precious stones to vouch for the 
trustworthiness of his words. He [Kantakouzēnos] explained that the /92/ 
Emperor’s illness was severe, and he beseeched God not to suffer them to be 
deprived of such an emperor. If perhaps a certain one of the expected 
outcomes happened [i.e., death], [God] having dispensed in this way the 
measure <of life> wholly justly and beneficially, she should not suspect any 
unpleasantness would arise from the change in public affairs, as he was no 
less favourably disposed towards her than if he had been born from her 
himself. 
While she was thus roused to anger, those formerly consumed by 
envy of the Grand Domestic’s fame were at that time even more inflamed by 
this passion, having observed clearly that he had become master of public 
affairs. Among them were numbered the parakoimōmenos Apokaukos and 
many others, Syrgiannēs being the ringleader in this affair.18 Realising that 
the empress’ anger might be of the greatest assistance to them in overcoming 
the Grand Domestic and ending his rule, many went to the empress [Xenē]. 
Since the Emperor was recovering and would be delivered from his illness, 
they pretended to be aggrieved on her behalf and accused the Grand 
Domestic of great ingratitude because, when the Emperor was dying, if he 
[Kantakouzēnos] had been reasonably minded, he needed to preserve the 
authority for both the empresses and especially for her [Xenē], because the 
Empire of the Romans belonged to her on account both of her son and her 
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marriage to the emperor [Michaēl IX].19 Having little concern for this and for 
what was lawful and proper, he had drawn all authority to himself, /93/ 
having added the Empress Anna to the oaths just as a cover for treachery. 
She – who had arrived from foreign parts only shortly before20 and had few 
among the Romans willing to risk themselves on her behalf – would readily 
hand over the sovereignty to him. They advised [Xenē] not to overlook what 
was happening but to destroy his [Kantakouzēnos’] power with great haste 
and zeal, instructing her son the Emperor that he had treacherous and 
criminal intentions concerning his rule while he was dying, and now he 
would persuade all the Romans of nothing less than to support him, with the 
result that he [Andronikos] would be emperor only in name, devoid of 
power over events, while that man would be emperor in practice. It was 
appropriate for him to consider these matters so they did not lead to ruin, 
but to check the attack beforehand, demolishing his [Kantakouzēnos’] great 
pretension and rendering him contemptible.  
So the empress rushed from her home [in Thessalonike] in great haste 
– having been inflamed by her own anger and more fully by these men – to 
the defence <of her son> against the Grand Domestic, if she was able. Having 
gone to her son the Emperor, she accused the Grand Domestic of acting as 
emperor, and she advised him to guard himself against that man, who 
feigned goodwill, but would act treacherously if ever there was opportunity.  
The Emperor made a lengthy argument in response to the empress, 
his mother, in defence of the Grand Domestic, proving that those accusing 
him of such things were sycophants and liars. As he wished to make clear by 
his deeds that he believed these things to be fabrication, he saw to it that, 
rather /94/ than his former kindness, he gave greater influence to the Grand 
Domestic and paid him even more punctilious attention, which caused his 
mother the empress to be even more irritated. So in this way the Emperor 
sent the sycophants packing. Having told him [Kantakouzēnos] everything 
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concerning why the empress had come, he advised him once again to 
assume the imperial garments, if for no other reason than because it was the 
opinion of many people anyway, so that their suspicions would be revealed 
to be true, and he would be freed from many annoyances. 
He was very grateful to the Emperor for his benevolence towards him 
and for his nobility. But he did not wish to change his dress for that of an 
emperor, not for any other reason than because of the sycophants 
themselves, so that he would receive justice from them for their villainy 
through this, by revealing them as sycophantsa through their deeds. He said 
that he knew, even before the empress [Xenē] arrived, that she was coming 
concerning these matters. For some of those aware of her secrets – 
concerning what had happened just now – came in advance of her arrival 
and they made known to the Grand Domestic the organisers of the plot. 
They advised him to bring her into conflict with her son the Emperor, 
anticipating her attack, and to throw the Emperor’s heart into confusion by 
invented arguments, so that she would have no power to accomplish 
whatever she might be planning. He had dismissed them angrily, as they 
were behaving no better than enemies towards him and in these matters 
were wearing the mask of friends. /95/ For such things were not befitting to 
him, but completely the opposite: if some dispute occurred between the 
Emperor and his mother, he would do everything and make every effort 
which might cause them to be reconciled. For this is the mark of true 
friendship; what they advised were the ways of a hated enemy, corrupt and 
unworthy. He was not paying court to the power of the Emperor, pretending 
affection, but chose to be a true and firm friend to the Emperor, from his 
earliest life until now and, trusting in God, for ever. So the intrigue against 
the Grand Domestic was broken up in this way. 
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Chapter 15 
The conspirators had seen by this time that nothing terrible had 
happened to him [Kantakouzēnos] in consequence of their plot but instead 
that their depravity had been recognised, and they were dreading that they 
would suffer something terrible because of this. While most tried to reconcile 
the Grand Domestic with themselves in various ways – although he made no 
move to avenge himself – the parakoimōmenos, conscious of his previous 
obscurity and his present glory, into which he had been thrust by him 
[Kantakouzēnos], and that he had not been disposed to be grateful, or fair, 
but had already clearly proved himself one of his greatest enemies, feared 
that, having angered him, he would be reduced to his former fortune. He 
decided not to use mediators and intercessors, as few or none would be 
capable enough, but to entreaty for himself, compensating for his villainy by 
showing he had changed.  
And in writing, /96/ stating frankly the kindnesses shown towards 
him by the Grand Domestic since the beginning, then also setting forth his 
former conspiracies against him, and then becoming his own prosecutor and 
agreeing to pay the most extreme penalties, he thereafter begged for 
forgiveness. He promised to show himself worthy of his benevolence – if he 
had not before, then he would do so now at least – and to observe, for all 
time, not only goodwill and remembrance of the benefactions shown 
towards him, but also to observe the commands issued by him 
[Kantakouzēnos] with all willingness and urgency, demonstrating clear and 
pure obedience in everything. He offered firm guarantees in addition to his 
words; not just unusual and terrible oaths, fearful to hear, but, moreover, at 
the same time as the most holy body of Jesus the Saviour who is the Saviour 
of all mankind was being celebrated.1 He shamefully pleaded by the 
suffering of the unscathable one on our behalf, and by the three days in the 
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tomb, and by the resurrection from the dead, for himself to be granted 
pardon by that man [Kantakouzēnos] and for him not to demand 
punishment for his folly; as many deeds by the Saviour were for the sake of 
insolent men, so should it be in regard to him. 
Next, he watched for an opportune moment. When the sacred liturgy 
was drawing to an end in the house of the Grand Domestic and he himself 
was there, having been especially nearby during the procession of the divine 
and life-giving body of our Saviour the Logos, he gave him [Kantakouzēnos] 
his written petition. He also said, by word of mouth, that he would produce 
as witnesses of what he had written the very same awe-inspiring body /97/ of 
Christ, as was just then being administered, and the angels proceeding 
unseen and accompanying the priests, visible and manifest to us, celebrating 
the office together with them [i.e., during holy communion]. While the 
Grand Domestic was holding the writings in his hands and waiting for the 
end of the service, the parakoimōmenos again came close. In order to convince 
him, he asked him to read what he held now so that, not only because of the 
oaths but also from reading it at that same time [as the service], what was 
written would be more fearful and more trustworthy.  
Since he was persuaded, he read <the petition>. He said nothing at 
that time but later, after the end <of the service>, he received the 
parakoimōmenos alone. “While struggling with your initial misfortune,” he 
said, “you were raised into your current success and prominence by me. 
While all the Romans may observe this with me, you may be more able to 
believe what is true and fair concerning yourself coming from me than from 
all of those bearing witness with me. Certainly, I have sufficient evidence of 
your beginnings from others and particularly from you. I was intending 
greater and more wonderful benefactions for you than these, and I shared 
this intention with myself and with Him who knows clearly the thoughts 
and stirrings of each man’s soul, that is, God. And you have remembered 
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nothing regarding the many occasions on which you were treated well by 
me, nor that you were shown so many kindnesses, and that not once were 
you treated badly. But like an unbroken chain, the succession of favours 
from me has been maintained until now, /98/ yet, having attached yourself to 
others who made war on me because of baseless malice, without injuring me, 
at least the worst evils you devised <for me> have come upon you all. 
“So what is it necessary for me to do and even to think about these 
matters, other than to attempt to harm you in any way I may be able? And if 
I had applied myself to these matters, what would have remained, other than 
for you to bewail your previous good fortune, with <only> sudden 
dishonour and poverty remaining from great power? So, on the one hand, 
this would be a matter of the greatest ease to me – and you can judge for 
yourself how worthy you are to benefit from scheming of such a kind and 
greater. On the other hand, being conscious that I myself stand in need of 
great forgiveness from God – I sin every day, not in such numbers or to such 
an extent as yourself but more often and more dreadfully – and, 
furthermore, trusting your oaths, I grant pardon and amnesty for your plot. 
You will take care to expunge your previous works by your future good 
deeds.” So then the parakoimōmenos again confirmed what he had written 
with further words and oaths. He enjoyed the support of the Grand 
Domestic again, surpassing many in fame, even those of illustrious family. 
Sometime later, and just as was previously narrated by us,2 he 
[Apokaukos] was appointed commander of the fleet facing the Persians by 
the Emperor who was then still alive. The Grand Domestic had begged for 
this from the Emperor many times, that he would be entrusted with the 
office, although [the Emperor] /99/ thought that employment in these matters 
was not fitting for him. The epi tōn anamnēseōn3 Spanopoulos4 and Iōannēs 
Melitēniōtēs5 were appointed to the office of mediator of public business,6 
and Geōrgios Pepagōmenos7 and Nikolaos Melitēniōtēs8 as treasurers of the 
 168 
public money. But when he [Apokaukos] was minded to treachery 
concerning the imperial letters and the money, just as we have said, the 
Emperor, hating his corruption, immediately dismissed him from command, 
which he had enjoyed only for a short time, and he spent an appropriate 
period without being entrusted with any public office. 
When the Emperor died, having begged the Grand Domestic many 
times and, furthermore, having turned from his private affairs to do him 
[Kantakouzēnos] favour, he [Apokaukos] was entrusted the office of 
mesazōn, but not yet with the keeping of the imperial money, although he 
was certain to receive this also in a little while, as the Grand Domestic later 
confirmed. But having seen one of the offices come to him immediately and 
easily at his demand, but not yet the other, it did not occur to him to be 
grateful for what he had been granted but instead to retaliate, thinking 
himself to have been unjustly deprived. Believing the Empress had 
commanded the Grand Domestic to entrust both the offices to him – 
although the favour to him would remove the other [office] from those 
holding it – he perceived it was necessary to strike openly. And, having 
approached the Empress while he [Kantakouzēnos] was present and 
conversing with her, he said, “I believe that not only the office which has 
now been granted to me, but all of them, as many as the Romans command, 
are bestowed on everyone not by the Grand Domestic but by you. /100/ On 
which account, I also think it is befitting for you to know my gratitude for 
your kindnesses. So, if indeed this is true, just as I think it is, then – contrary 
to this – having been appointed to hold both offices by you, which I also 
controlled when the Emperor was alive, he [Kantakouzēnos] bestowed one, 
robbing me of the other. I ask you to command him to restore the other too, 
or rather for it to be bestowed by you, even while he is present, so that I may 
give the proper appreciation for this kindness especially to you.” 
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The Grand Domestic did not utter a sound. The Empress, having 
observed his [Apokaukos’] great ingratitude, said, “A great cause to wonder 
has occurred to me, the cause of which is these arguments you have 
advanced, which I cannot comprehend. For, if you thought that the Grand 
Domestic does not possess the same power which he held previously or 
some difference has arisen between me and him, you must recognise that 
you have behaved presumptuously and rashly; you are very much mistaken 
in your concern. But if you know he has shed none of his power and 
goodwill towards me, then you have come forward from wickedness, not 
stupidity. But I would say, on my part, that these are words of madness. I 
know, when the Emperor was alive, you were entrusted with the office of 
mesazōn and of imperial treasurer. Except at that time, as anyone could have 
told you, the Emperor did not do this readily, but conceded it because of this 
man’s wish. On this account he [Kantakouzēnos] was often greatly 
reproached by him [the Emperor], /101/ who was carried away by anger 
against you, as you were doing nothing more useful than befitted his 
expectations. After having been appointed as admiral, you were dismissed 
from office again, and neither while the Emperor was alive nor after his 
death were you appointed to any office by me. Now this man, having being 
previously petitioned, has entrusted you with office, as you have said, then 
reported it to me later, and he persuaded me to consent to his decision. On 
this account, it is appropriate to be thankful for his kindness and not to 




The Grand Domestic himself also could not bear his [Apokaukos’] 
arrogance. He said, “Such a long period of time should have been your 
teacher that your existing good fortune was produced by me. Since you 
wished to do wrong willingly – when it was necessary to express great 
gratitude, you chose to say the very opposite – I will take away the office 
which I have already given to you, and from this day public affairs will not 
be a concern to you.” So he spoke in this way. 
Apokaukos enquired of the Empress if she also approved of what had 
been said. When she said she agreed with his words, the Grand Domestic, 
having forbidden every office to him hereafter, stood up and attended to the 
management of other business. 
All those present in the palace, having become aware of the 
parakoimōmenos’ argument with the Grand Domestic and that he was 
excluded from every office on account of his [Kantakouzēnos’] anger, 
remarked upon his [Apokaukos’] great arrogance and /102/ madness. While 
he was leaving the palace, although many were previously accustomed to 
follow and to serve him because of his rank, at that time nobody dared to 
approach him, but he departed while attended by just one of his servants, 
called Spalokotos by name.1 So, for these reasons, Apokaukos openly caused 
offence to the Grand Domestic and, having being driven out by his anger, he 
sat at home for many days, suffering from either true or feigned 
despondency. Then, once more becoming a suppliant to many of the Grand 
Domestic’s friends, and especially to the Patriarch, he persuaded him 
[Kantakouzēnos] through them to let go of his anger and, having made 
many promises and great oaths on his own account, convinced him that he 
would no longer put his hand to similar deeds. And after not very long he 
was given command of preparing the triremes against the Persians. After a 
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short interval, forgetting these promises, he plotted against the young 
Emperor Iōannēs, just as we have said.2  
The Empress reminded the Grand Domestic of these matters at that 
time, as the parakoimōmenos had plainly demonstrated his ingratitude 
towards him on many occasions. Because of this she was not persuaded to 
give him pardon, but to let him be confined in Epibatai, as if he was let out to 
go free, he would not be idle again but would set his hand to some new 
<scheme>. 
But he [Kantakouzēnos], having provided the Empress with many 
arguments on his [Apokaukos’] behalf, finally persuaded her to grant the 
pardon, but not to allow him to stay for any time in Byzantion.3 Instead, 
having come from Epibatai and made proskynesis to her, /103/ on the next day 
he was then to return to the same place. After she had considered these 
matters, oaths to grant him amnesty for his wicked deeds were then sworn in 
private by the Empress, the Grand Domestic, and the Patriarch. The oaths by 
the Empress and Patriarch were carried to Epibatai by Phōkas4 and Dexios5 
and, thirdly, Ampar,6 and those from the Grand Domestic by Dēmētrios 
Kasandrēnos.7 The parakoimōmenos, having seen these men, listened to the 
statements which they made to him. He declared that there were neither 
oaths nor any words that would convince him but he would take care of 
himself; he would arrange his affairs however seemed best to him. Therefore 
they returned having achieved nothing in this way.8 
The Grand Domestic, since he was hurrying to leave Byzantion 
because of public business, having taken the Patriarch aside on his own 
again, reminded him once more of his previous words and the oaths he had 
made to him. He asked him to show by his deeds that he was disposed 
exactly as he had promised eagerly in his words, and that he would not 
overlook him [Kantakouzēnos] being slandered by sycophants. The Patriarch 
once more offered the same words and promises, and told him to be 
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confident, as no less than if he were present himself, he would stand firm for 
justice on his behalf. Having bid farewell to each other, they parted. The 
Grand Domestic lectured all the others, especially those who had a short 
while before been arguing with the Patriarch on behalf of him 
[Kantakouzēnos] entering the palace on horseback, for a long time about 
good discipline and /104/ ready obedience to the Empress, and finally 
promised that if any attempted revolt, he would not set him free 
unpunished. He departed from Byzantion on the eighth day before the end 
of September.9 
Before he left Byzantion, he went again to the palace, so he could bid 
farewell to the Empress. Although she urged the Grand Domestic to betroth 
his daughter to the young Emperor Iōannēs, he put it off until his return 
from the west, on the pretence that these were pressing matters and did not 
permit him to spend time on such business, but in truth he remembered the 
words of his friends, which they had sent, preventing him from doing 
anything on his own behalf, whether it appeared good or bad, before he 
could talk with them alone. Cherishing his friendship with them and having 
resolved himself to do nothing before putting the decision to his friends, he 
postponed making the arrangements concerning his daughter’s marriage at 
that time.10 
As a secondary goal of his journey, he went by Epibatai and the 
reconciliation of the parakoimōmenos towards the Empress was accomplished 
by him. For when he came near to the fortress, the parakoimōmenos emerged, 
greeted him and justified himself concerning his rejection of the oaths: it was 
not because evil would be carried out by him, but so that he could show by 
his actions themselves that he did not need oaths from him [Kantakouzēnos], 
but he would rather take assurance from his plain-spoken words than the 
written oaths of others. Because he now understood that he could place 
himself most willingly into his [Kantakouzēnos’] hands that for this reason, 
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he was not asking for oaths or for anything else. The Grand Domestic, 
having thanked him in regard to these sentiments towards himself and 
having conversed enough, /105/ left him at his dwelling, as he [Apokaukos] 
would come to him on the next day. And he [Kantakouzēnos] went on to 
Selymbria.11 And on the following day when the parakoimōmenos came, he 
was sent to Byzantion so, having made proskynesis to the Empress, he would 
return again to him [Kantakouzēnos]. He, having gone to Didymoteichon, 
prepared for the campaign in the west. 
The parakoimōmenos, while in Byzantion, first did proskynesis to the 
Empress and asked for her pardon, in reference to those matters in which he 
seemed to have given offence. Then, having gone to the mother of the Grand 
Domestic, who was in Byzantion at that time to give consolation to the 
Empress,12 he first expressed great gratitude to the Grand Domestic, not only 
for his benefactions, which he had provided to him from the very beginning 
until then, but also for his magnanimity and affection, which he had shown 
to him not once but often, and on the last occasion just now, when he had 
out of folly caused offence. Then he promised that there was nothing that 
could persuade him or force him to demonstrate any ingratitude and wrong-
doing concerning him [Kantakouzēnos], but he would obey him completely, 
since not only he alone, but also his entire family had goodwill and 
obedience for him, through all time, and would maintain complete servitude 
just as to a master. He was ready at that moment to provide oaths as 
guarantee of what he had said, particularly those considered to be the most 
resolute and terrible. 
She [Theodōra] said to him, “It is not now necessary that I add to the 
list of benefactions which have come to you from the Grand Domestic since 
the beginning until now, because /106/ of his generosity regarding giving 
pardon to those who sin against him and the things that have come to him in 
exchange from your ungrateful mind, since you have previously witnessed 
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all this. There is no need for oaths now, but rather the oaths must be 
confirmed by deeds. For trust follows not from words but rather from deeds. 
For this reason it is befitting for you to demonstrate your goodwill towards 
him by deeds and not demonstrate it by words, which are inferior to deeds.” 
And he, having promiseda to make his goodwill towards him clear in 
every way, not only by words but also by deeds, departed from there and 
went to the Patriarch. 
                                                 
a II, 106.9: ἐπαγγειλάμενυς amended to ἐπαγγειλάμενoς. 
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Chapter 17 
Having greeted him [the Patriarch] and conversed concerning some 
other matters, he [Apokaukos] then said, “You yourself may know of the 
Grand Domestic’s favour towards me, as you closely follow these matters 
from your elevated position. A short while ago, having given offence to him 
through my thoughtlessness, I was close to being ruined, if you had not 
implored him; you persuaded him not only to put aside his anger towards 
me, but also to give me an occasion for glory, the command of the fleet 
against the Persians. For this reason, I acknowledge it is right to owe you not 
only a reward for saving me but also great gratitude for this honour and I 
will give counsel and act to your advantage with every attention and 
eagerness, so that these actions will bring the same harm and the same 
benefit to me and to you alike. If, therefore, /107/ I owe you my goodwill and 
my honest and pure friendship for many reasons, it would not be considered 
just, nor would it otherwise be advantageous to me, to conceal the most 
dreadful things which have been reported to me about you, just as someone 
else might, whether better or worse disposed, if he had little or no concern 
for you.” 
When the Patriarch asked whatever it was he might have heard about 
him, he said that he had not heard, but knew most certainly, that the Grand 
Domestic wanted, not before long, “to depose you from your throne and to 
elevate Palamas,1 who is one of his true friends and most diligent towards 
him.”  
Although the Patriarch asked him again and again from whom he 
could gain a clear understanding of this matter, and, if it was just as he 
maintained, from whom he would be allowed to learn the cause, he 
[Apokaukos] begged him not be curious. For he did not dare to venture 
upon these secrets. This single thing had utterly convinced him as, if his soul 
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had not suffered greatly, from his concerns for him from possessing such 
accurate intelligence, he would not have come to report it. As the Patriarch 
was still incredulous and could not accept the Grand Domestic’s sudden 
change, he [Apokaukos] confirmed by oaths that what he had said was not 
false but completely true. He advised him [the Patriarch] not to hesitate, but 
to make plans as quickly as possible; by doing this it was possible to escape 
from the danger. “For he [Kantakouzēnos] does not easily change his mind 
regarding what he has decided, as you would know even better than me.” 
The Patriarch, having been thrown into great confusion by this, and 
being above all convinced by the oaths that nothing of what he had said 
could be fabricated, asked /108/ him to give counsel of whatever he should 
do against so great a torrent of troubles. The parakoimōmenos, still wishing to 
lead the Patriarch further into his net, said, “And while I owe you much 
gratitude for your previous kindnesses, it is right not only to readily offer 
advice which I consider best and advantageous, but also to willingly give up 
money and servants and my relatives and my soul itself – if such a thing can 
be said! – for your sake. As I could not expect to advise you to attempt 
actions which hold great risk while standing aside from the dangers myself, I 
want you to make a partnership with me, and with my family and closest 
friends, by betrothing one of my daughters to your son,2 so that you may 
know clearly that I do not simply want to be one of those with a friendly 
relationship towards you, but one of those joining with you in the joyful 
achievement of prosperity and, equally, in perishing alongside you.”  
Since what he said was pleasing to the Patriarch, he was fully 
persuaded that the parakoimōmenos was working eagerly in his interests. 
Having discussed the marriage proposal a little (for there was no 
disagreement, with Apokaukos readily promising he would prepare 
everything), and fixed the arrangements concerning the wedding, then 
ratified the matter according to the custom of the Romans through 
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<exchanging> enkolpia,3 the parakoimōmenos having also given frightful oaths 
in addition to this, they then turned to their deliberation. 
The parakoimōmenos advised that they should not /109/ hasten to wage 
war openly against the Grand Domestic, relying on their own power. “Since 
it is not because our party alone is not sufficient when matched against him, 
but that it would still not be if we secured the support of many other such 
men. For his strength among the Romans is not only clear to us but it is not 
unknown even to barbarians living far away. He has been the strongest of all 
among us for a long time already, and everyone attends to him punctiliously; 
some have obtained many favours from him, and are expecting still more, 
while others grovel before his power. Because of these concerns I do not 
think it will be to our advantage to oppose him openly. For in addition to not 
being strong enough to achieve what we have decided, we may also destroy 
ourselves. But there is also somebody who could provide us with the 
necessary power, balancing ours against his. This power cannot be found 
from any other quarter, unless we can by some means turn the Empress 
against him. When this comes to pass, we will easily stand against him since 
many would join with us, fighting on behalf of the young emperor. By 
whatever means this may be arranged, your marvellous sagacity will most 
certainly discover, and I will advise you myself too. 
“Do not wonder if, while resisting a strong enemy, we also use lies. 
For he who attempts to destroy an enemy, ought not to consider this – 
whether to use lies or truth – but to look towards one thing only, to become 
stronger than the one they are fighting, /110/ and to dismiss everything else. 
Accordingly, once you have approached the Empress (and you will be suited 
for the purpose of persuasion from earlier, when you displayed kindness 
and attentiveness towards her after the Emperor’s death, and by seeming to 
be concerned on her behalf now), you must accuse him; so far as he is not 
under suspicion, he is already openly making the Empire his own and 
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intends soon to kill her and her son. If she demands proof of what you have 
said, persuade her not to inquire closely into such matters. For death will 
overtake her before such proofs are to come, unless she saves herself and her 
children by keeping apart from him. Because of these reasons, I expect, she 
will be struck down by fear and will entrust the war against him to us. 
Having accomplished this, nothing else remains than for that evil man to 
perish evilly; you will – in addition to escaping the impending danger – also 
govern the affairs of the Romans, being undoubtedly the most worthy of all. 
For this reason I ask you to be persuaded by my advice and not to shrink 
back from this matter; it will be arranged easily as I advise you. If you 
hesitate before the danger, I will voice no criticism; you can guess the fortune 
which presently awaits you.” So with these words he convinced the 
Patriarch to pay attention to him and to start a war against the Grand 
Domestic. 
Thereafter he contrived to persuade each of the others, who were 
distinguished from the masses by fame or family, /111/ excelling in stringing 
together lies and calumnies. And having gone first to Andronikos Asanēs, 
who was the father-in-law of the Grand Domestic – for which reason he 
thought to persuade him above all others – he set to work. For, a short time 
before, this man Asanēs, having gone to his son-in-law, asked him not to 
ignore him; he thought his life intolerable because his sons Iōannēs4 and 
Manouēl5 had been shut in prison by the Emperor [Andronikos III] for six 
years already, to suffer the most terrible things and were no better off than if 
they had been living in Hades.6 But, as he was going away to the west, since 
it is necessary to pass through Bēra7 where they were held, he could release 
them from the prison and, taking them along with himself, use them in the 
campaign. None of those he led were too dishonourable to employ in battles 
and military service. 
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The Grand Domestic said this plan was not acceptable to him. For 
they were not the sons of ordinary men, nor were they condemned for some 
minor matter; so if they were to be freed by him, there must be no pretext 
offered for disorder against the Empress. But it was first necessary for them 
to receive her pardon, then, having procured it, to be released from prison. 
“Now if we ourselves do this, without her first permitting it, it is reasonable 
to consider that she and the sycophants will be provided not with just any 
old pretext; they [the sycophants] will insinuate that we have already taken 
away all of her power and oppose her authority, and decide the most 
important matters without deeming her worthy even of any explanation. 
/112/ I think such things will certainly not be beneficial to me, in the first 
place, or to them [the prisoners]. So it is necessary for them to endure a little 
time longer besides the years they have been imprisoned, although it will be 
distressing for them, until – God permitting – I return from the campaign. 
Then, having implored the Empress myself on their behalf and, if necessary, 
pledged guarantees as well, I will arrange for them to leave prison and I will 
attempt to restore them to their former prosperity. Currently, while the army 
is already being prepared for the march, I do not have leisure to spend time 
on these matters, <instead> needing the time for preparation. But although 
these matters are urgent, I will attend upon them while passing by, just as on 
many previous occasions. I will not only console them because of their 
imprisonment and grant them needed solicitude, but I will also fill them 
with better hopes, faithfully promising freedom from their chains. And this 
will make the meantime more bearable to them than the period of a single 
day was previously.” So he [Asanēs] was pleased with these promises and 
acknowledged the many favours on their behalf. 
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Chapter 18 
The parakoimōmenos had learned of these things – he was very good at 
inquiring after matters of this kind – and approached Asanēs. First he 
acknowledged his former service, and encouraged him to believe that the 
good fortune in which he was currently established would not cause him to 
forget his former poverty, but that he simply thought of himself as one of his 
[Asanēs’] servants, willingly giving the goodwill which is appropriate to a 
good master from a slave /113/ when the moment calls for it. And he would 
do everything for his sake and that of his children, even if it was necessary to 
undergo the deepest misfortunes. Because of this he came before him now 
very readily; he believed that he could offer advice which would be to the 
advantage of both him and his children, and at the same time he explained 
that if there was anything needed for this matter, then he would most 
willingly fight alongside him, with money and servants and all that he 
possessed. For his [Asanēs’] children had for a long time already been kept 
under guard by an unjust and jealous decision of the Emperor, and he 
[Apokaukos] was greatly distressed, not only for their suffering from 
injustice and imprisonment, “But also because of my long-standing goodwill, 
which I owe to them and to you, their father; but having no way to help, I 
had to accept their punishment. Yet at the present time, seeing that the most 
suitable moment for freedom from their chains was arriving, I have come to 
advise you not to throw it away.” 
“Yet I have heard,” he said, “when I arrived from Selymbria, that 
although having pleaded many times on their behalf with your son-in-law, 
the Grand Domestic, you achieved nothing else. But he has gone away, 
having lied and raised empty hopes that he will release them from prison, if 
he returns from the west. If it has escaped your notice that this is a deception, 
I am very surprised! For, when the Emperor was alive, he [Kantakouzēnos] 
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was not unable to deliver his wife’s brothers from their ills, if he had at least 
chosen to act in a way that was civilised and becoming to him; he was no less 
powerful than /114/ an emperor. And right now, just as you yourself are not 
ignorant, he may be able to accomplish not only such things but also much 
greater, holding power unaccountably and being the absolute master of 
public affairs.1 But even then, he convinced the Emperor himself that the 
prisoners should be fettered, and he disparaged their courage and 
intelligence, dreading lest he was surpassed in fame by them. And now he 
intends nothing less than to hold them in chains for his whole life. I do not 
say this because I am guessing but because I have precise knowledge. For 
you know that I have enjoyed many favours from him and have shared in 
his secrets; I now hold these in contempt because of my goodwill for you. I 
know accurately everything about him, for which reason it is not necessary 
to doubt me, but to think it over quickly, so long as there is opportunity not 
only to deliver your sons from their troubles, but also to secure for yourself 
the rule of the Romans, which most fittingly belongs to you above all.  
“This is impossible in any other way, unless he is first removed from 
control of public affairs. This is again not otherwise possible unless you 
yourself make the Empress hostile to him, by denouncing him for intending 
to seize the Empire and kill her and her children. You would be most 
deserving of her trust, not only because you clearly know the deliberations 
of your son-in-law, but because you also seem to disdain Nature herself for 
the sake of your goodwill towards her /115/ and her son the emperor. And 
yet someone might say that his dismissal and ruin does not afford you 
genuine and unadulterated pleasure, since certainly your daughter would 
share in his misfortune. And insofar as there is this conflict, it is possible to 
consider these matters by placing them side by side. For they are not the 
same: on this side your sons live as if buried alive, which is beyond what 
they deserved to be punished for, and they live badly, and in want and 
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oppression, and your entire family is carried off by him as if slaves, and you 
suffer nothing better because of your compassion towards all of them. <On 
the other side>, for one unfortunate daughter, all these troubles can be cast 
off, and you are able to make not only your family and oikeioi, but also your 
other friends, splendid and illustrious, having transferred the entire rule of 
the Romans from him to you. For whom, once that man has fallen or been 
removed from authority, is it more just to be in control of affairs than for 
you, who stands out significantly amidst all the Romans, not only on account 
of your courage and experience of wars, but also of your glorious lineage 
and intelligence and everything else? I will eagerly fight with you against 
everyone, holding the rank of a servant, and submit most willingly to 
everything you command. Certainly, having entered the ring against such a 
strong competitor, there is no need to be exact concerning truth and lies but 
it is proper to have in view one thing only, his /116/ defeat. Consider nothing 
else, if you intend to make something worthwhile of your intelligence and 
ability as a general. We observe too that the most prudent generals are not 
always using straight talk and encountering their enemies among the front 
ranks, but it is the case that they use guile and treachery and certain 
contrivances, especially whenever they must engage certain fearsome and 
most formidable enemies. And nobody reproaches their deceit, but instead 
all admire how intelligence is more able to succeed than might.” 
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Chapter 19 
Having spoken to him thus, and made guarantees through oaths, he 
[Apokaukos] persuaded him [Asanēs] that he would now fight most 
willingly alongside him and, once he was established in authority, he 
[Apokaukos] would fulfil the role of a servant. Having left him to deliberate 
alone on how he might quickly succeed, he moved on to his [Asanēs’] 
brothers Kōnstantinos1 and Isaakios,2 the megas doux.3 And to begin with he 
lamented their undeserved misfortunes and appeared to sympathise. Then 
he reproached them for their voluntary servitude and for frivolously and 
sluggishly passing their lives in respect to their freedom. And they should 
not do this now at least, when the moment fortunately offered them 
deliverance from their period of subjection to the Grand Domestic; it was 
appropriate for noble and free men to give this some thought. Although 
when the Emperor was alive, as he favoured him [Kantakouzēnos] with 
great influence /117/ and made him no less powerful than himself, one had 
to acquiesce out of necessity. But now what prevented them, having made a 
show of zeal on behalf of the Emperor’s son, from advising the Empress – it 
was fitting for them to be trusted because of their nobility and their family 
connection – to dismiss him and annul his authority, because he is intending 
to seize the sovereignty and kill her and those dearest to her, and to 
tyrannise the Romans? 
“For doubtless the rule of certain cities and the administration of taxes 
are dangled before you by him, just as if they were bait, so that he might 
hold the greater part, just as if he is master, commanding and oppressing all, 
greater and lesser alike, thereby satisfying you in exchange for the 
deprivation of your liberty. For something so obvious cannot have escaped 
your notice; that, if he falls or is removed from authority, it will be possible 
for you to do whatever you choose without fear, having become either the 
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foremost or directly after the foremost of the Romans. There is no need to 
shrink back from considering this venture because you will speak lies and 
calumnies. For if not even a single lie was ever yet spoken by you until now, 
this would be an excuse. But if all of us are alike for the most part, and 
happen to forswear and to lie for the sake of a trifling profit or even none, 
why should we now fear that which we have dared many times, hesitating 
to obtain not something insignificant but the rule of the Romans? If you 
decide not to trust me, although I offer the best advice, /118/ it is at least 
fitting to trust your brother, who is older and knows better than you how to 
properly make use of changes and innovations in affairs. I think the 
dismissal of the Grand Domestic is also greatly desired by him [Andronikos 
Asanēs], who cannot bear the pretensions of his [Kantakouzēnos’] rule and 
that on his account everybody is treated as if they were slaves.  
“Therefore I advise you to do what I consider to be to your advantage. 
If you yourselves chose to attempt something for the sake of your own glory 
and a life of renown, it is necessary not to neglect the opportunity, otherwise, 
having let it pass by, we acquire nothing because of doubt. For while he 
[Kantakouzēnos] is absent, achieving everything will be easy, but if he 
returns from the expedition, I advise you not to dare to grumble, else there 
will be nothing preventing him noticing you, wherever on earth you live. 
And I will provide strong assurances, not simply through words but also by 
oaths, to give myself over completely to the struggles <ahead>, contributing 
money and arms and servants and, after his downfall, to do everything that 
is commanded by you, and to play my part as a subject for my entire life and 
never being ungrateful towards you for anything.” 
Having spoken thus, he added oaths as security of what he had said, 
and, since he had persuaded those men to act as he had counselled them, he 
went to Iōannēs Gabalas,4 the megas droungarios,5 who had just returned from 
an embassy to the Kralēs, for which he had been chosen by the Grand /119/ 
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Domestic. He asked him if he had heard something concerning himself. 
When he [Gabalas] replied, “nothing,” [Apokaukos] said, “But I have come 
to you as a messenger of bad tidings. For the Grand Domestic, having 
changed from his former goodwill towards you, is filled with great 
bitterness. And it is clear he will not hold back, unless he receives satisfaction 
from you for your betrayal of him. For I have heard him pouring much abuse 
on you, calling you a babbler and loose-tongued and mostly speaking lies, 
and that you are a corrupter and a traitor of the common good. For having 
been chosen by him as ambassador to the ruler of the Triballi, you carried 
out your embassy dishonestly, having taken bribes, and utterly betrayed the 
interests of Romans; you looked after their [the Serbs’] affairs and swore 
oaths to them; when staying amongst us, you were a friend to them, with all 
your strength betraying our secrets to them. Because of these things, he does 
not bear to count you wholly among the Romans, but believes you on the 
side of the Triballi.” 
Gabalas was astounded by this; he called upon God as a witness that 
it would never occur to him to say such things, and he could not wholly 
believe that the Grand Domestic, having thoughtlessly trusted certain 
calumnies and slanders in this way, would condemn him in his absence and 
be so uncharacteristically angry. For the passage of many years up to this 
time, during which he had managed the Romans’ affairs, did not bear 
witness to him [Kantakouzēnos] having this sort of bad and fickle character. 
The parakoimōmenos proclaimed his usual oaths, or rather perjuries, 
and persuaded him that there could be no element of fabrication in what he 
had said /120/ but that everything was true. He disclosed little by little that 
he had already organised a league, which was not ignoble, for the purpose of 
his [Kantakouzēnos’] overthrow, to which party he [Gabalas] needed to 
dedicate himself, and contribute, if he cared at all for the preservation of his 
household and himself. And he [Gabalas] knew he must put himself into his 
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[Apokaukos’] hands, without concealing anything, to be filled with courage. 
For the sake of assurance and greater confidence regarding what he had said, 
and knowing most clearly that he [Gabalas] would be much more eager on 
his behalf and take trouble for him, he [Apokaukos] pledged his daughter 
(for he [Gabalas] had previously lost his wife) and he gave oaths concerning 
this and an enkolpion as security, because it was something holy. 
Now that he had brought that man over to his side, he [Apokaukos] 
went to the megas stratopedarchēs6 Choumnos, who was one of his friends and 
besides they were related through his [Apokaukos’] wife’s family. For the 
one who had first been joined to him, the daughter of Disypatos,7 one of 
those counted among the clergy of the Wisdom of God [Hagia Sophia], had 
died. He then married Choumnos’ niece,8 being by now illustrious and not 
unworthy for those of noble birth. So, having friendly relations with him 
because of these matters, he approached him and reminded him of what he 
had said to the Grand Domestic, when they had been deliberating about the 
son of Michaēl the Mysian king [i.e., Sismanos], and if it would be necessary 
to give him up as demanded by Alexandros: ‘if ever something is revealed to 
the last, let the first be silent.’ “These words,” he said, “the Grand Domestic 
always remembers and carries them around as if they were an arrow in his 
heart, /121/ searching for an opportunity to suitably repay you for the insult. 
This [opportunity] is nothing other than his return from the west. For I have 
heard him talking in this fashion. Having concerned myself to the highest 
degree with your affairs – and the danger was not concerning a trifling 
matter but about your very life – I came to report such things as I have heard 
and, if you wish, will guide you to the path of salvation.” 
And he [Choumnos] was thrown into immoderate confusion 
regarding his words. He said he was amazed if the Grand Domestic had so 
suddenly changed from his habitual nobility, that instead of tolerant and 
kind, he appeared so merciless, angry, and vindictive towards those who 
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had given offence and ready to avenge himself. “For no previous time has 
witnessed such a thing in his character. While many have given offence to 
him, and deeply too, he has never yet appeared to retaliate harshly; he was 
moderately agitated towards me because of my speech, and shortly after he 
thus put aside his anger, as he did not think to say anything.” 
Apokaukos said, “If you replied in such a manner out of suspicion of 
my words, since you are testing me, and fear giving offence to him 
[Kantakouzēnos] again, I will make a different argument. But if you are 
thinking that this is truthfully how things stand, you have to understand that 
you are ignorant of everything. For he is not as he appears – civilised and 
kindly and spiteful to no man, just as you say – but for a long time everyone 
has served the great power which surrounds him and, until now, no-one has 
dared not only to speak against him but even to look him straight in the face. 
/122/ For this reason, he dealt moderately with all those bowing down before 
him and who were completely enslaved. You are now the first who has 
dared to speak against him publicly; he is no longer so ready to conceal his 
malice, but because of you, he will begin for the first time to punish those 
who wrong him.” Immediately he swore the most terrible oaths that 
everything, all that he had said, was true and that unless he [Choumnos] 
attempted to save himself in thea single fastest way, nothing hindered the 
destruction of him and all his family. 
And he, just as was natural, was in mortal fear about this. He asked 
him [Apokaukos] to explain the route through which it would be possible to 
escape the terrors which awaited him. And he said that it was not difficult 
and that he [Choumnos] could distinguish what was necessary in the present 
circumstances, being not one of the ignorant masses, but one who in political 
experience and intelligence contended among the foremost of the Romans. 
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But he would also advise him, of such measures as he thought would be 
advantageous but particularly regarding those without which it would be 
impossible to be saved. He thought that nothing else would avail him 
[Choumnos] and the others than, by waging war on him [Kantakouzēnos], to 
attempt with all their strength to destroy his power.  
“This will be easy, if having approached the Empress and having 
feigned kindness towards her and her son the emperor, you convinced her to 
consider that man an enemy and a plotter against her rule, saying that you 
are firmly convinced of such things about him and that you cannot bear the 
injustice, but /123/ would rather choose to lead yourself and your children, if 
necessary, to die for their sakes [the Empress and her son] while fighting 
against him, than instead to watch as they are unjustly deprived of their rule, 
or even while they are put to death. Having been easily convinced by fear at 
these words, just as is natural, she will break with him and entrust the war 
against him to us. When this happens, there is no obstacle, not only to 
deliverance from the anticipated disasters, but also to make the war against 
him the means for good fortune. It is unnecessary to consider that the 
pronouncements against him are not true. For the struggle that now lies 
before us does not concern truth and falsehood but whether to live 
gloriously, having destroyed his pride, or, if he should still rule over affairs, 
to die like those held captive by their fears. Because of this, one must use 
every scheme and must moreover consider every form of war, rather than 
talking about trivialities which cause no harm at all, whether these things are 
one way or the other.” So he persuaded that man [Choumnos] with these 
words. 
And already the conspiracy had reached fruition. But having that very 
thing [that it was a conspiracy] in mind, it seemed necessary to bring in some 
of the closest of the Empress’ household, since the Empress might perhaps 
suspect the others had maliciously devised these schemes between them, 
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through fear or envy, but she would suspect no such thing from her closest 
oikeioi. 
Zampea,9 who had followed the Empress from Savoy, had a son who 
was called Artōtos.10 Because of his courage in battle and other reasons, he 
had enjoyed great favour from the Emperor when he was still alive /124/ 
and, after his death, this man and his mother were treated with respect by 
the Empress. Having encountered this man, <Apokaukos said> if he would 
like to know something concerning himself, he would learn it. When he 
[Artōtos] said nothing, he [Apokaukos] said, “But I have heard with my own 
ears the Grand Domestic often accusing you and your mother and deriding 
the great simplicity of the Romans, for the reason that it is necessary to 
employ natives in public office, and while there are many men and women 
who are also suitable, they use Artōtos and his mother. He does not know 
why they endure foreigners – and of no better status than commoners – as 
attendants to the Empress. But so long as the Emperor was still alive and 
when everything around him was governed according to his authority, 
nothing was said to contradict him. ‘But now,’ <the Grand Domestic said>, 
‘the rule of public affairs has fallen to me; I will not overlook the public 
treasury of the Romans being squandered by people of such a sort, as if they 
were drones, but having placed them in a trireme after my return, I will 
dismiss them back to their own land.’ In addition to this, he accused you of 
cowardice and unmanliness in battle. But I was weighed down by such a 
great injustice, knowing you to be of greater worth than those Romans 
beside you, and I am willing to give my daughter in marriage to you and 
will do anything for your sake, not only because of our previous friendship, 
but also because of our kinship.”  
And at once he added oaths to what he had said and presented an 
enkolpion /125/ as full assurance of his words. As he had a pact with the Latin, 
he advised him to report what he had said to his mother, to persuade her, 
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and to employ every effort and diligence to make the Empress hostile to the 
Grand Domestic, and he added all the rest, which he had said to the others. 
And such was the situation contrived by him on the fourth day after 
his arrival in Byzantion. And when, one by one, they were convinced by 
what he had said, he, reporting again to each of them in turn, brought those 
holding the same intention about the war together. He encouraged them to 
deliberate in common regarding however it might seem best to start the war. 
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Chapter 20 
And when they went to the Patriarch, it seemed necessary to 
announce to the Empress what they had planned not as a crowd but 
approaching her a few at a time so that they would not arouse any suspicion, 
but would rather astound her, conversing continually about these matters, 
and better persuade her to consider what was said by so many in like 
manner to be true. So they thought that the megas doux [Isaakios] Asanēs and 
his brother Kōnstantinos should make their attempt on the Empress first. 
Therefore, coming before her, and having discussed many points concerning 
their goodwill towards her and the emperor her son, they then said they 
knew that the Grand Domestic wanted to acquire the Empire for himself and 
that he was intending to bring his design into action very soon. It seemed to 
them that this was one of the most terrible things indeed and it was needful 
not to conceal it but to make the plot known, /126/ so that having learned of 
it, she could take counsel on the necessary course of action for herself and 
her children. For the danger to them [the Empress and her children] did not 
concern minor matters, but whether to live well, holding the Empire as a 
rightful paternal inheritance, or to die ingloriously, having been plotted 
against by that man, who had acquired such power from his control of 
affairs. 
The Empress was suspicious of this, not only did she not commend 
what they had said, but she also seemed annoyed because of it. She advised 
them to desist from these calumnies as nobody, whatever they might say, 
would be able to cause a rift between her and the Grand Domestic, for she 
was convinced by the clear truth, just as was appropriate concerning him.  
When they returned empty-handed, Artōtos was sent in, along with 
his mother. And they, having made reports of a similar nature, were 
 192 
dismissed angrily, and the Empress did not suffer to hear the whole of their 
stories. 
On the next day Choumnos, along with his son and also his son-in-
law Manouēl Kantakouzēnos Stratēgopoulos,1 and Gabalas, similarly 
approached the Empress, as having learned just now of a rebellion, they 
brought tidings in haste. They advised her not to be remiss, but to rouse 
herself to her defence, and that they would contribute with money and arms 
for war. For having been brought up in goodwill and loyalty to the emperor, 
they could not bear to see the excesses of ambitious men, but were very 
willing even to give up their own lives than to ignore such proceedings. 
The Empress, having thanked them for their enthusiasm and /127/ 
said that she was persuaded clearly, that if such a thing happened, they 
would be willing to wage war on her behalf by all means. She then advised 
them to refrain from such words against the Grand Domestic, as they were 
nothing other than fiction and calumny, for she was fully aware of his 
affection for her and the emperor her son, “lest after his return, becoming 
thoroughly aware of the accusations made by you against him, he might 
justifiably be aggrieved with you for having said such things.” 
So the Empress, in consequence of arguments they had made, altered 
her original opinion in no respect, but she believed they were complete 
fabrications which had been concocted in the minds of each of them. When 
these men assembled with the others they all reported the various answers 
the Empress had given. All of them felt no little fear and thought themselves 
already enveloped by the utmost misfortunes, unless they could devise a 
more effective plan than they had discussed. The parakoimōmenos advised 
them to hesitate no longer. For it was not possible to conceal what they had 
said about the Grand Domestic in silence, since many were now aware. And 
as this had become apparent to him, it was possible for each of them to 
understand the extremity of the danger. On this account, he advised them to 
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refrain from despairing about the enterprise but, having put aside all other 
matters, to concentrate on this one alone: how they might overcome their 
greatest enemy, or – secondly – how they might not suffer utter ruin by his 
hand. At this point, it seemed that both the Patriarch and Andronikos 
Asanēs, the Grand Domestic’s father-in-law, were the last hope,2 and, /128/ 
through them, they [the conspirators] would try to knock down the 
arguments of the Empress, since they were more worthy for the purpose of 
persuasion than all the others. The Patriarch, honoured for his great holy 
office in addition to his seeming goodwill towards her, would never be 
suspected of telling lies. The other [Asanēs] would not be expected to plunge 
into such a pit of despair, unless he was truthfully aware of such a plan by 
his son-in-law, or willingly to choose the ruin of his daughter by lying to 
such an extent. 
When they had decided between themselves, they went to the palace 
as agreed. The Patriarch addressed the Empress first, saying, “All the 
Romans may know, and you above all, of the Grand Domestic’s favour and 
diligence for me from the very beginning, and that I was advanced from 
poor fortune and deep obscurity into this glory and splendour by him, for 
which I rightly owe him much gratitude. Consequently, so long as I saw him 
using sincere and just reasoning and observing kindness and honest fidelity 
towards you and your children, and spotless in his conduct towards the 
emperors, I also considered it necessary to devote myself to him as being the 
most genuine of my friends, and with nothing less than a father’s love, I 
chose to do what I hoped would bring benefit to his honour. 
“When I was informed of what many others were saying, and then 
heard the same for myself, that /129/ he intended, and had already started to 
perform, unjust and violent acts, unfairly repaying the Emperor’s great 
affection and his advancement into a position of great honour by depriving 
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his children not only of sovereignty but of life itself,a I was sickened by his 
intention, which is extremely cruel and lacks nothing in its utter ingratitude! 
And I knew I must consider him not one of my friends as before, but one of 
my greatest enemies. Believing that not even you are ignorant of these grave 
emergencies, I have come bringing this message so that, having considered 
the present circumstances, you may preserve not only yourself and your 
children but your entire authority, which is also endangered.” 
The Empress, just as if thunderstruck, said that she had heard his 
words, and thought that with such words even the originator of evil himself 
[the Devil] would never be able to attempt to persuade her that the Grand 
Domestic was a wicked man plotting against her and the Emperor’s children 
and giving thanks for their wonderful friendship in such a way! 
The Patriarch replied that he had also thought the same at first 
regarding what was being said about him [Kantakouzēnos] and had not 
believed those speaking, although they numbered not twice or four times as 
many but even many times more than those who had come forward to speak 
with her. Then, having given serious attention to and taken careful heed of 
his [Kantakouzēnos’] actions, he learned the error of his opinion. And he 
demanded that she also should be convinced and not delay in this manner, 
concerning an issue of such severe danger, /130/ but should already consider 
the safety of herself and her children. 
The Empress reminded him of the oaths which they [Kantakouzēnos 
and herself] had made to one another in his presence barely yesterday or the 
day before, “In which,” she said, “other things were promised to the Grand 
Domestic, as we know, and – above everything else – that if something was 
alleged by someone, we are not to condemn him in absentia like this but after 
having summoned him to trial and afforded him opportunity to defend 
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himself. If, on the one hand, he is convicted of wrongdoing and perjury, 
demand the severest punishments; on the other, if nothing of what has been 
said is accepted as true, the accusations against him should be dismissed and 
the sycophants will be shown to be the very same thing as they are, 
sycophants. At the present moment, I see nobody among the many faithless 
and perjuring accusers who would dare to oppose him before a court, in 
order to prove his wrongdoing. But indeed even now there is not a single 
person who has explicitly alleged that he was seen doing evil and is a traitor 
to me, so that I also can perceive from these words if what is being said is 
calumny or if it holds some truth. But everyone, just as if by prior agreement, 
condemns his seizure of the Empire without adding anything more. 
Certainly it is not right, nor otherwise honourable, for me to be persuaded by 
the rumours of the masses – they contain nothing definite as regards proving 
the truth – and to initiate civil war against him. For he is not a common man, 
so it will not be easy to /131/ overcome him. But it is at the present time clear 
from what has been said that no action should be taken against him, but 
having carefully examined everything and having established a careful 
inquiry into the matter, while he is away in the west, he will be summoned 
to trial immediately after his return and, having been granted opportunity 
for his defence, either he will be convicted – having been revealed as a 
perjurer – or acquitted of the charges, if he has been doing nothing of what 
he is suspected.” The Empress, thinking at once both justly and expediently, 
replied in such a way. 
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Chapter 21 
The Patriarch, having heard about proofs and a trial, was conscious of 
the great calumny by himself and the others and realised the danger, great as 
it was to them, along with the well-deserved disgrace for calumny which 
would result. He was distressed beyond measure and for the greater part 
was dying from fear. Yet not at all putting aside his tendency to wickedness, 
as if pitying the Empress’ loss of sense, he said, “If God on high also takes a 
part in these matters, everything is smoothly and well run, and is tirelessly 
brought to a successful conclusion; but if He willingly abandons them to 
perdition, it is entirely the opposite, full of difficulty and disorder. And, 
although surrounded by the most extreme dangers because of my own 
goodwill towards you and your children, I do not regard my own 
misfortune, including removal from my throne and being imprisoned, with 
such great fear as I do your own lot; they intend not only to undertake your 
removal from the rule of the Romans but also at the same time, lawlessly and 
dishonourably, to rob you of life itself. /132/ And you are a cause of great 
astonishment to me, if now, while he [Kantakouzēnos] is absent from 
Byzantion and very vulnerable because he knows nothing of what is 
happening here, you tremble in this way at the thought of war against him; 
after so long a period of time, in which it will be possible for him to be 
ignorant of nothing of what has been said – since not a few currently 
dawdling here [the palace] would happily give up even their souls for his 
sake – and to prepare himself for everything, as may seem best to him, you 
<cannot> hope to overcome him easily. For it is not as you imagine and he 
affects a dignified appearance while deceiving us; he will not return to 
Byzantion in this manner, leaving behind his friends and the large entourage 
that surrounds him, so you can treat him however you please. But knowing 
that he is suspected, he will persuade not only many of the nobility, by 
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promises and presents of great value, but also he will render the entire army 
obedient to him, having corrupted it with money. While holding great power 
around himself, he will easily destroy not only us, who choose to make war 
on him because of our goodwill towards you, but also you and your 
children, since there would be nobody to help; this is the way he will think to 
behave to benefit himself, having said a long-delayed farewell to all those 
proud boasts and tricks and dissimulations. I do not know how you do not 
see these things yourself and do not want to provide safety for yourself and 
your children from the means available, but instead dream of legal 
proceedings and calumny /133/ and cross-examination and are not willing to 
consider this very thing, that you may be destroyed before it comes to this.  
“So, as I was saying beforehand, I remember not only the favours of 
the Emperor, from whom I enjoyed many and great kindnesses, but also 
those of yourself, and besides being compelled by the laws themselves as 
well as justice, I have a natural need to help all those who suffer unjustly in 
any way to the extent of my abilities. <Therefore> I have abandoned my 
friendship with him, since he is planning unjust and illegal acts, although 
often having occasion for goodwill towards him, and I am advising you of 
what is to your advantage, having cast the dice, as they say, and – having 
chosen to be with you – either to live, having prevailed, or, if the opposite 
fortune is experienced, to die. But by a more divine fortune, there is also a 
man present who could never choose to speak falsely of one living in 
wedlock with his daughter, and he can advise you of what is necessary not 
only because of his intelligence and his experience of matters of state, which 
he has gathered in the long prime of his life, but also because of his goodwill 
towards the Emperor and his children, and his honest and pure fidelity. It is 
worthy to listen and to be persuaded by what he recommends; that advice 
which he wishes to impart is not unjust, nor is it misleading.” 
 198 
Asanēs, just like those who stand by waiting at athletic events, so as to 
contend with the victors, had prepared his words well. He said, “Nobody, 
doubtlessly, is ignorant of the close kinship and fatherly affection which I 
hold for the Grand Domestic, who lives together with my dearest /134/ 
daughter. For this reason I believe it is not appropriate for me to deny what 
is acknowledged by all. So it is abundantly clear that he, having 
accomplished what he intends, will be emperor and my daughter will live 
with him as empress. I will be the father of emperors and, sharing the 
sovereignty with them, I will also come into greatness and glory and wealth 
and splendour. But this brilliance and majesty, which might satisfy anyone 
else’s appetite for glory, appears to me greatly inferior to my present state. 
For having grown up from the earliest age with pure goodwill and loyalty 
towards the emperors, I would rather wish to suffer evil with them than, 
having sided with traitors, to enjoy the foremost honours and gifts among 
those men. So, as regards what may have been said about the Grand 
Domestic by the Patriarch and my own brothers and the others, I know that 
it is all true, and it is fitting for you to doubt them in no way but to trust me 
as I am versed in every detail. If it seems to you that what has been said as 
proof is weak, at least allow one thing to fully persuade you of the 
outrageous intentions the man has concerning you and your children. For 
before he left here, although you were compelling him to join his daughter 
with your son – and emperor! – in the partnership of marriage, he was not 
willing but he put off the matter until his return from the west. For he was 
ashamed,a after such great proofs of the favour shown towards him /135/ by 
you, to be known as your worst enemy and as one who would deprive the 
one joined in marriage to his daughter shortly before not only of his diadem 
but of his life. For it is not possible that any man of sound mind could say 
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that he ever thought to take a more prominent or wonderful groom to his 
daughter. For this reason, you must not neglect your own safety but do 
everything with urgency, by which it might be possible to prevail over his 
plotting. I, and as many of the most distinguished men as are currently in 
Byzantion, will readily sacrifice not only our money and bodies and servants 




The Empress was overwhelmed following these words, as if her soul 
was grieving, and since she could neither disbelieve what had been said by 
many so worthy of trust, nor believe that they had omitted any possible 
exaggeration of the evil, she let many tears fall from her eyes, until she had 
had enough. Then as if recovering from her despondency, she said, “I still 
hold fast to my earlier thinking, and I am unable to accept that the 
allegations against the Grand Domestic are true. For I call upon God – who 
comprehends everything even before it happens – as my witness that I never 
thought him inclined to be any more neglectful of me than of his own 
mother, or of a true sister, or to have cared any less for the Emperor’s 
children than the Emperor himself, /136/ if he were still alive; I would be 
considering not only the friendship he and the Emperor had for each other 
insignificant and unfaithful, but also that of ourselves towards him. But since 
he [Kantakouzēnos] is not led to such senseless thoughts for any other 
reason than God is permitting the destruction of the Romans by civil war, 
and thus he intends injustice and violence, then God, overseeing everything 
from on high, will judge his plot and grant just punishment for his deeds. 
And I entrust myself and my children to you, with <the help of> God, in 
order that everything you plan and do on our behalf is overseen by Him as a 
witness, so that the same way as you are disposed to me and my children, 
He is also disposed towards you.’ Thus she spoke, tearfully, without 
realising into what evils she had been brought by calumny and slander. 
They [the conspirators] were filled with pleasure and were unable to 
restrain themselves; as quickly as possible they rushed out and reported 
everything to the others who shared in the conspiracy, knowing they must 
no longer hesitate, but advance together to war, so that no event might 
hinder their plans. Immediately the Grand Domestic’s mother and his son 
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Andronikos1 and the wife2 of Matthaios,3 the eldest of his sons, who were in 
Byzantion, were placed under house arrest and surrounded by guards. 
Having appointed Apokaukos the parakoimōmenos as governor of Byzantion, 
they ordered the war to be set in motion, in whatever way /137/ seemed best 
to him. So the war started at the beginning of October.4 Apokaukos, aware 
that all the aforementioned men would not bear to be led by him, decided 
that he must rouse the common people5 to war, not only because they are 
swept along unthinkingly to anything whatsoever for even a little gain, but 
also because they would easily submit to his commands. And first he 
surrounded himself with some paupers and babblers, who were ready to 
commit the most desperate acts because of their poverty. Next, having 
thrown the people into turmoil through use of these men and having incited 
a great mob, he went to the house of the Grand Domestic, and ordered them 
to plunder his possessions and to ransack his house. But these men, who 
knew nothing of his plans and still quailed at the Grand Domestic’s power, 
advanced as far as the courtyard then stopped, at a loss as to which way to 
turn. When the Grand Domestic’s mother, from high in the house, inquired 
after the possible reason for their arrival, they sensibly and wisely said they 
did not know whatever cause had called them there. Having now realised 
this, they would withdraw, without venturing to attempt anything. So, after 
the Grand Domestic’s mother thanked them for their respect for her, they 
retreated from there and dispersed to their homes. 
Since the people’s movement had not ended according to their 
intentions, the Patriarch and his conspirators turned to those who were 
friendly towards the Grand /138/ Domestic and, laying hold of some of them 
on that same day, placed them under guard and plundered their property. 
The rest, seeing that they themselves were within a hair’s breadth of danger 
already, and fearing that they would also be overcome if they grappled with 
these myriads of evils (for immediately a sentence of utter destruction was 
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publicly pronounced against the friends of the Grand Domestic), went 
outside Byzantion’s walls, breaking through the so-called postern of the 
Porphyrogennētos.6 There were forty-two in total,7 led by Apelmene8 in this 
matter, who was one of the closest oikeioi of the Grand Domestic. Since they 
had escaped from their expected sufferings, he considered it necessary to 
make an embassy to the Empress, on one hand defending their venture, as 
they had not been made bold by malice but by fear of danger, and, on the 
other hand, begging her that they could return to their homes, if she granted 
them pardon. For they feared that, although forced to these actions by 
necessity, they would be held responsible as rebels even by the Grand 
Domestic on account of what they had dared to do. After he [Apelmene] had 
considered these matters, they selected Nikēphoros Kantakouzēnos, who 
was a cousin of the Grand Domestic,9 and Gabalas,10 who had not yet shown 
himself openly as an enemy of the Grand Domestic, but still seemed to be 
numbered among his friends, and sent them to the Empress. 
When they arrived, Gabalas, sharing with them such secrets as he 
knew, openly accused the runaways of treachery and, accusing the Grand 
Domestic just the same as the others, seemed sufficiently credible to the /139/ 
Empress. Having openly sided himself with the Patriarch and the others, he 
neglected nothing in playing his part in the actions being taken against the 
Grand Domestic. And for this reason, he received the rank of prōtosebastos, 
and a short time later also that of megas logothetēs, the reward for his 




However when those fugitives heard that one of the ambassadors had 
been imprisoned while Gabalas had openly joined the Grand Domestic’s 
enemies, despairing of their own return, they went to Didymoteichon to the 
Grand Domestic and reported everything about what had happened and the 
war being initiated against him. He did not want to believe them because of 
the absurdity of the things they reported. Instead he thought they had fled 
after giving some offence to the Empress and, fearing the danger, were 
pleading on their own behalf, slandering the Empress in this way. For she 
could never have undergone such a change in such a short time. Because of 
this, he intended to send the fugitives back to Byzantion once more, even 
against their will, as, if they had given some offence to the Empress, they 
would suffer their deserved punishment. Having now prepared the 
campaign to the west, he intended to engage in the task forthwith. 
When, after one or two days, many people arrived from Byzantion 
and reported the same thing as the fugitives, he decided he must wait a little 
while and send an embassy to the Empress concerning what was happening. 
/140/ And having selected the hēgoumenos of the Gaura Monastery,1 a man 
who sought virtue and had suitable experience in political matters, and 
Sgouropoulos,2 one of his own oikeioi, who was wise and able to report what 
was said by either of two parties of envoys precisely, he sent them to the 
Empress in Byzantion. And, first, he [Kantakouzēnos] guaranteed with oaths 
that he knew nothing of the accusations against him. Then, he asked that the 
oaths made shortly before by them towards each other, in the presence of the 
Patriarch,3 should not be utterly forgotten and that he should not be 
condemned in his absence, as she had been persuaded solely by sycophants, 
but she should summon him to trial and scrutinise the accusations. For he 
was prepared to face any accuser before a court. He gave a deadline to the 
 204 
ambassadors he dispatched, of as many days as he thought would be 
sufficient for the Empress, following careful consideration, to give her 
justification for the present situation so that, if she chose to do what was both 
beneficial and just, she would convene a court and demand proof of what 
had been said; he would accept their verdict, whatever that might be, 
without making trouble, so that the anticipated flame of internecine war 
would die away. If she acted unfairly and was not willing to do the right 
thing – either she would not hold an enquiry or exceeded the allotted time, 
delaying them after the aforementioned deadline – having called upon God 
himself as a witness of the injustice, /141/ he would do what he thought most 
advantageous to him and those with him. But before then he would change 
nothing of the established order of things, even if he saw everything being 
turned upside down. So the ambassadors, having been ordered to negotiate 
in this way, departed from Didymoteichon. 
When they came to Selymbria, men from the parakoimōmenos’ 
household happened upon them and seized their horses and their other 
baggage, then held them under guard. When these outrageous acts against 
the ambassadors were reported to those in Didymoteichon, all the others 
were disconcerted beyond measure and believed it was unbearable to be 
treated with contempt by such lowly men without any pretext.  
The Grand Domestic exhorted them not to be fainthearted. For while 
he thought these matters would not lead anywhere good but would be the 
pretext of great troubles, it was nevertheless necessary to abide by the 
decisions made by they themselves, and to take no extreme measures before 
the deadline arrived. For it is not good to act to the contrary of what they 
had already decided. “If something unexpected has happened to our 
ambassadors, it is no wonder. For to the daring parakoimōmenos and his 
servants it is not acceptable that all such matters are inviolable. It is certainly 
unfair to infer that the Empress, to whom we sent the embassy, is 
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responsible for the mindless and arrogant outrages of others. Besides if she, 
doing what she ought to, deliberates about everything profitably and puts an 
end to the expected war, then it is appropriate to overlook these events as if 
they had not happened. But if – and may it not come to this – /142/ these 
things lead to a greater outrage, then immediately greater matters will be set 
before us for consideration, not such minor matters as these. Therefore, for 
both reasons, it is necessary to think lightly of what has happened and not to 
become excited as if concerning vital matters.” Having spoken in this 
fashion, he stopped the disturbance. All prayed that the present troubles 
would turn out for the good, just as he had suggested, and not as they were 
forced to assume from what had taken place. So they thus restrained their 
uproar. 
When the Empress learned what was done to the ambassadors, she 
became angry and ordered that they be brought to her, having restored their 
plundered possessions to them. When they were brought, while the 
Patriarch and the remaining senators were also present, they put the terms of 
the embassy to the Empress and none of those worthies advanced a 
complaint about anything but they thought it right for all to negotiate. The 
ambassadors asked the Empress and the Patriarch not to hesitate concerning 
such important matters but to make amends quickly. The correct thing was 
to summon the Grand Domestic, in writing, to a tribunal. They <swore> 
themselves by their honour to death, if he did not present himself at once 
when he received the written orders. 
So all the others fell silent. Apokaukos feared that the Empress might 
decide to hold a trial, since she perceived the request to be just, and, in 
addition to gaining nothing from his plots, he might even be deprived of her 
protection. He realised it was necessary to use his insolence /143/ in time, as 
through it he would be able to upset and frustrate these discussions about 
peace. And immediately standing up amidst the council and signalling for 
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silence with his hand, before delivering any preamble or reason why he had 
started in such a fashion, he launched into a string of insults against the 
Grand Domestic, calling him a common enemy and disloyal to the emperors, 
and a perjurer and a liar for the most part, and finally he concluded with a 
shameful and servile rebuke. Having many around him who were similarly 
wanton and were prepared to eagerly spread any kind of impudence, he 
urged them to sport with the ambassadors. And arrogantly laying hands on 
the monk, they cried out ‘This is the Patriarch of Kantakouzēnos!’, calling 
him a mocker of Christ and a hypocrite and similar things which were even 
worse. Having likewise insulted and abused Sgouropoulos many times, next 
they placed them both under guard, in the house in which they had been 
received, so they were unable to leave. The Empress, either because she also 
was not displeased with what they were doing, or because she was already 
unable to check the attacks of these agitators, bore it in silence. Those in 
charge of matters set a stronger guard over the Grand Domestic’s mother, 
who was kept in her house along with her grandson Andronikos, and 
watched them more closely. 
Since war was already burning brightly in Byzantion, it seemed 
necessary to attempt to secure the support of the other cities, greater and 
lesser. /144/ So imperial letters were written to them all, ordering the Grand 
Domestic to be regarded as an enemy and that no city should accept him 
staying there but make war with their full strength and destroy him. As 
these things were also reported to the Grand Domestic and some of the 
letters were conveyed to him as manifest proof of what they were saying, he 
was now thoroughly alarmed, and it disturbed the hearts of him and those 
with him too. However in no way did they attempt to revolt, but waited for 
the deadline, believing it wrong to venture to do anything before it.  
When it arrived, none of the ambassadors were present and, because 
they were closely guarded, they were unable to make what had happened to 
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them clear either by letters or even by words. All the senators who were 
present in Didymoteichon, and the leaders of the army, together approached 
the Grand Domestic, advising him to hesitate no longer; since they were by 
now deprived of every excuse, they had to discover through careful 
consideration how he might provide for his own security and theirs. They 
seemed to him to be giving beneficial advice. For while the Empress and 
those around her did what they considered to be advantageous to them, he 
thought it was not appropriate for them to be quietly inactive. Yet, still 
thinking there would surely be some change and a settlement to the war, he 




A few days later a servant of the Empress, named Tzyrakēs,1 came to 
him from Byzantion, /145/ carrying a letter which ordered him to desist from 
all state business, to remain at home and not to leave the gate of 
Didymoteichon until she could decide whatever might seem best to do about 
him. She said the reason for her commands would not be revealed at the 
present time but would become clear to him and everyone else a little later. 
Other letters were written before this one, dictated by the parakoimōmenos, 
filled with bitterness and insolence and sarcasm, which the Empress had 
prevented being sent, only just persuading the bearers.2 
When he [Kantakouzēnos] read it out to the assembly, all the others 
were shocked by the absurdity of what had been written. They exhorted him 
to declare war immediately and not to lose the opportunity of destroying 
these men, through which it would be possible to save themselves. The 
Grand Domestic, seeing that matters had already reached the point of 
greatest danger, and thinking to delay no longer, now applied himself to 
deciding whatever he and they must do about these events. 
And first he spoke to those sitting in council, in such a way: “Fellow 
soldiers, the present circumstances have now reached a point of great 
difficulty and disorder and they are likely to worsen yet further, as it is 
possible for all of us alike to guess. If I was unknown, having either just 
come from some foreign land or been living among you in no better state 
than the ordinary people, there would perhaps be some reason to recount 
before you the nature of my habits and /146/ character. But since from the 
first flowering of manhood until now, I have been not only a statesman 
amongst you but I have also been administering the realm of the Romans 
second only to the Emperor, from the time he assumed it; because of this I 
was compelled, for better or worse, to try to give of myself to all: you 
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yourselves may know my character no less than I know myself. Therefore I 
will not speak any further about my previous life, proving to you that I 
myself have governed correctly and justly; you know all our circumstances 
well.  
“So, while the Emperor was alive, he granted me great weight in 
public affairs and trusted me to manage all the most important matters no 
less than he himself. And I rendered him goodwill and diligence in equal 
measure, omitting nothing, just as it is appropriate for one who is regarded 
with such affection. When he [Andronikos], as decided by He who governs 
everything, departed from the world of men, I considered nothing else 
appropriate to myself than to exhibit the clearest evidence of my goodwill 
towards him through my solicitude towards his children and the Empress 
his wife. And neglecting none of my duties, I persevered after his death until 
now, but also without sparing my body and money and all of my actions and 
plans, in order to assist in preserving the realm for them.  
“Truly, it cannot be that I governed correctly and justly until now, 
/147/ then, having become puffed up by the circumstances, I now intend to 
secure the rule of the Romans for myself, changing my present rank for that 
of emperor. For, concerning the past, events themselves may bear witness 
with me; regarding what will happen, I offer not only God as witness of our 
deliberations but also it is possible to produce clear proof of what is likely to 
happen from what has happened in the past. For if I covet such things, of the 
sort the sycophants allege, what prevented me when the Emperor was 
dying? I had his children, I had placed the palace under guard, and after 
three days the Empress arrived, all the money was there at my disposal, so 
that I could use it however I wanted; what prevented me from killing them, 
from possessing the Empire without toil and sweat, when there was nobody 
still remaining who would dare to stand against me? 
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“Not only was I seen to be intending nothing of this sort, but also on 
the ninth day from the death of the Emperor, having established complete 
security, I withdrew the guard from there and established myself at home. I 
attended to public affairs just as before; I made no innovations and did not 
manage affairs for my own benefit. For these reasons one could not 
reasonably think I was attempting to transfer the sovereignty to myself. For I 
retained as governors of the provinces and the cities those who were so 
before the Emperor’s death, and I took every trouble for the army, not so that 
they [the soldiers] would favour me, but instead /148/ so that they would be 
useful to the common good. Moreover, having also concluded treaties with 
the neighbouring barbarians, there is nobody at all who could claim that I 
preferred some private interest of my own should prevail over what was 
beneficial to the public. But I made peace with some, benefiting the 
commonwealth, and I was preparing to make war on others on their [the 
public’s] behalf, without suspecting danger from those close to me. 
“From all this, one may plainly see that I have governed honestly and 
genuinely on behalf of the Emperor’s children. For if I had intended to do 
such things as my accusers falsely allege, if nothing else, it would be 
necessary at least to gather together the wealth which is dispersed across the 
entire Empire of the Romans – which is not easily counted, as you know – 
and it would be most useful to me in the war. But right now it is possible to 
see not only an abundance of herds and crops, which one might perhaps 
think would produce some difficulty and suspicion while they are being 
gathered, but also there is much gold and silver dispersed everywhere. And 
yet I passed over the most amazing thing, as indeed I am saying something 
amazing. For not only did I not collect the distributed riches, but also spent 
unsparingly for public needs that which I had, and the part I held in my 
hands I willingly left behind in Byzantion. In any case, a few days ago, when 
there happened to be a need in the palace, over two hundred silver vessels of 
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no little value were provided from my own house. Following the occasion, 
those appointed to safeguard them [the vessels] /149/ asked to recover them; 
I believed it was not necessary, saying that there would be no difference if 
they were retained in the palace treasury or in my own house. Furthermore 
many islands and cities, both major and minor, were held by me, some of 
which I built up myself from the expenditure of my own resources, others I 
had as a gift from the Emperor; there was not a single one I occupied with a 
garrison, nor did I expect any in pronoia, in order to possess them securely.3 
And I could not be accused by anyone of either having done or intended 
anything in all this which would be of benefit to my own purposes. For 
surely even they will not accuse me of this: that through slothfulness and 
inexperience of warfare, I did not lead when necessary.  
“I will attempt to make a clear demonstration of the truth, not only 
from my behaviour in these matters but also from the testimony of all the 
Romans, not only those of you gathered with me now, but also those in 
Byzantion and living in any other land. For while there are many, both 
greater and lesser alike, who are similarly very well disposed to me above all 
others, and while some are related by blood, and others are joined to me by 
unbreakable bonds of friendship over many years and have provided great 
proof of their affection for me in many ways, not one of you present, nor 
anyone who may be living anywhere else, would be able to prove that he 
knew something of the accusations against me. And yet anyone at all, even 
one with but a small share of wits, could say that I am not able to attempt 
such things alone. At least /150/ there would be a need also for an army to 
assist in the enterprise and for the truest friends, and much preparation, 
because of which it would be impossible, if not for the masses but at least for 
those close associates, not to guess the intention behind what was going on. 
If anybody has anything with which they can convict me of such an 
undertaking, let him come here and prove it. But they would not be able to 
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do so. For I would yield to many men of both past and present in courage 
and intelligence and experience of wars, but to nobody in matters of 
righteousness and truth; it is for the sake of these that I now speak so openly 
and confidently. 
“If, both because of what I myself have been working on and because 
of your presence with me the whole time, I appear not to be suspected of, or 
actually doing, any of the things of which I am accused, then no one could 
justly blame me for being inappropriately led to anger in regard to these 
matters. For the Empress – who has known from the start that my character 
is not corrupt, and of that unrivalled and most remarkable friendship 
between myself and the Emperor, and of my great diligence and efforts for 
her and her children after his death – ought not to trust men who are 
sycophants and corrupt, but turn, rightly and justly, to me who governs for 
her sake. Since some malignant demon, of those searching for <our> ruin, did 
not allow her to believe what is true and fair regarding me, but persuaded 
her to believe me hostile instead of a friend, an enemy instead of an ally, and 
/151/ disaffected instead of the most loyal of all, I judged – trusting in myself 
– that it was necessary to do nothing in the present circumstances. Yet, using 
you as advisors, I will readily allow myself to be persuaded of whatever you 
might decide. But certainly I myself should first say what I think is expedient 
in the present situation. It is your concern either to decide if what I say seems 
advantageous, or for each to bring forward their own opinion of what will 
resolve the present situation and the even more difficult circumstances 
expected, preserving us and the entire hegemony of the Romans. I consider 
nothing to bring greater benefit and safety to all than, having gone to the 
Empress, to willingly entrust myself to her, so that she holds all authority to 
decide whatever she wishes about me. And if, preferring to do what is just, 
she convenes a court and allows opportunity for defence, I will take courage 
in God, who is the protector of truth and rejoices in this name,4 to refute 
 213 
everything with great ease, as they are lies and calumnies. If this happens, 
having resigned every office and removed every pretext for calumny and 
envy, I will stay at home, having nothing to do with public affairs, even if all 
men attempt to force or persuade me otherwise. If, however, she makes no 
mention of what is just, nor of what is appropriate, but having succumbed 
utterly to calumnies, condemns me in absentia even to the worst punishment, 
I will bear everything gladly, believing it is better by far to choose even a 
convict’s collar and prison /152/ and confiscation of property, and even 
something more awful than these, than to provide a pretext for civil war. For 
who among you all knows so well as I the evils that will quite clearly arise 
from this war? I would not provide any reason whatsoever, but I would 
rather prefer to be among those in Hades, ignorant of what is going on, than 
among the living to see this brought about by others. Therefore it is this 
which seems, at least to me, to benefit all the Romans in common. If it is 
possible for you to discover anything more beneficial than this, just as I have 
said, I will allow myself to be persuaded. For it is better, if I am wrong 
somehow, to become convinced of this by the majority than to accomplish 
great things by only believing in my own intelligence.” 
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Chapter 25 
So the Grand Domestic spoke in such a fashion. The most prominent 
of those who were present from the senate and the army said, as if using one 
tongue and mind, “Even before these innovations were dared and civil war 
had a beginning, each of us deliberated much and many times concerning 
these matters, not only in private to himself but also all together, as these are 
matters of necessity and we consider them of great concern, perhaps to the 
very life of each of us. Therefore it will not be necessary to examine the right 
course of action at the present moment, as we have spent a long time already 
thinking about these matters to find a solution. You, not least by the remarks 
you related to us /153/ just now, enabled us to understand whatever will be 
necessary and useful to all alike and to advise others. For the evils which 
arise from a civil war, which cause you to shudder and which you have said 
are most terrible, also cause us to shudder likewise and we believe every 
effort and all readiness must be used so that we do not fall into these sorts of 
evils. And we all consider the one kindling this most terrible war and 
plotting against everyone is our common enemy, and is the one who is able 
to make peace. If he willingly neglects this, he is a traitor to society, a 
slanderer and envier, who is destroying the underlying security of the state. 
“Accordingly, we may consider, assuming these things are 
accomplished – those which you have spoken about – whether the war is 
ended or rather takes its beginning from these actions. For if you, just as you 
contend, surrender yourself to justice, either you will retire from public 
affairs, escaping from the sycophants while loathing their great ingratitude 
and ungraciousness regarding all that is good, or having been condemned in 
absentia, you will suffer an irreparable injury. Do you think we have come to 
such a state of madness, or think us so very submissive and servile and 
unworthy of the glory of your earlier life, so as to serve Apokaukos as slaves, 
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doing everything that is ordered by that man, who is no better than one of 
the masses? Indeed each of us would think it is more appropriate to sink 
quickly into darkness and to be together with those who are in Hades /154/ 
than to endure such a thing. But at once some of us will openly wage war, 
with all available strength, from the cities we rule and by each raising an 
army of his own; of the others, some will offer themselves and their cities to 
Alexandros, the emperor of the Mysians, others we will put into the hands of 
Stephanos who rules over the Triballi, believing it much better to have 
barbarian men as lords than to serve those who were despised by us until 
yesterday or the day before. Therefore it will come about for these reasons 
that the war will not only be of ourselves against each other, with everyone 
plundering and carrying off each other’s possessions and doing so no less 
than external enemies, if not even more, inasmuch as we know each other’s 
possessions more accurately, ruining Roman affairs. But it will also cause the 
complete destruction of the Roman Empire; not only will many cities and 
armies be lost but also great revenues, from which our enemies will grow 
stronger and, even if previously they were evenly balanced against us, the 
result will be that the affairs of the Romans are weakened. So there is a risk 
that everything could be destroyed, and the admired and renowned Empire 
of the Romans will be enslaved by the Mysians or indeed other, even worse, 
barbarians. Those within the Empire would be revolting and destroying each 
other as much as possible, while external enemies would press upon us and 
make use of time as their strongest ally. 
“Having then all this in mind, and dreading the expected calamities, 
we will say nothing new and we will not advise you; /155/ the Emperor 
himself thought a certain thing to be of benefit to all and, when he was alive, 
he compelled it to be done, and when he was dying he recommended and 
urged it in his final commands. It is this: you must put on the imperial garb 
and lay hold of affairs more powerfully, as only when you do this will you 
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be able to put an end to the anticipated misfortunes.1 For it is not only we, all 
those who are present here right now, but also if there is any man of renown 
and ability to do great deeds living elsewhere, he would not be displeased 
about what is happening but he would also consider that day, on which it 
will be possible to end the civil strife, to be one of celebration. And all of us 
will proclaim you emperor most readily, being accustomed to be led by you, 
not just at this time but for all time before this, and give honour and 
goodwill, as is appropriate to an emperor, or to one who is very nearly one. 
“The instigators of this war, because they thought they would win 
easily if they announced their hostility to the emperor [Kantakouzēnos], 
upon seeing their affairs being reversed and not progressing according to 
their plan, while blaming many things for their thoughtlessness, will 
necessarily proceed to make peace, if indeed they have even a little concern 
for the safety of the whole [Empire] and they understand they should not 
busy themselves with causing outrage and ruin to both their own and the 
entire of public affairs. If, therefore, between us here together with you and 
those who are your enemies, there appears to be no other salvation for 
everyone then it seems better, having been persuaded by us, /156/ to do that 
which is of benefit to the public, just as you have promised from the outset, 
rather than to be persuaded by their arguments; from these there can be no 
benefit: either you will be destroyed by the sycophants or choose to pass life 
in bitter retirement from public affairs. Indeed, on the contrary, there will be 
civil strife, anarchy, plundering of property, countless murders, slavery, 
uprisings in the cities and the extreme and most fearful of evils that one can 
have in mind – slavery to the barbarians – since they will attempt to enslave 
us by using their participation in our war against each other. So what 
appears to be of benefit to we ourselves and to everyone else has been stated. 
It is possible for you, by choosing one or the other, either to prevent the 
expected misfortunes, or, [by standing trial] to be perceived by the Romans 
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as willingly appearing to be the ultimate cause of such great evils because of 
the ingratitude of certain people, giving no concern at all for others while 
contriving benefit for yourself, if indeed it is possible to call this beneficial.”2 
The leaders of the senate and the commanders of the army replied to the 
Grand Domestic in such a way.  
He, seeing their demand was just, realised they had laid out true and 
reasonable arguments, and because of this he could not contradict such a 
clear exposition of the truth. Nevertheless, hesitating greatly regarding the 
change and shrinking back, as he knew plainly that changes of this sort were 
usually the cause of evils, /157/ he withdrew into himself, directing his 
thoughts as to how he would reply, and deep silence filled the theatron, with 
everyone poised in suspense to hear what he would say. Having scarcely 
shaken the swirling doubts from his thoughts, he said, “My previous 
arguments concerning what we must do are not altered in essence nor 
overturned; I still hold them, and I myself would choose not only to be 
robbed of my property, but would if necessary suffer desperate maladies of 
the body, rather than provide a pretext for civil war. For you know of the 
hatred which I have had, since my early youth, for the seizure of another 
man’s goods or for rejoicing in murders and robbery and the ruin of men. 
Yet I would be ashamed, not only in front of barbarians or Hellenes who 
have heard of the friendship of myself and the Emperor for one another, but 
even before the sun or any other lifeless thing, if I now appeared as the 
enemy of his children after his death. For not only, if it were possible, would 
I have chosen with pleasure my death for the sake of his life but also I call 
upon the eye that oversees all [God] as my witness, that after his death I 
intended only what was the very best and most beneficial for his wife and 
children, and to do everything and to place myself in every danger so that 
they would be free of all difficulties and the affairs of the Romans would be 
raised to great glory and good fortune, while remaining in my present office. 
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“At this moment, and no less following the war which has been 
proclaimed by them /158/ for no reason and contrary, I might say, to any 
thought of justice, I have chosen to patiently endure the very worst acts for 
the sake of not giving the impression to the masses that I initiated a war 
against the Empress for the purpose of gaining power. Since the calamities 
expected from withdrawing from state affairs are greater and more terrible 
<than the alternative>, I am unwilling to do this, and I would clearly be 
deserting you in the face of danger. I understand it is appropriate for me to 
be persuaded as you have advised, not because of any desire for glory (for I 
currently enjoy the greatest satisfaction also in my present office) nor 
because of money (for that which I have presently is nearly greater in 
quantity; I give it freely it to those wanting to steal it), rather it is for the sake 
of all of you and the common salvation of the Romans that I prefer the great 
and numerous dangers that are to be expected instead of security in the 
present moment. And those things which, to me, seemed most beneficial – 
not from foolishness, or idleness, but from wishing to provide no pretext for 
war – I now willingly give them up, turning myself to what you expect will 
be of help to you, just as I have said.  
“Since I choose to do this not because of personal advantage but for 
the benefit of yourselves and the public, it would certainly not be just, or 
pious besides, for all of you alike to encourage me to do this and to indicate 
there is no other path to safety than this one, but then a short while later, if 
matters have not turned out as you planned, to desert one by one, /159/ 
procuring some imaginary safety for yourselves, while abandoning me alone 
in the face of dangers which I entered into for the sake of all of you, when I 
could have saved myself without risk. Certainly this would not only be 
damaging to me but also to you. For it is not possible for the helmsman to 
save the ship if the sailors abandon cooperation in favour of strife; no hope 
of safety would remain for the sailors, the ship would be lost. Instead all 
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must have the same resolution and demonstrate equal perseverance in trials, 
thus accomplishing great things. For none of the ancients raised a trophy at 
the expense of their enemies while being idle and lazy and slothful, but 
endured every labour and appeared undaunted in their trials. If what is 
taking place is not acceptable to someone and he does not want to risk 
everything, patiently staying here because of his goodwill to me, but he 
thinks rather it is necessary to save his home than to be raised up by empty 
hopes, I leave these matters in his hands; having employed free speech and 
disclosed their opinion, they must go back home – by no means suspecting 
any unfriendliness because of this but even enjoying equal favour from me if 
they live somewhere else for a while. If after such consideration and amnesty 
someone shows their wickedness, having escaped in order to plunder and 
ruin the masses, let him know that he will not be let off without the proper 
punishment, but he will teach the others to be wise and not to deceive in 
such ways.3 /160/  
“So, for the preservation of yourselves and the others, I have chosen 
to do exactly what you have advised. I call upon you, for the glory of 
yourselves and your ancestors, to demonstrate fitting courage and to 
strongly resist our enemies, who attack us unjustly and first began the war. 
They dare to attack me, contrary to God’s wholly just dispensation; 
accordingly, before long, the depravity of those who have started war 
unjustly, as well as your prudence and your preference for justice, will be 
manifest. Yet it seems to me that in addition to the first embassy, despite it 
being maltreated unjustly and unreasonably, we should send a second to 
those who have now chosen to make war against us, so that we will be 
greater than them in our magnanimity, just as we are in all other respects, as 
not only did they begin the war, but it has clearly already been inflamed by 
them, although they were asked about peace many times. Perhaps they did 
not accept our embassy because they were thinking at first that we would be 
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overcome easily. Now, seeing that matters have not turned out according to 
their judgement, they may take somewhat better and wiser counsel and may 




The Grand Domestic spoke in such a way. All those present 
applauded these words and gave thanks to God that they were able to 
persuade him to become emperor. For they imagined that, having become 
so, he would resolve all their difficulties. Having departed from there, /161/ 
they reported what had been decided to the others, and they held a general 
celebration and rejoiced together with each other. The Grand Domestic 
ordered the imperial regalia to be prepared by those appointed for this 
purpose. And on the following day oaths were taken; all swore to be loyal to 
the Grand Domestic alone and to observe honest and pure faith towards 
him. 
Before this war began, since he had been preparing to campaign in the 
west, he had sent his army’s mercenaries forward and they had advanced as 
far as Macedonia. Furthermore, many excellent soldiers, those who were 
settled in Morrha1 and the cities of Rhodopē2 which were subject to the 
Romans, under the command of the general Matthaios Kantakouzēnos, the 
Grand Domestic’s oldest son, were also encamped around the Chalkidikē in 
Thrace3 along with their general. Having been thus commanded by his 
father, they awaited his arrival. He immediately summoned them by letters 
to Didymoteichon, so they would be present at his proclamation, and, 
without hesitating, they were present. And since the brothers of his wife, 
Iōannēs and Manouēl, the sons of Andronikos Asanēs, were still secured by 
fetters in Bēra, a fortress in Thrace, just as we have said, he sent their sister, 
along with a military force.4 She released them from prison and ordered 
them to be led to him in Didymoteichon, after occupying the tower with a 
garrison and appointing as commander one of those well-disposed towards 
/162/ them [Kantakouzēnos’ faction]. 
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He was busy for a time in the preparation of the imperial insignia, 
when he thought not to hesitate and not to neglect an opportunity, as the 
eager warmongers in Byzantion would not hold back from any scheme, and 
so he himself wrote to all the cities throughout Thrace and Macedonia to 
turn them towards him, as he had by this time become Emperor of the 
Romans and able to do good to those submitting to him and, on the contrary, 
if they took up arms against him, to harm them. In private, he was winning 
over the leading men of the cities and the soldiers close to each of them with 
letters, reminding them of previous favours which he had done for them and 
therefore, if they showed their goodwill now and chose to do what he 
ordered, they would enjoy greater and more remarkable good fortune. He 
signed the documents with red letters, just as is the custom for emperors. 
With the letters he also sent guards, selected from the hoplites and light-
armoured bowmen, to those cities which he knew could easily be held by 
garrisons. 
So when these letters were delivered to each recipient, some received 
them eagerly and promised to do everything he commanded; others were 
displeased, thinking that his actions were a revolt against the emperor 
[Iōannēs V]. Even so, bowing down before the power of the future emperor 
[Kantakouzēnos], they received the letters, having been persuaded by those 
holding great power among them, choosing to do as he ordered. It was clear 
right from the outset that they would be rebels, if they could seize an 
opportunity. Among those who were convinced from the start /163/ to 
choose the side of the Emperor Palaiologos, some, having arrested the 
couriers, sent them as prisoners to Byzantion along with the letters, first 
stripping them of all they had. Others, who thought fit to act more 
moderately, rejected the letters and they prepared for war as, if it came, they 
would defend themselves.  
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When many of the letters were carried to Byzantion, those around the 
Patriarch, of the sort who had previously accused the Grand Domestic of 
intending to take the throne before the Empress, rejoiced and were filled by 
all sorts of pleasure. Exhibiting the letters, they said, “We were not bad 
judges of what was going to happen, but we reckoned well in our 
judgement, and he acts well with these deeds, proving outright that what we 
have been saying is true.” They jeered many blasphemies about him without 
restraint, and did not hold back from anything that was shameful in their 
insolence. And since the Empress was now persuaded that the Grand 
Domestic had openly become her enemy, she sent a few of these letters to his 
mother, who was under guard in her house, denouncing her son for such 
things as he had done. 
She [Theodōra] said these words did not concern her. For she [the 
Empress] should have earlier disclosed the accusations to her, when they 
accused her son. For then nothing of what was now happening would have 
occurred but she would have gained everything that was best from her son 
[Kantakouzēnos], for herself and her children and moreover all the Romans. 
/164/ For she knew his mind most clearly, that it inclined towards doing that 
which is kind rather than wicked. At that point she was under a close guard, 
by which she was kept under surveillance by them, without any charges 
being brought. Also there had been the outrage against his ambassadors, 
who came for the sake of peace and asked that he should be called to trial, so 
that if he were convicted as a perjurer he would accept the death sentence. 
“So why should he offer any justification for what he has been doing under 
imperial authority, as you say, whether indeed these are his letters or not?” 
Concerning the letters, therefore, she [Theodōra] said there was 
nothing to answer; but she would give the best advice, as it seemed to her, if 
indeed they were willing to be persuaded. And it is this: “Do not disregard 
my son, and do not despise him as incapable of great things. For not only the 
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Romans but also those barbarians living far away from the Romans are not 
ignorant of his power and intelligence and experience. So send ambassadors 
to him as quickly as possible, who will negotiate peace. He will not hesitate 
in so far as he must repair what has been done in words and deeds, if 
anything has come to pass, even matters which seem insoluble. If you 
yourselves decide otherwise, then it will be your concern to settle your 
private and public affairs well.” So the Grand Domestic’s mother responded 
in such a way to the accusations. 
The men sent by the Empress, having been commanded to do so, cast 
her [Theodōra] out of her house and led her into the palace, and they 
incarcerated her in a house built by /165/ Emperor Andronikos the first 
[Andronikos II], using it instead as a prison. They confiscated the greater 
part of her property, which was substantial, except for any silver, gold, 
precious stones and pearls which she, anticipating this, had removed secretly 
beforehand. But there was property beyond counting in provisions – freshly-
harvested wheat and barley and other produce – not only in her house near 
the palace, but also there were other granaries holding many times more 
produce than this near the Gorgoepēkoos Monastery.5 Those who supported 
the war and were entrusted to administer public affairs carried off 
everything heedlessly, not for any public benefit, but gratified themselves 
and others. 
After this, by tracking down the friends and associates of the Grand 
Domestic, they found a great amount of money. Some of this was betrayed 
by the keepers themselves in the hope of sparing part of the money, 
inasmuch as it was being handed over to those who did not know how much 
there was in the beginning; others were forced to disclose <everything> 
through compulsion and torments and every form of torture. Furthermore, 
many who had nothing from him [Kantakouzēnos] were also under 
suspicion; they endured these cruelties simply because of intimacy with him. 
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So such things took place in Byzantion and an Iliad of evils6 enveloped the 
friends of the Grand Domestic. 
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Chapter 27 
Once the imperial garments had been prepared in Didymoteichon and 
the appointed day for the proclamation of the new emperor arrived,1 all 
those staying /166/ in Didymoteichon at that time were present at his house; 
not only those of good birth and related to the Emperor by blood, but also 
the rest of the senators2 and the army. Having previously donned the 
imperial garb, the new emperor then, in view of all, adorned his feet with the 
red boots; one was fitted by the closest of his blood relatives and the other by 
those who were foremost in nobility and most splendid among the Latin 
mercenaries. Taking in his own hands the imperial pilos,3 which was lying on 
the ground before the icon of the immaculate Mother of God, he placed it on 
his head. At once those accustomed to chant such things began the 
acclamations of the emperors. And first the Empress Anna was acclaimed 
and, after her, her son the Emperor Iōannēs, and third the Emperor Iōannēs 
Kantakouzēnos with the Empress Eirēnē.4 They made the commemoration of 
the emperors and empresses in the same manner as the holy services, and 
similarly of the Patriarch Iōannēs. 
After the acclamation the Emperor [Kantakouzēnos], mounted on his 
steed, and all the others, as many as there were, following on horseback, 
went to the church named after the Great Martyr Geōrgios Palaiokastritēs,5 
and he rendered proskynesis,6 and he conferred the dignity of knighthood on 
certain men of the Latin army, doing everything that was customary for 
them.7 Having returned from there to the palace, he feasted splendidly 
together with his wife the Empress, in the presence of all according to the 
established customs for emperors.8 /167/ The brothers of the Empress, 
Iōannēs and Manouēl, and the cousin of the Emperor, Iōannēs Angelos, 
served them during the banquet. So the new emperors, wearing magnificent 
golden apparel, celebrated that day and those taking part with them from 
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the senate and the army left nothing undone that could possibly cheer the 
day of celebration. On the next day, having stripped off their golden 
garments, they [Kantakouzēnos and Eirēnē] cloaked themselves in white 
apparel, a sign that the emperors were mourning.9 The Emperor explained 
the reason for the change to those present: on the day before, because of the 
celebration, he had been clothed in that magnificent apparel but now that 
day had passed by, it was necessary to mourn again the death of his brother 
who was also emperor [Andronikos III]. 
And it is worthwhile to remember certain things which the crowd are 
accustomed to take as signs in relation to the proclamations of emperors, 
thinking there is some infallible evidence of the future success or failure of 
the emperors proclaimed, as if there is need to consider that such things are 
managed by divine providence rather than happening as fortune may have 
it, since God’s providence concerning human affairs lies in secrecy and is 
manifest only to those who are pure in thought and are judged worthy of 
such gifts by God. For on the day of the proclamation when it was necessary 
for the new emperor to put on the imperial garment, it happened that the 
inner part was rather tighter than needed, so that it was unable to cover the 
body, although greatly /168/ stretched, while the outer part was completely 
the opposite, being far looser than needed, yet both were sewn by a tailor 
who had made many well-fitted <garments> on previous occasions. On 
account of this a certain one of the Emperor’s closest friends who was 
present stated plainly that while the early part of the Emperor’s reign would 
certainly be a strain and give great difficulty to the Emperor, just as the 
garment now squeezed his body, the later part was measured more 
generously than required and would allow great relaxation. The same day, 
while the divine liturgy was performed, it happened that the very passage of 
the Evangelist was read in which our saviour and the king of the ages Jesus 
Christ was talking with his own disciples concerning what would happen to 
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them. “If they persecute me,” he said, “they will also persecute you; if they 
give heed to my word, they will also give heed to yours.”10 Those present, 
noting this, said that the petty men and corrupters and sycophants and those 
who cared nothing for Christ’s commandments of salvation would persecute 
the Emperor and show their great madness against him, just as the Jews had 
persecuted Christ their benefactor with great zeal. And they would prevail 
against him [Kantakouzēnos] for a while, just as those men [the Jews] had 
also imagined they did by slaying their redeemer. Later those who were 
good and virtuous and worthy of Christ’s commandments heeded His 
words, just as they will heed the word of the Emperor and will do 
everything commanded by him. /169/ Such are the things the masses 
ascribed to these words, which later turned out very closely to their 
interpretation. 
The Emperor himself, though, had great faith in the Archbishop of 
Didymoteichon11 and respected him as a superior, as he had been proven in 
many ways previously to have no small share of divine grace. The same day 
after the proclamation, he sent to him explaining what had happened, that 
he had done what was reckoned to be beneficial by common opinion, and he 
asked him to make prayers to God on his behalf, so that the good and 
pleasing will of God would be fulfilled for him. For this was his custom, to 
ask such a thing from those he respected, to make prayers to God on behalf. 
He [the Archbishop] said that it was not good to send tidings after the 
event. For when he [Kantakouzēnos] needed something, God permitting, he 
should have asked beforehand, since it was possible. Now nothing remained 
other than to ask God for the wellbeing of the community and of himself. To 
be Emperor of the Romans, as he too knew, is something decided by God. 
Besides, the lips swell from having eaten an unripe fig. He implied by this 
parable that many dangers and trials would first befall him 
[Kantakouzēnos]. Wishing as it were to reveal from where and from whom 
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the dangers would come, he [the Archbishop] reminded him of a vision of 
what would happen, which he was deemed worthy to see when the Emperor 
Andronikos was alive.  
And the new emperor explained this [to those present]: /170/ when 
the Emperor [Andronikos] was still alive, and he was still content with the 
fortune of a private citizen, this very Archbishop had made an exhortation to 
him denouncing Apokaukos – whom he named thus, without his title – 
<instructing him> not to make too much of it, but to be on guard against the 
man, as he would be responsible for a great insult. And when he 
[Kantakouzēnos] said that he appeared to be jesting – as what kind of an 
insult could an egg offer to a stone? – the Archbishop said that arrogance is a 
great evil, particularly in those who have otherwise attained perfect virtue 
and reached the highest level of earthly fortune. And he [Kantakouzēnos] 
said that these comments did not proceed from arrogance but from 
understanding his own great power and the other’s weakness; unless one 
may blame a wolf for venturing to consider itself stronger than a sheep, and 
the lion for thinking itself to differ greatly from the deer in strength. Yet he 
asked that he [the Archbishop] make his vision clear to him, as he would 
certainly trust whatever was said, because although Nature is created by 
God to be unchanging, human affairs turn out otherwise and undergo great 
change.  
Having been asked many times, to persuade him to describe the 
things he had seen, he [the Archbishop] said, “Once, while I was praying and 
meditating with myself alone and God, I seemed to see you standing before 
me. Suddenly Apokaukos attacked with excessive rage, and was pushing 
with such great force that he nearly succeeded in /171/ throwing you down. 
Nevertheless, although forced back by his charge on to one knee, by bracing 
your other foot and your left hand firmly on the ground, you resisted his 
pushing. And that man, although labouring greatly, was able to do nothing 
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more. You, having risen up from your fall, took up a cudgel and swung it 
down many times on his head; unable to withstand the blows, he collapsed 
to the ground. Following on, you severed his head from his body with a 
knife. So that was my vision,” he said. “Considering to myself whatever this 
signifies, I think he will start a war against you which will bring many and 
great dangers. But, following these dangers, God will grant you victory. For 
this reason you must not be remiss but guard yourself against that man.” So 
the Emperor related such matters concerning the Archbishop.  
Those present, having also heard the parable about the fig, <thought> 
it confirmed what had been signified by <Christ’s> sayings and the ill-fitting 
garments. For they paid attention to his [the Archbishop’s] words as if they 
were prophetic when he related something about the future, not only 
because he had correctly foretold what would happen many times before, 
but also because he had accomplished something miraculous, which is 
possible for God alone and those favoured by Him on account of their purity 
and elevated way of life. In regard to this, there is also another such incident, 
which I will narrate for the sake of amusement. 
A certain one of the eminent citizens of Didymoteichon was 
suspicious, not without cause, that his marriage-vows had been violated by 
someone, /172/ and he was not mistaken in his reasoning, for they had been 
violated. Being unable to bear keeping his suspicion silent because of 
jealousy, he asked his wife for assurances, which would be sufficient to 
persuade him that what he suspected was not true or, otherwise, he 
threatened to do terrible things, on account of her wantonness towards their 
wedding-vows. The assurances were for her to receive a hot iron in her 
hands.12 For otherwise he was not able to believe her. The woman, well 
aware that admitting what she had done would be a terrible thing (for the 
penalty for this offence towards her husband was death)13 and also thinking 
that to lay hold of the iron would clearly prove her crime, was thus being 
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driven to the utmost perplexity from both sides. She knew she must take 
refuge with the great Archbishop. Having gone to him and explained 
everything, she begged him to support her and not to ignore her, who had 
fallen into the worst evils because of her foolishness, but to persuade her 
husband to desist with the trial, teaching him, for her sake, that she could 
have done nothing of what he suspected. And he [the Archbishop], inquiring 
if some repentance regarding her licentiousness had entered into her mind 
and if she would promise to be prudent for the rest of her life, saw many 
streams of tears pouring forth. Since she insisted that she would never dare 
to do such things again, but also asked to be punished for her sins, he first 
lectured her for a long time concerning temperance and how she must not 
commit such a crime against her husband, then commanded her to lay hold 
of the iron, just as her husband demanded, and to brave the heat. And she, 
returning to her husband, /173/ asked him to proceed with the trial. He – for 
he could not bear to rid himself of his jealousy about his wife unless there 
was some unambiguous <proof> – took her alone inside a certain church 
sanctuary and prepared the iron, as much as was possible, by heating it in a 
fire then, gripping it with fire-tongs, he placed it in the hands of his wife. 
And he ordered her to walk three times around the holy skimpous.14 When it 
came to pass that she was holding it without suffering, as she was not 
exposed to the heat at all, the man wondered at the power of the truth and, 
having abandoned his suspicion about his wife, he ordered the iron to be 
placed on the skimpous. When it was laid there, it burned through the 
skimpous owing to its great heat and it fell to the ground. 
In such ways was this man [the Archbishop] deemed worthy of grace 
and he accomplished many more marvellous things, as we will mention later 
at an appropriate moment.15 
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Chapter 28 
The Emperor Kantakouzēnos, on the day after his proclamation, 
having gathered an assembly from the army and the senators who were 
present, said, “Romans, although I have related to you many times before 
my goodwill, care, and concern towards the Empress and her son the 
emperor, I am never, even until the present moment, satisfied without 
always relating these matters. Because of this I now call upon He who knows 
all clearly even before it happens [God] as witness of what is said, as I am 
not aware, at least in my own mind, of having turned away from correct 
reasoning /174/ but I have taken every care and effort not only for the 
betterment of the Romans, but also to preserve authority for the Empress 
and her son and to allow nobody, at least as far as it is in my power, to do 
wrong. It was also necessary for her, through paying attention to these 
matters, to consider what is true and fair about me and not to condemn me 
in absentia, having been convinced by men who are sycophants. Since she, 
having ignored the truth, preferred the lie and, although I have done nothing 
wrong and have provided absolutely no pretext for war, she decided I was 
an enemy and proclaimed to all the cities that I should not be received but 
fought with all strength. We did what seemed beneficial to you and to me in 
the present circumstances, having been driven together by necessity. 
Certainly I am very grateful to you because of your enthusiasm and goodwill 
for me. I believe it is right, demonstrating the same and equal solicitude for 
you, to advise and to command what I think would be of benefit to each of 
you. For it would not be friendly if, because of pursuing some private 
interest of my own, I neglected the safety of others. Accordingly, for those of 
you who have homes and children and wives and the other means of life in 
cities which have not submitted to us, or in unwalled towns, it is not 
necessary to abandon your homes while persevering here because of loyalty 
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towards us. For it is absurd for friendship towards me to be perceived as the 
cause of great misfortunes to you. For all those men, who are rash 
revolutionaries beyond all moderation, will not restrain themselves from any 
crime. /175/ But departing to your homes, you will retain the same favour for 
us and, when the time comes, you will show this.” 
Then he ordered the treasurers to give money to the mercenaries if 
some of their pay was owed, and he added a bonus. As for the others, those 
who held incomes from villages, having distributed sufficient gold to them 
as well, he sent them to their homes. They gave much and great gratitude for 
this kindness and so they promised to show themselves worthy of his 
benefaction, whenever they found opportunity. He retained around him all 
those who were without wives and children; if anybody else volunteered, he 
also stayed behind. 
After this he picked out sixteen regiments from the available army 
and, having appointed as generals the pinkernēs Iōannēs [Angelos] and 
Manouēl Asanēs, the brother of his wife, he ordered them to march upon 
Byzantion and, having camped around the Melas River,1 to confine the army 
of Byzantion <in the city> so that they could not advance against the cities 
which had sided with him. Meanwhile he was preparing the remaining 
soldiers so, having passed through Peirinthos2 and Selymbria and won them 
over (for they were in two minds and had not sided clearly with either of the 
emperors), he would go as far as Byzantion, making a trial of the walls 
together with the generals, the pinkernēs and Asanēs, if he was able to join 
them. 
When the letters of the Emperor Kantakouzēnos arrived in 
Adrianople, /176/ just as they had in the other cities too, urging them to 
recognise him, who had already become emperor, the dynatoi3 among the 
citizens received them readily and ordered the letters to be read out before 
an assembly. But the common people were not pleased and were clearly 
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going to revolt; some of them openly spoke against him. The dynatoi drove 
them away in anger, using not only insults but also the lash. They endured 
the wanton violence of the dynatoi at this time, fearing them as they were 
numerous, and there were not yet demagogues who would provoke them to 
anger. 
When night fell a certain man named Branos, who was one of the 
common people, labouring with his spade and his hands and from which he 
provided a meagre living, and two other associates, called Mougdouphēs 
and Phrangopoulos,4 went round the houses of the commoners during the 
night and persuaded them not to be complacent but to rise up against the 
dynatoi, as not only would they be freed from their arrogance but they would 
also plunder their property. And having organised a substantial popular 
force, they set upon the dynatoi and seized all of them, except for a few who, 
noticing the plot, escaped the danger by hiding themselves away. Having 
locked them [the dynatoi] in the towers of the city and set a guard, since by 
that time it was day, they went en masse to the houses of those they had 
captured, plundered their possessions then tore down their houses, not only 
stripping off the woodwork but, in their frenzy, even tearing down the walls 
as far as /177/ their foundations. And there was no awful deed whatsoever 
that was not dared against those who sided with the Emperor 
Kantakouzēnos. And while many, because of private disagreements, 
exploited the popular movement, others, who had money owed to them, 
were accused of Kantakouzēnism by those who seized them. Thus terrible 
civil strife was kindled from the outset. 
What took place among them at the beginning seemed even more 
brutal when, later, the entire Roman world also turned to far greater cruelty 
and savagery. Everywhere the common people considered it their duty to 
acclaim the Emperor [Iōannēs V] Palaiologos as their lord, while the better 
people5 either sincerely favoured the Emperor Kantakouzēnos or were 
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attacked by the poor and those wanting to revolt for the same reason without 
any evidence. The attacks came easily against those who had money, which 
the poor sought to plunder, and against those who had not wished to join 
the others in similarly unruly behaviour. And the common people held great 
hatred towards their betters, who had previously treated them as they liked 
when there was peace, and hoped besides to plunder their properties, which 
were many. They were ready to revolt even with the slightest pretext and 
dared the most terrible deeds. The agitators were mostly from among the 
very poorest and were robbers and thieves and, being compelled by their 
poverty, they did not hold back from any insufferable deed. They incited the 
common people to do the same, /178/ while pretending goodwill for the 
Emperor Palaiologos. For this reason they called themselves the most loyal.  
Later, it was just as if some malignant and terrible disease was 
spreading across the entire dominion of the Romans, and it provoked many 
who had previously seemed moderate and reasonable to similar violence. 
For in peace and the absence of wars, cities and individuals have better 
dispositions and are little tempted by shameful and mean actions, because 
they have not fallen into the constraints of necessity. War, stealing away 
daily prosperity,a is a violent teacher and what was previously regarded as 
unconscionable comes to pass. 
So all the cities in common revolted against their betters and those 
elsewhere, who were lagging behind, on learning of what was done before, 
displayed greater excesses and advanced even to massacres. The irrational 
rage of these savages was considered courage, and insensibility to kin and 
lack of feeling was considered steadfast loyalty to the emperor. The man 
embittered against the Emperor Kantakouzēnos and producing shameful 
and harsh insults against him was thought loyal, while the man of sound 
                                                 
a II, 178.9: ἀπορίαν amended to εὐπορίαν (following FK III, 447, n. 270). 
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mind, in control of his tongue and maintaining a respectable character was 
immediately viewed with suspicion. Similarly, plotting and lies and 
fabricating false accusations produced a reputation for intelligence. And 
betrayal of the closest relations was pursued as if it were something noble 
with a decent name. Thus every /179/ form of wickedness was exhibited in 
the cities at that time because of the sedition and there was nothing 
whatsoever that the more decent people did not endure. For the aristocracy 
was ruined at once, either being accused of previous goodwill to the 
Emperor Kantakouzēnos or because they did not immediately make war on 
him, while the middle class citizens were ruined either because they did not 
join in with the revolutionaries or by envy of their superiority. And human 
nature, always accustomed to act contrary to the laws, then showed itself 
quite powerless against anger which, when not restrained by the rulers, is 
stronger than justice, overwhelming the laws on this account, and an enemy 
of the Almighty, if it were possible for it to prevail. 
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Chapter 29 
Nevertheless, the people in Adrianople escorted their dynatoi 
prisoners to Byzantion, fearing that the Emperor Kantakouzēnos, who was 
staying nearby, would march in full force against them and they would not 
be ablea to resist because nearly all of the soldiers they needed were either 
prisoners or otherwise did not dare to peep out of their houses, in which 
they were hiding. Furthermore, they were not expecting any help to arrive 
for them from Byzantion, for they knew that the army of the Emperor 
Kantakouzēnos was encamped there. So they sent an embassy to the 
emperor of the Mysians, asking him to help them as quickly as possible. 
Alexandros, just as was natural, came to Adrianople without 
hesitating, not only because of the revolt but also thinking that, if he could 
bribe /180/ the rulers of the city with money, he could easily persuade them 
to go over to him. In fact, he accomplished none of his goals. For the leaders 
of the city said they were calling for an ally, not a master. But his arrival 
damaged the Emperor Kantakouzēnos no less, as it was believed by all to 
have happened on the Empress’ behalf. For theb army had been sent by him 
[Kantakouzēnos] to the River Melas and its generals, considering it 
disadvantageous to risk danger there while their emperor was being 
besieged by the Mysians, broke camp <to join him>. Some of the senators and 
not a few of the soldiers deserted the generals during the retreat, escaping to 
Byzantion. And among them was Iōannēs Batatzēs,1 leading the unit called 
‘Achyraïtōn’.2 
The cities of Thrace and Macedonia which were obedient to the 
Emperor Kantakouzēnos, upon learning that the invasion of the Mysians 
might be in opposition to the Emperor [Kantakouzēnos], collectively 
                                                 
a ΙΙ, 179.15: οἷοίτε amended to οἵοί τε (following P). 
b II, 180.6: ἥτε amended to ἥ, τε (following S, pers. comm. Sonja Schönauer). 
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revolted in favour of the Empress, except for a very few. And having 
arrested their rulers and the dynatoi among the citizens, they sent them to 
Byzantion in chains. The cities in Rhodopē were doing the same and so their 
war was jointly against the Emperor Kantakouzēnos and the dynatoi among 
them. For the body of citizens was split almost in two, and the few were 
acting in the interests of the Emperor Kantakouzēnos, while the people, led 
by the agitators and the poor, chose the Empress instead. Everywhere the 
masses /181/ were stronger, destroying the dynatoi, and terrible confusion 
and disorder gripped the cities. 
When Alexandros, the emperor of the Mysians, was not able to 
occupy the city of Adrian, he departed and took up a position near 
Didymoteichon, although he did not yet cross the Hebros.3 Having picked 
out no small force from his own army, he sent them out plundering the cities 
across Thrace. So it happened that the army retiring from Byzantion, with 
the pinkernēs Angelos, chanced to meet no small number of them and, being 
stronger, killed them in a battle. Similarly a Persian army, which had been 
carried over to plunder among the coastal villages of Thrace, having by 
chance encountered the surviving Mysians, killed or captured alive many of 
them. The remnant returned to their home camp, not only having gained 
nothing but also having lost many of their own. 
Alexandros, although he had previously been contemptuously 
disposed towards the Emperor Kantakouzēnos – because he thought he 
[Kantakouzēnos] would hardly be able to stand against him – having heard, 
in addition to the blows struck from both sides by the Romans and the 
Persians, that the Emperor was well established in Didymoteichon with a 
large and good quality army, feared for those remaining alive, lest his 
boldness might not turn out well for him. And, having sent an embassy, he 
negotiated for peace. 
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Among those who were close to the Emperor, those who were young 
and more aggressive advised him not to accept peace but rather urged him 
/182/ to battle. But he was not persuaded, thinking the war would bring 
them no benefit at all. “For if our struggle was against the Mysians alone,” he 
said, “this boldness might have a reason. But now it is necessary for us to 
consider not so much them [the Mysians] than how we will defend ourselves 
against the Byzantines. For, if we defeat the Mysians, it will determine 
nothing more than how we drive them away; it is necessary to do this very 
thing to them, whether they are defeated or not. If we ourselves are defeated, 
it will be just as if we were deliberately acting as generals for our enemies 
against ourselves. So what would be more pleasant and beneficial to them, 
than to do to ourselves by thoughtlessness what they consider worthy of 
prayer? Besides, since Alexandros can produce no legitimate reason for war 
against us, we would be wrong if we were unwilling to be reconciled. For he 
did not come to make war against us but, having come for another reason, he 
harmed us unintentionally. And therefore, because there is no benefit to us 
from war and no just pretext to be had, one must rather choose peace.”4 
Having spoken in such a way, he summoned the [Mysian] 
ambassadors to him and negotiated about treaties. And since they were 
ready to be reconciled, having given gifts to them, he sent them back to their 
camp. Then, having sent an embassy to Alexandros, he also confirmed the 
treaty. Although the emperors also wished to meet with each other to make 
their friendship more secure, this was prevented by the hard winter which 
had arrived. Because /183/ the Mysian army was unable to endure this in 
tents, they withdrew to their own country, some of the soldiers and their 
horses having been killed by the cold. 
After this the Emperor Kantakouzēnos once more sent a peace 
embassy to the Empress. He asked her not to attempt similar or even worse 
acts because of her previous bad advice but – having understood from what 
 240 
was happening that the war would bring no benefit but that the affairs of the 
Romans would be utterly destroyed – to choose peace. For, although he was 
able to defend himself through appropriate measures, he too greatly hoped 
to put aside war for the sake of the common good. Dēmētrios Sgouropoulos, 
who had previously participated in an embassy, and Iōannēs Pothos,5 from 
the household of the pinkernēs Angelos, were together appointed as 
ambassadors. Yet the Empress’ officials in Byzantion made no response to 
the embassy. Having insulted one of the ambassadors a little while, they 
placed him under guard. Meanwhile, having tormented Sgouropoulos with 
many blows and having shaved his beard and head, they paraded him 
through the public marketplace. Then, having restrained him with manacles, 
they shut him in prison. The difference in the punishment was made for 
anyone who was among the Emperor’s oikeioi, for whom it was necessary to 
exhibit utter bitterness and to neglect no extremity of insult. They believed 
that through them, they also dishonoured him [Kantakouzēnos] and at the 
same time would provoke him to seek revenge, laying aside his thoughts 
about peace. /184/ For they feared that if the Empress chose peace too, they 
would be destroyed, having been recognised as completely responsible for 
the present evils. They planned, having released Pothos from prison after a 
short time, to send him to the pinkernēs, promising many and wonderful 
things if he would desert the Emperor and choose to make war on him 
alongside them instead. For this reason they dealt with him [Pothos] 
somewhat more kindly. 
Shortly later, they also arrested Syralēs6 while he was crossing over to 
Chios7 at the command of the Emperor [Kantakouzēnos] and, because he 
was one of his closest oikeioi, they brought him to Byzantion; having shaved 
off his hair and beard, and mounted him upon a donkey, facing towards its 
backside, they forced him to hold the donkey’s tail to make it even more 
humiliating. And they led him in triumph in this way. 
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Chapter 30 
When all the cities throughout Thrace except for Pamphilon1 and 
Koprinos2 and a certain fortress near Didymoteichon called Empythion3 – 
which the Emperor [Kantakouzēnos] had built from its foundations many 
years before – had revolted in favour of the Empress, as if on an agreed 
signal the properties of the Emperor scattered in nearly all [the cities] were 
plundered (these had in fact convinced people everywhere to become hostile 
to him, since they saw not a little profit from war), as were the properties of 
those who were his followers, either truthfully or just suspected for some 
reason.  
At all events, it is not possible to state very precisely the total sum of 
money looted from the Emperor and his mother by these acts of the 
Empress’ party /185/ in Byzantion and all the other cities, and the sum was 
not known accurately to the owners themselves, because of its very 
magnitude. Many herds of cattle and oxen to the number of five thousand in 
pasture; yoke-pairs used for ploughing, one thousand; mares in pasture, two 
thousand five hundred; camels, two hundred; mules, three hundred; 
donkeys, five hundred; herds of swine, numbering fifty thousand pigs, and 
sheep, seventy thousand.4 And there was an unbelievable quantity of 
agricultural produce, altogether beyond counting. Although robbed of 
everything in a short time, he uttered nothing vulgar or miserly; he grieved 
only that it was squandered on nothing useful for the common good. For he 
maintained that he had intended that everything should be spent for the 
benefit of the Romans. 
In Byzantion, Andronikos Asanēs, the Emperor’s father-in-law, was 
appointed general for their campaign and, having undertaken the war 
against his son-in-law, rousing himself from there, he went round the cities 
throughout Thrace, all of which welcomed him eagerly and were 
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contributing to the war to the extent of their ability. The Emperor 
Kantakouzēnos had a large and good army but it was impractical to take the 
field because of the season; the army would have no refuge from the rains 
and snow, since all [the cities] had already become hostile. For this reason, 
when there was fair weather, /186/ they ravaged the nearby cities and treated 
them harshly, while the army from Byzantion slunk into the cities and had 
no power to oppose them. But when they were forced to withdraw by the 
winter, the Byzantines, regaining their courage again, put pressure on the 
cities which they considered hostile. And while the entire countryside was 
laid waste as if by enemies, <the inhabitants> migrated to the cities and there 
was nothing dreadful which they did not suffer, and the entire of inhabited 
Thrace was rendered a Scythian desert before long and the might of the 
Romans was squandered and destroyed by itself.  
Of course, the barbarians were not negligent but, knowing that the 
Roman army was divided and at odds with itself, crossed over from Asia 
with cavalry and infantry. They caused the greatest destruction with nobody 
to oppose them, and in a short time the entire coast was rendered empty of 
people; everyone was enslaved except those living in the cities and 
fortresses. Later, after those areas were laid waste, they advanced inland. 
However the Romans continued marching against each other this way 
during the winter and causing damage to the full extent of their strength. But 
the army from Byzantion never dared to attack Didymoteichon, as the 
Emperor was there. However those who were settled in Tzernomianou,5 a 
certain fortress not far from Didymoteichon caused no little harm through 
their pillaging. For nearly all night without pause, they were lurking around 
the walls and /187/ robbing those they happened to encounter. They escaped 
detection not only because of their small numbers but also because of their 
experience; they were very well practiced in banditry. But the soldiers in 
Didymoteichon laid an ambush when, contrary to their habit in robbery, 
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more than the usual number of intruders came back; rising from their 
ambush, they killed quite a few of them.  
The Emperor Kantakouzēnos intended that at the start of spring he 
would march on Byzantion and attempt to win it over to himself, if it was 
possible. All the same, during the winter, he was sending secretly to those 
ruling in Adrianople and negotiating with them. He convinced them to hand 
over the city. And they agreed on a day, during which he needed to 
approach, while bringing the entire army and pretending to march against 
other cities in Thrace, as if to besiege them, so that the attack against 
Adrianople would not be revealed by any of those who had chosen the 
Empress’ party. He camped along the Hebros so he could cross over the next 
day. Having sent to his cousin, the pinkernēs, who was at that time 
garrisoning Pamphilon with one thousand soldiers, and the acropolis with 
other hoplites and one hundred light archers, he ordered him to come to 
him, leaving the garrison on the acropolis and three hundred of the army’s 
cavalry, in order to watch the lower city, while bringing the rest.6 He also 
made the reason for which he called him clear.  
Supposing the existing garrison on the acropolis to be sufficient for 
holding the city alone, he [Angelos] hastened to the Emperor bringing all the 
cavalry. The same night the north wind blew more keenly; on the next day 
/188/ the river began to freeze and shortly later it seemed covered in ice. But 
the surface was not hard enough to support the cavalry crossing over to him, 
nor <weak enough> to allow for the river crossing by means of the usual 
light boats. But while it appeared quite solid, it was too weak to hold the 
horses. On this account, there was great perplexity regarding the crossing. So 
the Emperor camped there for twelve days, waiting in case any opportunity 
to cross the Hebros arose.7 Meanwhile six hundred soldiers, arriving in 
Adrianople from Byzantion, prevented his attack. 
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In Pamphilon, since the pinkernēs had departed, taking the army, those 
who had previously feared to rebel corrupted some of the garrison with 
money. They persuaded them to treacherously empty the vessels they 
guarded, in which their water and wine and any other drinkable fluid were 
stored, for it was not possible to draw water from a spring. So when they 
heard the plot was accomplished, the entire city in common rose up in war 
against the garrison of the acropolis. And forcing them in this way to 
capitulate within days, being greatly distressed by thirst, they were brought 
to terms. Having tied up their leaders, of whom there were three, they sent 
them and the garrison to the Empress. Those in Byzantion, having 
dishonoured them and shown every form of insolence, put them in prison.8 
Similarly, they also demonstrated great ingratitude to the Emperor 
Kantakouzēnos, sparing no insult. /189/ They proceeded to such absurdity, 
that whenever the young Emperor Iōannēs emerged from the palace for his 
leisure (for certainly there was no part of public business that could be 
managed by him owing to his very immature age; he was nine years old 
when his father died), some were sent before him by those controlling public 
affairs to provoke the people, both men and women, to pour out great abuse 
against Emperor Kantakouzēnos – even the most vile – while the young 
emperor was passing by. And they did this as if they were presenting a 
pleasant gift to the young emperor. Their aim in these outrages was nothing 
less than that the people would also be thrown into greater fear that, if the 
Emperor prevailed, he would harshly avenge himself for their insults. And 
this turned out according to their aim, for the more all the people were fired 
up, the more they feared this. And for this reason they were irreconcilable to 
him, instead they were raving because of their cowardly expectation of 
revenge. Besides, they [the conspirators] offered to all the suggestion that 
unless he was completely weakened and destroyed, they could not despise 
him in this way. Certainly the abuse was practiced by them no less for this 
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reason also: so that when he heard about it, he would give up on peace, 
thinking contrary to his inclination that such insults were brought about by 
the Empress. For it appeared to them that the war was not so terrible as the 
danger they considered peace would bring. On this account they contrived 
and plotted everything, so that it would not come about. /190/ However they 
did not ignobly abuse him before the Empress in this way (for she bore anger 
against these disgusting acts) but they poured out only the very worst insults 
and condemned his great moral perversity and wicked ways, that having 
enjoyed such great benefits from the Emperor [Andronikos] and so much 
affection, he [Kantakouzēnos] appeared on the contrary to be utterly 
thankless and wicked concerning his children. And so they were completely 
unrestrained in their speech. 
And the Patriarch, giving little or no thought for ecclesiastical law, 
placed the Emperor himself – who had given no pretext for war, but had 
asked often and many times to be reconciled – as well as anyone who had 
dealings with him, under excommunication because he was <allegedly> seen 
as <intending> evil towards the Empress. The Emperor Kantakouzēnos not 
only showed himself to be doing completely the opposite but also convinced 
those with him <to do the same>. For he observed all honours due not only 
to the Empress, whenever it was necessary to commemorate her, but he also 
called the others by their official titles rather than by their names. Of course 
he used those [titles] granted to each by the Emperor Andronikos, since he 
[Kantakouzēnos] rejected the many which were bestowed later as contrary to 
justice.9 And when one of his followers, in his presence, shamefully insulted 
the parakoimōmenos and a certain other one of those in Byzantion, he ordered 
him to be beaten, saying that such things were appropriate for women who 
were prostitutes, not for men who did battle. 
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Commentary on Chapter 1 
1: The ‘Palaiologoi emperors’ are Andronikos II Palaiologos (r. 1282-
1328)1 and his grandson Andronikos III Palaiologos (r. 1328-1341). 
Andronikos III’s revolt against his grandfather is the subject of Book I of the 
Histories and his reign is the subject of Book II. 
  
2: Andronikos III Doukas Angelos Komnēnos Palaiologos, Emperor of 
the Romans 1328-1341 (PLP 21437).2 Andronikos was the oldest son of 
Michaēl IX Palaiologos and Rita/Maria of Armenia, born on 25 March 1296 or 
1297.3 He had been proclaimed co-emperor, in common with his father and 
grandfather, but tension between Andronikos II and his putative heir 
escalated rapidly after the death of Michaēl IX in October 1320. Following his 
son’s death, the old emperor asked governors to renew their oath of 
allegiance, previously sworn to all three emperors, to himself alone.4 The 
young Andronikos unsurprisingly saw this as signalling an intention to 
remove him from the succession in favour of his uncle Kōnstantinos and 
began to plan revolt. Kantakouzēnos is notably quiet on the reason for this 
change, stating only that a supernatural power must have influenced the old 
                                                 
1 PLP 21436. For his reign, see Laiou, Andronicus II, passim, and Nicol, Last Centuries, 93-
140. 
2 For a summary of his reign, see Nicol, Last Centuries, 167-182. The major monograph 
remains Bosch, Andronikos III.  
3 For Andronikos’ parents, see Ch.14:19 and Ch.14:14, respectively. His birth is recorded 
only by CBB I, 76, no. 8/11a. The stated year is 1297 (,Ϛωε’) but Schreiner amended it to 1296 
on the basis of Greg. I, 474.11-12, which states Andronikos was 36 when his grandfather 
died in February 1332 (see CBB II, 215-6). Greg. I, 560.4-5, correspondingly states that 
Andronikos III was around 45 when he died, which again suggests he was born in 1296. 
Papadopulos, Palaiologen, 43, and Bosch, Andronikos III, 7, also accept 1296. However, both 
the PLP and FK I, 218, n. 32, prefer the chronicler over Grēgoras. Furthermore, 
Kantakouzēnos writes that Andronikos was aged 27 in November 1324 (Kant. I, 193.22-
194.12), which points to the year 1297. Grēgoras is probably in error in this case. 
4 Kant. I, 16.8-18.9. 
 247 
man.5 However, Andronikos was tired of his grandson’s apparently 
dissolute behaviour, which culminated in the death of his younger brother, 
the despotēs Manouēl, at the hands of Andronikos III’s bodyguards in a case 
of mistaken identity.6 Grief from the incident was generally considered to 
have contributed to Michaēl IX’s death shortly after.7 The resulting struggle 
continued for over seven years but comprised only three relatively short 
periods of violence: April-June 1321, winter 1321-July 1322, and October 
1327-May 1328, separated by two compromise agreements, sworn at Rhēgion 
and Epibatai.8 During the longest period of harmony, Andronikos was 
formally crowned emperor on 2 February 1326.9 Following his final victory 
in 1328, Andronikos III deposed his grandfather, although he treated the old 
man and his partisans mildly.10 His conciliation of his defeated opponents 
may have been rooted in personal benevolence or political necessity, or both, 
but it certainly created a model for later conflicts, including Kantakouzēnos’ 
conciliation of his own opponents. Of course, the apparent success of his 
usurpation also set a precedent for the intra-familial strife that continued 
throughout the rest of the Palaiologan era.  
Andronikos III can be considered the last emperor to govern a 
relatively centralised and viable state, despite the disruption to the 
administrative system resulting from the struggle with his grandfather. 
Apparently wary of increasing separatism, he showed unusual concern to 
tour his territories, often holding court outside Constantinople,11 and he 
minimised the scope for successful military revolts by leading his armies in 
                                                 
5 Kant. I, 14.8-15. 
6 Greg. I, 285.12-286.3. For Manouēl, see PLP 21511. 
7 For other causes of the revolt, see Laiou, Andronicus II, 284-8. 
8 The period is the subject of the entire first book of the Histories. For a summary, see 
Bosch, Andronikos III, 9-52; Laiou, Andronicus II, 284-99; Nicol, Last Centuries, 151-62. 
9 CBB I, 77, 8/15; Kant. I, 196.8-204.3; Greg. I, 373.14-20. 
10 Kant. I, 311.2-316.21. 
11 Kant. I, 473.5-6, states that he spent an entire year at Didymoteichon at one point. 
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person. Owing to the manner of his rise to power, his position was insecure 
and he seems to have been justly suspicious of disaffected elements of the 
aristocracy gathering around potential challengers or even restoring his 
grandfather. He evidently faced substantial threats during his illness of 
1329/30, Syrgiannēs’ revolt in 1334, and the attempted coup – with Genoese 
backing – by his uncle, despotēs Dēmētrios Palaiologos in 1335.12 Thereafter 
he seems to have reigned unchallenged. Despite the loss of some territory to 
Serbia and the remnants of Bithynia to the Turks, Andronikos successfully 
asserted authority over Chios (1329), Thessaly (1333, 1338), Lesbos (1335) and 
Epiros (1338-40).13 His victories brought him considerable prestige and there 
are no contemporary indications that the Empire was on the verge of 
collapse. Security from incursions was elusive but the Empire suffered 
nothing on the scale of the ravages of the Catalans. By the end of his reign, 
Andronikos was able to spend substantial sums on fortification projects and 
to consider the re-establishment of a standing fleet.14 He seems to have 
suffered from fragile health: besides his near-fatal illness in 1329/30, he was 
ill in summer 1324,15 suffered from an illness which ‘distressed his interior 
parts’ before his campaign to suppress the Epirote revolt in 1340, and fell 
sick again during the subsequent siege of Arta.16 He died following another 
brief illness on Friday 15 June 1341.17 
Although Andronikos was arguably one of the most successful 
Palaiologan emperors, he tends to be overshadowed in modern scholarship 
by the disasters of his grandfather’s reign and the destructive civil war 
                                                 
12 For these incidents, see Ch.14:12, Ch.14:9, Ch.17:6, respectively. 
13 See Ch.29:7, Ch.1:13, Ch.11:6, respectively.  
14 Kant. I, 540-542. 
15 Kant. I, 194.1-4. 
16 Kant. I, 525.10-16: ἐκεκάκωτο τὰ σπλάγχνα. 
17 Kant. I, 560.14-18; Greg. I, 560.2-3 (both agree on the date, although Kantakouzēnos 
says in the evening and Grēgoras says morning); CBB I, 64, no. 7/8. Other short chronicles 
provide a variety of dates, sometimes wildly mistaken; see CBB II, 250-251. 
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following his own demise.18 This is partly a result of the contemporary 
record; Kantakouzēnos is more concerned with his own role in Andronikos’ 
reign and the latter emerges from the Histories as a brave but characterless 
leader, whose main distinguishing feature is his love for Kantakouzēnos. 
Grēgoras, in contrast, is unable to conceal his dislike; he supported 
Andronikos II during the first civil war and idolised his tutor, Theodōros 
Metochitēs, whom Andronikos III ruined and exiled.19 He draws a 
contradictory portrait of Andronikos, at once approachable, frivolous and 
irresponsible, yet also headstrong and secretive.20 As Grēgoras was happy to 
attribute achievements during Andronikos’ reign to others, he contributes to 
an impression that Kantakouzēnos was the eminence grise. While it is 
impossible to establish the reality of the situation, both historians had strong 
motives for propagating such an impression. 
 
3: The war can be considered to have formally started with 
Kantakouzēnos’ acclamation as emperor on 26 October 1341 and ended with 
his reconciliation with the Empress on 8 February 1347.21 
 
4: Kantakouzēnos refers to the letters between Neilos and 
‘Christodoulos’ which open the first volume of the Histories, where the 
author similarly emphasises his love of truth, the value of his eyewitness 
testimony, and his disregard of hearsay and rumour.22 
 
                                                 
18 Bosch, Andronikos III, esp. 194-5, makes a very positive assessment of Andronikos and 
believes Kantakouzēnos in particular distorted the historical record in obsessive pursuit of 
his own Machtgier/‘lust for power’. 
19 For Metochitēs, see PLP 17982. 
20 Greg. I, 565.13-568.17. 
21 For the date of Kantakouzēnos’ acclamation, Ch.27:1. For the date of reconciliation, 
Kant. II, 614.23-615.3. CBB I, 84, no. 8/47, alternatively states 7 February. 
22 Kant. I, 10.7-20; Trone, Kantakouzenos, 108 (translation), 223-4 (commentary). 
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5: Anna Palaiologina, Empress of the Romans 1326-c.1365 (PLP 
21347).23 She was born Jeanne/Giovanna of Savoy, probably in 1306.24 
Andronikos III’s first wife, Adelheid/Eirēnē of Brunswick, died prematurely 
on 16 August 1324, without any surviving children.25 Andronikos II, then co-
ruling with his grandson, took the initiative in negotiating his remarriage. 
Kantakouzēnos shows some pleasure in narrating that ambassadors for the 
French king also sought Anna’s hand but were spurned in favour of the 
alliance with Andronikos.26 Anna arrived in Constantinople, with a large 
number of attendants, in February 1326 and married Andronikos in October, 
the original plans having been delayed by her falling ill.27 She appears to 
have learnt Greek rapidly and to have been closely trusted by her husband. 
When Andronikos was sick and expected to die in 1330, he entrusted 
sovereignty to his pregnant wife, although the business of government was 
given to Kantakouzēnos.28 In 1335, while campaigning in the Aegean, he 
seems to have left authority in Anna’s hands. She is credited with 
suppressing a serious conspiracy, with the assistance of Kantakouzēnos’ 
mother, Theodōra.29 Although Anna had embraced Orthodoxy, western 
hopes that she could convert her husband or bring up her children in the 
Roman Catholic faith meant that she was involved in diplomatic 
correspondence with the Papacy.30  
Following the death of Andronikos III, Anna was the only crowned 
holder of basileia, or sovereignty, in the Empire. Her exact constitutional 
                                                 
23 Muratore, Principessa Sabauda, provides a long but romanticised study of her life. Nicol, 
Byzantine Lady, 82-95, is concise and distinctly unsympathetic. Malamut, ‘Jeanne-Anne’, is 
detailed and even-handed but not concerned with post-1347.  
24 Muratore, Principessa Sabauda, 227. 
25 Kant. I, 193.20-24; PLP 21356. 
26 Kant. I, 195.10-196.7. 
27 For the arrangement of her marriage and subsequent festivities, see Kant. I, 194.9-196.7, 
204.4-206.1. 
28 Kant. I, 393-4; Greg. I, 439-440. 
29 For this incident, see Ch.17:6. 
30 Malamut, ‘Jeanne-Anne’, 93-4. 
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status has attracted considerable attention; coins depict her alongside her 
son, but in the position of honour, and surviving lead seals style her 
autokratōrissa, but many documents are signed in the name of her son alone.31 
However it was clear that even a politically astute woman could not simply 
step into the shoes vacated by Andronikos III, an emperor who had 
campaigned continually and whose government tended towards being 
peripatetic. Her ministers, consequently, seemed to have enjoyed substantial 
autonomy but her control over government strengthened as time went on, 
particularly after Apokaukos’ death. By the end of the war Anna possessed 
sufficient authority to depose the Patriarch.32 She showed considerable, albeit 
ultimately extremely damaging, resourcefulness in her determination to 
resist Kantakouzēnos, attempting overtures to various Balkan, Latin and 
Turkish powers. Famously, Anna pledged the jewels from the imperial 
crown to Venice for 30,000 ducats in 1343, which were never redeemed. 
Kantakouzēnos only vaguely refers to imperial treasures having been sold 
off, but the transaction is well attested in Latin sources.33 Even when her 
impending defeat was clearly unavoidable, Anna refused to come to terms 
and held out in the Blachernai palace for five days after Kantakouzēnos 
entered Constantinople. Only when his soldiers prepared to storm the 
building was she forced to surrender.34 As part of the settlement of the war, 
Kantakouzēnos continued to honour her as Empress and left her and her son 
Iōannēs V in the imperial apartments while he moved into inferior 
accommodation.35 However, she probably had much of her remaining wealth 
confiscated36 and was removed from government. This changed after 
                                                 
31 Dölger, ‘Kaisertum’; Malamut, ‘Jeanne-Anne’, 101-4.  
32 See Ch.1:16. 
33 Kant. II, 471.13-14; Hetherington, ‘Jewels’; Malamut, ‘Jeanne-Anne’, 109-110. 
34 Kant. II, 607-15. Kantakouzēnos entered Constantinople on 3 February but did not 
enter the palace until 8 February. 
35 Greg. II, 783.24-784.10. 
36 Greg. II, 790.7-9. 
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Kantakouzēnos’ overly-optimistic decision to leave the eighteen year old 
Iōannēs V in Thessalonike around the end of 1350.37 The young emperor 
soon began to conspire with Stefan Dušan and Kantakouzēnos sent Anna in 
mid-1351 to restrain her son and prevent a new civil war. She succeeded and, 
following their brief joint government of the city, her son soon departed to 
take up a different appanage.38 Anna remained ruler of Thessalonike until 
her death. She appears to have been well regarded locally and, although 
effectively independent from Constantinople, her relations with 
Kantakouzēnos, and subsequently her son, appear to have been harmonious. 
She died in Thessalonike, probably in 1365, having become a nun some time 
before.39 She is commemorated in the Synodikon of Orthodoxy as the nun 
Anastasia, who piously protected the doctrines of the Church against 
Barlaam and Grēgorios Akindynos.40 
 
6: Andronikos had gone to the Hodēgōn Monastery to rest 
immediately following the synod condemning Barlaam, which took place in 
Hagia Sophia on 10 June 1341.41 He died in the monastery five days later and 
was buried there.42 The Hodēgōn was located east of Hagia Sophia, near the 
sea walls. From at least the twelfth century it was home to the famous icon of 
the Virgin Hodēgētria, attributed to St. Luke, which was carried in 
procession each Tuesday.43 In February 1347 Anna moved the icon to the 
                                                 
37 Kant. III, 159.19-160.19. 
38 Kant. III, 200-9. For this incident and her subsequent residence in Thessalonike, see 
Nicol and Bendall, ‘Numismatic evidence’, 87-93; Loenertz, ‘Chronologie de Cabasilas’, 216-
226; Malamut, ‘Pouvoir et influence’, 71-3. 
39 Dating of her death relies on a single letter by Kydōnēs, see Kydōnēs, Letters, I.ii, 369-
371, ep. 61 (German trans. and commentary). 
40 Gouillard, ‘Synodikon of Orthodoxy’, 100-103. For discussion of her Orthodoxy in 
relation to claims that she remained Catholic, see Nicol, Byzantine Lady, 93-5. 
41 Kant. I, 557.10-560.18. For the synod, Meyendorff, Palamas, 54-6. 
42 CBB I, 81, no. 8/32. 
43 A.-M. Talbot, ‘Hodegon Monastery’, ODB II, 939; N.P. Ševčenko, ‘Virgin Hodegetria’, 
ODB III, 2172; Janin, Géographie ecclésiastique, 199-207. 
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palace temporarily to assist in her appeal for mercy to the victorious 
Kantakouzēnos.44 Its importance made it a major attraction for pilgrims and 
several Russian descriptions survive from the Palaiologan period.45 
 
7: The honorific ‘Senator’ (συγκλητικός), is not precisely defined 
during this era. For Kantakouzēnos, it appears to indicate a social class 
comprising the courtiers, including all holders of court titles, and those of the 
leading noble families, but not the provincial notables. Men of this class 
monopolised the senior administrative and military commands, although 
considerable differences of wealth and status existed between them. The 
existence of any institutionalised senatorial class and senatorial assembly can 
be discounted.46 
 
8: ‘Byzantines’ (Βυζάντιοι) are the native inhabitants of 
Constantinople, which continued to be known also by its ancient name, 
Byzantion.  
 
9: The title megas domestikos dates from at least the eleventh century.47 
The holder was in theory the senior military commander of the empire, 
second only to the emperor, and entitled to an equal, one fifth, share of the 
booty taken by the army.48 He also held significant ceremonial duties, 
attested by Pseudo-Kodinos and Michaēl VIII’s prostagma of 1272, such as 
holding the imperial sword and serving at the emperor’s table.49 However, as 
is often the case in the Palaiologan era, there was not always an exact 
                                                 
44 Kant. III, 8.11-16. 
45 Majeska, Russian Travelers, 362-366. 
46 Kyritses, Byzantine Aristocracy, 53-71, esp. 61-64. See also Ch.2:23. 
47 On the history of the office, see Guilland, Institutions I, 405-425. 
48 Ps-Kod., 205-209; Kant. I, 498.8-13; Kyriakidis, ‘Megas Domestikos’, 248. 
49 Ps-Kod., 119, 159-167; Heisenberg, ‘Palaiologenzeit’, 37.6-13; Kyriakidis, ‘Megas 
Domestikos’, 249. 
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correspondence between function and title; major campaigns were 
sometimes led by others and certain megaloi domestikoi never campaigned.50 
Kyriakidis justly notes that Kantakouzēnos’ power is a consequence of his 
position as Andronikos III’s closest associate rather than a function of his 
office.51 Kantakouzēnos does not describe any significant action where he 
fought in Andronikos III’s absence nor does he refer to a megas domestikos 
during his own reign. The exact date of Kantakouzēnos’ own appointment is 
unknown but Pseudo-Kodinos states that he was appointed by both the 
Andronikoi, so sometime after the treaty of Rhēgion which concluded the 
first phase of their struggle and possibly after Andronikos III’s coronation in 
February 1325.52 In the process, they raised his rank to equal that of 
panhypersebastos. When Andronikos II finally abdicated, his grandson raised 
Kantakouzēnos’ precedence once again, placing the megas domestikos fourth, 
inferior only to despotēs, sebastokratōr, and kaisar, and thus above many 
members of the imperial family.53 This action, and the general importance of 
the megas domestikos throughout Pseudo-Kodinos’ text has led to suggestions 
that Kantakouzēnos had direct input into drafting the ceremonial 
handbook.54 However, there are significant objections to this and the text is 
likely to have been a product of Iōannēs V’s sole reign.55 In any case, later 
megaloi domestikoi did not enjoy such privilege.  
There is evidence that, on occasion, more than one megas domestikos 
held the title at once.56 Michaēl VIII granted it to William of Villehardouin in 
                                                 
50 Bartusis, Army, 241; Kyriakidis, ‘Megas Domestikos’, 254-5. 
51 Kyriakidis, ‘Megas Domestikos’, 242. 
52 Ps-Kod., 27, 51; Nicol, Family, 36-7. Weiss, Kantakuzenos, 10, n. 50, suggests 1322-25; the 
earlier date represents the beginning of the uneasy co-rule of the Andronikoi following the 
peace of Epibatai. 
53 Ps-Kod., 27-28. On the manipulation of court precedence for political reasons, see 
Ch.30:9; Macrides, et al., Pseudo-Kodinos, 280-9. 
54 E.g., Gaul, ‘Purple Stockings’, 73-85. 
55 Macrides, et al., Pseudo-Kodinos, 1-10, 15-18; Kyriakidis, ‘Megas Domestikos’, 247-9.  
56 Kyriakidis, ‘Megas Domestikos’, 253-254. 
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1261, when Alexios Philēs was already megas domestikos, although this was 
clearly intended as an honorific.57 It is possible that Kantakouzēnos’ term in 
the office overlapped with that of Stephanos Chrelja, who is also attested as 
megas domestikos. However this seems incompatible with the exceptional re-
ordering of the court hierarchy in favour of the megas domestikos which was 
implemented explicitly to honour Kantakouzēnos; it is quite possible that 
Chrelja was honoured by Kantakouzēnos after his acclamation as basileus.58 A 
megas domestikos Alexios Rhaoul is mentioned in two documents dated to 
either 1337 or 1355.59 Despite the editor’s insistence on the earlier date,60 it 
seems unlikely that Rhaoul, who is not mentioned in the histories of the 
period, was sharing the office with Kantakouzēnos, so the latter date appears 
more probable.61 
 
10: Only the Blachernai palace complex in the north-west of the city 
was in active use as an imperial residence in the Palaiologan era. The older 
Great Palace, which Kantakouzēnos distinguishes as the ‘Palace of 
Constantine the Great’,62 received occasional ceremonial use but generally 
seems to have been allowed to decay.63 The Blachernai complex is not well 
documented or excavated; the main sources consist of accounts of court 
ceremonies.64 At its heart was a single tall block containing the imperial 
apartments, an audience chamber and a church, facing a large courtyard 
which housed a chapel, among other structures. There also appears to have 
been an outer courtyard, probably containing many of the service buildings 
                                                 
57 For Philēs, PLP 29809. 
58 For the sources, see Ch.11:15.  
59 PLP 24111; Bénou, Saint-Jean-Prodrome, 205-206, 420-421. 
60 Bénou, Saint-Jean-Prodrome, 5-6 (Bénou’s introduction). 
61 This reasoning is also followed by Mavrommatis, ‘Alexis Raoul’, 159. 
62 Kant. II, 537.23. 
63 C. Mango, ‘The Great Palace’, ODB II, 869-70; Ps-Kod., 237. 
64 However, see the recent area survey in Dark and Özgümüş, Constantinople, 66-82. 
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necessary for the functions of both government and palace.65 The complex, 
which bordered upon the land walls of the city to its west, was fortified in its 
own right: even after Kantakouzēnos’ entry into Constantinople in 1347, the 
Empress continued to defend the palace for several days until she was 
persuaded to surrender.66 Probably only a portion of its total extent was in 
active use in the fourteenth century, a decline which the civil war must have 
accelerated.67 Grēgoras relates that Kantakouzēnos, following his victory, left 
Anna and Iōannēs V in possession of the imperial apartments and occupied 
inferior quarters, which he describes as ‘ruins’.68 
 
11: Kantakouzēnos has previously indicated that the guard of 500 was 
composed of ‘the most trustworthy of his own servants’ and ‘axe-wielding 
Varangians, as many as there were’.69 Blöndal identifies this as the final 
explicit narrative reference to the famous Varangian guard,70 though there 
are a number of fleeting references to Varangians in written sources until the 
fifteenth century.71 A number of different palace guard units are known but 
the Varangians remain the best attested.72 They are not mentioned as a 
battlefield force in the Palaiologan era but continued to serve in ceremonial 
and guard roles.73 Apart from this incident, Kantakouzēnos records their 
                                                 
65 Macrides, et al., Pseudo-Kodinos, 367-78 surveys the available evidence. For further 
detail, particularly regarding the relationship between the two palace complexes, see 
Macrides, ‘Citadel’ and Magdalino, ‘Pseudo-Kodinos' Constantinople’, 1-6.  
66 Kant. II, 611ff; Macrides, ‘Citadel’, 297. 
67 Magdalino, ‘Pseudo-Kodinos' Constantinople’, 5-6. 
68 Greg. II, 783.24-784.10. 
69 Kant. I, 560.10-12: τῶν οἰκετῶν τοὺς πιστοτάτους τῶν ἰδίων περὶ πεντακοσίους τὸν 
ἀριθμὸν καταλιπὼν, καὶ τοὺς τοὺς πελέκυς ἔχοντας βαράγγους ὅσοι ἦσαν. 
70 Blöndal and Benedikz, Varangians, 175. This volume is the standard study of the 
Varangian guard but concentrates on the pre-1204 era. 
71 Bartusis, Army, 273-6. 
72 For these units, and the Varangians during this era, see Bartusis, Army, 271-286. 
73 For ceremonial roles, see summary in Macrides, et al., Pseudo-Kodinos, 97, n. 199. Note, 
however, that Kantakouzēnos writes that it is usual for Varangians to hold the keys to a city 
when the emperor is present, not, as stated, when he is absent. 
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presence at Andronikos III’s coronation and as guarding his residence on 
campaign when he took possession of Nea Phōkaia.74 
 
12: The historical origins of the Albanians are obscure; Greek texts 
only start to mention them in the eleventh century.75 Those migrating into 
Roman controlled lands were largely pastoral; their arrival was not 
welcomed by the settled population, not least owing to their tendency to 
engage in banditry. They were a volatile element in the politics of the region 
in the 13th-15th centuries, courted and feared by those seeking dominance of 
the region.76 In 1333, the leading Albanian clans in Thessaly, whom 
Kantakouzēnos identifies as the Malakasioi, Bouioi and Mesaritai, had 
submitted to Andronikos III.77 Winnifrith suggests that these ‘Albanians’ 
were probably ethnically Vlachs rather than Albanians, pointing out the 
similarity between the names given for their chieftains and Thessalian Vlach 
villages existing in some cases to the present day.78 This hypothesis is 
supported by Kantakouzēnos’ chrysobull of 1342, which refers to Thessaly as 
Βλαχία throughout.79 In 1338, Andronikos III deployed Turkish infantry 
from Aydin against Albanians who had raided Balagrita (Berat), Kanina and 
other towns in the north-west. The Turks defeated the Albanians and 
enslaved many, while the Roman troops helped themselves to prodigious 
quantities of livestock.80 The rebels in Thessaly, whether Albanians or Vlachs, 
either considered Andronikos’ death freed them from their submission or, 
assuming that the government would be in chaos, simply took the 
                                                 
74 Kant. I, 200.11-12, 389.14-16. 
75 O. Pritsak, ‘Albanians’, ODB I, 52-3; Attaleiatēs, History, 542-3. For origins of the name, 
see Pollo and Puto, Albania, 37-40. 
76 For the political role of the Albanians in the area, see Magdalino, ‘Thessaly and Epirus’, 
102-4; Nicol, Despotate, passim. 
77 Kant. I, 474; Nicol, Despotate, 104. 
78 Winnifrith, Vlachs, 120-1. 
79 E.g. Kant. II, 320.3. For this document, see Hunger, ‘Chrysobullos Logos’. 
80 Kant. I, 495-499; Nicol, Despotate, 108-110. 
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opportunity to raid. The harshness of the punitive action taken in 1338 
clearly made a lasting impression, if they withdrew at the threat of a repeat.  
 
13: Thessaly had a complicated political history following 1204. 
Control was continually contested between its own leading men, 
Constantinople, Epiros, and various Latin lordships, particularly the Duchy 
of Athens.81 Andronikos III took advantage of the death of the local dynast 
Stephanos Gabriēlopoulos82 in 1333 to return the region, except the Catalan-
held districts south of Neopatras, to direct imperial control.83 Kantakouzēnos 
makes surprisingly little of such a major success, in contrast to his lengthy 
account of the later annexation of Epiros. This is probably because he played 
only a small part in the proceedings and, moreover, the initiative was taken 
by the then governor of Thessalonike, Michaēl Monomachos, who 
subsequently sided with the regency at the outbreak of the civil war.84 
Monomachos was appointed governor of Thessaly after its acquisition but in 
1342 moved his forces north to Serres to oppose Kantakouzēnos.85 During 
Monomachos’ absence, but after Kantakouzēnos had secured Serbian 
support, a Thessalian delegation requested Kantakouzēnos to rule over 
them.86 He instead appointed Iōannēs Angelos, who ruled the area largely 
independently until his death in 1348.87 Thessaly soon thereafter fell to the 
Serbs, although Kantakouzēnos only mentions this conquest some time after 
the event.88 Kantakouzēnos’ dreams of re-conquest had no realistic chance 
                                                 
81 For Thessaly generally, see Koder and Hild, Hellas. For the post-1204 period 
particularly, see Magdalino, ‘Thessaly and Epirus’; Nicol, Despotate (s.v. Thessaly). 
82 PLP 3435. 
83 Kant. I, 473.12-474.19; Nicol, Despotate, 102-4. 
84 PLP 19306. For his decision to oppose Kantakouzēnos, see Kant. II, 191.16-18. 
85 Kant. II, 228.18-21. 
86 Kant. II, 309.20ff. For this and the following events, see Nicol, Despotate, 125-130. 
87 For Angelos, see Ch.11:18. 
88 Kant. III, 113.23-4, 147.14-16; Soulis, Serbs and Byzantium, 35; Nicol, Despotate, 129. 
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during his reign. However his son-in-law Nikēphoros briefly ruled the area 
again from 1356.89 
 
14: Kantakouzēnos generally refers to the capital as Byzantion, or 
simply polis, ‘the City’. Kōnstantinoupolis is employed rarely, and not at all in 
the present translation, but ‘city of Constantine’ is used somewhat more 
frequently. Information on the condition of Constantinople or the size of its 
population in the early fourteenth century is scant.90 However an estimate of 
around 100,000 residents does not seem implausible.91 The civil war, 
followed by the arrival of the Black Death in 1347 and the progressive 
Turkish conquest of its hinterland from the 1350s unsurprisingly caused 
rapid demographic and economic decline. Accounts from the fifteenth 
century correspondingly describe a declining city scattered with crumbling 
monuments; Tafur’s reflection that ‘[the emperor's Palace] is in such state 
that both it and the city show well the evils which the people have suffered 
and still endure’ is indicative.92 However such later observations have 
tended to overshadow the pre-civil war evidence of a more positive picture. 
Andronikos II’s reign saw a great deal of restoration and construction.93 The 
account of Ibn Battuta, who claims to have visited Constantinople during the 
reign of Andronikos III, while rather confused and clearly exaggerated, 
records an apparently wealthy and impressive metropolis.94 Somewhat 
earlier, probably in the early 1310s, Theodōros Metochitēs produced an 
                                                 
89 For Nikēphoros, see Ch.11:8. 
90 Constantinople’s history is largely inseparable from that of its empire. For a brief 
summary, see Külzer, Ostthrakien, 461-70. For an introduction to the surviving monuments, 
Freely and Çakmak, Istanbul; in more detail, Janin, Constantinople byzantine and DOP 54 
(2000); for the fourteenth century in particular, Magdalino, ‘Pseudo-Kodinos' 
Constantinople’. For a recent archaeological survey, and bibliography, see Dark and 
Özgümüş, Constantinople. 
91 Matschke, ‘Urban Economy’, 465. 
92 Tafur, Travels, 145. 
93 Matschke, ‘Builders and Building’, 315-6. 
94 Ibn Battuta, Travels, 504-514. 
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extended oration, the Byzantios, praising the city and particularly its 
commercial prosperity. Although essentially an encomium, the Byzantios 
must have had some basis in contemporary reality to be accepted as 
anything other than wishful thinking; it reflects Constantinople’s continuing 
commercial vitality even as it recovered from the disastrous rampages of the 
Catalans.95 During the civil war, the capital was the stronghold of the 
regency and the war ceased only when Kantakouzēnos managed to enter the 
city. It is worth noting that, for Kantakouzēnos, Byzantion is distinct from 
Galata, which he views as essentially an independent settlement, occupied 
by ‘Genoese colonists’.96 This is unsurprising in view of the unsuccessful 
wars he fought against them in 1348-9 and 1351-2.97 
 
15: Kantakouzēnos sometimes refers to the cathedral of Hagia Sophia 
simply as ‘the Wisdom of God’.98 During the war, an earthquake caused a 
partial collapse of the cathedral, on 14 May 1346. Reconstruction and 
redecoration were initiated by Anna but continued throughout 
Kantakouzēnos’ reign into the sole reign of Iōannēs V.99 Grēgoras denounces 
Kantakouzēnos at length for allegedly giving money gifted by Russians for 
its repair to pay off Orhan.100 The most detailed descriptions of the cathedral 
during Kantakouzēnos’ lifetime are provided by Russian pilgrims.101 
 
16: Iōannēs XIV Kalekas, Patriarch of Constantinople 1334-1347 (PLP 
10288). Iōannēs Kalekas had lived much of his life in relative obscurity; he 
                                                 
95 See Voudouri, ‘Byzantios’, esp. 113-129. 
96 Kant. I, 476.18: τοῖς κατὰ Γαλατᾶν ἀποίκοις οὖσι Γεννουϊτῶν. 
97 Nicol, Last Centuries, 221-7, 235-7. 
98 E.g., Kant. II, 120.14-15: τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ Σοφίας. 
99 Kant. III, 29.18-30.15 (trans. Miller, Cantacuzenus, 166-7). Several short chronicles record 
the date and the repairs; see CBB II, 265-7. In detail, see Teteriatnikov, ‘Mosaic Program’. 
100 Greg. III, 198.18-200.22. 
101 Majeska, Russian Travelers, 198-236 (translation with commentary). For an introduction 
to the vast modern bibliography, see Mark and Çakmak, Hagia Sophia. 
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was probably born around 1283, as Grēgoras comments that he was almost 
65 when he died.102 He was married and had fathered a son and a daughter; 
after the death of Andronikos III, the former was betrothed to a daughter of 
Alexios Apokaukos103 and the latter married a son of Iōannēs Batatzēs.104 He 
was a priest of undistinguished family from Apros in Thrace who had been 
enrolled among Kantakouzēnos’ oikeioi and subsequently passed by his 
recommendation into the palace clergy.105 Although both historians give the 
impression that he was promoted to Patriarch soon after the death of 
Patriarch Ēsaias, the patriarchal throne appears to have been vacant for 
almost two years, a delay which remains unexplained.106 Kalekas was finally 
appointed in February 1334.107 Kantakouzēnos states that he advised 
Andronikos III to appoint Kalekas as he ‘seemed by nature very suited for 
the holy ministry’.108 Grēgoras praised his memory, clever tongue and 
knowledge of canon and civil law, if not his secular education.109 
Kantakouzēnos omits Grēgoras’ claim that Kalekas was chosen from the 
outset, ‘to be regent and guardian’ of the Empress and children, and that 
they were entrusted to him in a ceremony in Hagia Sophia ‘if something 
unexpected happened to public affairs’.110 The fundamentally political nature 
                                                 
102 Greg. II, 813.14-15. 
103 Kant. II, 108.8-21. 
104 For Batatzēs, see Ch.29:1. 
105 Kant. I, 432.2-10; Greg. I, 496.17-18. 
106 Ēsaias died in May 1332; see CBB I, 79, no. 8/26c, and Schreiner’s commentary, CBB II, 
242. 
107 CBB I, 80, no. 8/28. The sequence of Kantakouzēnos’ narrative implies earlier but this is 
part of the ‘disordered’ section, see Loenertz, ‘Ordre et désordre’, esp. 230. Greg. I, 496, 
places the appointment just before Andronikos’ campaign against Syrgiannēs in 1334, which 
agrees which the chronicle. 
108 Kant. I, 432.3-4: περὶ δὲ τὴν ἱερατικὴν λειτουργίαν μάλιστα δοκοῦντα ἔχειν εὐφυῶς. 
109 Greg. II, 813.18-814.9. 
110 Greg. II, 496.18-23: ᾧ δὴ καὶ ὑπὸ Θεῷ μάρτυρι παραδίδωσι φέρων ἐπὶ μέσου τοῦ 
μεγίστου νεὼ τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ Σοφίας τήν τε σύζυγον δέσποιναν καὶ τὰ τέκνα, ἐπίτροπον 
ἅμα καὶ φύλακα τοῦτον εἶναι μετά γε Θεὸν παρακελευσάμενος ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς, εἴ τί που τῶν 
ἀδοκήτων τοῖς κοινοῖς ἐπισυμβαίη πράγμασι. This act took place in the context of 
Syrgiannēs’ revolt, which was especially threatening owing to his alliance with Serbia (see 
Ch.14:9). Note that the suggestion of Bosch, Andronikos III, 121, that Kalekas was given the 
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of Kalekas’ appointment is however confirmed by Kantakouzēnos’ narration 
of how he tricked and pressured the synod in order to secure Kalekas’ 
election, despite its opposition to selecting a married priest.111 
Kantakouzēnos next mentions him during the two Church councils of 1341, 
in which he naturally played a leading role.112 Following Andronikos III’s 
death, Kalekas clearly believed that he had a legitimate claim and a duty to 
act as regent, which set him on a collision course with Kantakouzēnos. 
During the war, he played a leading role in the regency government; 
Kantakouzēnos says the Empress favoured him as ‘archon of the archons’ and 
Grēgoras that he was her most trusted advisor.113 However, his efforts to 
isolate or remove Kantakouzēnos’ partisans and sympathisers from 
influential positions in the Church rapidly led him into confrontation with 
the prominent theologian and monk Grēgorios Palamas.114 The Patriarch’s 
increasingly divisive efforts to diminish the influence of Palamas and his 
followers, including arrests and imprisonment, produced uproar with which 
neither Apokaukos nor the Empress were comfortable.115 This was not least 
because overt hostility to Palamas came close to overturning the last official 
act of Andronikos III, the June 1341 Church council which had condemned 
Barlaam for heresy and acquitted Palamas. Anna took an increasing interest 
in the debate and vehemently opposed Kalekas’ attempts to raise the leading 
anti-Palamite monk Akindynos to the episcopate in November 1344.116 
                                                                                                                                          
governorship of Constantinople, was convincingly refuted by Matschke, Fortschritt und 
Reaktion, 151-2, n. 121. Nor is there a clear textual basis for Nicol’s assertion that Kalekas 
assumed the same role as regent during Andronikos’ 1340 campaign in Epiros, although it 
may perhaps be inferred from the beginning of Chapter 2; see Nicol, Last Centuries, 187, and 
Nicol, Reluctant Emperor, 47. Nicol, Family, 45, does not make such a claim when discussing 
the same incident. 
111 Kant. I, 431.20-435.20. 
112 Kant. I, 550.8-557.9. 
113 Kant. II, 602.12: ἄρχοντα ἀρχόντων εἶναι; Greg. II, 780.6-10. 
114 For Palamas, see Ch.17:1. 
115 For Kalekas’ struggle to control the Church, see Meyendorff, Palamas, 64-77. 
116 Akindynos, Letters, xxvi-xxviii (Hero’s introduction). 
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Kalekas ignored her objections but, as their relationship soured, she later 
seized the chance offered by complaints against him to hold an investigation 
into his conduct.117 This culminated in Anna placing Kalekas under house-
arrest and assembling a synod of bishops on 2 February 1347.118 It declared 
him deposed him for elevating Akindynos, persecuting Palamas and acting 
contrary to the 1341 Councils.119 Kantakouzēnos entered Constantinople later 
the same night and shortly afterwards offered Kalekas opportunity to refute 
the allegations against him before the synod. He repeatedly refused to 
appear, leading to the renewed confirmation of his deposition in the tomos of 
late February 1347, which recapitulated his offences throughout the war and 
recorded his condemnation.120 Even after this, he continued to conspire and 
Kantakouzēnos, apparently at the request of the bishops, banished him to 
Didymoteichon.121 Within months he was returned to Constantinople, where 
he was confined in the palace – according to Grēgoras because he was 
suspected of fermenting unrest at Didymoteichon, according to 
Kantakouzēnos because he needed medical attention.122 Kalekas died of an 
illness soon after, on 29 December 1347.123 
                                                 
117 Kant. II, 604.2-22; Akindynos, Letters, xxx-xxxi; Meyendorff, Palamas, 78-9. 
118 CBB I, 84, no. 8/46a; 681, no. 113/3. His confinement to his palace apartments is 
reported by Greg. II, 781.18-19. 
119 Meyendorff, ‘Tome Synodal’, esp. lines 355-387. 
120 For all of Kantakouzēnos’ dealings with Kalekas after the war, see Kant. III, 20.20-28.4 
(trans. Miller, Cantacuzenus, 158-164). Miller’s commentary, esp. 256-261, surveys the various 
sources for the final year of Kalekas’ life. For the text of the tomos, see Meyendorff, ‘Tome 
Synodal’ and for Kantakouzēnos’ official support of the synod’s decision, which also 
mentions Kalekas’ failure to testify in his defence, see Rigo, ’Prostagma’. 
121 Kant. III, 24.14-18.  
122 Greg. II, 813.10-14; Kant. III, 24.22-25.3. 
123 CBB I, 106, no 11/3.  
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Commentary on Chapter 2 
1: Kantakouzēnos refers to Andronikos’ sons, Iōannēs (b. 1332) and 
Michaēl (b. 1337), whom he placed under his protection in the palace 
immediately after their father’s death.1  
 
2: Kantakouzēnos here explicitly indicates that the measures apply if 
both he and Andronikos were to die; implicitly he assumes that he is the 
natural defender of the Emperor’s sons in event of the latter’s death, which 
Andronikos does not challenge. Therefore the Patriarch should not be 
involved unless Kantakouzēnos was also off the political stage. 
Kantakouzēnos shows himself as the instigator of this act to demonstrate his 
concern for defending the legitimate succession. 
 
3: Andronikos probably refers to the excommunication incurred by 
his own great-grandfather, Michaēl VIII Palaiologos, who broke a similar 
oath administered by the Patriarch Arsenios for the protection of Iōannēs IV 
Laskaris. Michaēl gradually usurped the young emperor’s prerogatives and 
finally had him blinded on Christmas Day 1261.2 Similarly, Andronikos and 
his followers had been excommunicated for revolt against his grandfather, 
which Kantakouzēnos admits was ineffective.3 Ironically, Kantakouzēnos 
himself would be excommunicated under the measures he proposed here, 
although he then protests bitterly that it was uncanonical.4  
 
                                                 
1 Kant. I, 560.6-14; Greg. II, 576.18-577.4. For Iōannēs, see Ch.2:7. For Michaēl, of whom 
little is known, PLP 21521. 
2 Angold, Government in Exile, 80-93; Shawcross, ‘Palaiologan Usurpation’, esp. 205-7. 
3 Kant. I, 94.3-11. 
4 Kant. II, 190.7-11. The Church did indeed sometimes oppose imperial requests for 
‘political’ excommunications, see Angelov, Ideology, 397-8; Svronos, ‘Serment de fidélité’, 
114-6. 
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4: There were often a large number of bishops and metropolitans in 
Constantinople, especially following the Turkish invasions of Asia Minor. 
The Patriarch Athanasios I (r. 1289-1293, 1303-1311) saw them as a source of 
intrigue and opposition to his authority, famously complaining to 
Andronikos II that they should be sent back to their sees.5  
 
5: The date of this pronouncement is uncertain. Darrouzès suggests 
that it was made towards the end of May 1341, between Andronikos’ return 
from suppressing the revolt in Epiros and his death.6 Parisot favoured early 
1340, before the western campaign.7 This date, or even an earlier year, seems 
more probable; Kantakouzēnos’ argument regarding the possibility of death 
in combat would be more appropriate if a campaign was being planned. 
Moreover, Darrouzès‘ reservations rest on the phrase οὐκ ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ πρὸ 
τῆς τελευτῆς8 and, as discussed in the Introduction, Kantakouzēnos’ 
chronological statements are often very vague.9 It is possible that this is a 
distorted account of Andronikos’ delegation of responsibility to protect the 
imperial family before his 1334 campaign against Syrgiannēs.10 
 
6: Kantakouzēnos here appears to acknowledge that the Patriarch 
possessed some formal responsibility for the protection of Andronikos’ 
children after his death. It is possible the phrase οἷα δὴ τῶν βασιλέως 
παίδων φύλαξ is meant sarcastically but more likely that the Patriarch had 
some form of pastoral responsibility for their upbringing and protection, as 
implied by the preceding discussion of excommunications. Kantakouzēnos 
clearly disapproves of Kalekas’ attempt to expand this into a more general 
                                                 
5 Athanasios, Correspondence, 56-7, ep. 25. 
6 Regestes, 162-3, no. 2208. 
7 Parisot, Cantacuzène, 139. 
8 Kant. II, 16.21. 
9 See above, Section 4.2. 
10 See Ch.1:16. 
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political role; phylax (protector/guardian) is much more general than epitropos 
(governor/regent), which Kantakouzēnos uses to denote legal or political 
responsibility. 
 
7: Iōannēs V Palaiologos, Emperor of the Romans 1341-1391 (PLP 
21485).11 Iōannēs was born on 18 June 1332 and thus nine years old when his 
father died, and only fifteen when the civil war ended.12 He had probably 
already been acclaimed as basileus13 but was eventually crowned on 19 
November 1341, probably as a hasty response to Kantakouzēnos’ 
proclamation on 26 October.14 While both parties in the civil war claimed to 
support Iōannēs’ rights – and issued documents in his name – he is rarely 
mentioned in person, although Apokaukos seems to have made an abortive 
attempt to take him on campaign before Iōannēs fell ill and had to return to 
the capital.15 As part of the eventual peace settlement, Kantakouzēnos 
married his daughter Helenē to Iōannēs, in May 1347,16 and agreed that he 
would hold authority as senior emperor for ten years before handing control 
over to his new son-in-law.17 However Iōannēs was intensely, and not 
unreasonably, suspicious of Matthaios Kantakouzēnos’ ambitions to succeed 
his father and rapidly became a focus for political discontent against 
Kantakouzēnos. His repeated struggles against both Matthaios and his father 
are a major theme of Book IV of the Histories and led to his own temporary 
deposition in 1353 and subsequently to Kantakouzēnos’ abdication in 1354. 
                                                 
11 Papadopulos, Palaiologen, 46-47, no. 73.  
12 Greg. I 482.1-3; CBB II, 242. Greg. II, 791.20-21, errs in stating he was sixteen. 
13 See Ch.9:5. 
14 Kant. II, 218.2f.; Greg. II, 616.7-16. For the date, Greg. II, 616.11-12; CBB II, 253-4. For the 
address of the Patriarch on either the coronation or the following public acclamation on 24 
December (Greg. II, 616.16-617.6), see Joannou, ‘Unedierte Rede’. 
15 Kant. II, 432.20-23. Kantakouzēnos probably mentions this incident to show he did not 
take the field against Iōannēs V in person. 
16 Kant. III, 29.15-18. The exact day is uncertain, see Schreiner’s commentary, CBB II, 271. 
17 Kant. II, 614.14-20; III, 9.13-14. 
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By 1356 he had finally put paid to Matthaios’ ambitions too.18 Iōannēs’ own 
reign would however be no more successful than his predecessor’s. To halt 
the rapid Turkish advance in Europe, Iōannēs made repeated but only 
marginally successful attempts to solicit western aid. These led to his 
personal conversion to Roman Catholicism in October 1369. His ultimate 
lack of success led to formal submission to the Ottomans and contributed to 
his temporary usurpation by his eldest son Andronikos IV (1376-1379) and 
grandson Iōannēs VII (1390). Iōannēs V died in February 1391.19 
The portrayal of the young emperor in the Histories presented a 
dilemma for Kantakouzēnos, who maintained throughout the war that he 
supported Iōannēs’ right to eventually succeed to the throne. At the time of 
composition, Iōannēs was the ruling emperor and Kantakouzēnos’ own son-
in-law. However, Iōannēs had also routinely broken agreements and his 
continual revolts against the tutelage of his father-in-law severely 
undermined the latter part of Kantakouzēnos’ reign. Whatever his true 
feelings, Kantakouzēnos remains largely complimentary towards Iōannēs 
and attempts to explain away the more bitter insults as the actions of 
subordinates or the result of misunderstandings.20 While the struggle with 
the regency is always a ‘war’ (polemos), the conflict with Iōannēs is 
characterised as a ‘disagreement’ or ‘quarrel’ (diaphora).21 However he does 
not always conceal his frustration with the younger man’s behaviour or 
policies and may have dared some back-handed compliments.22 
                                                 
18 For his conflicts with Matthaios, see Ch.22:3. 
19 CBB II, 345. For his reign, see Nicol, Last Centuries, 253-295. The main monograph on 
his reign remains Halecki, Empereur. 
20 E.g., Kant. III, 268.16-269.6. 
21 E.g., Kant. III, 8.9, 364.6. 
22 E.g., Kant. III, 9.17-19: οὐ μόνον γὰρ εἶδος ἄξιον ἐπεδείκνυτο τυραννίδος, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
πρὸς ἀνδρίαν καὶ σύνεσιν οὐκ ἀγεννεῖς ὑπέφαινεν ἐλπίδας (’For not only did he display 
an appearance worthy of a ruler, but also in regard to his courage and intelligence he gave 
no cause for ignoble expectations’). The tone is positive but the choice of τυραννίδος is odd, 
given that Kantakouzēnos uses it only in its negative sense elsewhere. 
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8: From Antiquity a child was considered to be someone under the 
age of fourteen, which marked the onset of puberty and the opportunity to 
be legally married (although in fact the law recognised girls as reaching 
marriageable age at twelve). Following legal tradition, the law maintained 
that full adulthood, for both genders, began at twenty-five. Below this age 
children remained under paternal authority unless they set up an 
independent household or were formally emancipated.23 The reality was 
more blurred, as actions such as marrying, taking monastic vows or joining 
the military effectively ended childhood.24 However, the legal definition may 
have informed Kantakouzēnos’ peace settlement with Iōannēs V in 1347, 
when the latter was fifteen: ‘they would respect each other with the goodwill 
appropriate both to a father and a son; the younger would submit to the 
older in all matters and allow him control for ten years on account of his 
youth.’25 Kantakouzēnos was effectively claiming not just de facto but also de 
jure guardianship over Iōannēs, by virtue of the marriage of the junior 
emperor to his daughter. 
 
9: The diplomatic crisis with Bulgaria is known only from 
Kantakouzēnos. The struggles for the Bulgarian throne which led to this 
incident were detailed in Book II, hence his lack of explanation here.26  
 
10: Kantakouzēnos consistently refers to the ruler of the Bulgarians as 
basileus, a title which he otherwise reserves for the Roman monarch. It is 
therefore translated as ‘emperor’ throughout, in contrast to scholarly 
                                                 
23 Prinzing, ‘Childhood’, esp. 16-23. 
24 J. Herrin, A. Kazhdan and A. Cutler, ‘Childhood’, ODB I, 420-21. 
25 Kant. II, 614.16-19: ἀλλήλοις εὐνοεῖν τὴν προσήκουσαν εὔνοιαν πατράσι καὶ παισὶ 
πρὸς ἑκατέρους· ὑπείκειν δὲ τὸν νέον τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ κατὰ πάντα καὶ τοῦ πράττειν 
αὐτῷ παραχωρεῖν ἐπὶ δέκα ἔτεσι διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν. 
26 Kant. I, 430.16-21, 458.17-459.4. 
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custom.27 Nicol’s assertion that Bulgarian monarchs in the Histories ‘had to be 
content to be known as the Tsars of the Mysians’ is baseless.28 Page has 
observed that, in 1,400 uses of the word basileus, Kantakouzēnos refers to 
Roman rulers 98% of the time, with most of the remaining instances 
applying to the Bulgarian ruler.29 Kantakouzēnos in one instance even refers 
to himself and Alexander together as ‘the emperors’.30 He seems simply to 
have ignored any claims by successive Bulgarian rulers to exercise 
sovereignty over the Romans.31 Yet the more powerful Serbian ruler is 
always designated as kralēs, emphatically denying legitimacy to Dušan’s 
proclamation of himself as basileus of the Romans and Serbs in late 1345.32 
While Grēgoras accorded the title basileus to the sovereigns of 
Constantinople and Trebizond, he generally avoided its application to 
Bulgarians and Serbs. Page found the difference between the two historians 
‘hard to explain’.33 The difference was also noted by Djurić who believed 
Kantakouzēnos followed diplomatic niceties but held an ‘unfavourable and 
ironic attitude’ to using the title.34 This assertion, however, cannot be clearly 
substantiated by reference to the text. The most likely explanation is found 
not in political theory, but in Kantakouzēnos’ marriage into the Asanēs 
                                                 
27 Fatouros and Krischer always translate basileus, in relation to Bulgarian monarchs, as 
‘König’ or ‘Zar’, Cousin employed ‘roi’ rather than ‘empereur’, and Pontanus ‘rex’ instead of 
‘imperator’.  
28 Nicol, Reluctant Emperor, 164. It may be observed that the supposed unique application 
of the title of basileus is upheld more consistently by modern historians than by the Romans 
themselves. 
29 Page, Being Byzantine, 156. However Kantakouzēnos does use βασιλεύς in its general 
sense as ‘king’ on occasion, e.g., Kant. II, 53.13-14: μείζοσι καὶ περιφανεστέροις τῶν παρ´ 
ἑκάστοις ἔθνεσι βασιλεῦσιν ἢ δυνάσταις οὖσι. 
30 Kant. II, 182.21-22: βουλομένων δὲ τῶν βασιλέων καὶ ἀλλήλοις συνελθεῖν. 
31 Soulis, Serbs and Byzantium, 28-9.  
32 Kant. II, 552.1-2; Greg. II, 747.1-2; also see Soulis, Serbs and Byzantium, 28-30. Dušan 
actually signed himself βασιλεὺς Ῥωμανίας rather than Ῥωμαιῶν in his Greek documents 
but his intent to supplant the Roman emperor was undisguised; see Oikonomides, ‘Emperor 
of the Romania’. 
33 Page, Being Byzantine, 156. Grēgoras does however employ the title on occasion, e.g., 
Greg. II, 596.15: Ἀλεξάνδρου, τοῦ τῶν Μυσῶν βασιλέως. 
34 Djurić, ‘Titles’, 36. 
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dynasty, which supplied many of the monarchs of the Second Bulgarian 
Empire. His intention is therefore more likely to be subtle self-
aggrandisement rather than deliberate validation of the equal status of 
Bulgarian rulers. There is an emperor of the Romans (basileus tōn Rhōmaiōn) 
and emperor of the Mysians (basileus tōn Mysōn); Kantakouzēnos ignores any 
ideological ramifications in favour of reminding the reader that he is related 
to monarchs, through both his own descent from the Palaiologoi and 
through his wife, thereby buttressing his own claim on the imperial office 
and flattering the Asanai, many of whom were his partisans. Kantakouzēnos 
later has Apokaukos tell Andronikos Asanēs that his lineage qualifies him to 
rule.35 
 
11: ‘Mysians’ is the standard classicising term for Bulgarians. Despite 
close cultural ties and occasional long periods of peace, Roman-Bulgarian 
relations were generally characterised by mistrust and opportunism; political 
instability in one state posed strong temptations to the other. The Bulgarian 
state was not as formidable as it had been in the aftermath of the Fourth 
Crusade as, for roughly a century following 1242, the Tatars on its north-
eastern border often intervened in its affairs, sometimes with the 
encouragement of Constantinople.36 Michael VIII and Andronikos II 
attempted to keep friendly candidates on the Bulgarian throne and to annex 
choice territories, with occasional success. In 1305, Tsar Teodor Svetoslav 
took advantage of the Catalan crisis to seize territory in northern Thrace. He 
accepted peace in 1308 in exchange for recognition of his conquests and the 
hand of Michaēl IX’s oldest daughter, Theodōra, then aged only twelve.37 
                                                 
35 Kant. II, 115.14-19 
36 Vásáry, Cumans and Tatars, 69-98. For the Tatars, see also Ch.2:21. For a general, if 
imprecise, narrative history of Bulgaria, see Fine, Late Medieval Balkans, 170-184, 195-199, 224-
230, 268-274. Also see Bosch, Andronikos III, 53-77. 
37 Laiou, Andronicus II, 170-1. For Svetoslav, see PLP 27251; for Theodōra, see Ch.2:18. 
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Svetoslav died in 1322 and was succeeded by his son, Georgij II Terter, who 
had previously seized Philippopolis during the early phase of the war 
between the Andronikoi.38 Terter, probably encouraged by his earlier 
success, launched another attack; Andronikos III, then temporarily at peace 
with his grandfather, responded by defeating him.39 Terter then died 
childless, having reigned only months, and a number of cities, probably with 
large Greek-speaking populations, revolted in favour of the Romans. 
Andronikos took advantage by invading while sending a Bulgarian exile to 
seize the throne. To repel this onslaught, in 1323 Bulgarian nobles elected 
Michael Šišman as Tsar, who counter-attacked and reclaimed the lost 
ground, apart from the city of Philippopolis. Peace was eventually agreed, 
on condition of Michael putting aside his Serbian wife, Anna-Neda, and 
marrying Svetoslav’s widow, Theodōra.40 Andronikos III tried to carry their 
alliance further through an agreement against his grandfather on 13 May 
132741 but was confounded when Michael double-crossed him the following 
year and sent assistance to Andronikos II. Michael was eventually persuaded 
to withdraw, ensuring Andronikos III’s final victory over his grandfather.42 
In June 1328, Michael launched another incursion, which was soon checked 
and led to a new peace.43 Michael, on bad terms with Dečanski after having 
renounced marriage to his sister, then recruited Andronikos for a joint attack 
against their mutual competitor, Serbia. While Andronikos attacked 
northwards from Macedonia, Michael struck west from Bulgaria. However 
                                                 
38 Kant. I, 169.20-170.14; for Georgij, see PLP 27586. 
39 Kant. I, 170.15-171.7. 
40 Kant. I, 172-187. Kantakouzēnos does not provide a date for the marriage and there is 
considerable debate concerning this, with suggestions varying between 1323 and 1326. For 
details, see Van Dieten, Gregoras II, 190-192, n. 191. 
41 Kant. I, 207.20f. Kantakouzēnos plays down the significance of this meeting; Greg. I, 
390.8-392.6, is explicit that they made an alliance against Andronikos II, as is the chronicle 
which records the date, CBB I, 78, no. 8/18. 
42 Kant. I, 288.2-17, 294.14-300.5. 
43 Kant. I, 323.6-329.2, 340.18-341.4. 
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his army was completely overwhelmed when it was confronted by Dečanski 
at Velbužd, in July 1330.44 The battle led to Michael’s death and Dečanski, 
although refraining from any territorial annexations, insisted on the 
restoration of Michael’s first wife and their eldest son to the throne. 
Andronikos III took the deposition and banishment of Theodōra as a casus 
belli and seized extensive territories from Bulgaria in late 1330.45  
 
12: Ivan Alexander Asanēs/Stracimir (PLP 91374).46 Ivan Alexander 
was the son of the Bulgarian noble Stracimir and a nephew of Michael III 
Šišman, and rose to power in early 1331 through the support of leading 
courtiers, who deposed Ivan Šišman and his mother in Alexander’s favour.47 
He restored relations with Serbia by marrying his sister Helena to the new 
Kral, Dušan.48 Shortly after his accession, Alexander embarked on a 
campaign which succeeded in re-taking the territories seized by Andronikos 
III the previous year. Andronikos’ counter-attack ended in defeat at 
Rhōsokastron on 18 July 1331, where Kantakouzēnos depicts Alexander as 
behaving treacherously by attacking after having agreed a peace treaty.49 A 
new treaty was then agreed, and Andronikos was forced to accept a 
marriage alliance between Alexander’s heir, Michael, and one of his 
daughters, although it was only concluded some years later.50 Roman-
Bulgarian relations thereafter remained irenic until Andronikos’ death. 
                                                 
44 Kant. I, 428.4-431.14; Greg. I, 454.7-456.7. 
45 Kant. I, 430.15-431.20. 
46 For his Asenid heritage, see Božilov, ‘Asen’. He is also named Asanēs in patriarchal 
records, e.g., Register II, 544. 
47 Kant. I, 458.17-459.4; Greg. I, 457.16-458.12.  
48 Soulis, Serbs and Byzantium, 3. 
49 Kant. I, 464.12-470.13; Greg. I, 483.21-488.20; Vásáry, Cumans and Tatars, 130-31; for 
summary of the agreements, Kaiserurkunden IV, 147, no. 2776-2779. 
50 Kant. I, 508.16-509.8; Greg. I, 546.16-21. Exactly when this wedding took place is 
uncertain as Grēgoras implies 1339 and Kantakouzēnos 1337 or 1338. Moreover, 
Kantakouzēnos consistently calls the bride Maria while Greg. III, 557.20-23, calls her Eirēnē. 
It is possible she was renamed on subsequent remarriage. For both issues, see FK II, 192, n. 
105 and 239, n. 305, and esp. Kydōnēs, Letters, I.2, 560-562, n. 6 (Tinnefeld’s commentary). 
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During the civil war, both parties vied for Bulgarian support. Alexander’s 
first intervention, prompted by regency loyalists in Adrianople, gained him 
nothing but intimidated Kantakouzēnos’ sympathisers in northern Thrace 
into abandoning his cause.51 In 1342, Eirēnē Kantakouzēnē asked Ivan to 
break the regency’s siege of Didymoteichon, promising rewards on her 
husband’s return from Serbia or possession of the city if he died. As 
Kantakouzēnos observes, this gave Alexander good reason to actively 
prevent his return and Alexander effectively joined the siege before being 
chased off by Umur of Aydin.52 The regency secured Alexander’s formal 
support in 1344, in exchange for transferring nine cities and their garrisons to 
him, including Philippopolis. However, he refused to attack Kantakouzēnos 
until his Turkish allies left Thrace.53 Although Alexander subsequently 
invaded Morrha, he retreated when Kantakouzēnos attacked and signed a 
truce.54 However, Alexander’s gains during the war encouraged him to 
consistently present himself thereafter as tsar ‘of the Bulgarians and 
Greeks’.55 Despite the apparent cultural and economic flourishing of 
Alexander’s reign, Bulgaria was militarily weak and suffered badly from 
Turkish raids. As the Turks had to cross Thrace or sail via the Bosporus, 
Alexander suspected Kantakouzēnos either encouraged them or did very 
little to prevent them, despite his protests.56 Kantakouzēnos attributes 
Alexander’s military support for Iōannēs V in 1352 to this suspicion, 
although Bulgarian forces retreated without fighting when confronted by an 
Ottoman army.57 Kantakouzēnos asked Alexander to subsidise naval forces 
                                                 
51 See Chapter 29. 
52 Kant. II, 337.4-344.10. 
53 Kant. II, 406.12-407.13. 
54 Kant. II, 420.18-21, 426.20-427.21. 
55 Djurić, ‘Titles’, 32-33; Obolensky, Commonwealth, 245-247; Soulis, Serbs and Byzantium, 
29. 
56 Kant. II, 530.14-20; III, 162.13-163.9.  
57 Kant. III, 246.24-250.4. 
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to patrol the Hellespont but, after initial enthusiasm, he refused. 
Kantakouzēnos proclaimed that Alexander would regret his decision and 
that the Turks would ruin his affairs.58 Kantakouzēnos is otherwise 
surprisingly respectful of Alexander in the Histories, despite their frequent 
clashes. Even the failure of the naval venture is attributed to the interference 
of Dušan. As Alexander did not die until 1371, it may be that Kantakouzēnos 
continued to see him as a possible ally to the Empire and was wary of any 
overt criticisms reaching his ears. 
 
13: Šišman (PLP 25403). A son of Michael III Šišman by his first wife, 
Anna. Confusion over the identity of this son has been compounded by 
Kantakouzēnos identifying him only by surname. Many scholars identify the 
fugitive as Ivan Stefan Šišman,59 Michael III Šišman’s heir and who was 
briefly in power after his death, under the supervision of his mother Anna. 
However no evidence is provided to support this identification and 
Kantakouzēnos states that Ivan/Iōannēs returned to Serbia with his mother, 
while ‘Sismanos’ went to the ‘Scyths’ (Tatars) before later travelling to 
Constantinople.60 Furthermore, a ‘Despot Michael, son of Tsar Michael’ is 
known from an Old Church Slavonic inscription on a painting in the church 
of Donja Kamenica, now in Serbia. This has been convincingly interpreted as 
referring to a homonymous son of Michael III Šišman, who may have ruled 
in nearby Vidin or simply possessed the title by virtue of being the son of a 
Bulgarian basileus.61 As Kantakouzēnos implies that there were only two 
                                                 
58 Kant. III, 163.9-166.2. 
59 For example, Fine, Late Medieval Balkans, 293; Soulis, Serbs and Byzantium, 11; Laurent, 
‘L’assaut avorté’, 156; Lemerle, Aydin, 136, n. 2. 
60 Kant. II, 19.23-20.1: ἡ μὲν τὸν ἕτερον ἔχουσα τῶν υἱῶν Ἰωάννην, πρὸς Κράλην 
ἐπανῆκε τὸν ἀδελφόν, Σίσμανος δὲ ὁ λοιπὸς τῶν παίδων, εἰς Σκύθας ᾤχετο φυγάς. 
61 Kiel, ‘Donja Kamenica’. For Vidin and its links to the Šišman family, see Ch.7:1. 
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sons,62 certain scholars have accepted that this Michael Šišman is 
Kantakouzēnos’ ‘Sismanos’.63 Others have assumed that ‘Sismanos’ is a third, 
otherwise unknown, son.64 This apparently rests on the assumption that the 
Michael attested at Donja Kamenica must have been ruling Vidin in this 
period, as the city’s status is otherwise unknown. On the basis of 
Kantakouzēnos’ testimony that Tsar Šišman had only two sons with his first 
wife and his own threat to send ‘Sismanos’ to Vidin,65 it appears that the 
most likely identification of ‘Sismanos’ is in fact the younger Michael Šišman 
and that Vidin was under the control of Ivan Alexander. The reasons for 
Šišman’s move to Constantinople at this time are unknown but it is possibly 
connected to Özbek Khan’s death in the same year.66 If Šišman had ever 
sought to win the Golden Horde’s support to gain the Bulgarian throne, aid 
had clearly not been forthcoming. Özbek’s successor may have withdrawn 
protection, forcing the fugitive to flee again. Whatever Šišman’s intentions 
were, he is not attested again and his fate can only be guessed at. It is 
unlikely Ivan Alexander felt seriously threatened; the request for his 
extradition was probably an attempt to test the Empire’s strength after 
Andronikos’ death. 
 
14: Michael III Šišman, Tsar of Bulgaria 1323-1330 (PLP 91377).67 
Michael had succeeded his father as ruler of Vidin; Kantakouzēnos states he 
was of Bulgarian and Cuman descent but incorrectly identifies his father as 
                                                 
62 Kant. I, 19.23-20.1: ἡ μὲν τὸν ἕτερον ἔχουσα τῶν υἱῶν Ἰωάννην, πρὸς Κράλην 
ἐπανῆκε τὸν ἀδελφὸν, Σίσμανος δὲ ὁ λοιπὸς τῶν παίδων. 
63 E.g., Bosch, Andronikos III, 81-2; Nicol, Last Centuries, 188. 
64 E.g., PLP 25403; FK III, 415-6, n. 17. 
65 Kant. II, 55.2-6; see Chapter 7. 
66 Vásáry, Cumans and Tatars, 133. 
67 His political career is outlined above, Ch.2:11. 
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Stracimir, who was actually father of Ivan Alexander.68 Following his defeat 
at Velbužd, he was captured and died of his wounds four days later.69  
 
15: Anna-Neda, Tsarina of Bulgaria 1330-1331. A daughter of the Kral 
Stefan Uroš II Milutin70 and sister of Stefan Dečanski. She married Michael 
Šišman while he was still ruling Vidin.71 Michael divorced her, in favour of 
Theodōra, shortly after becoming Tsar but following his death she was 
restored to the throne at Dečanski’s command, probably in late July or 
August 1330.72 Despite her eldest son, Ivan Stefan, being crowned as Tsar, 
Kantakouzēnos regards her as the true ruler of Bulgaria; she seems to have 
acted as regent. She fled after being deposed by a conspiracy of Bulgarian 
nobles early in the following year.73 The turmoil of Dečanski’s usurpation in 
Serbia at that time precluded Serbian intervention in her favour. She is not 
mentioned again after her flight. 
 
16: Stefan Uroš III Dečanski, Kral of Serbia 1321-1331 (PLP 21181).74 
Dečanski had himself been previously been exiled to Constantinople 
following an unsuccessful rebellion against his father.75 The early years of his 
reign were taken up with civil war against his brother and cousin.76 His 
second wife was a daughter of Iōannēs Palaiologos, a nephew of Andronikos 
                                                 
68 Kant. I, 175.12-14. 
69 Greg. I, 456.2-5. Kant. I, 430.2-4, is characteristically less precise and states that he 
survived only a short while after being captured. Some Serbian sources record he died on 
the battlefield, see FK II, 202, n. 146; Hafner, Serbisches Mittelalter, 179. 
70 PLP 21184. 
71 Vásáry, Cumans and Tatars, 107. Anna is not named in the Greek sources but is known 
from Serbian texts. 
72 Kant. I, 430.15-21; Hafner, Serbisches Mittelalter, 239-40.  
73 Kant. I, 458.17-21.  
74 The most detailed source on his life is the laudatory biography by the anonymous 
continuer of Danilo II, see Hafner, Serbisches Mittelalter, 205-258.  
75 The dates are not securely known but 1314-21 are most commonly accepted; see Soulis, 
Serbs and Byzantium, 161, n. 5. 
76 Fine, Late Medieval Balkans, 262-5. 
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II, who sought Dečanski’s support for creating a separate domain carved out 
of Roman Macedonia, a project cut short by Palaiologos’ death.77 Dečanski 
also intervened, albeit with little effect, in the last phase of the first civil war 
in favour of Andronikos II, before finally deciding not to take sides.78 He did 
however use the opportunity provided by the conflict to make some 
territorial gains, including the city of Prosek in 1328.79 Later, he attempted to 
take Ochrid, but was repulsed by Andronikos III.80 Kantakouzēnos 
subsequently justified Andronikos’ decision to side with Michael Šišman 
against Dečanski as an ‘opportunity to take satisfaction from the Triballi who 
had wronged the Romans’.81 Although Dečanski’s crushing victory at 
Velbužd put an end to any Bulgarian threat to Serbia for good, it brought 
him little joy; he was deposed shortly after by a conspiracy of nobles and his 
eldest son from his first marriage, Stefan Dušan. Dečanski was imprisoned, 
and then murdered.82  
 
17: The Triballi are the Serbs.83 Serbia was recognised as an 
independent kingdom by the papacy in 1217; although predominantly 
Orthodox, there were significant Latin communities and influence in the 
north and west. The arrival of the Tatars in the 1240s devastated its powerful 
neighbours, Hungary and Bulgaria, and afforded the Serbian state greater 
independence. Although the transfer of power was often protracted and 
violent, the Serbian kingdom gradually expanded, greatly assisted by the 
                                                 
77 PLP 21479. For the plot, Kant. I, 209f; Bosch, Andronikos III, 39-41. 
78 Kant. I, 278-284. Also see the involvement of Chrelja, Ch.11:15. 
79 Kant. I, 285.10-11. 
80 Kant. I, 427.18-428.3. 
81 Kant. I, 428.10-11: καιρὸν εἶναι δίκας παρὰ Τριβαλῶν λαβεῖν ὧν ἠδίκησαν 
Ῥωμαίους. 
82 Greg. I, 456.7-457.11. For the Serbian sources, see Van Dieten, Gregoras II, 327, n. 318. 
For Dušan, see Ch.12:1. 
83 For Serbia in this period, see Ćirković, Serbs, 34-76; Fine, Late Medieval Balkans, 217-224, 
255-275, 286-292, 296-307, 309-312; Soulis, Serbs and Byzantium; Βυζάντιο καὶ Σερβὶα. 
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intensification of silver mining in its territory, allowing the crown to pay for 
significant numbers of foreign mercenaries to supplement or confront its 
own belligerent aristocracy.84 Regular Serbian incursions into Macedonia 
while Andronikos II was preoccupied with other borders led him to consent 
to the scandalous marriage of his five year-old daughter Simōnis to Kral 
Milutin in 1299 and the concession of extensive western territories.85 Milutin 
ended hostilities and subsequently provided some assistance against the 
Catalans and their Turkish allies.86 Somewhat later, Milutin lent 2,000 Cuman 
soldiers to Andronikos, although he was eager for their return by 1321.87 
Despite such occasional cooperation, the Serbian crown remained a tempting 
– and welcoming – source of patronage for Roman defectors; Kantakouzēnos 
admits freely that he and Andronikos III sought Milutin’s aid before 
revolting against Andronikos II, even though their agreement was never 
activated.88 Similarly, loyalists of Andronikos II who fled from Andronikos 
III’s advances in the west went to Dečanski and attempted to persuade him 
to side with them. After he declined to intervene, they took possession of 
various fortresses in Macedonia, some of which he subsequently took over.89 
Syrgiannēs and later Kantakouzēnos himself would receive Serbian soldiers 
to pursue their own goals.90 Serbia would be the most obvious immediate 
beneficiary of the 1341-7 civil war but its gains should be seen as part of an 
established policy of exploiting political differences in the Empire rather 
than an indication of overwhelming economic or military strength. 
 
                                                 
84 Kantakouzēnos repeatedly reports German mercenaries in Serbian service: Kant. I, 
429.17 (300 knights); II, 354.13-15; III, 120.16-17. 
85 Laiou, Andronicus II, 93-100; Fine, Late Medieval Balkans, 222-3. For Milutin, PLP 21184. 
86 Laiou, Andronicus II, 221-2, 232-3; Oikonomides, ‘Serbs in Asia Minor’. 
87 Kant. I, 35.17-36.1. 
88 Kant. I, 36.1-37.3. In any case, Milutin died soon after. 
89 Kant. I, 274.23-285.23. 
90 See Ch.14:9 and Ch.12:1. 
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18: Theodōra Palaiologina, Tsarina of Bulgaria 1308-1330 (PLP 
21379).91 Oldest daughter of Michaēl IX and elder sister of Andronikos III. 
She was married in 1308, aged twelve, to the Bulgarian Tsar, Svetoslav. She 
remained in Bulgaria after the death of her first husband but after the death 
of her second, Michael, she was exiled with her children and returned to 
Constantinople in 1330.92 She then became the nun Theodosia; in this role she 
attended to Kantakouzēnos’ mother after her imprisonment. Following the 
latter’s death in January 1342, Theodosia denounced the cruelty and 
inhumanity of her imprisonment to the Empress.93 She is not attested 
thereafter. 
 
19: Ivan Stefan, Tsar of Bulgaria 1330-1331 (PLP 8762). The oldest son 
of Michael III Šišman and Anna-Neda. He occupied the throne briefly, 
apparently under his mother’s authority, before fleeing to Serbia with her. 
Little else is known about him for certain. He and his father are 
commemorated in the Bulgarian additions to the Synodikon of Orthodoxy.94 
 
20: ‘Kral’ is Serbian for ‘king’. Kantakouzēnos also occasionally refers 
to Serbian rulers as archōn or despotēs.95 In contrast to his treatment of 
Bulgarian monarchs,96 Kantakouzēnos avoids the title basileus, refusing to 
legitimise the rule of Serbian monarchs over former Roman territory. 
 
                                                 
91 Papadopulos, Palaiologen, 45, no. 71, is rendered obsolete by Dölger, ‘Theodora’, but 
note that he mistakes Andronikos III’s mother, Rita-Maria, for Kantakouzēnos’ mother, 
Theodōra, at 229-30. 
92 Kant. I, 430.18-19; Greg. I, 457.18-19, claims she only just escaped with her life.  
93 Kant. II, 222.14-223.5. See also Ch.9:18. 
94 Petkov, Voices, 256; Gouillard, ‘Synodikon of Orthodoxy’. 
95 E.g., Kant. I, 35.17; II, 240.13-14. 
96 See above, Ch.2:10. 
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21: The ‘Scyths’ are the Tatars of the Golden Horde.97 The Khans had 
intervened in contests for the Bulgarian throne on previous occasions, as 
Bulgaria was usually a tributary.98 It was therefore logical for Šišman to seek 
their support against Ivan Alexander, although clearly he was unsuccessful. 
Kantakouzēnos asserts that ‘the Scythians from Hyperborea are almost 
countless in number and they are the strongest of all nations’.99 While this 
appears to be a classicising topos, the Tatars were indeed able to mobilise 
much larger forces than any of the Balkan powers, who remained justly wary 
of them. The Tatars first entered the Balkans in 1242, ravaging Bulgaria and 
forcing it into some form of submission. Their relations with Michaēl VIII 
changed from initial hostility to close alliance sealed by diplomatic 
marriage.100 By the fourteenth century, relations had cooled; Kantakouzēnos 
states that they raided Bulgaria and as far as Adrianople in 1320, and then, in 
the following year, overran most of Thrace although causing little damage. 
In 1324, an army he implausibly estimates at 120,000 invaded and 
comprehensively plundered Thrace for 40 days. Following engagements led 
by Andronikos III and Kantakouzēnos, they eventually retreated. He records 
but denies the rumour that the Tatars were summoned by Andronikos II to 
weaken his grandson.101 Units of Tatars regularly appear as allies in 
Bulgarian armies, and were instrumental in Ivan Alexander’s victory over 
Andronikos III at Rhōsokastron.102 Andronikos attempted to maintain good 
relations with the Golden Horde and apparently married an illegitimate 
                                                 
97 For an outline of Tatar political entanglements in the Balkans, although marred by 
minor inaccuracies in regards to the Greek sources, see Vásáry, Cumans and Tatars, 69-133.  
98 Vásáry, Cumans and Tatars, 79-84, 86-96. 
99 Kant. I, 188.2-4: τὸ δὲ ἐξ Ὑπερβορέων Σκυθικὸν πλήθει τε ἀναρίθμητον σχεδὸν ὂν 
καὶ δυνατώτατον τῶν ἑκασταχοῦ ἐθνῶν.  
100 Vásáry, Cumans and Tatars, 69-85. Kant. II, 188.6-19 alludes to the success of the 
diplomatic approach without naming individuals. 
101 Kant. I, 188.19-193.17. Although other Greek sources are silent, the extent of 
destruction was remarked on in Italy: see Laiou, Andronicus II, 291. 
102 E.g., Kant. I, 294, 323, 459. 
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daughter to Özbek Khan.103 Despite this, Grēgoras reports a major incursion 
reached the Hellespont in 1337, plundering Thrace for 50 days and taking (a 
wildly exaggerated) 300,000 prisoners.104 The cause of the attack was a failure 
to pay tribute: ‘the Romans neglected to send the customary gifts to the chief 
of the Scyths and the nobles around him’.105 A letter by Akindynos reveals 
that a Tatar conquest was planned in 1341.106 The invasion was averted by a 
diplomatic mission headed by Dēmētrios Kydōnēs’ father, sent before 
Andronikos’ death.107 The success of this mission may however have been 
overstated as a final incursion into Thrace occurred in 1342, although it 
apparently achieved little as the land was already laid to waste and, with the 
exception of one town, the population took refuge within fortifications.108 It 
is unknown if either of the warring parties called for Tatar intervention but it 
may simply be that the demands of the civil war would have again halted 
tribute payments. After this attack, the Tatars appear not to have directly 
intervened in Roman affairs again and, as emperor, Kantakouzēnos records 
no dealings with them. 
 
22: Ivan Alexander was reminding the Romans of the peace treaty 
agreed following the Battle of Rhōsokastron, presumably by sending a copy 
of the agreement and the guarantee sworn to support it.109 Oaths were an 
accepted way for foreign states to guarantee their agreements and were often 
                                                 
103 The existence of an unnamed imperial bride is attested by Ibn Battuta, Travels, 488, 
who gives her the Turkish name Bayalūn, and by Akindynos, Letters, 57, ep. 12. For 
demonstration that she was an illegitimate daughter of Andronikos III, see Laurent, 
‘L’assaut avorté’, 147-8. 
104 Greg. I, 535.11-536.8; Vásáry, Cumans and Tatars, 131-2. Kantakouzēnos is silent 
concerning this event. 
105 Greg. I, 536.3-4: Ῥωμαῖοι πέμπειν ἠμέλησαν τὰ εἰθισμένα δῶρα τῷ τε τῶν Σκυθῶν 
ἡγεμόνι καὶ τοῖς περὶ αὐτὸν εὐγενέσιν. 
106 Akindynos, Letters, 56-61, ep. 12. 
107 Loenertz, ‘Notes’, 162-6. Regarding Kydōnēs senior (PLP 13874) and his mission, see 
Saint-Guillain, ‘Manouèl Kydônès’; Laurent, ‘L’assaut avorté’. 
108 Kant. II, 302.13-305.1. Surprisingly this incursion goes unmentioned by Grēgoras. 
109 See above, Ch.2:12.  
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regarded by contemporaries as more powerful than the treaty itself.110 
Although imperial ideology had previously dictated that emperors did not 
bind themselves with oaths, this prohibition began to crumble in the 
thirteenth century111 and it became common practice; Kantakouzēnos 
explicitly states that oaths were exchanged by Alexander and Andronikos III 
at Rhōsokastron, ‘according to custom’.112 
 
23: It is unclear whether such an assembly of senators was entirely ad 
hoc or an established, if irregular, practice. There is no systematic survey of 
representative and consultative bodies in the Palaiologan era113 and the issue 
is complicated by lack of evidence and imprecise terminology; 
Kantakouzēnos himself refers to this gathering as the synklētos, boulē, and 
bouleutērion.114 While a gathering of this size was an unusual event, arising 
from the political vacuum created by Andronikos’ death, emperors certainly 
sought the advice of occasional consultative councils or assemblies.115 
Despite this, there is a lack of evidence of any formalised institutions until 
possibly the fifteenth century.116 While Andronikos II seems to have 
governed with the assistance of some form of privy council,117 he was 
publicly criticised in a political tract by one of his sons, Theodōros 
Palaiologos, Marquis of Montferrat, for over-reliance upon a single chief 
minister, Theodōros Metochites.118 He urged the establishment of 
                                                 
110 Laiou, ‘Foreigner and Stranger’, 88-91. 
111 Angelov, Ideology, 41. 
112 Kant. I, 469.15-16: καὶ ὅρκους ἐποιήσαντο ἐπ’ αὐταῖς οἱ βασιλεῖς κατὰ τὸ ἔθος. 
113 Tsirpanlis, ‘Parliaments’, usefully catalogues the literary references to political 
gatherings during 1081-1351, however Tsirpanlis’ analysis is tendentious and marred by 
misunderstandings; his account of this incident contains a number of errors. 
114 Kant. II, 20.10-11, 22.24, 24.2-3. 
115 See Kyritses, ‘Imperial Council’. 
116 Kiousopoulou, Emperor or Manager, 86-7. 
117 Angelov, Ideology, 291-2.  
118 Shawcross, ‘Counsel’, esp. 90-101; for Theodōros Palaiologos, PLP 21465; Laiou, 
‘Theodore Palaeologus’. 
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representative assemblies.119 Andronikos III similarly appears to have relied 
upon a relatively small inner circle, of which Kantakouzēnos was 
indisputably part, although Grēgoras claimed Andronikos was secretive, 
trusted only his own counsel, and did not take advice from others.120 Both 
Grēgoras and Theodōros probably exaggerated the isolation of the respective 
emperors but the fact that they could be criticised in such a way 
demonstrates that there was no regulated consultative institution. 
The assembly in 1341 was almost certainly called on Anna’s initiative, 
although Kantakouzēnos avoids acknowledging this; the ambassadors 
reported to her and it would have been prudent to seek consensus before 
making any response that could potentially lead to war. Kantakouzēnos’ 
disapproval of the entire incident is apparent: he portrays the assembly as 
disorderly, a tool exploited by his enemies, in particular the Patriarch, and an 
affront to the social order. Moreover it is apparent he did not think anyone 
other than himself had much useful advice to offer. However he often 
mentions his own consultations with military commanders and supporters, 
so his disdain relates to the specific circumstances of this assembly rather 
than the principle of consultation or even collective decision-making. Shortly 
after his victory in 1347, Kantakouzēnos called a much larger popular 
assembly, albeit not to seek advice but to solicit voluntary contributions to 
the fisc.121 Lacking a single figure with the political strength to fill the role of 
basileus, the regency government appears to have relied unusually heavily on 
some form of imperial council during the war.122 
 
                                                 
119 Shawcross, ‘Counsel’, 98-101. 
120 Greg. I, 565.15-19. 
121 Kant. III, 33.10-40.21; Miller, Cantacuzenus, 171-8 (translation), 289-291 (commentary). 
122 Kyritses, Byzantine Aristocracy, 59. 
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24: Geōrgios Choumnos (PLP 30945).123 A son of Nikēphoros 
Choumnos, Andronikos II’s long-time mesazōn.124 He was later persuaded by 
Apokaukos, who was in any case married to his niece, to join the conspiracy 
against Kantakouzēnos.125 In return he received the high title megas 
stratopedarchēs, which was ranked 10th in the list of precedence, at Iōannēs V’s 
coronation in November 1341.126 However, following efforts to persuade the 
Empress to make peace, he was placed under house-arrest by Apokaukos at 
the end of 1342.127 It seems probable that he was later obliged to become the 
monk Gerasimos, either by Apokaukos or, as an anti-Palamite, following 
Kantakouzēnos’ victory.128 His sister, Eirēnē, the nun Eulogia, was a leading 
anti-Palamite and provided political and financial support to Akindynos 
during the war.129 
 
25: Epi tēs trapezēs ranks 21st in Pseudo-Kodinos’ list of precedence, 
very clearly below megas domestikos, hence Kantakouzēnos’ outrage at him 
speaking first.130 There were a number of ceremonial duties associated with 
the office, principally serving at the imperial table, as the title indicates.131 
 
26: Cf. 1 Corinthians 14:30. These words are also a direct quotation 
from the letters of Theodōros Stouditēs.132 They apparently made a deep 
impression on Kantakouzēnos, who refers to them on a number of 
                                                 
123 See also Verpeaux, ‘Famille Choumnos’, 261-2, no. 18. 
124 PLP 30961. 
125 See Chapter 19. 
126 Kant. II, 218. 
127 Kant. II, 325, 336. 
128 Verpeaux, ‘Famille Choumnos’, 262.  
129 Meyendorff, Palamas, 83-4. For Eulogia, see PLP 30936. 
130 Ps-Kod., 29. 
131 Ps-Kod., 151-165, 241. See also Guilland, Institutions I, 237-241. 
132 Theodōros Stouditēs, Epistulae I, 33-4, ep. 5. 
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occasions.133 As he explicitly states, Kantakouzēnos considered himself the 
‘first man’ of the Empire at this time, so the attack on his authority is clear.134 
A relatively junior courtier such as Choumnos would not have mounted 
such an open attack unless he had support, presumably from the Patriarch’s 
party; Kantakouzēnos alleges as much in the following chapter.135 
 
27: Dēmētrios Tornikios Palaiologos (PLP 29124).136 Tornikios and 
Tornikēs are alternative spellings.137 Dēmētrios, a nephew of Andronikos II 
and an uncle of Andronikos III, was probably quite elderly by this time.138 
Although Kantakouzēnos does not mention his title, he is attested as megas 
droungarios tēs viglas repeatedly from 1324 onwards, including as one of the 
co-witnesses of a chrysobull along with Kantakouzēnos.139 The title was of 
middling importance; Pseudo-Kodinos ranks it 24th and reports that the 
holder is responsible for organising the watch when the army makes camp, 
under the supervision of the Grand Domestic.140 Dēmētrios’ subsequent fate 
is unknown. 
 
28: There was a traditional right to seek asylum within a church for 
those fearing imprisonment or physical harm, reflected by legislation from 
the fourth century onwards.141 The practice remained until the end of the 
Empire, although it was not always respected and fugitives were 
occasionally dragged from churches by force. This is particularly notable in 
claims to asylum arising from political rather than criminal issues: Michaēl 
                                                 
133 Kant. II, 23.21-2, 26.10-11, 120.20-1. 
134 Kant. II, 25.7-9. 
135 Kant. II, 26.7-14. 
136 See also Schmalzbauer, ‘Tornikioi’, 124-5; Papadopulos, Palaiologen, 5, no. 3. 
137 A. Kazhdan, ‘Tornikios’, ODB III, 2096-7. 
138 FK III, 417, n. 23. 
139 MM III, 111. 
140 Ps-Kod., 207. 
141 Macrides, ‘Asylum’, esp. 510. 
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VII Doukas was heavily criticised for removing a critic from Hagia Sophia in 
1078142 and Chōniatēs records a number of cases, including the kaisarissa 
Maria who met threats of eviction with force and led an armed revolt from 
within the cathedral precincts.143 These incidents make the Patriarch’s claim 
that asylum had always been respected somewhat absurd, which is surely 
Kantakouzēnos’ intention here. The rights of asylum seekers in Hagia 
Sophia, as long as they did not live in the church itself, were re-affirmed in a 
March 1343 prostagma of Iōannēs V144 but Kantakouzēnos claims that his 
supporters who had claimed asylum there, apparently including Grēgorios 
Palamas, were arrested and imprisoned by the Patriarch just before Easter of 
the same year.145  
 
29: Kantakouzēnos’ rather passive-aggressive behaviour compels the 
Empress to directly request his opinion, re-asserting his importance before 
the senate but also alleviating suspicion that she backed Choumnos’ attack. 
Thus he implies that the Patriarch, who emerged as the leading speaker, 
sponsored the outburst. 
                                                 
142 Attaleiatēs, History, 473. 
143 Chōniatēs, History, 232.32-241.87 (trans. Magoulias, 131-6). 
144 Register II, 308-310, no. 141. 
145 Kant. II, 300.14-20; Meyendorff, Palamas, 69-70.  
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Commentary on Chapter 3 
1: For a man of Kantakouzēnos political stature, apragmosynē, 
retirement or ‘freedom from worldly affairs’, in the prime of life would have 
meant entering a monastery, not least to prevent his enemies suspecting that 
he intended to return. 
 
2: The coupling of barbarians and Hellenes to indicate ‘all enemies’ is 
familiar from Thucydides.1 However, Kantakouzēnos steadfastly maintains a 
Roman/Rhōmaios identity throughout the Histories, abstaining from a 
strengthening trend for intellectuals, from the twelfth century onwards, to 
identify themselves and their compatriots as Hellenes, or even (very rarely) 
as Graikoi.2 Kantakouzēnos’ theological works similarly retain the distinction, 
traditional to the genre, between Christians and Hellenes, the latter being 
pre-Christian thinkers or pagans.3 Therefore his present designation of 
Hellenes as both external and hostile appears significant.4 Hellenes are most 
probably those who are ethnically and culturally Roman, in contrast to 
barbaroi, but actively rejected the emperor’s rule and were therefore rebels, 
just as ancient pagans rejecting the Christian revelation were Hellēnes and not 
Rhōmaioi. Kantakouzēnos almost certainly had in mind Andronikos’ 
autochthonous adversaries in Hellas/Greece itself, notably the states of 
Epiros and Thessaly.5 He exhibits what could be termed Roman nationalism; 
he regards it as proper that ethnic Rhōmaioi should wish to be part of the 
                                                 
1 Thuc. 2.36.4: βάρβαρον ἢ Ἕλληνα πολέμιον. 
2 Angelov, Ideology, 95-98; Kaldellis, Hellenism, 373-388; Runciman, Byzantine Renaissance, 
17-22. 
3 E.g., Kantakouzēnos, Refutationes I, 8.29-30: τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων σοφίαν μωρὰν; 
Kantakouzēnos, Contra Mahometem, col. 545: οἱ μὲν εἰδωλολάτραι Ἕλληνες. 
4 Kant. II, 28.20-21: ὅσα τε πρὸς τοὺς ἔξωθεν πολεμίους, καὶ Ἕλληνας λέγω καὶ 
βαρβάρους. 
5 When identifying these opponents specifically, Kantakouzēnos refers to them by their 
localities, not collectively or culturally, e.g. Kant. I, 504.11-12: Ἀκαρνάσι καὶ Θετταλοῖς.  
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basileia tōn Rhōmaiōn, while not applying the name to those who reject 
imperial rule and place themselves outside the national community.6 
                                                 
6 For discussion and further examples of this, see Page, Being Byzantine, 163-169. For 
Byzantium as a Roman ‘nation-state’, see Kaldellis, Hellenism, 74-111. Joannou, ‘Unedierte 
Rede’, 40, notes that Patriarch Kalekas’ patriotic appeals to the Roman nation/race (τὸ 
Ῥωμαίων γένος), on the occasion of Iōannēs V’s coronation, indicate contemporary 
identification of a Volksgemeinschaft (‘national community’). 
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Commentary on Chapter 4 
1: Edouard (1284-1329), Count of Savoy 1323-29. He was Anna’s half-
brother, born of the first wife of their father Amadeo V (r. 1285-1323), while 
her mother was his second wife, Maria of Brabant.1 Anna married during his 
reign in 1326. Edouard died without sons and was succeeded by his younger 
brother, Aymon (r. 1329-43).2 Savoy was a small Alpine county, which 
derived its importance from its control of many of the western passes 
through the Alps.3 Andronikos II’s main considerations in arranging his 
grandson’s marriage to Anna were probably to improve diplomatic links to 
the Latin world in general, but also to secure Savoy’s friendship with the 
neighbouring marquisate of Montferrat, ruled by Andronikos II’s son 
Theodōros.4 Theodōros would later, in 1330, marry his only daughter to 
Count Aymon.5  
 
2: These conveniently prophetic words are the only ones that 
Kantakouzēnos has Andronikos provide regarding his own role after the 
Emperor’s death. He does not record any speeches during his brief account 
of Andronikos’ final illness.6 Whatever Andronikos’ actual words were, it is 
clear that he did not explicitly pass control of the government to 
Kantakouzēnos.  
                                                 
1 FK I, 269-70, n. 258; Malamut, ‘Jeanne-Anne’, 87. 
2 Cox, Green Count, 11-12, 378-9. 
3 For Savoy’s history in the fourteenth century, see Cox, Green Count, esp. 17-32. 
4 PLP 21465; Laiou, ‘Theodore Palaeologus’. For the political considerations behind this 
marriage, Laiou, Andronicus II, 302-5. 
5 Cox, Green Count, 12-13. 
6 Kant. I, 557.10f. 
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Commentary on Chapter 5 
1: Oikeioi were trusted members of the entourages (i.e., ‘households’) 
of the powerful, who lacked close kinship ties and voluntarily owed some 
form of service and obedience, possibly confirmed by oath.1 In documents, 
Palaiologan emperors referred to most high office-holders who were not 
relatives as oikeioi.2 There are similarities with the western concept of 
vassalage but, given the absence of formalised legal definitions, the 
institution appears closer to the ancient Roman patron-client relationship.3 
Oikeioi are largely documented as imperial clients, and have generally been 
discussed as such, but Kantakouzēnos clearly regards trusted followers of 
prominent individuals as oikeioi.4 He occasionally distinguishes some as 
oikeiotatōn, usually translated as ‘closest oikeioi’.5 He also tends to identify his 
own agents as oikeioi but those of others, particularly Apokaukos, more 
frequently as oiketai, simply ‘servants’. This term may sometimes have 
included oikeioi but certainly also designated followers who were hirelings.6  
 
2: Kantakouzēnos here speaks to τοῖς ἐκείνῳ προσήκουσιν ὑμῖν, i.e., 
the imperial family, although he begins by addressing the Empress alone. He 
once again vaguely refers to opposition among the Palaiologoi at the start of 
Chapter 9.7 In the present situation, it is conceivable that Anna was flanked 
by other family members in the audience chamber but perhaps as likely that 
                                                 
1 Verpeaux, ‘Oikeioi’; Maksimović, Provincial Administration, 23-5; Angelov, Ideology, 224-
6. On the composition of this group, Kyritses, Byzantine Aristocracy, 16-20. 
2 Verpeaux, ‘Oikeioi’, 94-7. 
3 For comparison with western institutions, Verpeaux, ‘Oikeioi’, 93-4; Angelov, Ideology, 
225-6. 
4 As recognised by Weiss, Kantakuzenos, 143-4; Kyritses, Byzantine Aristocracy, 17. 
Verpeaux and Maksimović view oikeioi as exclusively imperial functionaries. 
5 E.g., Kant. II, 71.3, 138.8-9. 
6 Trone, Kantakouzenos, 282-3. 
7 Kant. II, 64.11-12: τῶν δὲ καθ’ αἷμα προσηκόντων βασιλεῖ τινων. 
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the author, in the passion of his self-justification, addresses his contemporary 
critics.  
 
3: Cf. Nicene Creed and 2 Timothy 4:1. 
 
4: Much of Kantakouzēnos’ speech is a justification of his behaviour 
after Andronikos’ death, to defend himself against allegations that he was 
seeking to become emperor. Nobody, within the narrative of the Histories, 
has yet made such an allegation. Although it is almost certain such 
accusations were made at the time, it represents an unusual break in the 
consistency of the narrative of the Histories and, at times, the author seems to 
have had his contemporary readership at the forefront of his mind. Within 
the speech, the historical character of the Grand Domestic displays unusual 
foreknowledge, warning that his opponents will say that he threatens the 
Empress’ life, that they will try to corrupt her with lies, that believing them 
will lead to civil war, uprisings in the cities, and the destruction of the 
Empire. Although he comes close to presenting the forthcoming civil war as 
a simple choice in the hands of the Empress, in the following chapter he 
shows her making the right choice, i.e., to accept his role in government. This 
is consistent with his portrayal of the Empress as an unwilling facilitator of 
the war. It does, however, suggest that he was ultimately prepared to hold 
her responsible if faced with the alternative of admitting guilt himself.  
Grēgoras reports a speech which is similar in many respects – 
although with more learned name-dropping and without such blood-
curdling warnings of civil war – and which also concludes with the exchange 
of oaths.8 Insofar as either account bears resemblance to dialogue that 
actually took place in 1341, they imply that the Empress was paying heed to 
                                                 
8 Greg. II, 591.25-595.16. 
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a wider circle of courtiers, somewhat at odds with her dramatic pleas to the 
Grand Domestic in the previous chapter of the Histories. Kantakouzēnos’ 
offer to resign is therefore best understood to mean ‘back me or sack me’ 
rather than an offer to step aside for the sake of political harmony. The 
identity of these courtiers is suppressed; the only members of the original 
anti-Kantakouzēnos/sykophantai party (i.e., before Apokaukos constructs his 
conspiracy) identified in the Histories are the Patriarch and Choumnos. 
Grēgoras names only Apokaukos and the Patriarch. It is likely that certain 
individuals were sufficiently prominent, or sufficiently closely related to 
either the Emperor or Kantakouzēnos himself, to cause embarrassment for 
both parties.  
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Commentary on Chapter 6 
1: In the Histories, Andronikos is indeed fond of expressing his 
affection for someone by stating that he would not defend himself even if 
that person were to attack him with a sword.1 
 
2: Oaths were widely used in the Palaiologan era for securing political 
allegiances, and oath-taking is presented as an accepted practice.2 Oaths are 
taken to secure agreements between rulers,3 formal oaths of fidelity 
administered en masse to prevent subversion or show loyalty,4 oaths are 
given as guarantees of truth,5 and – as here – oaths are exchanged to seal 
political agreements. Kantakouzēnos demonstrates that his enemies break 
their most solemn undertakings and, in particular, paints Apokaukos as a 
regular perjurer who makes and breaks even the most holy oaths without 
compunction.6 However, the practice of swearing oaths was not 
uncontroversial, and some ecclesiastic critics found any form of oath 
offensive, owing to its prohibition in Matthew 5:34-37.7 Within the Histories, 
no reservations are expressed by the Patriarch, but Kantakouzēnos is later 
criticised for his use of sworn statements by some of his opponents who 
claim that he never used them before declaring himself basileus and therefore 
that his sudden adoption of them indicated he was behaving unfaithfully.8 
Kantakouzēnos defended oaths (in this case, unilateral rather than reciprocal 
                                                 
1 Kant. I, 48.13-24 (regarding his grandfather), 330.5-9, 364.7-12 (both regarding 
Kantakouzēnos). 
2 See Svronos, ‘Serment de fidélité’; Rochette, ‘Serment’; Angelov, Ideology, 326-44. 
3 See Ch.2:22, also Kant. II, 69.21. 
4 E.g., during Andronikos III’s illness, Kant. II, 91.9-15; before Kantakouzēnos’ 
acclamation as emperor, Kant. II, 161.4-6. 
5 E.g., Kant. II, 107.17-19, 116.11-12. 
6 A consistent theme of Chapters 15-19. 
7 Angelov, Ideology, 318, n. 28.  
8 Kant. II, 229.9-21. 
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oaths) both with biblical precedents and by stating that oaths are made 
‘either because the swearers are not sufficiently credible, or because those 
receiving them are otherwise of mean character, or because the magnitude of 
what is promised is impossible to believe without oaths.’9 He makes it clear 
that his critics must belong to the second group.  
Although Palaiologan emperors did, very occasionally, swear oaths 
towards their subjects,10 Kantakouzēnos’ insistence on reciprocal oaths 
between himself and the Empress is aggressive, and a sign of tension 
between them. It seems probable that he agreed to uphold the sovereignty of 
Anna and her son, in return for delegation of all administrative authority 
and assurances not to give heed to his enemies. By administering the oath, 
the Patriarch was effectively made complicit in the agreement, restricting his 
own political ambitions. Although Kantakouzēnos would effectively be 
acting as regent, the agreement seems not to have made any change to his 
official public status. This gave it a temporary character which failed to halt 
the political manoeuvres of his enemies, or those of his supporters pushing 
him to assume the imperial office, as is clear from the following chapters.  
 
3: Saint Dēmētrios ‘myrrh-streamer’ is considered the patron saint of 
Thessalonike, which houses his relics. While Thessalonike still remains the 
main pilgrimage site for his cult, he was revered throughout the Empire and 
beyond. His epithet derived from the reputed ability of his relics to 
miraculously produce streams of scented oil (myrrh).11 The Palaiologoi 
                                                 
9 Kant. II, 230.7-10: ἢ διὰ τὸ μὴ τοὺς ὀμνύοντας ἀξιόχρεως πρὸς πίστιν εἶναι γίνεσθαι, 
ἢ διὰ τὸ τοὺς δεχομένους ἢ φαύλους τοὺς τρόπους εἶναι, ἢ διὰ μέγεθος τῶν 
ἐπαγγελλομένων ἀδυνάτως ἔχειν πείθεσθαι ὅρκων χωρίς. 
10 Kant. I, 83.9-118, explicitly cites the precedent of oaths given to Michaēl Palaiologos by 
Iōannēs III Batatzēs, although he mistakes the latter for his son, Theodōros II Laskaris (see 
Trone, Kantakouzenos, 320). See also Rochette, ‘Serment’, 162-4; Angelov, Ideology, 344, n. 120. 
11 A. Kazhdan and N.P. Ševčenko, ‘Demetrios of Thessalonike’, ODB I, 605-6. For the 
importance of St Dēmētrios’ cult in this period, particularly in relation to Thessalonike, 
Russell, St Demetrius, esp. 9-28. 
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regarded the saint as the particular patron of their family. Michaēl VIII 
Palaiologos founded the monastery of St Dēmētrios-Kellibara in 
Constantinople in 1282, in part to replace a church to Dēmētrios built by his 
ancestor Geōrgios Palaiologos which had been destroyed. In his typikon, he 
described the saint as ‘my great defender’ and stated that he ‘appears to have 
been the ancestral patron of the house of the Palaiologoi.’12 This monastery 
was evidently located near the sea walls to the south of the city, so it cannot 
be identified with the palace church referred to by Kantakouzēnos.13 It 
however remains quite possible that Michaēl VIII added a church dedicated 
to his patron during his refurbishment of the Blachernai complex following 
his conquest of the city. The palace church frequently referred to by Pseudo-
Kodinos may be that of Saint Dēmētrios, or the Komnēnian foundation 
dedicated to Saint Thekla, or indeed neither of these.14 Kantakouzēnos 
reports that Andronikos III had particular affection for the saint from 
childhood, honouring him above all others ‘as if he were his lover’.15 While 
Dēmētrios’ image generally appeared on coins produced at Thessalonike’s 
mint, Andronikos III also appears to have included it on some of his 
Constantinopolitan issues as well.16 Kantakouzēnos was acclaimed on Saint 
Dēmētrios’ day and the few surviving coins issued by Kantakouzēnos 
during the period 1352-1354, when he was in open conflict with Iōannēs V, 
show the emperor facing not his now-deposed colleague but Saint 
Dēmētrios.17 Matthaios Kantakouzēnos, who never ruled Thessalonike, also 
                                                 
12 Dennis, ‘Kellibara’, 1246-7.  
13 Ibid., 1238-9. 
14 Magdalino, ‘Pseudo-Kodinos' Constantinople’, 4. FK III, 419, n. 42, assumes the church 
is located in the Great Palace, which is surely incorrect. 
15 Kant. I, 270: ἦν γὰρ ἐξ ἡλικίας πρώτης τιμὴν αὐτῷ καὶ πίστιν πλείω ἢ κατὰ τοὺς 
ἄλλους μάρτυρας παρέχων καὶ ὥσπερ ἐραστὴς αὐτοῦ ὢν. 
16 E.g., Grierson, Byzantine Coins, 308 and Plate 89, no. 1426. 
17 Bendall and Donald, Coinage, 148-151. The identification of these figures is 
unambiguous owing to the inscriptions ΚΤΚΖ and ΔΜΤ. For Kantakouzēnos’ acclamation, 
see Ch.27:1. 
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seems to have adopted the image of Dēmētrios on his few surviving coins, 
demonstrating both the widespread popularity of the saint and that 
association with him had become a factor in imperial legitimation.18 
 
4: The origin of this proverb is unknown, although Kantakouzēnos 
certainly had direct relationships with Turks and spoke Turkish to some 
degree.19 Despite the apparent complacent misogyny, there was a long 
tradition of female involvement in imperial politics and Kantakouzēnos 
himself frequently trusted his mother and his wife to safeguard his political 
interests.20 His intention here is to offer a conventional explanation for the 
Empress’ later hostility to him – the inescapable ‘natural’ weakness of her 
gender, which his enemies are able to exploit – rather than attributing it to 
her own character or to deliberate hostility.  
 
5: Kantakouzēnos reminds the reader of his earlier account of Kalekas’ 
election and his central role in it.21 Kantakouzēnos’ expectation of assistance 
for help which he earlier provided freely (προίξ) should be understood in 
the context of the importance of patron-client relationships, often identified 
as friendship (φίλος). 
 
6: In other words, as Kantakouzēnos controls the state, his victories or 
failures affect the lives of all. 
 
                                                 
18 Morrisson, ‘Coinage and Money’, fig. 50. 
19 Kant. III, 66.6: ἐκέλευεν… Περσιστὶ. 
20 See Ch.9:18 and Ch.27:4, respectively. On the importance of female involvement in 
politics generally, see Herrin, ‘Women’; for the Palaiologan era specifically, Malamut, 
‘L’impératrice’, esp. 655-6. Thessalonike was also repeatedly governed by widowed or 
estranged empresses; see Malamut, ‘Pouvoir et influence’. 
21 Kant. I, 431.20-435.20. 
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7: The Trisagion, or ‘thrice-holy’ hymn, originated in the 4th century 
and by the 6th century had become part of the Eucharist service.22 
                                                 
22 R.F. Taft, ‘Trisagion’, ODB III, 2121. 
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Commentary on Chapter 7 
1: Vidin, on the Danube, was one of the major towns of Bulgaria and 
is described in an anonymous contemporary scribal note as a ‘great and 
populous city’.1 It lay not only a considerable distance overland from Roman 
borders at that time but is also over 500km from the mouth of the Danube, so 
Kantakouzēnos was not threatening simply to raid an easily accessible 
coastal town. Vidin, with Hungarian support, was frequently independent of 
the government in Tŭrnovo. The Šišman family came to dominate it in 1290, 
thereafter ruling as Despots; the Mamluk historian Baybars refers to the 
surrounding area as ‘Šišman’s country’.2 Subsequently there were in effect 
two separate Bulgarian states most of the time, one governed from Tŭrnovo 
and the other from Vidin.3 The principality had been Michael III Šišman’s 
powerbase for his rise to the Bulgarian throne and his ascension united the 
two territories at least until his death.4 In 1341 it is not entirely clear whether 
Vidin was under the direct control of Ivan Alexander, although 
Kantakouzēnos’ plan to send ‘Sismanos’ to Vidin to spark a civil war 
indicates that it was probably not governed by the Šišman dynasty at the 
time.5 It is however likely that the Šišman family retained considerable 
support in the city, so Kantakouzēnos’ threat was plausible and menacing.6 
In the late 1340s Vidin apparently became an appanage controlled by one of 
Ivan Alexander’s sons, and grew increasingly independent after the two men 
fell out.7  
                                                 
1 Petkov, Voices, 471. 
2 Vásáry, Cumans and Tatars, 97, 107-8. For consideration of the territorial extent of the 
principality of Vidin, including areas north of the Danube, see Božilov, ‘Vidin’. 
3 Fine, Late Medieval Balkans, 273-4. 
4 When narrating Michael’s rise to power, Kant. I, 175.11-12, notes that he is ruler of 
Vidin: τὸν τῆς Βιδύνης ἄρχοντα Μιχαὴλ. 
5 For ‘Sismanos’, see Ch.2:13. 
6 FK I, 264, n. 228; FK III, 421, n. 54. 
7 Fine, Late Medieval Balkans, 273; Petkov, Voices, 470-1, 513-4.  
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2: A ‘trireme’ is any large oared vessel armed as a warship.8 
Kantakouzēnos does on occasion mention smaller vessels which he 
designates monoremes and biremes.9 
 
3: Kantakouzēnos adopts the standard classicising practice of styling 
the Turks as ‘Persians’ and correspondingly employs the ancient Persian title 
‘satrap’ to indicate the various Turkish lords. These rulers are more correctly 
known as either beys (Turkish) or emirs (Arabic), and their principalities as 
beyliks or emirates. Their states were recent creations, founded on the 
territory of the older Seljuk state and more recently conquered Roman 
possessions. Western Anatolia had begun to come under serious Turkish 
pressure towards the end of Michaēl VIII’s reign. Despite Andronikos II’s 
repeated attempts to repel the Turks, the situation deteriorated rapidly and, 
by 1328, Roman rule was reduced to enclaves in Bithynia and the isolated 
cities of Phōkaia and Philadelphia.10 The political situation in Asia Minor 
remained extremely fluid as many small emirates were founded and then 
subsequently absorbed into more powerful groupings. This is vividly 
illustrated by Ibn Battuta’s journey through western Asia Minor in the early 
1330s; nearly every town he visits is subject to a different ‘Sultan’.11 The 
emirates established in coastal areas became the Empire’s maritime 
neighbours. Most of these launched seaborne raids, often in cooperation with 
each other, which created a state of chronic insecurity for all the Christian 
                                                 
8 The Souda defines triremes as πλοῖα πολεμικά, corresponding with Kantakouzēnos’ 
usage: D. Whitehead (trans.), ‘Τριήρεις’, Suda On Line <http://www.stoa.org/sol-
entries/tau/977>, 19 May 2011, last accessed 02 September 2014. 
9 E.g., Kant. I, 477.3. 
10 The chief sources on the advance of the Turks are Pachymerēs and, to a lesser degree, 
Grēgoras. However, data are confused and fragmentary, reflecting the nature of the 
conquest itself; see Vryonis, Decline, 249-58. For Andronikos II’s campaigns, see Laiou, 
Andronicus II, passim. For Bithynia, see Ch.9:13. 
11 Ibn Battuta, Travels, 425-460. 
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communities on the coasts and islands of the Aegean.12 All would eventually 
be absorbed into the Ottoman state during the fifteenth century. 
There has been considerable scholarly debate concerning the 
importance of Islam in explaining the aggression of these emirates, partly 
owing to the characterisation of the constant warfare as jihad (holy war), 
waged by gazis (holy warriors) in contemporary or near-contemporary 
Turkish sources.13 Some scholars have carried this idea to the point of 
caricature, portraying the Turks as motivated almost exclusively by fanatical 
religion,14 ignoring the conflicts of the emirs with one another and the 
willingness of many to cooperate with Christians in pursuit of short-term 
goals.15 In the Histories, Kantakouzēnos tends to treat the Islamic Turkish 
states much as he does Latin or Orthodox Christian states: as opportunistic 
enemies or possible allies. However he designates the Turks as ‘barbarians’ 
much more regularly than others and frequently feels compelled to make a 
pained defence of his employment of them.16 In particular, he relates that 
Apokaukos first employed allied Turks in Macedonia in spring 1343 and, 
consequently, that he warned his enemies that he would have to do the same 
in response.17 After the civil war, Kantakouzēnos describes his unsuccessful 
negotiations with the papacy to facilitate a large-scale crusade against the 
                                                 
12 For an overview, see Inalcik, ‘Turcoman Maritime Principalities’; in detail, 
Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade. 
13 Perhaps the most significant example is the Düstūrnāme; see Ch.7:4. The so-called ‘gazi 
thesis’ was originally proposed in Paul Wittek’s work in the 1930s. For the difficulties 
associated with some of this evidence, see Imber, ‘Osman Gazi’, esp. 72-4. For a critical 
examination which largely accepts the centrality of religion, see Zachariadou, ‘Holy War’.  
14 E.g., Nicol, Last Centuries, 141-7. 
15 E.g., the Catalan Grand Company had repeatedly joined forces with Turks at various 
times, see Ch.12:6. 
16 E.g., Kant. II, 461, 506.21-507.21, 608; III, 37.16-38.1, 53.18-54.2. 
17 Kant. II, 357.19f, 381.14-383.12. Their presence is confirmed by Greg. II, 658.22-659.13. 
The credibility of Kantakouzēnos’ assertion, that the regency first employed Turkish troops, 
rests implicitly upon his depiction of Umur deciding to relieve Didymoteichon entirely on 
his own initiative in winter 1342/3. Although it is possible Kantakouzēnos had not 
personally communicated with Umur (see Ch.7:6), it is inescapable that the first direct 
Turkish intervention in the war was on his side. 
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Turks.18 Popular hostility to the Turks was inflamed by their enthusiasm for 
plundering and, most critically, slaving; both Christians and Muslims saw 
the religion of the victim as sufficient justification for taking slaves.19 
Kantakouzēnos acknowledged that the prospect of slavery was one of the 
‘most fearful evils’ to emerge from the war.20 His inability to prevent his 
erstwhile Turkish allies compensating themselves for providing their 
assistance by taking slaves would have contributed significantly to his 
unpopularity during his reign. 
 
4: Umur Aydïnoğlu, Emir of Smyrna 1334-1348 (PLP 21059).21 Aydin 
was in fact Umur’s grandfather and founder of the eponymous emirate of 
Aydin. Its creation is obscure but most of the towns fell into Turkish hands 
between 1307 and 1326, while Umur himself took the port of Smyrna from 
the Genoese in 1329. Aydin’s son Mehmet divided his emirate between his 
sons, with his oldest son Hizir in possession of Ephesos and his second son, 
Umur, being given Smyrna. On Mehmet’s death in 1334, Umur inherited his 
overall authority as emir.22 Umur was an extremely aggressive freebooter 
and rapidly became widely renowned and feared for his deeds. His 
formidable pirate fleet enabled Aydin to raid or extract tribute from all of the 
Christian states in the Aegean, including Venetian and imperial possessions. 
                                                 
18 Kant. III, 53.13-62.21 (trans. Miller, Cantacuzenus 188-197; see also Miller’s commentary, 
308-321). 
19 See further Ch.11:12. 
20 Kant. II, 156.7-8: τὸ κακῶν ἔσχατον καὶ φοβερώτατον τοῖς γε νοῦν ἔχουσιν, ἡ ὑπὸ 
βαρβάροις δουλεία. 
21 The major source on Umur’s life is the Düstūrnāme by Enveri, an epic poem glorifying 
the deeds of various Muslim heroes and dynasties, concluding with the Ottomans. 
However, just under a third is concerned with Umur alone. Although composed in the 
fifteenth century, Enveri relied on earlier authors: see Enveri, Düstūrnāme, 27-38 (Mélikoff-
Sayar’s introduction); Lemerle, Aydin, 7-13. It is worth noting that the poet displays quite 
detailed knowledge of the 1341-7 civil war and is generally sympathetic to Umur’s ally 
‘Domestikos’, i.e., Kantakouzēnos For a general history of the emirate of Aydin, see Foss, 
Ephesus, 141-67. The most detailed study (up to 1353) remains Lemerle, Aydin.  
22 Foss, Ephesus, 144-6; Enveri, Düstūrnāme, 39-40 (Mélikoff-Sayar’s introduction); 
Lemerle, Aydin, 19-62. 
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Indeed, Umur first appears in the Histories leading a substantial raid into 
Thrace in 1331. However, when he is confronted by a force led by 
Andronikos III and Kantakouzēnos, he retreats without serious conflict.23 He 
is mentioned thereafter largely in the context of his relationship with 
Kantakouzēnos, which is considered below (Ch.7:6). However Aydin raided 
imperial territories regularly, at least until 1335, and menaced the city of 
Philadelphia, which was by then an isolated Roman enclave in Anatolia.24 
 Umur’s piracy caused significant damage to Latin interests and 
Venice responded by organising two serious crusading ventures against the 
Turks. The first was the ‘Sancta Unio’ of 1334, which launched attacks on 
many of the maritime emirates and won a substantial naval victory over a 
Turkish fleet at Adramyttion. Although the majority of the defeated fleet 
belonged to Karasi, Umur seems to have sustained significant, although far 
from irreparable, losses.25 By 1341, he was able to raid as far away as Crete, 
and Aydin was acknowledged as the strongest of all the Turkish 
principalities.26 This ascendancy provoked the second crusading venture, the 
Crusade of Smyrna, which struck at the heart of Umur’s power in October 
1344, seizing the harbour of Smyrna and its associated fortifications.27 
Although Umur’s counterattacks prevented the crusaders from extending 
their gains, the loss of the port significantly restricted his ability to launch 
maritime expeditions. Umur was killed in April 1348 while attempting to 
                                                 
23 Kant. I, 470.14-473.5.  
24 Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, 37-8. 
25 For this alliance and its activities, see Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, 21-40. For Karasi, 
see Ch.9:8. 
26 Greg. II, 597.11-19; Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, 41-2. 
27 For the Crusade, see Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, 41-62; Carr, ‘Crusade of Smyrna’; 
Lemerle, Aydin, 180-203. The development and activity of the western alliances against 
Aydin are described in detail in Carr, Motivations and Response, 127-234. The attack is noted 
by Kant. II, 529.14-20. 
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recapture the port; it would remain in Latin hands until 1402.28 The emirate 
of Aydin declined in importance after Umur’s death and was finally 
absorbed by the Ottomans in 1425. 
 
5: Although a suspiciously round number, many Greek and Latin 
sources attribute fleets of such magnitude to the Aegean emirates, 
particularly Aydin, although there was considerable variation in the size and 
type of such vessels.29 Enveri tells of a fleet of 350 vessels, possibly for the 
same expedition.30 However Turkish fleets generally proved unable to match 
quite small numbers of Latin or Roman war galleys: in 1320, ten galleys from 
Genoa and Rhodes defeated eighty Turkish vessels, and the battle of 
Adramyttion in 1334 saw forty crusader galleys defeat a fleet of more than 
two hundred Turkish boats.31 Umur possessed only a few vessels considered 
as being proper war galleys32 and Kantakouzēnos comments that, at sea, the 
Turks were generally ‘cowardly because of inexperience and easy to defeat 
in all circumstances’.33 
 
6: Grēgoras confirms that the personal intervention of Kantakouzēnos 
averted an attack by Umur, which he views as a major achievement and 
emphasises Umur’s personal respect for Kantakouzēnos.34 Umur and 
Kantakouzēnos appear to have first met in 1335, although Kantakouzēnos 
claims to have established a friendly relationship with Umur, via an 
                                                 
28 For Umur’s death, see Greg. II, 834.3-835.21; Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, 54; 
Lemerle, Aydin, 227-9. 
29 Inalcik, ‘Turcoman Maritime Principalities’, 205. 
30 Enveri, Düstūrnāme, 89, verse 1218.  
31 Zachariadou, ‘Holy War’, 215-6; Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, 32-3. 
32 Inalcik, ‘Turcoman Maritime Principalities’, 207-8. 
33 Kant. I, 539.12-13: ἐν ναυμαχίαις δὲ ἀτολμοτάτους δι´ ἀπειρίαν καὶ ῥᾳδίους τῷ 
προστυχόντι παντὶ ἡττᾶσθαι. 
34 Greg. II, 598.12-21. 
 304 
exchange of letters, at an earlier date.35 Kantakouzēnos spent four days 
feasting with Umur at Klazomenai and negotiated a significant agreement. 
Umur apparently agreed to remit the tribute paid by Philadelphia and 
provide 30 ships to assist with Andronikos III’s ongoing siege of Nea 
Phōkaia, then in Genoese hands.36 It also appears that Umur ceased his raids 
on imperial territory.37 While Kantakouzēnos pretends that Umur agreed out 
of simple goodwill and was rewarded with ‘gifts’, Enveri states that 
Andronikos offered 100,000 hyperpyra but Umur rejected it in favour of an 
annual tribute, apparently for undisturbed possession of Chios. As far as 
Enveri was concerned, this was an act of submission; according to Islamic 
law, the payment of regular tribute for a territory made it part of the Dar al-
Islam.38 However, the relationship seems to have strengthened into an 
alliance and Umur provided Turkish infantry to crush Albanian resistance in 
1338.39 
The true proof of Umur’s friendship with Kantakouzēnos came in the 
civil war. In winter 1342/3 Umur led an army up the Hebros to break the 
siege of Didymoteichon by the regency and the Bulgarians.40 Kantakouzēnos 
and Grēgoras both portray his intervention as sudden and unexpected, but 
Enveri states that an embassy led by a certain ‘Esen’ arrived from 
Kantakouzēnos to implore Umur’s aid.41 It seems likely, as suggested by 
Lemerle, that – since Kantakouzēnos was at the time in Serbia – the embassy 
was sent directly by the defenders of Didymoteichon and that the emissary 
was Manouēl Asanēs.42 While the Greek sources portray him as helping 
                                                 
35 Kant. I, 482.14-17. 
36 Kant. I, 482.12-483.18. 
37 Kant. II, 398.3-6; Enveri, Düstūrnāme, 84, verse 1066. 
38 Enveri, Düstūrnāme, 84-5, verses 1033-1084; Inalcik, ‘Turcoman Maritime Principalities’, 
192-3. For Chios, see Ch.29:7. 
39 See Ch.1:12. 
40 Kant. II, 344.6-348.12; Greg. II, 648.4-652.10. 
41 Enveri, Düstūrnāme, 94, verse 1335f. 
42 Lemerle, Aydin, 162-3. For Manouēl, see Ch.17:5.  
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Kantakouzēnos out of a submissive sense of friendship, Enveri reverses the 
situation, portraying Kantakouzēnos as a suppliant, and raises the possibility 
that he may have offered Philadelphia to Umur.43 In any case, Umur 
returned with a large force at Kantakouzēnos’ request in spring 1343, 
transforming Kantakouzēnos’ military situation. He was finally able to force 
his way back from Macedonia into Thrace and began systematically to force 
the cities into submission.44 Although Umur swung the war into 
Kantakouzēnos’ favour, the Crusade of Smyrna in October 1344 seriously 
limited his ability to assist Kantakouzēnos. While Umur managed to return 
to Thrace by passing through the territory of other emirs in 1345,45 
Kantakouzēnos increasingly had to turn to other allies, notably the 
Ottomans, to achieve victory. 
Grēgoras portrays Umur and Kantakouzēnos as genuinely dedicated 
to each other, comparing the pair to Orestes and Pylades, and is surprisingly 
complimentary to Umur, stating ‘this barbarian was not barbaric but 
civilised and possessed an altogether Hellenic education.’46 Enveri describes 
Kantakouzēnos as Umur’s kardesh, or blood-brother.47 Kantakouzēnos 
happily supports the idea that Umur was devoted to him almost as a 
‘spiritual slave’48 but understandably does not record strong reciprocal 
sentiments towards Umur. However he concedes that Umur was an ally and 
friend, that he sought and accepted Umur’s advice,49 and admits that he 
                                                 
43 Enveri, Düstūrnāme, 93, verses 1329-1330. It is presented as a slander by Apokaukos, 
although the proposal seems logical. 
44 Kant. II, 383-411. 
45 Kant. II, 529.14ff. 
46 Greg. II, 649.13-15: οὐ βάρβαρον ὁ βάρβαρος εἶχε τὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ’ ἥμερον καὶ 
παιδείας Ἑλληνικῆς τὸ παράπαν ἐχόμενον. 
47 Enveri, Düstūrnāme, 106, verses 1772-3, as discussed by Bryer, ‘Byzantine-Ottoman 
marriage’, 490-491. 
48 Kant. II, 413.1-414.19. 
49 Kant. II, 546.20ff. 
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asked for Umur’s approval for marrying Theodōra to Orhan.50 Although 
Kantakouzēnos himself does not mention Umur’s passing, Grēgoras claims 
that he was grieved by the death of ‘a great friend who had maintained 
goodwill to him throughout his life’.51 Umur’s assistance was undoubtedly 
central to Kantakouzēnos’ eventual victory in the civil war, although it came 
at a terrible price to the inhabitants of the regions he conquered. A short 
chronicle which briefly recounts Umur’s aid to Kantakouzēnos comments 
that ‘he destroyed the whole of Macedonia, such ruin as had never yet 
occurred.’52 
                                                 
50 Kant. II, 586.8-587.8. See also Bryer, ‘Byzantine-Ottoman marriage‘‚ 490-491; Ch.9.12. 
51 Greg. II, 835.11-12: φίλου μεγίστην αὐτῷ διὰ βίου τηρήσαντος εὔνοιαν. 
52 CBB I, 83, no. 41: ἔφθειραν δὲ τὴν Μακεδονίαν ὅλην, οἷα φθορὰ οὐκ ἐγένετο 
πώποτε. The chronicler refers to western Thrace as ‘Macedonia’, see Ch.9:9. 
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Commentary on Chapter 8 
1: It is unclear who exactly these ‘others’ (ἄλλων) are. It may indicate 
non-pronoiar soldiers who received cash payments from the state, such as 
foreign mercenaries.1 
 
2: Grants of pronoia were state incomes, which might be composed of 
fiscal rights, rents, and labour services, re-assigned to the benefit of grantees, 
most commonly awarded on condition of military service.2 Soldiers 
maintained by this method, often termed ‘pronoiars’ in modern scholarship, 
were usually natives and, in the Histories, generally seem to be equipped as 
heavy cavalry. Although Kantakouzēnos’ exact use of the word πρόνοια is 
sometimes ambiguous, he most often employs it in its non-technical sense, as 
‘providence’, ‘care’, or ‘solicitude’, in accordance with his general avoidance 
of technical terminology.3 However, in the episode described in the present 
chapter it is obvious that he refers to pronoia in its technical sense. 
Kantakouzēnos usually designates pronoiars as those ‘holding incomes from 
villages’.4 
 
3: Theodōros Patrikiōtēs (PLP 22077). A wealthy apographeus, or fiscal 
assessor, and literary patron. Perhaps surprisingly he seems not to have held 
                                                 
1 For the various classifications of contemporary soldiers, see Bartusis, Army, 137-305; 
Kyriakidis, Warfare, 75-135. 
2 The most recent, and most comprehensive, survey is Bartusis, Land and Privilege. There 
is an immense scholarly literature concerning pronoia, with much discussion concentrating 
on similarities or differences with the Western European fief; see Kazhdan, ‘Pronoia’. For 
concise consideration of the significant differences with Western feudalism, see Bartusis, 
Army, 182-184. 
3 Regarding Kantakouzēnos’ usage of πρόνοια, see Bartusis, Land and Privilege, 14-18, 
324-325. 
4 Kant. II, 81.15-16, 175.5-6: τῶν ἐκ χωρίων τὰς προσόδους ἐχόντων. See also Bartusis, 
Land and Privilege, 324-9. 
 308 
a court title.5 Pachymerēs complained that Michaēl VIII transferred the 
duties of fiscal surveyors from high office holders to ‘men of no account’, 
which seems to be borne out here.6 Manouēl Philēs dedicated numerous 
verses to him and he was the recipient of many letters from Michaēl Gabras.7 
The author Alexios Makrembolitēs was employed by him, seemingly during 
this period, and addressed a speech to him.8 Patrikiōtēs was an active 
apographeus under Andronikos II but during the first civil war he apparently 
retired to a monastery, perhaps to escape taking a position in the conflict.9 
He does not seem to have been tonsured and it is unclear when he returned 
to his profession. While relating the attacks of the demos upon his partisans 
and the rich in late 1342, Kantakouzēnos states that they tortured Patrikiōtēs 
and ‘having suspended him by cords, left him to die’.10 
 
4: Patrikiōtēs is offering to carry out a fiscal reassessment, or exisōsis 
(‘equalisation’). This process is described by Kantakouzēnos later in the 
chapter. Such fiscal surveys provided tax officials with numerous 
opportunities for corruption, hence why Patrikiōtēs’ offer might have 
aroused suspicion. 
 
5: In other words, Patrikiōtēs is confessing to acquiring wealth 
corruptly but, in his defence, without the worst abuses, such as outright 
extortion, of which others were presumably guilty. 
 
                                                 
5 He is addressed respectfully as pansebastos sebastos but this is not a court title. See 
Maksimović, Provincial Administration, 22, n. 45. For apographeis, ibid., 186-217.  
6 Pach. I, 293.4-7. There continued to be high ranking apographeis though, although their 
rank may be a result of exploiting their success in fiscal matters rather than being the cause 
of their appointment; an example is Iōannēs Batatzēs, see Ch.29:1. 
7 For analysis of the letters, Gabras, Letters I, 63. 
8 Makrembolitēs, ‘Dialogue’, 190 (Ševčenko’s commentary). 
9 FK III, 423, n. 63. 
10 Kant. II, 298.13-14: ἐναποθανεῖν ἐᾶσαι καλλωδίοις ἐξηρτημένον. 
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6: Presumably, Patrikiōtēs means the poor would be free to spend the 
money on immoral purposes, and thus the charity would, at least from his 
point of view, be wasted. 
 
7: Exisōtēs, or ‘fiscal assessor’, is synonymous with apographeus.11 
Kantakouzēnos describes, in idealised terms, a central duty of apographeis, 
the exisōsis: to survey pronoia holdings, establish their value, and remove 
revenues from those who have unlawfully acquired more than their 
allocation and re-allocate them to those who have less than assigned, or to 
allow the establishment of additional pronoiars. Each soldier should ideally 
possess sufficient income to support himself and provide effective service, 
according to their status.12 Apographeis held quasi-judicial powers to resolve 
land disputes and, as Patrikiōtēs’ career demonstrates, there were 
considerable opportunities for dishonest enrichment in the performance of 
such a duty, whether through taking bribes or fraudulently reassigning 
property; there is even evidence of an apographeus illegally imposing his own 
taxes.13 
 
8: The currency can be assumed to be hyperpyra. 100,000 is an 
enormous sum for an individual, and a stark indication of the scale of 
corruption at the time. In comparison, the entire state revenue for 1321 
amounted to one million hyperpyra.14 In 1340, Andronikos provided 100,000 
hyperpyra for the outfitting and maintenance of a fleet,15 and the annual 
                                                 
11 Maksimović, Provincial Administration, 186-7, n. 5.  
12 For a discussion of fiscal reassessments, and this incident in particular, see Bartusis, 
Army, 177-8; Bartusis, Land and Privilege, 324-5, 415-6; Maksimović, Provincial Administration, 
204-6. 
13 Maksimović, Provincial Administration, 213-5, 226. 
14 Greg. I, 317.18-20. 
15 Kant. I, 540.5-6; see also Ch.15:2. Following Hendy, Studies, 162-3, this sum could 
support perhaps ten or as many as twenty war galleys for a year, depending on how 
inflation and currency debasement is calculated. 
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household expenses of Andronikos III in 1322, as junior co-emperor, were 
36,000 hyperpyra.16 Patrikiōtēs’ offer thus appears sufficient to finance a 
military expedition in its own right. There is no compelling evidence that 
Kantakouzēnos is exaggerating significantly; it is implied that the embezzled 
profits were gathered throughout Patrikiōtēs’ entire career and presumably 
represented the liquidation of much of his property.17  
 
9: The sixty day duration of the exisōsis causes some problems with 
Kantakouzēnos’ chronology. In the previous chapter, he gave the Bulgarian 
ambassadors thirty days to make peace or declare war. As they do not make 
peace, at the end of the following chapter Kantakouzēnos leads the army into 
Thrace to confront Ivan Alexander.18 The sixty days apparently pass in 
between setting the deadline and military mobilisation, which seems rather 
leisurely in the circumstances. However, there is no obvious reason that 
Kantakouzēnos could not have campaigned with some portion of the army 
before the entire bureaucratic process was completed; many soldiers would 
already have received their payments and others would know that their 
incomes would shortly be increasing.19 Moreover, Kantakouzēnos appears to 
have a particular weakness for multiples of thirty and these intervals should 
perhaps not be taken as absolutely reliable.20 
 
                                                 
16 Kant. I, 167.10-12; Hendy, Studies, 205. See also Bartusis, ‘Cost of Warfare’, esp. 81-2. 
17 Maksimović, Provincial Administration, 198, argues it is an unbelievable sum when 
compared to Grēgoras’ figure for the customs revenue of 1348 (30,000 hyperpyra). Although 
the total may be exaggerated, the comparison both assumes post-war revenues closely 
resemble pre-war figures and that customs duties were a major element of state income. The 
former assumption is unlikely and there is insufficient evidence of the second. 
18 For the dating of this campaign, see Ch.9:17. 
19 Fatouros’ and Krischer’s suggested chronology may be correct but it seems 
unnecessary to treat the sixty days as inviolable: FK III, 424, n. 67 and 425, n. 75. 
20 As observed by Kazhdan, ‘L’Histoire de Cantacuzène’, 307. 
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10: The description of this incident, where pronoia incomes are 
distributed to the soldiers, is somewhat at odds with Kantakouzēnos’ earlier 
statement that Patrikiōtēs’ wealth was held as cash. Although a cash 
donative is being paid as a bonus, it is unclear how Patrikiōtēs endowed the 
recurring pronoia entitlements given to the soldiers who had lost their former 
income. Either they were provided by transferring revenues from other 
holders who had acquired them illegally, or Patrikiōtēs provided new 
incomes by purchasing revenue-generating properties from their current 
holders. There is no evidence that a Grand Domestic would normally have 
been involved in an exisōsis, or determining military incomes without 
reference to the emperor. Kantakouzēnos’ action would have been politically 
provocative and easily construed as an attempt to secure the loyalty of the 
army to himself personally; he acknowledges this later by placing such an 
allegation into the Patriarch’s mouth.21 Grēgoras also states that the army 
were loyal to Kantakouzēnos because he shared their hardships on campaign 
and provided them with wealth.22 
 
11: Most soldiers were expected to supply their own equipment so, by 
increasing military incomes, Kantakouzēnos allowed them to improve their 
armament. The number of mounts a soldier owned appeared to be an 
indicator of his status and effectiveness; Pseudo-Kodinos mentions that there 
had previously been soldiers called monokaballoi (soldiers with one mount), 
dikaballoi (two mounts), and trikaballoi (three mounts).23  
                                                 
21 Kant. II, 132.14-15: στρατιὰν ἅπασαν αὐτῷ προσέχειν παρασκευάσει χρήμασι 
διαφθείρας (‘he will render the entire army obedient to him, having corrupted it with 
money’). 
22 Greg. I, 586.8-12. 
23 Ps-Kod., 113. See also Kyriakidis, Warfare, 88-90. 
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Commentary on Chapter 9 
1: Myron is holy chrism, traditionally prepared by the Patriarch of 
Constantinople. The Patriarch would draw a cross in myron on the emperor’s 
head as part of the coronation ritual.1 Anointment with myron is securely 
attested from the coronation of Michaēl IX onwards, and was probably 
established practice for all the Palaiologoi emperors.2 There is disagreement 
regarding whether the custom of physical, rather than metaphorical, 
anointment originated following 1204 or before.3 In either case, the new 
literary emphasis on anointment was probably a response to the importance 
it was accorded in Latin practice.4  
 
2: Parakoimōmenos was a high-ranking court title, originally 
designating the eunuch guarding the imperial bedchamber.5 It was 
frequently held by non-eunuchs as time went on and in the thirteenth 
century it appears to have been divided into two roles: that of a bodyguard, 
parakoimōmenos tou koitōnos, and that of the keeper of the state seal, the 
parakoimōmenos tēs sphendonēs.6 Apokaukos occupied the latter position, 
which Pseudo-Kodinos ranked sixteenth.7 The sphendonē in this case was a 
ring for marking wax seals.8 
 
                                                 
1 Ps-Kod., 221. 
2 Nicol, ‘Kaiseralbung’. 
3 For after 1204, see Angelov, Ideology, 387-92; for 12th century or earlier, Shawcross, 
‘Conquest Legitimized’, 187-8.  
4 Macrides, et al., Pseudo-Kodinos, 424-5. 
5 Guilland, Institutions I, 202-215. 
6 Ps-Kod., 87-9; Guilland, Institutions I, 208. 
7 Ps-Kod., 456. 
8 Macrides, et al., Pseudo-Kodinos, 87, n. 159. 
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3: Alexios Apokaukos (PLP 1180).9 Apokaukos’ birth date is unknown 
but is often assumed to be 1280.10 The major sources for his life are the 
extremely hostile accounts of Grēgoras and Kantakouzēnos. Apokaukos’ 
career is recounted in detail in Chapters 14 and 15. He was from an ‘obscure’ 
Bithynian family; Grēgoras goes so far as to say that he ‘grew up in poverty’ 
but this cannot be taken to mean that his family were literally paupers, since 
they were clearly able to secure him a good education.11 His intelligence was 
acknowledged even by his enemies. Grēgoras states ‘while he was not of 
very distinguished birth, he was a man of profound wisdom, and was 
inventive and clever at devising schemes’.12 Kantakouzēnos admits that 
Apokaukos possessed ‘a profound mind and was able to take advantage of 
opportunities and circumstances’.13 His ability, allied with obvious ambition, 
allowed him to rise quickly through the fiscal administration and become 
extremely wealthy. He had achieved the office of domestikos tōn dysikōn 
thematōn and received charge of the imperial salt monopoly before he joined 
Andronikos III’s conspiracy against his grandfather.14 He was rewarded with 
the title of parakoimōmenos, probably following the Treaty of Rhēgion in June 
1321, which ended the first phase of the civil war.15 Apokaukos held the title 
                                                 
9 For his life see Matschke, Fortschritt und Reaktion, 133-146; Guilland, ‘Apokaukos’ 
(somewhat outdated); Apokaukos may sometimes have used the name Doukas; see Polemis, 
Doukai, 101. 
10 Guilland, ‘Apokaukos’, 523. This was followed by Matschke, who demonstrates that 
his career probably began before 1310; see Matschke, Fortschritt und Reaktion, 149, n. 73. 
Therefore, although 1280 is quite possible, he may well have been younger. 
11 Greg. II, 577.20-21: πενίᾳ συντεθραμμένος. Regarding Apokaukos’ social origins, see 
Ch.14:2. 
12 Greg. I, 301.12-14: οὗτος μὲν οὖν οὐ πάνυ τῶν εὐγενῶν ἦν, βαθυγνώμων δὲ ἀνὴρ καὶ 
εὐμήχανος καὶ δόλους συνθεῖναι δεινός. He also expresses similar sentiments, albeit in a 
more hostile tone, somewhat later; see Greg. II, 577.11-18.  
13 Kant. I, 25.7-8: βαθείας ὄντα φρενὸς καὶ δυνάμενον καιροῖς καὶ πράγμασι χρῆσθαι. 
14 Greg. I, 301.11-12. Regarding this title, see Ch.14:6. 
15 Kant. I, 116.8, names him parakoimōmenos before this but is probably a slip. Andronikos 
II would have had to confirm the title either at Rhēgion or Epibatai (in 1322), see Kyritses, 
Byzantine Aristocracy, 339. 
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thereafter until promoted to megas dux at Iōannēs V’s coronation in 1341.16 
During Andronikos III’s sole reign, Apokaukos apparently enjoyed great 
responsibility for the imperial finances and administration, although 
Kantakouzēnos attempts to downplay this.17 It may have been his financial 
and commercial interests which led to his increasing interest in naval power. 
In 1340 he resigned many of his responsibilities to gain command of a fleet, 
probably intended as a new standing navy, proving himself an able 
commander against the Turks.18 His apparent concern for maritime defence 
was popular in the capital and he seems to have developed strong support 
among the sailors and commercial classes in Constantinople.19 When 
Kantakouzēnos had effectively isolated Constantinople from its hinterland in 
1345, Apokaukos thought to transform the city to a largely maritime 
economy.20 However this must be seen as an adaptation to circumstance 
rather than a long-held goal.  
Despite Kantakouzēnos’ scorn for Apokaukos’ martial abilities,21 he 
proved himself to be a wily strategist during the civil war and effectively 
hounded Kantakouzēnos into taking refuge in Serbia in 1342. However, as 
the conflict slowly swung into Kantakouzēnos’ favour, Apokaukos 
unsurprisingly came under political pressure and in summer 1344, following 
the death of his son-in-law Andronikos Palaiologos,22 he appears to have 
come under serious pressure to make peace, particularly from Iōannēs 
Gabalas.23 Apokaukos saw off the threat but Kantakouzēnos claims he had to 
                                                 
16 Kant. II, 218.9-10. 
17 See Ch.14:11. 
18 See Ch.15:2. 
19 Matschke, ‘Flotte’, summarises and analyses Apokaukos’ naval activities. 
20 Kant. II, 536.14-537.10. 
21 Kant. I, 539.4-9; II, 364.9ff. 
22 PLP 21433. Kantakouzēnos claims that Apokaukos planned to depose Iōannēs V and 
place Andronikos on the throne, see Kant. II, 323.23-324.21.  
23 For this incident, see Ch.19:4. 
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govern ‘not so monarchically as before but somewhat more moderately.’24 
Apokaukos generally seems to have taken rapid and harsh action against 
perceived opponents and, ironically, this proved to be his undoing. In June 
1345, while inspecting the construction of an extension to the prison he had 
established in the Great Palace, Apokaukos was overwhelmed and beaten to 
death by the inmates, many of whom were Kantakouzēnos’ partisans.25 They 
apparently displayed his body on the walls in expectation of a popular 
uprising. None came and Apokaukos’ supporters, particularly sailors, 
stormed the building the next day, killing nearly everyone.26 Although 
Kantakouzēnos and Grēgoras portray him as the regency’s evil mastermind, 
his death was not the clear turning point that might be expected from this 
characterisation. Order was rapidly restored in Constantinople and the 
Empress quickly appointed Isaakios Asanēs to take his place in 
government.27 
 
4: Grēgoras also states Kantakouzēnos wished for Iōannēs V to be 
crowned shortly after Andronikos’ death but he places responsibility for 
preventing it with the Patriarch, not Apokaukos.28 Kantakouzēnos later 
suggests that the coronation was to be put back until Christmas.29 
 
5: The Palaiologoi generally proclaimed their chosen heir as co-
emperor at an early stage to secure their peaceful succession. A formal 
proclamation of a co-emperor preceded any coronation, often by a long 
interval; Andronikos II was crowned in 1272 but appears to have held the 
                                                 
24 Kant. II, 444.3-4: οὐ μὴν, ὥσπερ πρότερον, μοναρχικῶς, ἀλλὰ μετριώτερόν πως. 
25 The event is noted by three chronicles. Although there is some variation regarding the 
exact date, 11 June is generally accepted; see CBB II, 263. 
26 Kant. II, 542.6-545.22; Greg. II, 729.1ff.; Doukas, History, V.4-5 (trans. Magoulias, 65-6).  
27 For Isaakios, see Ch.19:2. 
28 Greg. II, 616.13-16. 
29 Kant. II, 82.2-5. 
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imperial title since at least 1265/6.30 Although the practice strengthened the 
dynasty by minimising uncertainty about succession, it was not without 
critics.31 Grēgoras, thinking of Andronikos III, warned that it encouraged 
designated heirs to revolt rather than waiting for the death of the emperor.32 
While there is no direct literary evidence that Iōannēs V was proclaimed 
basileus in his father’s lifetime, Kantakouzēnos consistently refers to Iōannēs 
V as basileus even before his coronation in November 1341. In comparison, he 
refers to himself consistently as megas domestikos before his own 
proclamation and only as basileus thereafter. This is inconclusive though, as 
Kantakouzēnos wrote during Iōannēs V’s sole reign and he is not always 
precise in reflecting changes in individuals’ honours. However, both 
Kantakouzēnos and Grēgoras record that Iōannēs was heralded as basileus 
during Kantakouzēnos’ acclamation in October 1341, which anticipated 
Iōannēs’ coronation.33 Moreover, a Genoese document of September 1341 
refers to Iōannēs as Iohannes Dei gratia imperator Romeorum.34 His imperial 
status is also suggested by numismatic evidence; Nicol and Bendall 
demonstrated that the ‘type 11’ coins of the ‘Salonica hoard’, which depict a 
large and a small emperor, most probably represent Andronikos III and the 
young Iōannēs V, again suggesting Iōannēs was formally proclaimed before 
1341.35 The coins cannot represent Iōannēs V and Iōannēs VI, as had been 
                                                 
30 Macrides, ‘New Constantine’, 37. 
31 Although the hereditary principle was predominant, political thought allowed for non-
hereditary succession; see Angelov, Ideology, 116-133. 
32 Greg. I, 53-5; Angelov, Ideology, 218-282. 
33 Kant. II, 166.11-13; Greg. II, 611.21-2.  
34 Malamut, ‘Jeanne-Anne’, 102. 
35 Nicol and Bendall, ‘Numismatic evidence’, 95-6. For Nicol’s earlier view that Iōannēs V 
was not proclaimed, see Nicol, Last Centuries, 185-6 (this apparently escaped revision from 
the 1972 edition). For further supporting arguments, see Protonotarios, ‘Monnayage’. 
Although Grierson, Byzantine Coins, 293, dismisses the idea that Iōannēs V was acclaimed in 
his father’s lifetime, without supporting arguments, he also identifies a silver basilicon and 
copper trachy as portraying Andronikos III and a smaller Iōannēs V, which he attributes to 
the regency (299 and Plate 83, no. 1322; 309 and Plate 92, no. 1474). However, all other coins 
struck by the regency government portray Anna (always with Iōannēs, and sometimes also 
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thought, since they were struck in Thessalonike, which Kantakouzēnos did 
not control until 1351, and all post-war coinage depicts the co-emperors the 
same size.36 While Grierson suggests the coins portray Andronikos III 
posthumously alongside his son, such a representation would be highly 
unusual, although there were precedents in the eleventh century and 
before.37 Shea’s recent survey of the hoard accepts Grierson’s identification, 
but acknowledges that the type concerned could equally well be attributed 
to Andronikos III’s reign.38 Therefore it seems that the indirect testimony of 
Kantakouzēnos, Grēgoras, and the coinage point to Iōannēs V having been 
proclaimed before 1341. Consequently, his coronation would have had 
limited effect on his own status beyond reducing suspicion regarding 
Kantakouzēnos’ intentions towards him, which is surely why he protests 
that he sought it. However, as suggested by Malamut, Iōannēs’ coronation 
would have diminished the status of the Empress to an extent and this may 
have been a reason for her lack of enthusiasm at that time.39  
 
6: Sarukhan, Emir of Sarukhan (PLP 24922).40 Kantakouzēnos first 
mentions Sarukhan when Andronikos III made a treaty with him during the 
expedition to secure Phōkaia in 1329.41 In 1335, he provided infantry and 
naval forces to assist in the sieges of Phōkaia and Mytilene, which had been 
occupied by a Genoese adventurer; a son of Sarukhan, Süleyman, and a 
                                                                                                                                          
Andronikos); see Grierson, Byzantine Coins, 299-300, and Plate 83, nos. 1323-1325; Plate 81, 
no. 1295; Bendall and Donald, Coinage, 132-8. It would seem unlikely that regency issues 
would omit Anna, the actual sovereign; Grierson may conceivably have been influenced by 
Nicol’s original assertion that Iōannēs was not proclaimed and constructed his analysis 
accordingly.  
36 For coins depicting Iōannēs VI and Iōannēs V together, see Grierson, Byzantine Coins, 
293-4, and Plate 81, no. 1296; 299-300 and Plate 83, nos. 1326-1327; 309 and Plate 89, no. 1427; 
312-3 and Plate 94, nos. 1500-1502; Bendall and Donald, Coinage, 138-147. 
37 Protonotarios, ‘Monnayage’, 83-4. 
38 Shea, ‘Salonica Hoard’, 308, n. 41. 
39 Malamut, ‘Jeanne-Anne’, 101-4. 
40 See also E.A. Zachariadou, ‘Sarukhan’, in EI, IX, 69. 
41 Kant I, 388.11-16. 
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number of other leading Turks had been taken hostage by the Genoese in 
Phōkaia and only freed by the Emperor following a lengthy siege.42 During 
the civil war, Sarukhan took an ambivalent line; he obstructed 
Kantakouzēnos’ ally Umur (whose naval power had been crippled by the 
crusade of 1344) from crossing to Thrace until Umur capitulated to him in a 
territorial dispute. He then allowed Süleyman to accompany Umur and aid 
Kantakouzēnos.43 Süleyman subsequently died of an illness, causing Umur 
to retreat to placate his father.44 Near the end of the conflict, Sarukhan was 
induced to send soldiers to help the regency, although they then came to an 
agreement with Kantakouzēnos, through Umur’s assistance, and indulged in 
freelance plundering instead.45 Sarukhan died some point after 1348, when 
he was last mentioned, in a Genoese document.46 
Andronikos’ treaties with Sarukhan probably provided for the 
security of Phōkaia in return for tribute but most likely did not, or could not, 
prevent all raiding. Lemerle suggests that the Turkish emirs viewed their 
treaties as being with the emperor in person and were thus voided by 
Andronikos’ death. While this may be correct, it is probable that Apokaukos’ 
naval victory off Chios in early 1341 was over Sarukhan’s fleet, and therefore 
that agreements had already broken down or were very limited in scope.47 
 
7: The eponymous emirate of Sarukhan mapped only partially onto 
the ancient region of Lydia, defined as lying in western Asia Minor, roughly 
between the Hermos and Maeander rivers.48 Doukas characterises it more 
precisely as stretching from Pergamon (belonging to Sarukhan’s northern 
                                                 
42 For the entire incident, see Kant. I, 476-494; for date CBB I, 80, no. 8/29. 
43 Kant. II, 529.14-530.8. 
44 Kant. II, 550.17-551.17. 
45 Kant. II, 591.8-596.24. 
46 E.A. Zachariadou, ‘Sarukhan’, EI, IX, 69. 
47 Lemerle, Aydin, 148, n. 2; Kant. I, 540.23-541.2; Ch.15:2. 
48 Smith, Classical Dictionary, 507-8. 
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neighbour, Karasi) to Magnesia.49 Although Sarukhan’s capital was 
Magnesia on the Hermos, the southern part of the region, encompassing 
Smyrna and Ephesos, was controlled by Aydin. Mount Sipylos, situated 
between the two cities, may have marked the border. Although fertile and 
prosperous, the area is poorly documented but its fortresses mostly seem to 
have fallen into Turkish hands during the early fourteenth century.50 
Magnesia itself had been extremely wealthy and one of the major centres of 
Laskarid rule, but it fell to Sarukhan in 1313.51 Phōkaia and New Phōkaia, at 
this time under imperial control, lay within this region.52 Despite occasional 
conflicts with its neighbours, the emirate survived until 1390, when it was 
annexed by the Ottomans.53 
 
8: Yakhshi Khan, Emir of Karasi (PLP 4171).54 Karasi, named after its 
largely unknown founder, encompassed the north-west corner of Asia 
Minor; Grēgoras stated that its territory stretched ‘from Lydia and Aeolis as 
far as Mysia on the Hellespont’.55 The emirate’s origin is obscure but it 
appears to have been established during the chaos following the Catalan 
Company’s withdrawal from Anatolia in August 1304.56 After Karasi’s death, 
the territory appears to have been split between his sons, Yakhshi, whose 
name means ‘excellent’ and who held sway around Pergamon, and his 
brother Demir, who ruled Balikesir and whom Ibn Battuta described as a 
                                                 
49 Doukas, History II, 3 (ed. Grecu, 33.27-8). 
50 Foss, ‘Lydia’. 
51 For Magnesia, see Foss, ‘Lydia’, 306-9. 
52 Ibn Battuta, Travels, 448, mentions the ‘strongly fortified town’ paid tribute to 
Sarukhan.  
53 E.A. Zachariadou, ‘Sarukhan’, EI, IX, 69. 
54 See also Cl. Cahen, ‘Karasi’, EI IV, 627-8. 
55 Greg. I, 214.20-21: τὰ δ’ ἀπὸ Λυδίας καὶ Αἰολίδος ἄχρι Μυσίας τῆς πρὸς τῷ 
Ἑλλησπόντῳ. 
56 Zachariadou, ‘Karasi’, 226. For this event, see Laiou, Andronicus II, 136-7. 
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‘worthless person’.57 The emirate was well-positioned for launching raids 
across the straits into Thrace and possessed a formidable fleet. However it 
suffered a severe setback in 1334 when crusading forces destroyed much of 
its fleet at the Battle of Adramyttion58 but by 1337, Grēgoras relates that they 
were able to bring both horses and men across the straits to raid Thrace.59 
Yakhshi himself disappears from the sources after this event; an emir 
Süleyman, identified by Kantakouzēnos as satrap of Karasi was courted by 
the regency during the war but later offered his services to Kantakouzēnos.60 
Kantakouzēnos later relates that the ‘satrap of Lydia’ allied with the 
treacherous Iōannēs Batatzēs; however Grēgoras reports that Batatzēs’ ally 
was called Süleyman and held sway around the Troad, thus clearly being the 
same emir of Karasi.61 Enveri also confirms that a Süleyman was the son of 
Karasi (and thus Yakhshi’s brother).62 Zachariadou plausibly suggests that 
Batatzēs’ death at his allies’ hands is evidence for a wider rivalry between 
Karasi and the Ottomans, which soon led to the latter’s conquest of the 
emirate, sometime between 1346 and 1348.63  
 
9: Thrace was the agricultural and fiscal hinterland of Constantinople 
and essentially the remaining heartland of the Empire.64 Kantakouzēnos 
speaks of Thrace as a geographic region rather than a formal administrative 
                                                 
57 Ibn Battuta, Travels, 449. 
58 Lemerle, Aydin, 96; Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, 32; Carr, Motivations and Response, 
151-3. 
59 Greg. I, 538.10-14. 
60 Kant. II, 476.12-18, 507.14-18. This identification is confused though as he names him 
satrap of Phrygia, which corresponds to Germiyan rather than Karasi. 
61 Kant. II, 553.17-18. Greg. II, 741.21-22. For Batatzēs see Ch.29:1. It seems most likely 
Kantakouzēnos has erred on this point, see Lemerle, Aydin, 204, n. 1. 
62 Enveri, Düstūrnāme, 123, verse 2295.  
63 Zachariadou, ‘Karasi’, 232-4. 
64 On the region generally, see Külzer, Ostthrakien; Soustal, Thrakien. For areas west of the 
Hebros, see Asdracha, Rhodopes. 
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area; indeed, there was no province of Thrace in the Palaiologan period.65 For 
Kantakouzēnos, the area is defined by the sea to the east and south, the 
Bulgarian border to the north, and the Rhodope Mountains to the west. The 
boundary on the south coast is the city of Christoupolis (modern Kavala), 
which he places in Thrace itself.66 From Christoupolis to the Adriatic are the 
‘Macedonian and western provinces’.67 Classical writers considered the 
Nestos to be the western boundary of Thrace, so Kantakouzēnos adopts a 
very expansive definition.68 While Grēgoras uses the name in a similar 
manner to Kantakouzēnos, earlier historians such as Akropolitēs and 
Chōniatēs, as well as contemporary chroniclers, identify much of geographic 
Thrace as ‘Macedonia’.69 This situation arose from the creation of a theme of 
Macedonia, with its capital in Adrianople, around the start of the 9th 
century.70 Kantakouzēnos’ usage arises from his visualisation of Thrace and 
Macedonia as two separate geographic zones, with the fortifications of 
Christoupolis forming a strangle-point between them; at this point the 
mountains reach almost to the sea and the gap remaining was blocked by the 
town and a wall built by Andronikos II.71 As Kantakouzēnos’ Thrace 
possesses an extensive coastline, the immediate target of the Turkish attack is 
unclear. However the Turks ultimately take the shortest, safest, route by 
crossing over to the Chersonese.72 
 
                                                 
65 Palaiologan administrative units were generally small and centred on cities, see 
Maksimović, Provincial Administration, 48-53. 
66 Kant. I, 35.16-17: τὴν ἐν Θρᾴκῃ Χριστοῦ πόλιν. 
67 Kant. I, 115.17-19: τῶν ἀπὸ Χριστουπόλεως Μακεδονικῶν τε καὶ ἑσπερίων ἐπαρχιῶν 
ἄχρις Ἐπιδάμνου καὶ Δαλματίας, τῶν ἄκρων ὅρων τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμονίας. 
68 Strabo, 7a.1.33. 
69 E.g., CBB I, 81, no. 8/33, states Kantakouzēnos travelled into ‘Macedonia’ to reach 
Didymoteichon. 
70 Andriotes, ‘Macedonia’, 146-7; Daperglos, ‘Theme of Macedonia’. 
71 Greg. I, 246.2-6, who also comments on its role blocking passage between Thrace and 
Macedonia. 
72 See Ch.10:3. 
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10: It is clear that the state did not possess a standing naval force of 
any significance.73 Facing financial crisis, Andronikos II disbanded the navy 
early in his reign, a decision criticised by contemporaries and historians 
alike.74 Piracy became endemic in the Aegean and Turkish raiding parties 
were fought on land, despite their weakness in naval combat.75 Although 
Kantakouzēnos relates substantial naval actions, such as the campaigns 
against Lesbos in 1335 and against Turkish pirates in 1341, he always 
mentions the outfitting of a fleet beforehand.76 As in the present case, the 
costs involved were not always met by the imperial treasury alone but with 
private contributions by prominent aristocrats.77 So while there appear to 
have been vessels and crew that could be called up at short notice when 
sufficient funds were made available, possibly engaged in trade when not in 
service, there was insufficient money and political commitment to keep a 
standing navy ready and patrolling at all times. It is possible that 
Apokaukos’ initiative in constructing a fleet in early 1341 was a serious 
attempt to re-establish a regular navy but his dismissal from command 
appears to have led to its disbandment, as Kantakouzēnos apparently 
needed to muster it afresh.78 The insecurity of employment offered to sailors 
and marines made them a very volatile political group, who strongly backed 
Apokaukos during the civil war.79 Although Apokaukos was apparently 
mocked for squandering resources on a fleet during the conflict, it was 
critical in keeping Thessalonike out of Kantakouzēnos’ hands, as he 
                                                 
73 For an overview, see Ahrweiler, Byzance et la Mer, 374-388. However there are some 
confusions in chronology and analysis is overshadowed by (understandably) unfavourable 
comparisons with earlier eras. 
74 Pach. III, 81.19-83.19; Greg. I, 174.10-175.3; Ahrweiler, Byzance et la Mer, 374-9; for an 
estimate of the costs involved, Hendy, Studies, 161-4. 
75 Ahrweiler, Byzance et la Mer, 377-8. On Turkish weakness at sea, Ch.7:5. 
76 Kant. I, 477.1-7, 540.3-8. 
77 E.g., for the 1329 Chios campaign, Kant. I, 381.20-22.  
78 For Apokaukos’ fleet, see Ch.15:2.  
79 Kant. I, 24.19-23, comments on the disorder of the sailors at Kallioupolis in 1321. For 
detailed analysis, see Matschke, ‘Flotte’. 
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grudgingly admits.80 On the other hand, the fleet appears to have posed no 
serious obstacle to the passage of Kantakouzēnos’ Turkish allies to and from 
Europe. 
 
11: When referring to a treasury, Kantakouzēnos sometimes writes 
dēmosios or dēmosia, ‘public treasury’ and, less frequently, basilika or basilikon 
tamieion, ‘imperial treasury’.81 Two separate treasuries are known to have 
existed in the Empire of Nikaia82 but their precise functions are unclear, as is 
whether they continued to exist in the Palaiologan period. Miller argued 
strongly that there were two distinct treasuries: the dēmosia for state taxes 
(which he identifies with the bestiarion mentioned by other writers)83 and the 
basilikon tamieion for other sources of revenue, notably income from imperial 
estates, thus maintaining the ancient Roman division between public money 
and the private property of the ruler.84 Miller argued that Kantakouzēnos, 
well versed in the detailed workings of the state, employed the terms in a 
deliberate and technically accurate manner. In particular, he points to a 
passage where Kantakouzēnos refers to drawing funds from both in the 
same sentence.85 While Miller, in an addendum to his article, admitted that 
contemporary writers certainly did use the terms interchangeably at times, 
he continued to believe Kantakouzēnos, with his precise knowledge of 
                                                 
80 Kant. II, 225.8-19. 
81 E.g., δημόσια: Kant. II, 65.21-2, 89.17; βασιλικόν ταμιεῖον: Kant. II, 89.13-14. 
82 Pach. I, 97.21-26 for the treasury at Astritzion; the main treasury was in Magnesia: 
Pach. I, 101.20-25. 
83 E.g., Ps-Kod., 111. 
84 See Miller, ‘Basilika and Demosia’. Miller views the demosion as the actual taxes (see 
173) but the word can apply to the fisc itself (see Maksimović, Provincial Administration, 219, 
n. 126). 
85 Kant. III, 80.12-16: Καὶ ἀπεδείκνυτο, καὶ τῶν τὰ χρήματα παρασχομένων 
συνομολογούντων, μὴ πλέον εἰσπεπρᾶχθαι πέντε μυριάδων, ἃ ἀνάλωτο πρὸς τοῦ 
στόλου τὴν παρασκευήν, καὶ ἕτερα οὐκ ὀλίγῳ πλείω τούτων ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων καὶ 
βασιλικῶν. 
 324 
government, was using them correctly.86 Angold, on the other hand, 
acknowledged the existence of two Laskarid treasuries but considered the 
bestiarion to have been the ‘sole central treasury’ of the Nikaian Empire and 
the treasury at Astritzion to have been ‘a subsidiary treasury’.87 Hendy also 
saw the Astritzion treasury as a secondary, regional treasury.88 Bartusis and 
Maksimović, in their studies of administrative and financial documents, treat 
the terms as interchangeable.89 Angelov, without reference to Miller, also 
noticed the variation in the terms used for treasuries, but, citing a great 
number of examples, concluded the two terms were interchangeable and did 
not indicate the existence of separate institutions.90 Kantakouzēnos, 
consistent with his classicising style, demonstrates little interest in 
administrative details and is imprecise on many matters. Each of 
Kantakouzēnos’ references to treasuries can accept a generalised, rhetorical 
reading as easily as a specific, technical one: even Miller’s example 
mentioned above could be read as not referring to two distinct 
administrative/financial institutions but simply as a reference to having 
spent the income from both taxation and his own estates (or stored 
resources), which were, in 1349, ‘imperial’. This is consistent with 
Kantakouzēnos’ frequent reminders that he spent private resources on 
matters of public benefit. In conclusion, given the prevalence of confusion 
and lack of corroboration elsewhere, the weight of evidence appears to be 
against Miller’s argument. 
 
12: Orhan, Emir of Bithynia 1326-1362 (PLP 21133). Orhan was a son 
of Osman, who gave his name to the Ottoman dynasty. The origins of the 
                                                 
86 Miller, ‘Basilika and Demosia’, 191. His argument is accepted by FK II, 174, n. 37a and 
FK III, 433, n. 125. 
87 Angold, Government in Exile, 204-5.  
88 Hendy, Studies, 443. 
89 Maksimović, Provincial Administration; Bartusis, Land and Privilege. 
90 Angelov, Ideology, 255, 269. 
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Ottomans are shrouded by scant contemporary sources and the subsequent 
mythologising of fifteenth-century Turkish writers.91 Orhan was certainly 
emir by the time he captured Prousa in 1326 but he had succeeded Osman 
perhaps up to two years earlier.92 Kantakouzēnos first mentions Orhan, 
during Andronikos III’s campaign in Mesothynia, as the ‘satrap of the 
Persians there’.93 The campaign ended with Andronikos’ defeat at the Battle 
of Pelekanos in June 1329, which marked the last serious attempt to halt the 
Turkish advance in Anatolia.94 Although Orhan thereafter slowly overcame 
the few remaining Roman cities in Bithynia,95 he appears not to have 
acquired a fleet of any significance and the only sizeable recorded Ottoman 
attack on Thrace, in 1337 or 1338, led to most of Orhan’s men being killed or 
captured.96 However, the civil war transformed the fortunes of the Ottomans. 
Both sides sought Orhan’s assistance; Kantakouzēnos claims that the regency 
was first to approach him.97 Although it was Kantakouzēnos who gained his 
assistance, it initially appears to have been relatively limited.98 However, 
after the crusader attack on Smyrna in October 1344 limited Umur’s ability to 
support Kantakouzēnos, he became desperate to acquire an ally of similar 
power. Consequently, Kantakouzēnos married his daughter Theodōra to 
Orhan. This first marriage of a legitimate imperial princess to an already-
married Muslim ruler, shortly after Kantakouzēnos’ coronation in May 1346, 
                                                 
91 On the difficulties posed by the early Ottoman narrative sources, see Imber, ‘Osman 
Gazi’; for an attempt to make sense of the available evidence, Beldiceanu-Steinherr, 
‘Ottomans’. 
92 See Beldiceanu-Steinherr, ‘Ottomans’, 372-3. The fall of Prousa is dated by a number of 
chronicles, see CBB II, 231-2.  
93 Kant. I, 342.15-16: Ὀρχάνης δὲ ὁ τῶν αὐτόθι Περσῶν σατράπης. 
94 Kant. I, 341.5-363.8; Greg. I, 433.9-436.15; Nicol, Last Centuries, 169-170; Kyriakidis, 
‘Pelekanos-Philokrene’. 
95 See below, Ch.9:13. 
96 Kant. I, 505.8-508.16; Greg. I, 538.4-542.2.  
97 Kant. II, 498.11-16. 
98 Kant. II, 498.22-499.3. 
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would have been scandalous.99 Kantakouzēnos is clearly defensive, claiming 
his daughter was a beacon for Christianity in the Ottoman lands.100 It is quite 
probable that Orhan saw the betrothal as an acceptance of vassalage by 
Kantakouzēnos.101 However, Orhan’s followers gave Kantakouzēnos a 
formidable advantage, as Grēgoras notes,102 and must have formed the bulk 
of the force that saw him to victory in 1347. Kantakouzēnos’ dependence on 
his new son-in-law ensured that one of his earliest acts as emperor was to 
meet with Orhan and his sons in spring 1347.103 Kantakouzēnos repeatedly 
requested Ottoman auxiliaries throughout his reign but, as he was unable to 
reliably control them, they often proved of dubious benefit and their 
depredations undoubtedly undermined his legitimacy.104 Orhan even sided 
with the Genoese against Kantakouzēnos and his Venetian allies in 1352.105 
The earthquake of the night of 1/2 March 1354 enabled Orhan’s son 
Süleyman to occupy Kallioupolis; Kantakouzēnos’ efforts to bribe the 
Ottomans to leave were ineffectual, although he places the responsibility for 
his failure on Süleyman rather than his father.106 Although, shortly after, 
Kantakouzēnos lost power to Iōannēs V, the new emperor’s policy of 
confrontation with the Ottomans was equally unsuccessful and they began a 
systematic conquest of Thrace. Orhan himself died in March 1362, probably 
from plague.107  
                                                 
99 Kant. II, 585.18-589.11; Greg. II, 762.18-763.15; Bryer, ‘Byzantine-Ottoman marriage’; for 
Theodōra, Nicol, Family, 134-5, no. 29. 
100 Kant. II, 588.17-589.11. 
101 Bryer, ‘Byzantine-Ottoman marriage’, 485-7. 
102 Greg. II, 763.14-15: ἦν ἐντεῦθεν φοβερός τις καὶ ἄμαχος Καντακουζηνός (‘thereafter, 
Kantakouzēnos was someone fearsome and unconquerable’). 
103 Kant. III, 28.5-24 (trans. Miller, Cantacuzenus, 165). 
104 Kant. III, 32 (in 1348), 111-116 (in 1350), 243-250 (in 1352), 323-328 (1356, summoned by 
Matthaios in his conflict against Iōannēs V). 
105 Kant. III, 228.12f. 
106 Kant. III, 276.17-281.18. For the date, CBB II, 283-4. 
107 CBB I, 66, no. 7/15; I, 561, no. 72a/4; II, 290-1 (Schreiner’s commentary). 
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The Histories reflects Kantakouzēnos’ understandable discomfort 
regarding Orhan, who emerges as a rather distant and shady figure; there is 
no hint of any personal warmth in their relationship, in contrast to 
Kantakouzēnos’ relationship with Umur of Aydin. Kantakouzēnos and 
Orhan communicate mainly through emissaries and Orhan was not even 
present for the ceremonies of his marriage to Theodōra; instead, after the 
festivities at Selymbria, she was escorted to him in Anatolia. The only 
occasion on which Kantakouzēnos admits that he met Orhan in person is at 
the celebration in spring 1347. The Ottoman conquest of Thrace, which 
would have been in full flow while the Histories were being composed, is not 
directly mentioned.  
 
13: Bithynia is the north-west region of Anatolia bordering the 
Propontis, facing Constantinople.108 The area was critical to the security of 
the capital but had been under attack by Turks since the end of the thirteenth 
century, accelerating after the Battle of Bapheus in 1302.109 Its final loss to the 
Ottomans was the greatest failure of Andronikos III’s reign. His resolution to 
repel the Ottomans by force appears to have crumbled after his defeat at 
Pelekanos in 1329.110 Nikaia fell in March 1331111 and in 1333 Andronikos 
began to pay 12,000 hyperpyra annually as tribute for the remaining 
territory, including Nikomēdia, the last remaining city.112 This agreement 
apparently broke down as the city was starved into submission by Orhan, 
probably while Andronikos was absent in the west in 1337 or 1338; Grēgoras 
                                                 
108 For Bithynia, see Geyer and Lefort, Bithynie. Janin, ‘Bithynie’, although somewhat 
outdated, is still a useful historical summary. 
109 For the early progress of the Ottoman conquest, see Beldiceanu-Steinherr, ‘Ottomans’, 
364-73. 
110 As mentioned above, Ch.9:12. 
111 Recorded by a number of chronicles, see CBB II, 238. 
112 CBB I, 79, no. 8/24. 
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records that Turkish raids on Thrace increased afterwards.113 Unsurprisingly, 
in light of his later alliances with Orhan, Kantakouzēnos does not note the 
fall of either Nikaia or Nikomēdia, or Andronikos’ agreement to pay tribute. 
In any case, the Ottoman emirate was not a stable entity at this time and its 
borders would not have corresponded exactly to those of the province of 
Bithynia.114 
 
14: Didymoteichon (modern Didymoteicho) lies on the Erythros River, 
close to its confluence with the Hebros.115 A rocky outcrop rises 
commandingly above the surrounding low hills and plains, providing a 
natural site for its heavily fortified acropolis, of which substantial ruins 
remain. Numerous stores, cisterns and dwellings are carved into the soft 
rock, further increasing its resilience to siege.116 The city’s name, first attested 
in the sixth century, probably refers to ‘twin castles’, the other being the 
closely neighbouring settlement of Plōtinopolis, abandoned probably in the 
ninth century.117 In the early thirteenth century, Villehardouin described it as 
‘one of the strongest castles in Romania as well as one of the richest’.118 
However, following the slighting of its walls by Kalojan, he regarded it as 
                                                 
113 Greg. I, 545.15-21. The chronologies of Kantakouzēnos and Grēgoras are not entirely 
reconcilable during these years. See FK II, 236-7, n. 295, for 1337; Van Dieten, Gregoras, II.ii, 
359-361, n. 451, for 1338. 
114 Beldiceanu-Steinherr, ‘Ottomans’, 353-4. 
115 For the city and its monuments, see Giannopoulos, Didymoteichon; Ousterhout and 
Bakirtzis, Monuments, 87-144; Asdracha, Rhodopes, 130-7; Soustal, Thrakien, 240-44. 
116 Greg. I, 357.9-12, mentions rainwater cisterns. Additionally, many chambers are 
indented to receive pithoi and other containers, see Ousterhout and Bakirtzis, Monuments, 99-
102. A few inhabited dwellings, at least partially cut into the rock, still remain (pers. obs., 
2013). 
117 Ousterhout and Bakirtzis, Monuments, 88-89; Soustal, Thrakien, 240. There is however 
some evidence of an outer wall on the north side although not around the entire circuit: 
Giannopoulos, Didymoteichon, 95-102. 
118 Villehardouin, Conquête de Constantinople, 282 (trans. Smith, 76). 
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‘pointless to try to rebuild them’.119 In this case, there must have been 
significant reconstruction during the Laskarid and Palaiologan periods.120 
While imperial officials and the garrison would have resided in the 
acropolis, there were also substantial unwalled suburbs. In late 1341, 
Kantakouzēnos had a ditch dug to protect them, although these areas were 
subsequently were devastated by the inhabitants of the upper city following 
a failed popular revolt.121 Didymoteichon is more prominent during the early 
fourteenth century than at any other period in its history, and 
Kantakouzēnos mentions it more frequently than any other author.122 The 
city became a de facto capital for Andronikos III during the first civil war, 
along with Adrianople, and remained a favoured retreat thereafter; Iōannēs 
V was born there in June 1332.123 A clear factor for its increase in importance 
relative to Adrianople was its convenient location for campaigns to the west 
as well as the north. It became the great fortress of Kantakouzēnos’ faction in 
the second civil war; he states that Apokaukos despaired of taking it, 
‘realising it was impregnable because of its very strong walls and the high 
spirits and courage of those who held them.’124 The Kantakouzēnoi probably 
had significant ties in the locality; Kantakouzēnos’ construction of the nearby 
fortress of Empythion suggests local landholdings and Theodōra 
Kantakouzēnē had twice been deputised as governor by Andronikos III 
during the first civil war.125 However a state of siege during Kantakouzēnos’ 
                                                 
119 Ibid., 449 (trans. Smith, 121). Curiously, Asdracha, Rhodopes, 132, states its 
fortifications and location ‘rendait la ville inexpugnable’ before noting this conquest of the 
city. 
120 The fortifications were being actively maintained as late as the 1350s, as is clear from 
the monogram of Tarchaneiōtēs on the walls, see Ousterhout and Bakirtzis, Monuments, 95, 
98; Ch.10:8. 
121 Kant. II, 287.23-289.23. 
122 Asdracha, Rhodopes, 131-2. 
123 Greg. I, 482.1-3. 
124 Kant. II, 302.2-3: διά τε καρτερότητα τειχῶν καὶ εὐψυχίαν καὶ τόλμαν τῶν ἐχόντων 
ἀνάλωτον νομίζων. 
125 For Theodōra, Ch.9:18; for Empythion, Ch.30:3. 
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absence in 1342-3 forced his partisans to subsist by raiding the surrounding 
area, doubtlessly causing corresponding damage to his popularity.126 
Accordingly, if somewhat ironically, the city and its populace strongly 
supported Iōannēs V during his 1352-3 war against Matthaios 
Kantakouzēnos.127 The circumstances of its final fall are obscure but it was 
under Ottoman control by 1361. 
 
15: Adrianople is modern Edirne.128 Kantakouzēnos uses both the 
forms Ἀδριανοῦ and Ἀδριανούπολις.129 Grēgoras generally prefers Orestias, 
its ancient name before it was refounded by Hadrian. Adrianople was the 
‘greatest and most important of the cities of Thrace.’130 Lying about 230km 
from Constantinople, on the River Tunca, very close to the confluence of the 
Arda and Hebros, the city’s importance was always ensured by its position 
on the chief route between Constantinople and central Europe, as well as 
west to Philippopolis. The Hebros was navigable as far as Adrianople, 
providing a direct route to the Aegean.131 It did not occupy a naturally strong 
site like Didymoteichon but its walls, following their ancient plan, enclosed a 
greater area; Kantakouzēnos comments that it was ‘large and populous’.132 
The defences were very effective for, although in the path of Bulgarian, Tatar 
and Catalan incursions, the city was not taken by force in the Palaiologan 
period until the eventual Ottoman conquest. Villehardouin relates that the 
crusaders abandoned their determined siege of 1205 because ‘the city was 
                                                 
126 Kant. II, 349.12-20. 
127 For the whole incident, see Kant. III, 238-53. 
128 See also Asdracha, Rhodopes, 137-48; Ousterhout and Bakirtzis, Monuments, 161-78; 
Soustal, Thrakien, 161-7. 
129 Translated as ‘the city of Adrian’ and ‘Adrianople’, respectively. 
130 Kant. II, 405.11-12: μάλιστα τῶν ἐν τῇ Θρᾴκῃ πόλεων μείζω καὶ ἀναγκαιοτέραν 
οὖσαν. 
131 Asdracha, Rhodopes, 140-1. 
132 Kant. I, 23.21: μεγάλην οὖσαν καὶ πολυάνθρωπον. 
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very strong and very well defended’.133 These factors naturally influenced 
Andronikos III in choosing the city as his destination in 1321 when he fled 
from Constantinople, beginning the first civil war.134 Unsurprisingly 
Adrianople was also an immediate goal for Kantakouzēnos during the 
second civil war. However the demos revolted in favour of the regency, an 
uprising that he treats as a model for the other popular revolts against him.135 
In early 1345, partisans within the city, allied with the appointed governor (a 
son of Alexios Apokaukos), tried and failed to hand the city over to him.136 
Within a few months though, with virtually the rest of Thrace in 
Kantakouzēnos’ hands, the city and its surrounding fortresses decided to 
come over.137 Kantakouzēnos was subsequently crowned in Adrianople on 
21 May 1346.138 The city later formed part of Matthaios’ appanage but 
another popular revolt in favour of Iōannēs V left him stranded in the 
acropolis, until rescued by forces from Constantinople.139 After Matthaios 
had been forced to abdicate, Adrianople apparently remained under 
Constantinople’s authority until taken by the Ottomans around 1369. 
 
16: See Chapters 3-6. 
 
17: The date of Kantakouzēnos’ departure is unclear. An anonymous 
short chronicle places it in July.140 However, Grēgoras states that it took place 
                                                 
133 Villehardouin, Conquête de Constantinople, 396 (trans. Smith, 106). Chōniatēs, History, 
622-624 (trans. Magoulias, 340-2), provides a more detailed account. 
134 Kant. I, 89-90. 
135 Kant. II, 175.22-179.11. 
136 Kant. II, 484.10-487.19. 
137 Kant. II, 525.21-526.1. 
138 Kant. II, 564-568; II, 564.16-18, for the date.  
139 Kant. II, 242ff. 
140 CBB I, 81, no. 8/33. 
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‘after the rising of Arcturus’, generally accepted as 26/27 August.141 While 
Fatouros and Krischer recognise that Grēgoras could simply be borrowing 
the phrase from Thucydides,142 they lean towards this date owing to 
Kantakouzēnos’ earlier statement that his reorganisation of the army took 
sixty days.143 If Kantakouzēnos fully completed the process before taking the 
field, as he implies, July would be impossible (since Andronikos died in mid-
June) and late August seems more compelling. However, Loenertz dismissed 
Grēgoras’ account in favour of the chronicle, although without any 
compelling reason and without acknowledging Kantakouzēnos’ ‘sixty 
days’.144 Kantakouzēnos relates that, following his departure, he travelled to 
Didymoteichon, gathered an army, made peace with Ivan Alexander, 
marched to the Chersonese, fought two battles over an interval of days with 
the Turks, returned to Didymoteichon and dealt with various embassies 
before returning to Constantinople at some point during September, before 
finally leaving again in late September.145 For Grēgoras’ dating to be 
absolutely accurate, all of this would have had to be achieved within thirty 
days at the very longest. Therefore, while a July departure may be too early, 
the end of August seems too late. Van Dieten questioned the traditional 
26/27 August date and suggested Grēgoras meant mid-August.146 This would 
fit roughly with Kantakouzēnos’ sixty days and his subsequent activities in 
Thrace. 
 
                                                 
141 Greg. II, 596.13: Μετὰ μέντοι τὰς τοῦ Ἀρκτούρου ἐπιτολὰς; FK III, 425, n. 75; CBB II, 
251. 
142 Thuc. 2.78.2. 
143 FK III, 424, n. 67; 425, n. 75. For similar reasons, 26 August is accepted by Parisot, 
Cantacuzène, 167, n. 4; 171, n. 4. However, also see above, Ch.8:9. 
144 Loenertz, ‘Chronique’, 61. Followed by Nicol, Family, 45-6 and Schreiner, CBB II, 251. 
145 See below, Ch.16:9. 
146 Van Dieten, Gregoras III, 235-236. 
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18: Theodōra Palaiologina Angelina Kantakouzēnē (PLP 10942).147 
Although Theodōra is described as aunt of Andronikos III,148 her parentage, 
and thus her (and her son’s) exact relationship to the Palaiologos family, is 
unclear.149 She was widowed by 1294 and never remarried, and Iōannēs 
seems to have been her only child. It is probable that he was born after his 
father’s death and thus she was solely responsible for his upbringing.150 Her 
son states she was ‘experienced in management of political matters, and of 
greater judgement than the lot accorded to a feminine nature.’151 Grēgoras 
similarly spoke highly of her dignity, intelligence, ingenuity and knowledge 
of state affairs.152 She was indeed no stranger to political affairs, helping to 
finance Andronikos III’s revolt and taking joint command of Didymoteichon 
in 1321 and 1327.153 She also took the lead in suppressing the attempted 
putsch of 1335, during the absence of Andronikos and her son on 
campaign.154 It is highly likely that Theodōra was tasked with looking after 
her son’s political position when he left the capital. She was thus naturally 
the first target of his enemies when they began to move against him and was 
placed under house-arrest in October 1341.155 She later suffered 
                                                 
147 See also Nicol, Family, 30-33, no. 21; Papadopulos, Palaiologen, 16-17, no. 25, is 
superseded by Nicol. Lemerle’s commentary on her life is also useful although perpetuates 
the error that she had a second son; see Actes de Kutlumus, 82-87, no. 18, esp. 84-85. 
148 Kant. I, 125.16-17, 260.4-5. She also signed herself as θεία τοῦ ... βασιλέως, see Actes de 
Kutlumus, 87, line 87. Malamut, ‘Jeanne-Anne’, 92, n. 34, suggests that she was called 
Andronikos’ aunt owing to her son’s designation of himself as Andronikos’ brother. As 
Kantakouzēnos only called himself Andronikos’ brother following his own acclamation, this 
cannot be true.  
149 Nicol, Family, 30-31, summarises the main suggestions and their weaknesses. Nicol, 
‘Family Addenda’, 313, later described Papadopulos’ tentative theory as ‘wildly conjectural’. 
Owing to lack of evidence, Nicol offers no suggestion of his own. 
150 For dating the death of her husband, see Nicol, Family, 27-30, no. 20. 
151 Kant. I, 125.18-20: πρὸς διοίκησιν ἔμπειρος πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ φρονήσεως 
ἐῤῥωμενεστέρας ἢ κατὰ φύσιν γυναικείαν τυχοῦσα. 
152 Greg. I, 530.11-14; II, 619.5-8. 
153 Kant. I, 125.15-22, 138.4-20, 260.3-5. 
154 On this incident, see Ch.17:6. Her political role is also discussed by Weiss, 
Kantakuzenos, 13-14. 
155 Kant. II, 136.18-22. 
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imprisonment and confiscation,156 before being maltreated, allegedly on 
Apokaukos’ orders.157 She died of disease and neglect on 6 January 1342, one 
of the few dates provided by Kantakouzēnos.158 Grēgoras later spitefully 
attributed her demise to her son’s support of Palamas.159 
                                                 
156 Kant. II, 164.21-165.12. 
157 Her sufferings are narrated at some length: Kant. II, 219.22-222.14; Greg. II, 617.1-620.4. 
158 Kant. II, 222.11-14. 
159 Greg. II, 886.17-19. 
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Commentary on Chapter 10 
1: Stilbnos is modern Sliven, in central Bulgaria. It lies in the southern 
foothills of the Balkan Mountains and controlled two passes across the 
range.1 While few traces of the medieval town survive, there are the 
remnants of a number of fortresses in the neighbourhood.2 Its position and 
fortifications made it a convenient mustering point for Bulgarian expeditions 
into Roman Thrace, a role it was to serve again during the civil war.3 The 
regions between Sliven and Adrianople were frequently contested between 
the two states.4 It seems to have marked, in Kantakouzēnos’ mind, the edge 
of unquestionably Bulgarian territory; following the death of Georgij II 
Terter in 1322, he states that all the towns ‘from Mesēmbria as far as Stilbnos’ 
briefly revolted in favour of the Romans.5  
 
2: Tŭrnovo, the capital of the Second Bulgarian Empire, modern 
Veliko Tarnovo. The city lies in the northern foothills of the Balkan 
mountains, on the river Yantra. Extensive ruins of the fortified royal palace 
complex remain, spectacularly situated on rock terraces of the hill of 
Tsarevets. Nikētas Chōniatēs called it ‘the best fortified and most excellent of 
all the cities along the Haimos’.6 It possessed an estimated population of 
15,000-20,000 during the fourteenth century and was a centre of artistic 
production with a lively economy, which appears to have reached its peak 
during Ivan Alexander’s reign.7 A contemporary Bulgarian translation of 
Kōnstantinos Manassēs’ chronicle referred to Tŭrnovo as the ‘new 
                                                 
1 FK I, 263, n. 220. 
2 Soustal, Thrakien, 462-4. 
3 Kant. II, 420.18-20. 
4 See Ch.2:11. The most recent conflicts, 1328-1333, are summarised in Vásáry, Cumans 
and Tatars, 128-131. 
5 Kant. I, 172.9: ἀπὸ Μεσημβρίας ἄχρι Στίλβνου. 
6 Chōniatēs, History, 470.75-76 (trans. Magoulias, 258). 
7 Dochev, ‘Tŭrnovo’. For the art and architecture of Tŭrnovo, see Bossilkov, Turnovo. 
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Tsarigrad’; on the basis of this, Obolensky claimed that Bulgarian imperial 
ideology viewed Tŭrnovo as the successor to Rome and head of the 
Orthodox oikoumenē, implicitly denying Constantinople’s claims.8 However, 
on the basis of a single somewhat ambiguous note, it is difficult to 
definitively accept that this ideology was widely accepted or promoted in 
the Bulgarian court. The contemporary pride invested in this striking capital 
city is however unarguable. 
 
3: The Thracian Chersonese, i.e., the Gallipoli peninsula. It was 
generally a fertile area, known since Antiquity for its olives and grain.9 
Following the abandonment of coastal Asia Minor, the narrowness of the 
Hellespont (about 1.2km at its narrowest) made the area very vulnerable to 
raids from the opposite shore. Andronikos III was injured in a surprise 
encounter with 70 Turks here in 1326,10 and small Turkish raids were 
probably very frequent. Its chief city, Kallioupolis, would famously become 
the gateway for Ottoman conquests in Europe in 1354.11 The ease of ferrying 
people and horses across the Hellespont without seagoing boats made it a 
favoured point for transit between the two continents. Kantakouzēnos 
narrates the exploits of a group of 3,100 Turks during the civil war who, 
having lost their ships to a Latin fleet, agreed to fight for him if he would 
allow them to return to Anatolia via the Chersonese.12 Similarly, following 
his loss of the port of Smyrna, Umur adopted this route to reach Thrace.13 
 
                                                 
8 Obolensky, Commonwealth, 246. For a recent translation of the whole passage, see 
Petkov, Voices, 451. 
9 Külzer, Ostthrakien, 311-313. 
10 Greg. I, 384.3-13. Kant. I, 206-207, confirms the skirmish although the exact location is 
unclear. 
11 Kant. III, 278-9. 
12 Kant. II, 423-5. 
13 Kant. II, 529.14-530.1. 
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4: Pergamon (modern Bergama) was the capital of Yakhshi’s domain. 
In the 1330s, Ibn Battuta described it as ‘a city in ruins, with a great and 
formidable fortress on top of a hill.’14 It is not entirely clear if the ruins he 
referred to were the ancient city or recent damage inflicted by its conquerors 
but the former seems likely as the medieval city largely clung to the hill, 
while the remains of the ancient lower city were numerous and visible.15 
Pergamon was no longer a major settlement, but it had been substantially re-
fortified against Turkish attacks by Manouēl I Komnēnos as part of his 
Neokastra development.16 The city was inland; Kantakouzēnos presumably 
means that the army originated from there rather than having embarked 
there. 
 
5: Kantakouzēnos mentions his preparations for a western campaign 
several times but only in Chapter 12 does he explain that it is directed 
against the rebel Albanians mentioned in Chapter 1.  
 
6: Epibatai, modern Bigados/Selimpaşa, was a small coastal settlement 
about 10km east of Selymbria, easily accessible from the sea or the Via 
Egnatia.17 Kantakouzēnos mentions that it was still unfortified in July 1322, 
when the Andronikoi signed their second peace treaty there.18 The fortress 
was Apokaukos’ private possession, well-stocked against siege, and also 
served as a treasury.19 In conjunction with his patronage of Selymbria, 
Apokaukos clearly had strong ties with the region.20 After his death in June 
                                                 
14 Ibn Battuta, Travels, 448-9. 
15 Foss, ‘Twenty Cities’, 479-481. 
16 Chōniatēs, History, 150 (trans. Magoulias, 85); Foss and Winfield, Byzantine 
Fortifications, 147. 
17 Külzer, Ostthrakien, 350-2. For the Via Egnatia, see Oikonomides, ‘Via Egnatia’; Soustal, 
Thrakien, 136-8; Asdracha, Rhodopes, 25-30. 
18 Kant. I, 166.16-17. 
19 Kant. II, 495.20-22; Greg. II, 602.23-603.3. 
20 See Ch.16:11. 
 338 
1345, Apokaukos’ widow fled to Epibatai with all that remained of his 
fortune.21 As Kantakouzēnos was in possession of Selymbria by that time, it 
seems likely he had decided that laying siege to the fortress was not worth 
the cost. Epibatai appears in the narrative for the last time as the site where 
Matthaios is finally persuaded to lay aside his imperial claims and make 
peace with Iōannēs V.22 A so-called ‘tower of Apokaukos’ still survived in 
the area in 1878.23 
 
7: Apokaukos’ flight is dated by an anonymous chronicler to 28 
August 1341; the same chronicle also recounts that Kantakouzēnos was 
recalled to the capital by Anna to deal with the matter, arriving during 
September.24 Kantakouzēnos’ return is confirmed by Grēgoras, although he 
is vague about the reasons for Apokaukos’ escape, stating only that his 
habitual scheming had been discovered.25 The plot, as described by 
Kantakouzēnos, seems utterly implausible. Not only does it lack subtlety but 
a forced marriage is hardly likely to have been recognised upon Iōannēs 
regaining his freedom. Moreover, it seems extremely improbable that Anna 
would have forgiven and subsequently trusted Apokaukos as readily as she 
did if there had been any substance to such a scheme. Although it is possible 
that the plot was simply a rumour originated by a rival to discredit 
Apokaukos, a more likely explanation is offered by fears for Anna’s health at 
this time. Kantakouzēnos mentions somewhat later, following his return to 
the capital, that she was ill.26 Grēgoras goes further, stating that it was 
primarily her illness, followed by Apokaukos’ flight and concern about the 
Patriarch, which caused Kantakouzēnos to abandon his campaign and 
                                                 
21 Kant. II, 549.19-22.  
22 Kant. III, 345-357. 
23 Külzer, Ostthrakien, 352. 
24 CBB I, 81, no. 8/34; Loenertz, ‘Chronique’, 61. 
25 Greg. II, 599.12-14. 
26 Kant. II, 83.3-5. 
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return.27 It seems likely that Anna’s sudden, albeit brief, illness was serious 
enough to cause panic: if she was also to die, seizure of Iōannēs could be 
justified as a measure to ensure his safety against other factions (just as 
Kantakouzēnos himself claimed, when surrounding the palace with his men 
immediately after Andronikos’ death), and custodianship of the young 
emperor would allow his new guardian to present himself as regent. 
Apokaukos may well have been planning to seize the initiative, in event of 
Anna’s death, while Kantakouzēnos was absent.  
 
8: Manouēl Kourtikēs Tarchaneiōtēs (PLP 27503). A loyal supporter of 
Kantakouzēnos, belonging to a long-established military family.28 He was 
prominent among the defenders of Didymoteichon, and was selected for the 
dangerous mission of locating Kantakouzēnos when he fled to Serbia.29 He is 
finally seen fighting alongside Kantakouzēnos against the renegade 
Momčilo.30 Grēgoras speaks of him as ‘Manouēl Tarchaneiōtēs, who is 
related by blood to the Emperor and was a man of heroism’31 and praises 
him at length. However his precise familial relationship with Kantakouzēnos 
is unknown32 and he is unattested thereafter; the prōtostratōr and fleet 
commander Kōnstantinos Tarchaneiōtēs,33 who appears frequently in Book 
IV, has occasionally been confused for Manouēl.34 The Tarchaneiōtēs 
monograms still visible on the walls of Didymoteichon are attributed to 
                                                 
27 Greg. II, 599.11-17. 
28 A. Kazhdan, ‘Tarchaneiotes’, ODB III, 2011-12. 
29 Kant. II, 195, 322-3. 
30 Kant. II, 430. 
31 Greg. II, 652.13-15: Μανουὴλ ὁ Ταρχανειώτης, ὃς δὴ καθ’ αἷμα προσήκων τῷ βασιλεῖ 
καὶ ἡρωϊκός τις ἦν ὁ ἀνὴρ. 
32 For known connections of the Tarchaneiōtai to the Kantakouzēnoi, see Nicol, Family, 
139-140; Nicol, ‘Family Addenda’, 311. 
33 PLP 27494. Kantakouzēnos usually refers to him only as ‘Tarchaneiōtēs’ but confirms 
his identity on two occasions: Kant. III, 72.6-7, 221.5. 
34 E.g., Weiss, Kantakuzenos, 39, n. 257; FK III, 427, n. 83. 
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Kōnstantinos’ governorship there in 1352.35 Manouēl clearly did not identify 
himself with the name Kourtikēs often, and Kantakouzēnos does not use it 
hereafter, but he probably intended to distinguish him from a previously 
mentioned nephew also called Manouēl Tarchaneiōtēs, who died in battle 
against the Turks.36 
 
9: It is not clear from the phrase ‘placed under his control’ (τῶν ὑπ' 
αὐτῷ τελούντων) whether Kantakouzēnos indicates fortresses belonging to 
him personally, or placed under his command temporarily by the Emperor. 
However, a number of clearly private aristocratic fortresses are mentioned 
by Kantakouzēnos. Besides Epibatai, Apokaukos apparently had another 
refuge, the tower of Mangana in Constantinople, which he acquired in 
Andronikos III’s reign and ‘equipped and made extremely strong in the 
years of the civil war.’37 Iōannēs Batatzēs possessed the fortress of Tēristasis 
‘which he had previously fortified at his own expense when the Emperor 
Andronikos was alive.’38 Finally, and somewhat ironically given the scorn he 
pours on the idea, Kantakouzēnos’ castle of Empythion fulfilled a similar 
function.39 It appears that Andronikos could not easily prohibit such private 
fortresses or else he tolerated them as a contribution to public security that 
did not incur public expense.40 While private fortifications for protecting 
estates against small raiding parties were quite common,41 these large 
aristocratic fortresses were constructed to endure determined military action 
and prolonged siege. Matschke considers such fortifications a trend among 
                                                 
35 Ousterhout and Bakirtzis, Monuments, 95, 98.  
36 Kant. I, 361.22-362.3; PLP 27500. 
37 Kant. II, 438.7-9: ἐν δὲ τοῖς τοῦ ἐμφυλίου πολέμου χρόνοις ἐπισκευάσας καὶ 
ὀχυρώτατον ἀπεργασάμενος. 
38 Kant. II, 475.6-7: ὃ πρότερον αὐτὸς ἔτι βασιλέως Ἀνδρονίκου περιόντος  
οἰκείοις ἀναλώμασιν ἐτείχισεν. 
39 See Ch.30:3. 
40 Kyriakidis, Warfare, 161-3, favours the latter view. 
41 Smyrlis, ‘Estate fortifications’; Bogdanović, ‘Tower’. 
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Palaiologan aristocrats, to safeguard their influence and wealth by leaving 
turbulent cities in favour of strongholds nearby.42 However Kantakouzēnos’ 
account suggests they were intended rather as temporary refuges from 
dangerous developments in court politics than as secure residences designed 
to control a localised powerbase. Grēgoras seems to agree, deploring 
Apokaukos’ fortifications as evidence of wicked intentions from the outset.43 
Apokaukos later offers similar advice (somewhat disingenuously) to Iōannēs 
Gabalas.44  
 
10: There is probably a deliberate irony in this choice of address as 
Apokaukos had a great interest in medicine, while Kantakouzēnos is not 
noted for any. Iōannēs Aktouarios, chief physician to Andronikos II, 
dedicated his Method of Medicine to Apokaukos, probably in 1329 or 1330.45 
The well-known deluxe MS of Hippocrates (Par. gr. 2144) was either 
commissioned by Apokaukos himself or was intended as a gift by friends. It 
contains portraits of Hippocrates and Apokaukos, with accompanying 
dedicatory verses in which they flatter each other’s intellectual and medical 
talents.46 Production of the volume began during the civil war, as it refers to 
Apokaukos’ office as megas doux, but the work remains incomplete, probably 
owing to his death.47 
 
                                                 
42 Matschke, ‘Urban Economy’, 465-6. 
43 Greg. II, 585.10-586.3. 
44 Kant. II, 495.18-496.4. For Gabalas, see Ch.19:4. 
45 J. Scarborough and A.M. Talbot, ‘John Aktouarios’, ODB II, 1056; PLP 6489; Munitz, 
‘Apokaukos and Hippocrates’, 275. 
46 For this MS, see Munitz, ‘Apokaukos and Hippocrates’; Spatharakis, Illuminated 
Manuscripts, 148-151. 
47 Munitz, op. cit., 267-280. 
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11: Grēgoras reports a surprisingly similar exchange between the two 
men.48 That men are of greater value than buildings is an ancient literary 
trope.49 
                                                 
48 Greg. II, 600.15-602.4. 
49 FK III, 428, n. 86. 
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Commentary on Chapter 11 
1: Rule of the Peloponnese was divided between Romans, Franks and 
Venetians. The Frankish Principality of Achaia was established by Geoffrey 
de Villehardouin in 1205 and rapidly expanded across the entire peninsula. 
Venice acquired the enclaves of Koronē and Methonē in June 1209, which 
became important outposts and ports for the Republic, frequently mentioned 
in Venetian documents.1 Venetian possession of them was largely 
uncontested until the Ottoman conquest. However, following the Battle of 
Pelagonia in 1259, Villehardouin’s son and successor, William, was captured 
and forced to concede several fortresses to Michaēl VIII, including 
Monembasia and Mistra.2 Over the following decades frequent conflict saw 
the Roman governors at Mistra slowly gain territory at the Franks’ expense.3 
Kantakouzēnos’ otherwise unknown father served as one of Andronikos II’s 
governors4 as did Andronikos Asanēs.5 Neither Kantakouzēnos nor Grēgoras 
mention the Peloponnese during their accounts of the civil war; the province 
apparently remained loyal to Constantinople but played no active role in the 
conflict. Kantakouzēnos later alludes to rising disorder in the peninsula 
during the war, mentioning Latin and Turkish raids as well as continual 
local feuds, leading to his appointment of his second son Manouēl as 
                                                 
1 Lock, Franks, 154-5. 
2 For the establishment of the imperial province, see Geanakoplos, Michael Palaeologus, 
154-160. 
3 For these events, see Lock, Franks, 73-86. For the Frankish states in Greece generally, 
ibid., 68-134. The standard account for the imperial territories remains Zakythenos, Morée. 
Runciman, Mistra, 15-85, provides a narrative from the Latin to the Turkish conquests. 
4 All that is known for sure about Kantakouzēnos’ father comes from the Histories: Kant. 
I, 85.2-13. Zakythenos, Morée I, 68-70, suggested he was governor 1308-1316. Nicol, Family, 
28-9, argues strongly against this, in favour of 1286-1294. As he died in the Peloponnese, the 
earlier dates seem more convincing and his premature death would explain Kantakouzēnos’ 
lack of siblings.  
5 For Asanēs, see Ch.14:4. 
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governor in 1349.6 The province remained under Manouēl’s control until his 
death in 1380 and Mistra became a refuge for his family, with his elder 
brother Matthaios and Kantakouzēnos himself also ending their days there. 
 
2: Bishop Israel of Koronē, on the south-western tip of the 
Peloponnese.7 He was bishop 1338-1341 and is known to posterity chiefly for 
this mission.8 Although he would have been a Venetian, there is no hint of 
official Venetian involvement in the plot. 
 
3: Jean Sydera/Juan Sidēros (PLP 25311). Now only attested by 
Kantakouzēnos but he was mentioned in the lost Angevin archives studied 
by Hopf.9 Hopf suggests that Sidēros was a gasmoule (i.e., of Greek and 
Frankish parents). His lands in Skorta, given to his father by William II 
Villehardouin, had been confiscated so he had cause for dissatisfaction.10 
Ντζιουὰν is Kantakouzēnos’ rendering of ‘Juan’, which may indicate 
Catalan heritage. 
 
4: The offer appears to be to substitute the emperor (or, in the 
interregnum, Kantakouzēnos) for their own liege, Catherine de Valois. The 
Latin lords would thus have retained their status and estates but paid their 
fiscal and military obligations to the emperor. In return they presumably 
expected an end to Roman raids and protection against external threats. 
Catherine had been resident in the Morea between October 1338 and June 
                                                 
6 Kant. III, 85.3-14 (trans. Miller, Cantacuzenus, 218-9); for the date, CBB I, 243, no. 33/7. 
For Manouēl, see PLP 10981; Nicol, Family, 122-128, no. 25. 
7 Hopf, Griechenlands, 434. 
8 Bon, Morée, 243, n. 3. 
9 Hopf surveyed most of the Angevin registers and makes detailed references to them. As 
they were destroyed in 1943, his work has attained the status of a quasi-primary source. See 
Lock, Franks, 26. 
10 Hopf, Griechenlands, 433; FK III, 429, n. 89. 
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1341, so she had clearly made a poor impression on a substantial fraction of 
the local barons.11 The scheme would probably have provoked a military 
response from Catherine and loyalist barons; certainly Kantakouzēnos’ 
speech in the following chapter anticipates that some military action would 
be necessary.12 His reception of such an embassy of course signified that 
foreign states regarded him as de facto emperor, an implication he does not 
comment on, and would naturally have been provocative to his domestic 
opponents. Unsurprisingly, given its conspiratorial nature, there is no record 
of this embassy in the Latin sources.13 However there is evidence of 
discontent among the barons14 and Grēgoras alludes to the conspiracy when 
he mentions Kantakouzēnos’ receipt of secret correspondence promising 
obedience from various groups, including the ‘Latins of the Peloponnese’.15 
Therefore there can be little doubt that this embassy took place; the Empire’s 
acquisition of Thessaly and Epiros put it in a more threatening position, 
while the negotiated nature of the settlement in Epiros, referred to in the 
letter, probably reassured the barons that they would have little to fear in 
terms of losing their own rights. 
 
5: Pagano di Pistoia (PLP 20760). He is otherwise unattested.  
 
6: Akarnania is a region of west-central Greece, considered in 
Antiquity to be between the Ionian Sea and the Achelous River, bordering on 
the Ambracian Gulf to the north.16 Kantakouzēnos uses the name loosely to 
                                                 
11 Lock, Franks, 130. 
12 Kant. II, 82.6-10. 
13 Hopf, Griechenlands, 434-5, cites only Kantakouzēnos when narrating this incident.  
14 Zakythenos, Morée I, 76. 
15 Greg. II, 596.3-5: Ἧκον δ’ αὐτῷ καὶ γράμματα λάθρα πολλὰ πολλαχόθεν, ἔκ τε 
Ἀκαρνάνων καὶ Τριβαλλῶν ἔκ τε Θετταλῶν καὶ Πελοποννησίων Λατίνων, τὴν σφῶν 
ὑποταγὴν ὑπισχνούμενα. 
16 Strabo, 10.2.1. 
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indicate the entire territory of the Epirote state, or ‘Despotate of Epiros’, of 
which Akarnania proper was only a small part.17 Trone suggested this was 
because Epiros was considered to be a non-Greek, ‘barbarian’ region during 
Antiquity.18 However Kantakouzēnos does once make the distinction 
between Epiros and Akarnania; his usage probably reflects that the capital 
Arta was in the south, albeit slightly further north than classical Akarnania.19 
Grēgoras, as is often the case, tends to be more specific in his classicism, 
distinguishing between Akarnania and Aitōlia.20 The Epirote state was 
founded by Michaēl Komnēnos Doukas in 1205 and had long resisted the 
restoration of rule from Constantinople, but the death of its ruler, despotēs 
Giovanni Orsini,21 when his heir Nikēphoros was underage, gave 
Andronikos III a chance to impose his authority.22 There seems to have been 
an imperial party in Epiros, as well as determined opposition. Andronikos 
intimidated Epiros into submission in 1338,23 but a revolt the following year 
rallied around the figurehead of the young Nikēphoros,24 aided by Catherine 
de Valois, Angevin ruler of Naples and titular Latin Empress of 
                                                 
17 E.g., the despotēs Thōmas is described as ‘ruler of Akarnania’, Kant. I, 13.6-7: ἄρχοντι 
τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας. ‘Despotate’ was not a contemporary Greek term for the state; see Nicol, 
Despotate, 2-3. 
18 Trone, Kantakouzenos, 250. 
19 Kant. II, 239.18-19: Ἀκαρνανίαν καὶ Ἤπειρον. 
20 E.g., Greg. I, 550.8-9. For these regions, see Soustal and Koder, Nikopolis. 
21 For Orsini, see PLP 207; Polemis, Doukai, 98-9, no. 56. The year of his death is not firmly 
established and has been placed in 1335 (Bosch, Andronikos III, 135), 1335/6 (Polemis, Doukai, 
99), 1336 (Papadopulos, Palaiologen, 32) and 1336/7 (PLP 21345; Nicol, Despotate, 107). Of 
these, 1335 appears unlikely. For a review of the contradictory evidence, see Van Dieten, 
Gregoras, II.ii, 377-8, n. 475. 
22 For the history of Epiros, see Nicol, Despotate; for the period covered by 
Kantakouzēnos, ibid., 107-138. 
23 Dating Andronikos’ campaign to the west is difficult owing to the vagueness and 
incompatibility of Kantakouzēnos’ and Grēgoras’ chronologies. It has been dated to 1337 by 
many scholars (e.g. Bosch, Andronikos III, 136; Lemerle, Aydin, 111; Nicol, Last Centuries, 180), 
but arguments for spring 1338, relying on a short chronicle, seem more persuasive and have 
been adopted here: see Loenertz, ‘Chronique’, 56-58; CBB I, 80, no. 8/30; II, 248-9 (Schreiner’s 
commentary); Van Dieten, Gregoras, II.ii, 359-361, n. 451 and 380-381, n. 481; Nicol, Despotate, 
110, n. 8. However these arguments are rejected by FK II, 232, n. 272. Without further 
evidence, the matter cannot be settled conclusively. 
24 For Nikēphoros, see below, Ch.11:8. 
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Constantinople. It was owing to her overlordship of Achaia that Latin 
soldiers from the Peloponnese were involved in the campaign. The main 
centres of the revolt were Arta, Rogoi and Thōmokastron; Nikēphoros was 
established in the latter with Catherine’s help. Following limited military 
action in 1339-40, Kantakouzēnos personally negotiated the surrender of all 
three locations.25 From the current passage, it appears he impressed the 
Frankish soldiers as much as he did the native leaders of the revolt. 
Kantakouzēnos was understandably proud of his achievement, narrating it 
at some length.26 The annexation of Epiros was a notable triumph; 
Kantakouzēnos emphasises that Michael VIII’s attempted conquest had 
failed and cost him an army, while his great-grandson had managed the feat 
with little violence.27 During the civil war, Kantakouzēnos expected Epiros, 
along with Thessaly, to back him owing to the connections he had 
established during his presence there.28 After failing to take Thessalonike, he 
planned to take refuge in the west to build his strength but was thwarted by 
swollen rivers and opportunistic Serbian incursions, forcing him to turn to 
Dušan instead.29 The province apparently remained neutral into 1343 but 
was eventually taken over by Iōannēs Angelos, Kantakouzēnos’ governor in 
Thessaly.30 It is not clear exactly when Dušan overran Epiros, although his 
invasion was complete by 1348.31 The conquest was apparently brutal and 
caused widespread starvation.32 Kantakouzēnos expressed his desire to 
                                                 
25 Kant. I, 499-504, 509-534; Nicol, Despotate, 110-122; Bosch, Andronikos III, 135-8. 
26 Kant. I, 509-534, for the entire campaign; Kant. I, 527.1-534.5, for the Thōmokastron 
negotiations. Grēgoras was also fulsome in his praise: see Greg. 553.19-554.8 and Van 
Dieten, Gregoras, II.ii, 393, n. 510. 
27 Kant. II, 504.8-16. 
28 Kant. II, 239.10-12. 
29 Kant. II, 239-253; Nicol, Reluctant Emperor, 64. 
30 Greg. II, 657.17-658.12; Nicol, Despotate, 127. 
31 Nicol, Despotate, 129-130. 
32 Kant. III, 147.14-23. 
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regain the region, although had no serious prospect of actually doing so.33 
Dušan’s death, which presented such an opportunity, occurred after 
Kantakouzēnos’ abdication.  
 
7: Thōmokastron was a fortress lying on the west coast of Greece, 
north of the Ambracian Gulf, apparently built by despotēs Thōmas before his 
death in 1318.34 It has been identified with Riniasa, of which remains can still 
be found, located on a towering outcrop west of modern Riza.35 
Thōmokastron could be easily supported by sea: Kantakouzēnos relates that 
when Andronikos III attacked in 1340, ‘it easily withstood the siege, since the 
Romans only besieged it from the land.’36 However Kantakouzēnos 
eventually negotiated its surrender and then garrisoned it to prevent further 
Tarantine interference.37 Although it is occasionally mentioned in later 
sources, it is known principally in connection with this incident.38  
 
8: Nikēphoros II Doukas Angelos (PLP 222).39 He was Giovanni 
Orsini’s son and heir to Epiros. Following the death of his father, his mother 
Anna apparently proposed that he be married to a daughter of 
Kantakouzēnos in order to improve relations with Constantinople and 
forestall imperial interference.40 At this time, Kantakouzēnos reports that he 
was not yet aged seven.41 Andronikos III, however, decided to annex Epiros 
                                                 
33 Kant. III, 113.21-114.2. 
34 PLP 197. 
35 Soustal and Koder, Nikopolis, 250-1. 
36 Kant. I, 511.18-20: διέφερε ῥᾳδίως τὴν πολιορκίαν, ἅτε ἐξ ἠπείρου τῶν Ῥωμαίων 
μόνον πολιορκούντων. 
37 Kant. I, 525.23-534.12; summarised in Nicol, Despotate, 120-121. 
38 See Soustal and Koder, Nikopolis, 251. 
39 See also Polemis, Doukai, 99-100, no. 57. 
40 Kant. I, 500.23-501.5. For Anna, PLP 21345; Papadopulos, Palaiologen, 31-2, no. 51. 
41 Kant. I, 500.2-3. This accords with his statement that Nikēphoros was too young to fight 
in the civil war. Although Greg. I, 545.23, states he was fourteen in 1339/1340, it may be 
assumed that Kantakouzēnos was better informed about his son-in-law. Polemis’ contention 
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and had Nikēphoros betrothed to Kantakouzēnos’ oldest daughter, Maria.42 
Nikēphoros, as the legitimate heir, was subsequently spirited away by an 
anti-imperial faction who then used him as a figurehead in their revolt the 
following year. Following the revolt’s collapse in 1340, Andronikos granted 
Nikēphoros the high dignity of panhypersebastos.43 He played no active part in 
the civil war, being too young to campaign, and remained in Didymoteichon 
with Maria.44 It is likely that his marriage into Kantakouzēnos’ family was a 
factor in the apparent loyalty of Epiros to Kantakouzēnos during the civil 
war. Kantakouzēnos’ appointment of Iōannēs Angelos as governor of 
Thessaly in 1342 made provision for the future appointment of ‘my beloved 
relative lord Nikēphoros Doukas’ to rule neighbouring Epiros.45 Although 
the Serbian invasion made this impossible, it is a rare insight into 
Kantakouzēnos’ intentions in case of victory. Shortly after Kantakouzēnos 
entered Constantinople he promoted Nikēphoros to despotēs, placing him on 
a par with his son Manouēl.46 He was given the towns of the Hellespont and 
increasingly trusted with military responsibilities by his father-in-law, 
remaining loyal to him in the struggles with Iōannēs V.47 At some point he 
was entrusted with the city of Ainos but, after Kantakouzēnos’ abdication, he 
surrendered it to Iōannēs V.48 In early 1356 he took advantage of the anarchy 
following Dušan’s death to seize Thessaly and Epiros. He ruled successfully 
                                                                                                                                          
that he was born in 1328/9, adopted by the PLP, is mistaken because he misdates 
Andronikos’ first expedition to Epiros to 1335/6 (Polemis, Doukai, 99, n. 3), during which 
Kant. I, 500.3, states Nikēphoros was not yet aged seven (οὔπω ἔτη ἑπτὰ γεγενημένου). As 
this expedition took place in 1337 or, more probably, 1338 (see Ch.11:6, above), this would 
suggest Nikēphoros was born in 1330/1. 
42 Kant. I, 503.5-6. For Maria, see PLP 16885; Nicol, Family, 130-133, no. 27. 
43 Kant. I, 534.13-15. 
44 Kant. II, 195.5-8. 
45 Kant. II, 321.14-16: ὁ περιπόθητος γαμβρὸς αὐτῆς κύριος Νικηφόρος ὁ δούκας. His 
designation as γαμβρός infers that his marriage had taken place by this time although he 
must have been rather young. 
46 Kant. III, 33.2-4. 
47 Kant. III, 65, 211, 287, 294. 
48 Kant. III, 310.10-16. 
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for a time but divorced his wife to marry the sister of Dušan’s widow. 
Although he repented of this act, which seems to have lost him popular 
support as well as Kantakouzēnos’ sympathy, he was killed soon afterwards, 
in 1359, while attempting to suppress an Albanian revolt.49 
 
9: Iakōbos Broulas (PLP 3231). An oikeios of Kantakouzēnos, known 
only from the Histories. The outbreak of war ruined any plan to reintegrate 
Achaia; Broulas, having returned from the Peloponnese, is next seen 
participating in a peace embassy to Constantinople in 1343.50 Apokaukos had 
him mutilated, publicly exhibited, and then incarcerated in the prison he had 
built in the abandoned section of the Great Palace. He was killed there in the 
massacre of prisoners that followed Apokaukos’ death in June 1345.51 
 
10: The epi tou stratou formally held responsibility for siting camps for 
campaigning armies.52 Kantakouzēnos seems to have increased the title’s 
precedence, possibly to reward Senachēreim’s presumed loyalty to him 
during the war.53 
 
11: Senachēreim (PLP 25138). This military commander is otherwise 
unattested. As Sarukhan had already been defeated, his action appears to be 
a punitive raid. 
  
12: Kantakouzēnos claims that only non-Christians could be enslaved: 
‘The Romans do not enslave people. For it is not permitted to them, unless 
they are of the barbarians who do not put faith in the dispensation of Christ 
                                                 
49 Kant. III, 314-19; Nicol, Despotate, 134-6. 
50 Kant. II, 395. 
51 Kant. II, 398.21-24, 399.15-20. 
52 Ps-Kod., 205; see also Kyriakidis, Warfare, 154-155. 
53 Macrides, et al., Pseudo-Kodinos, 287. 
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our Saviour.’54 Certainly, Muslims were enslaved when the opportunity 
arose: Maximos Planoudēs claimed that Alexios Philanthrōpenos’ 
conspicuously successful campaign in Asia Minor during 1295 had caused 
the price of a Turkish slave in Anatolia to fall below that of a sheep.55 Slaves 
are however rarely mentioned explicitly in the Palaiologan period; doulos 
referred to any person rendering service to another and could indicate state 
officials of high social status.56 Despite his objection to enslaving Christian 
captives, there was little that could be done to prevent enslavement of 
Christians by allies: Kantakouzēnos confesses that his Turkish allies from 
Aydin enslaved the inhabitants of Thracian villages which refused to submit 
to him during his campaign in 1343.57 Moreover, Latin merchants showed 
few reservations in dealing with Orthodox slaves and there was a highly 
developed market, centred on Venetian-occupied Crete which dealt nearly 
entirely in Orthodox Greeks.58 Andronikos III had sent the monk Barlaam of 
Calabria as an emissary to the Pope in 1339, to whom he proposed that ‘all 
Greeks who have been sold by Latins, wherever they are, should be freed’ 
and that those buying or selling them in future should be excommunicated.59 
This suggestion was not followed. 
 
13: Prōtostratōr ranked 8th in the court hierarchy.60 The holder was the 
chief of the emperor’s mounted attendants and the Grand Domestic’s second 
                                                 
54 Kant. I, 497.13-15: Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ ἀνθρώπους μὲν οὐκ ἐξηνδραποδίζοντο. Οὐδὲ γὰρ 
ἔξεστιν αὐτοῖς, εἰ μὴ ἀπὸ βαρβάρων εἶεν τῶν τῇ σωτῆρος Χριστοῦ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν οἰκονομίᾳ 
μὴ πεπιστευκότων. Also see Kyriakidis, ‘Booty’, 169-170. 
55 Laiou, Andronicus II, 81-2; Planoudēs, Epistulae, 182-4, ep. 120: καὶ νῦν οὕτως ἐστὶν 
εὔωνον Περσικὸν ἀνδράποδον ἐν Ἄσίᾳ, ὡς οὐδὲν ἂν τῶν ὁποίων ἂν εἴποι τις πρόβατον.  
56 Kyritses, Byzantine Aristocracy, 15-16.  
57 Kant. II, 404.12-16.  
58 Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, 160-3. 
59 Gill, Papacy, 196-9 (Gill’s translation, 198). 
60 Macrides, et al., Pseudo-Kodinos, 455. For detailed history of the office, Guilland, 
Institutions I, 478-497. 
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in command, deputising for the latter in ceremonial roles when necessary.61 
On the battlefield, he was supposed to advance in protection of the army’s 
mounted scouts,62 although in practice a prōtostratōr could equally be found 
in other roles such as commanding fleets.63 
 
14: Theodōros Doukas Palaiologos Komnēnos Synadēnos (PLP 
27120).64 His mother was a niece of Michaēl VIII and Kantakouzēnos 
consequently refers to him as an uncle of Andronikos III.65 Synadēnos is 
prominent in Book I of the Histories; he, along with Kantakouzēnos and 
Syrgiannēs, were the initial supporters for Andronikos’ revolt and formed 
his inner circle. Kantakouzēnos praises his abilities and claims they were 
close friends.66 In 1320 Synadēnos was governor of Prilep and, after joining 
Andronikos, he seems to have been tasked with a series of the most critical 
governorships: ‘all Thrace’ in 1327 while Andronikos campaigned elsewhere; 
Constantinople in 1328, immediately after Andronikos’ victory; Mesēmbria 
when it was in danger of falling to the Bulgarians in 1331; Epiros after its 
annexation in 1338 and finally Thessalonike, arguably the most important 
single governorship, by 1341.67 He stumbled only in Epiros when a revolt 
took him by surprise, and was imprisoned until Andronikos and 
Kantakouzēnos arrived with an army.68 After Andronikos III’s death, 
Synadēnos was apparently sympathetic towards Kantakouzēnos’ claims to 
authority, but not unconditionally. He undoubtedly expected consultation 
                                                 
61 Ps-Kod., 73-75. 
62 Ps-Kod., 83.  
63 E.g. Kōnstantinos Tarchaneiōtēs, see Ch.10:8. For differences between Pseudo-Kodinos 
and actual practice, Kyriakidis, Warfare, 149-50. 
64 See also Hannich and Schmalzbauer, ‘Synadenoi’, 136-7, no. 24; Polemis, Doukai, 180-1, 
no. 196. 
65 Kant. I, 37.15-18, 468.22-3. 
66 Kant. I, 38.5-11. 
67 Kant. I, 259.20, 312.9-10, 459.11-13, 504.1-2. 
68 Kant. I, 509.17-18, 512.6-12. 
 353 
and concessions before giving his approval, and Kantakouzēnos 
undoubtedly needed his support. He therefore disapproved of 
Kantakouzēnos’ hasty acclamation in October 1341 and, mindful of growing 
local opposition and fearing for the safety of his family in regency-held 
Constantinople, only reluctantly offered to open the gates of Thessalonike.69 
However, before Kantakouzēnos could reach the city, Synadēnos and his 
loyalists were expelled from the city by the Zealots.70 He rather begrudgingly 
joined Kantakouzēnos’ army for a time but defected to Apokaukos in 
summer 1342 upon receiving offer of an amnesty.71 He was promoted to 
prōtobestiarios shortly after but subsequently fell out of favour: by 1344 he 
was under house-arrest and Kantakouzēnos relates that he thereafter died 
‘poor and dishonoured’.72 He is portrayed, alongside his wife Eudokia, in MS 
Lincoln College gr. 35, f. 8r.73 His daughter Anna was married to Manouēl 
Asanēs, who supported Kantakouzēnos throughout the war.74 He must be 
distinguished from the Synadēnos frequently used as a messenger between 
Apokaukos and Kantakouzēnos during the civil war.75 
 
15: Stefanos Chrelja (PLP 30989).76 Kantakouzēnos describes him as 
‘well practiced in generalship and the sort of man who knew how to help 
friends and, especially, to harm enemies’.77 He was a Serbian noble and first 
appears in 1327 as the commander of Serbian allies sent to help Andronikos 
II in the first civil war, although he declined to meet Andronikos III in 
                                                 
69 Kant. II, 191.18-24, 193.6-12, 233.8-22; Greg. II, 632-635. 
70 For the Zealots, see Ch.12:3. 
71 Kant. II, 233-244; CBB I, 82, no. 8/38. 
72 Kant. II, 491.24-492.8: πένης καὶ ἄτιμος. 
73 Spatharakis, Illuminated Manuscripts, 195. 
74 See Ch.17:5. 
75 PLP 27101. FK III, 284, misidentifies him as Theodōros, although the associated 
footnote refers to the correct man. 
76 See also Bartusis, ‘Chrelja’. 
77 Kant. II, 233.5-7: περὶ στρατηγίας κάλλιστα ἐξησκημένος καὶ οἷος τούς τε φίλους 
ὠφελεῖν καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους βλάπτειν μάλιστα εἰδέναι. 
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battle.78 Kantakouzēnos portrays him as subsequently discouraging Kral 
Dečanski from taking any further action against Andronikos III.79 Although 
Chrelja was granted authority over substantial territory previously taken 
from the Empire, he later defected to Andronikos III, bringing over a force of 
1,000 soldiers and three cities.80 This must have happened between 1336 and 
June 1341, most probably during Stefan Dušan’s illness in early 1340. 
Kantakouzēnos claims to have been the intermediary who arranged this 
defection.81 Chrelja’s motive may have been simple opportunism; during 
these years the Empire was prospering and may have endangered his small 
Macedonian domain. In winter 1341/2, Chrelja contacted Kantakouzēnos at 
Didymoteichon and advised him to move west so that he could help.82 
However he soon declared that he required possession of the city of Melnik 
before he could join Kantakouzēnos.83 The latter quickly took over the city 
and the pair met and agreed to cooperate.84 However Chrelja seems to have 
kept his options open as he is next seen, in mid-1342, in the company of 
Apokaukos.85 Despite this, he featured prominently in Kantakouzēnos’ 
negotiations with Dušan; the latter demanded that Chrelja return to his 
authority. Kantakouzēnos apparently refused but Chrelja, abandoning 
Kantakouzēnos and Apokaukos, petitioned Dušan for his return and offered 
Melnik to obtain his goodwill.86 He did not enjoy it long: he died in 
                                                 
78 Kant. I, 261-6. 
79 Kant. I, 280.10-281.19. For Dečanski, see Ch.2:16. 
80 Kant. II, 193.12-17. For the probable identities of these cities, see Bartusis, ‘Chrelja’, 213. 
Greg. II, 626, names Stroumitza, which had been lost via Syrgiannēs’ revolt but Bartusis 
argues persuasively that Grēgoras exaggerated the area Chrelja controlled. 
81 Kant. II, 193.20-21. For dates, see Bartusis, ‘Chrelja’, 203. 
82 Kant. II, 193.21-23. 
83 Kant. II, 227-8. 
84 Kant. II, 232.3-233.8. 
85 CBB I, 82, no. 8/38; Bartusis, ‘Chrelja’, 204-5. 
86 Kant. II, 273-6. These negotiations are summarised in Soulis, Serbs and Byzantium, 15-18; 
Bartusis, ‘Chrelja’, 205-6. 
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December 1342, as a monk, while visiting the Rila monastery, presumably of 
a sudden illness.87 His lands were quickly occupied by Dušan.88 
Neither Kantakouzēnos nor Grēgoras provide a court title for Chrelja, 
although such an important defector would doubtless have been honoured. 
The Serbian crown recognised him as prōtosebastos89 and three Greek sources 
give him the higher rank of megas domestikos.90 Thus it may be possible that 
he held the title, but not the function, simultaneously with Kantakouzēnos. 
However the evidence is inconclusive: the imperial privilege issued in 
favour of Chrelja is incomplete and the date and identity of the issuing 
emperor is uncertain.91 It seems more likely that Kantakouzēnos granted 
Chrelja the office of megas domestikos, vacant following his own acclamation 
in October 1341, to secure his support.92  
 
16: Kōnstantinos Palaiologos (PLP 21495). He was the son of despotēs 
Michaēl Koutrulēs and Anna Palaiologina, a daughter of Michael VIII. 
Andronikos II therefore calls him a nephew while Kantakouzēnos, more 
loosely, calls him an uncle of Andronikos III.93 A document of 1324 also 
describes him as an uncle and gives his title as megas papias.94 While he had 
previously acted as an agent of Andronikos II against his grandson,95 he 
appears as a supporter of Kantakouzēnos in the present passage. However, 
when Kōnstantinos was sent forward into Macedonia at the start of 
                                                 
87 Known from his gravestone; see Bartusis, ‘Chrelja’, 206. 
88 Kant. II, 328.6-8. 
89 Actes de Chilander, Slaves, 458-61, no. 27 (dated 1336). 
90 Actes de Chilander, Grecs, 275-6, no. 131 (undated); 303-5, no. 144 (dated 1355); CBB I, 82, 
no. 8/38 (dated 1342). 
91 Actes de Chilander, Grecs, 275. The editor attributes the document to Andronikos III but 
offers no evidence. 
92 Bartusis, ‘Chrelja’, 215, concludes that Chrelja acquired the title between 1330 and 1342. 
For arguments against Kantakouzēnos and Chrelja simultaneously occupying the office, see 
Ch.1:9. 
93 Kant. II, 535.9. 
94 MM III, 104.24. 
95 Kant. I, 130.2. 
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campaigning in 1342, he promptly defected to Guy de Lusignan in Serres.96 
Kantakouzēnos attributes this either to fear of losing his property, because he 
lived in Serres, or calculation that the popular revolts meant Kantakouzēnos’ 
cause was already lost.97 Malatras observes that Kōnstantinos’ defection was 
also consistent with his membership of the imperial family, nearly all of 
whom rallied behind the regency.98 Kōnstantinos became the governor of 
Serres after Lusignan’s departure and is described as a close friend of 
Apokaukos by the end of the same year; his son Andronikos, a prominent 
regency general, was married to a daughter of Apokaukos.99 Kantakouzēnos 
reports a secret plot by Apokaukos to proclaim Andronikos as basileus, with 
Kōnstantinos’ knowledge, although he leaves some doubt about Apokaukos’ 
actual intentions.100 In any case, the plot came to nothing. Eventually, in 1345, 
Kōnstantinos was compelled to request Kantakouzēnos’ help to break the 
Serbian siege of Serres.101 His fate thereafter is unknown. He must be 
distinguished from the prōtosebastos Kōnstantinos Palaiologos, another 
partisan of Kantakouzēnos, but who was captured by Apokaukos while on a 
diplomatic mission and then imprisoned.102  
 
17: The pinkernēs was the imperial cupbearer, who waited on the 
emperor while he dined.103 Such access to the emperor made it a senior title, 
which Pseudo-Kodinos ranked 14th.104 
 
                                                 
96 Kantakouzēnos styles him Συργής, he was governor of Serres and a determined 
opponent; see PLP 92566. 
97 Kant. II, 196.3-9. 
98 Malatras, Social Structure, 267. 
99 Kant. II, 329.2-5. For Andronikos Palaiologos, see PLP 21433. 
100 Kant. II, 323.23-324.21. 
101 Kant. II, 535.  
102 Kant. II, 256. Little else is known about him, see PLP 21494. The two individuals are 
conflated by Papadopulos, Palaiologen, 30, no. 48. 
103 Ps-Kod., 157. 
104 Ps-Kod., 29. On the earlier history of this office, see Guilland, Institutions II, 242-4. 
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18: Iōannēs Angelos (PLP 91038). One of Kantakouzēnos’ most trusted 
and effective followers. While ἀνεψιός could mean either cousin or 
nephew,105 Grēgoras describes him as Kantakouzēnos’ πρωτεξάδελφος, or 
first cousin, while Kantakouzēnos at one point refers to him as θεῖος, ‘uncle’, 
to one of his sons, so cousin appears to be the correct interpretation.106 
Although of the same generation as Kantakouzēnos, he was clearly 
somewhat younger; he is first mentioned as governor of Kastoria in 1328; 
Kantakouzēnos comments that Angelos ‘is closely related to me by blood 
and owed great goodwill and obedience to me, having brought him up and 
taught him the arts of war’.107 Grēgoras similarly praises him as ‘a man 
skilful in the arts of war’,108 and he was trusted with senior commands, 
including leading the left division at the Battle of Pelekanos.109 After arriving 
at Didymoteichon, he stayed with Kantakouzēnos and took a prominent role 
in Kantakouzēnos’ acclamation.110 The following March he accompanied 
Kantakouzēnos as a commander on his campaign to the west.111 When the 
cities of Thessaly offered to submit to Kantakouzēnos, later the same year, he 
issued a chrysobull appointing Angelos as their kephalē or governor.112 The 
chrysobull essentially delegated him complete autonomy, with only an 
obligation to provide military aid when requested; it is effectively a model 
for the appanages which would become the dominant governing structure 
                                                 
105 On the imprecision of the terminology for family relationships, including this case, see 
Nicol, ‘Prosopography’, 84-5. 
106 Greg. II, 628.7-8; Kant. III, 31.16-17. See also Nicol, Family, 147-8, no. 37. 
107 Kant. I, 274.2-4: ὁ Ἄγγελος ὃς ἐμοί τε ἔγγιστα προσήκει κατὰ γένος καὶ πολλὴν 
ἐμοὶ τὴν εὔνοιαν καὶ τὴν εὐπείθειαν ὀφείλει, ἐκθρεψαμένῳ τε αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ πολέμια 
διδάξαντι. 
108 Greg. I, 657.15: ἀνὴρ δεινὸς τὰ πολέμια. 
109 Kant. I, 349.25-350.1. Andronikos III and Kantakouzēnos led the other divisions. 
110 Kant. II, 167.2-3. 
111 Kant. II, 195.20-196.3. 
112 Kant. II, 309.20-312.14. 
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after the civil war.113 At the time, this was the only significant territory 
pledging allegiance to Kantakouzēnos. Angelos was subsequently 
summoned for a single campaign114 but otherwise apparently remained in 
his domain, governing it with considerable success and taking over Epiros.115 
He seems to have died from the Black Death, easing Dušan’s conquest of the 
area, which was complete by the end of 1348.116 Although his kinship with 
Kantakouzēnos appears to make him a natural partisan, his father-in-law 
was the prōtobestiarios Andronikos Palaiologos so Angelos could perhaps 
equally have joined the regency camp.117 The civil war created deep divisions 
in the aristocracy and it is worth noting that Kantakouzēnos had few 
‘natural’ supporters outside his immediate household.  
 
19: Megas papias was a court title without any specific function, ranked 
between 20th and 24th in the various surviving lists of precedence.118 
Kantakouzēnos held the title before his promotion to Grand Domestic.119 
 
20: Arsenios Tzamplakōn (PLP 27752).120 Arsenios is only known by 
his monastic name. The Tzamplakōnes were major landowners in 
Macedonia; they seem originally to have been a Bulgarian magnate family 
who were elevated to the court aristocracy by Iōannēs III Batatzēs in 
                                                 
113 Kant. II, 312.15-322.15. On this chrysobull, see Hunger, ‘Chrysobullos Logos’; 
Maksimović, Provincial Administration, 135-6. The term ‘appanage’ has become established 
for such quasi-independent territories although this does not imply they were identical to, 
or inspired by, French feudal practice, see Barker, ‘Appanages’, esp. 116-122; Kyritses, 
Byzantine Aristocracy, 387-91. 
114 Kant. II, 355.11f. 
115 Greg. II, 657-8. 
116 Nicol, Despotate, 130. Kant. III, 147.21-23, accuses Dušan of taking advantage of 
Angelos’ death. 
117 Weiss, Kantakuzenos, 36. For Andronikos Palaiologos, see PLP 21435. 
118 Ps-Kod., 93 and n. 183; for the ranking see 456-7. 
119 Greg. I, 301.7-9. Kantakouzēnos himself never mentions his possession of this title. 
120 Owing to a number of documentary survivals, the Tzamplakōnes are relatively well 
known; see Theocharides, ‘Οἱ Τζαμπλάκωνες’, esp. 164-169; Estangüi Gómez, 
‘Tzamplakônes’, esp. 290-293. 
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exchange for their submission when he conquered the region.121 Arsenios’ 
father, Alexios, had been a strong supporter of Andronikos II in the first civil 
war but changed sides in 1327, gaining himself promotion to megas papias.122 
After Alexios’ death, Arsenios was awarded the same title, which he held 
from 1333. He enjoys some prominence earlier in the Histories as Syrgiannēs’ 
accuser.123 He remained loyal to Kantakouzēnos throughout the war, unlike 
his brother Dēmētrios, who declared for the regency.124 In 1342 Arsenios was 
sent as an emissary to Stefan Dušan, but was captured and handed over to 
Apokaukos. The latter confiscated his property and subjected him to public 
humiliation then imprisoned him for the rest of the war.125 He survived his 
ordeal and next appears as co-governor of Didymoteichon in 1352, where he 
is somewhat mistrustful of Iōannēs V.126 Kantakouzēnos’ naval commander, 
the megas dux Tzamplakōn, was another brother, Asōmatianos.127 Arsenios 
retired to Vatopedi monastery shortly after Kantakouzēnos’ abdication and 
died at some point before August 1362.  
 
21: The exact form of this proskynesis cannot be established. The term 
embraced a number of different gestures for honouring its recipient, from a 
simple bowing of the head to full prostration, depending upon the occasion 
and the difference in ranks between the giver and recipient.128 
 
                                                 
121 Estangüi Gómez, ‘Tzamplakônes’, 278-80. 
122 PLP 27748; Estangüi Gómez, ‘Tzamplakônes’, 287-90; Theocharides, ‘Οἱ 
Τζαμπλάκωνες’, 160-4. 
123 Kant. I, 437-441, 446-449. 
124 PLP 27755. Dēmētrios, along with Kōnstantinos Palaiologos (above), eventually sought 
Kantakouzēnos’ help against the Serbs. 
125 Kant. II, 256.4-257.9. Matschke, ‘Flotte’, 196-7, plausibly suggests that, as a prominent 
local magnate, he was singled out for public humiliation to embolden popular support for 
the regency party. 
126 Kant. III, 237.9-19. 
127 Kant. III, 74-77; PLP 22753. 
128 For further discussion, see Macrides, et al., Pseudo-Kodinos, 386-7. 
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22: Besides the emperor, only the highest ranks of the imperial family 
(despotēs, sebastokratōr, kaisar) could enter or leave the palace courtyard on 
horseback.129 As a mark of honour, this privilege was also extended to the 
Patriarch.130 Others accompanying them would dismount at a designated 
spot outside and enter on foot. Within the courtyard there were also 
particular locations for the various permitted ranks to dismount and it can be 
inferred that the emperor would ride further into the courtyard than the 
others. This protocol would be maintained even when the emperor was 
away from the palace, with the space around the emperor reconfigured to 
reproduce the same orders of precedence. Thus Kantakouzēnos’ allies here 
attempt to re-enact the rituals associated with the courtyard of the imperial 
palace in the courtyard of his own house in Didymoteichon, placing him in 
the role of emperor. When the emperor mounted his horse, senior courtiers 
would handle it and hold the stirrup. Realising what his friends are 
intending, Kantakouzēnos orders his horse to be taken outside and then 
walks to the gate himself, as the Grand Domestic would have been expected 
to do at the palace.  
                                                 
129 For the following protocols associated with mounting and dismounting in the palace, 
see Macrides, et al., Pseudo-Kodinos, 389-91. 
130 Ps-Kod., 257.  
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Commentary on Chapter 12 
1: Stefan Uroš IV Dušan, Kral of Serbia 1331-1355 (PLP 21182).1 Dušan 
was born around 1308. He spent some of his formative years with his father, 
Dečanski, as an exile in Constantinople, but later headed the noble faction 
which overthrew him.2 He married Ivan Alexander’s sister, Helena, on 
Easter Day 1332;3 his friendly relations with Bulgaria made him particularly 
dangerous to the Empire as he was able to concentrate his attention on 
continuing the gradual Serbian advance into Macedonia. Andronikos III and 
Kantakouzēnos seem to have met Dušan in 1333, for obscure reasons, and 
Kantakouzēnos claims that they established a ‘strong friendship’ (φιλία 
ἰσχυρὰ).4 However Dušan provided opportunistic support to Syrgiannēs the 
following year, making some gains in the subsequent peace treaty and even 
compelling Andronikos III to provide an auxiliary force to aid his fight 
against Hungary.5 The peace subsequently seems to have held until 
Andronikos’ death, at which point Dušan clearly considered it expired. 
Although his opportunistic invasion in 1341 did not come to much, 
Kantakouzēnos would soon provide him with much greater opportunities. 
After the desertion of most of his army in summer 1342, 
Kantakouzēnos was forced to seek refuge with Dušan. He was content 
enough to offer Kantakouzēnos military assistance but he expected to be 
rewarded. While Dušan apparently requested all cities west of Christoupolis, 
or at least those west of Thessalonike,6 Kantakouzēnos protests that he 
offered only friendship to Dušan in exchange for his assistance, although he 
                                                 
1 The most comprehensive single volume study of his life, particularly regarding his 
dealings with Kantakouzēnos, is Soulis, Serbs and Byzantium. 
2 See Ch.2:16. 
3 Soulis, Serbs and Byzantium, 3. 
4 Kant. I, 474.20-475.25. For the date, see Loenertz, ‘Ordre et désordre’, 229. 
5 Kant. I, 457.21-458.15; Soulis, Serbs and Byzantium, 6-8. 
6 Kant. II, 264.11-14. 
 362 
was grudgingly forced to concede Melnik. The apparent lack of any 
meaningful concessions makes the terms Kantakouzēnos describes 
impossible to believe.7 He also claims the regency offered Dušan all of 
Macedonia except Thessalonike in exchange for disposing of him.8 In any 
case, the soldiers provided by Dušan were soon stricken by an epidemic, 
forcing Kantakouzēnos to return to him again. A second expedition was 
foiled by desertions; Kantakouzēnos returned to Serbia over the winter of 
1342/3. Supplied with German mercenaries by Dušan for a third attempt, 
Kantakouzēnos finally began to make progress in early 1343.9 However, 
Dušan, who had been busy conquering cities under the pretext of helping 
Kantakouzēnos, soon turned on him openly. Once Kantakouzēnos’ main 
operations moved east into Thrace, Dušan made rapid conquests. By the end 
of the war, he had overrun all of Macedonia except Thessaloniki, Epiros and 
Thessaly. In late 1345, on the basis of his conquests, he added the imperial 
title to his own as emperor of the ‘Serbs and Romania’.10 Although 
Kantakouzēnos complained bitterly, and launched wars against Serbia in 
1348 and 1350, he was unable to force Dušan to relinquish his gains. 
However, Dušan’s attempts to exploit Iōannēs V’s hostility to 
Kantakouzēnos were similarly unfruitful. The Empress Anna foiled his 
intrigues to gain Thessalonike in 1351 and, in the following year, a Serbian 
army allied to Iōannēs V was smashed by Kantakouzēnos’ Ottoman allies in 
Thrace.11 Dušan died suddenly, in unknown circumstances, on 20 December 
1355.12 His empire began to fragment almost immediately, causing 
                                                 
7 Kant. II, 271-276; Soulis, Serbs and Byzantium, 15-18. Greg. II, 656, claims that conquered 
cities were allowed a free choice between the two states without the other party interfering. 
8 Kant. II, 306.10ff. 
9 Nicol, Family, 52-5; Soulis, Serbs and Byzantium, 19-26. 
10 See Ch.2:10. 
11 Kant. III, 200-9, 247.2-249.22. 
12 CBB I, 379, n. 53/2; 623, n. 91/1. 
 363 
Kantakouzēnos to wearily observe that the Romans were then too weakened 
by continuous civil wars to take advantage of the situation.13  
 
2: Kantakouzēnos’ Macedonia bordered to the north on the Rhodopes, 
north-west on Serbia, to the south-west on Epiros and Thessaly and to the 
east on Thrace, with Christoupolis marking the dividing line.14 Along with 
Thrace, it formed the heartland of the Empire. While not as agriculturally 
rich as Thrace, Macedonia seems to have been well populated, although the 
fragmentary evidence indicates there may have been a demographic decline 
in the early fourteenth century, probably owing to the regular raids and 
invasions.15 The region had been under constant pressure from Serbian 
magnates throughout the Palaiologan period and significant cities had been 
ceded during the reigns of the Andronikoi.16 Before his assassination, 
Syrgiannēs’ had ‘promised to make subject to the Triballi the land of the 
Romans in Macedonia’.17 Following Syrgiannēs’ death, Andronikos III 
remained concerned about the defences of the area and invested in a series of 
fortifications to protect Thessalonike and Serres.18 When the civil war began, 
most of the cities in the region revolted against Kantakouzēnos.19 His 
subsequent alliance with Stefan Dušan brought Serbian forces into the area 
once more. While the main theatre of the civil war was Thrace, the region 
became a battleground between the regency, Dušan, and Kantakouzēnos. By 
the war’s end, the Serbs had overrun all of Macedonia except for 
                                                 
13 Kant. III, 314.12-315.13. 
14 See Ch.9:9. 
15 Laiou, ‘Agrarian Economy’, 312-7. 
16 The clearest narrative of these advances is Soulis, Serbs and Byzantium, 1-10. For the 
general history of Macedonia, see Sakellariou, Macedonia, esp. 306-351. 
17 Greg. I, 490.8-9: ὑπισχνουμένῳ ποιήσειν ὑπήκοον Τριβαλλοῖς τὴν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ 
χώραν Ῥωμαίων. 
18 Kant. I, 541.23-542.10. 
19 Kant. II, 180.14-17; see Chapter 29. 
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Thessalonike and its immediate hinterland.20 Kantakouzēnos attempted to 
reconquer some of these cities in his campaign of 1350 but, despite some 
impressive initial success, these were soon lost once he returned to 
Constantinople.21 
 
3: Thessalonike was, as Kantakouzēnos remarks, the second city of the 
Empire.22 Its population during this period has been estimated at 25-40,000 
people,23 and it possessed considerable commercial and intellectual vitality.24 
Like Constantinople, the city still occupied the extensive area defined by its 
ancient walls, which were frequently repaired – including by Andronikos III 
– and strengthened, through the addition of the acropolis and the 
Heptapyrgion fortress, during the medieval period.25 These defences, second 
only to Constantinople’s, rendered it effectively unassailable to the Serbs 
even at the height of their military strength and even more so to the 
combatants in the civil war, who lacked the resources to sustain long sieges 
and generally relied on negotiation, economic attrition, or trickery to take 
cities.26 Kantakouzēnos mentions the city frequently; the main land and sea 
routes to the west ran by it and it was the obvious base for campaigning in 
Macedonia and Greece. The city twice revolted in favour of Andronikos III, 
                                                 
20 The course of the war in Macedonia is summarised in Soulis, Serbs and Byzantium, 19-
27. 
21 Kant. III, 118-162; Soulis, Serbs and Byzantium, 42-7. 
22 Kant. II, 573.5-6: Θεσσαλονίκην, μετὰ τὴν μεγάλην παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις πρώτην πόλιν. 
For an introduction to Thessalonike during this period, see Barker, ‘Byzantine Thessalonike’. 
Tafrali, Thessalonique, also remains of some use despite its age. For physical situation and 
numerous surviving monuments, see Bakirtzis, ‘Late Byzantine Thessalonike’; 
Kourkoutidou-Nikolaidou and Tourta, Byzantine Thessaloniki; more generally, see Hassiotis, 
Thessaloniki. 
23 Bakirtzis, ‘Late Byzantine Thessalonike’, 61. 
24 Matschke, ‘Urban Economy’; Tinnefeld, ‘Intellectuals in Thessalonike’. 
25 Kourkoutidou-Nikolaidou and Tourta, Byzantine Thessaloniki, 15-26. See also Bakirtzis, 
‘Late Byzantine Thessalonike’, 39-47; for the acropolis and fortress, and the socio-political 
relation of the acropolis to the main body of the city, ibid., 43-7. 
26 Kyriakidis, Warfare, 182-3. 
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during both phases of the first civil war.27 This may have been a further 
expression of its tendency towards separatism from the capital, which 
Kantakouzēnos would experience to his cost.28 In spring 1342 Synadēnos, 
Thessalonike’s governor, offered Kantakouzēnos possession of the city.29 
However, internal opposition to this policy spectacularly manifested itself as 
a popular uprising, led by a group known as the Zealots, which drove 
Synadēnos and his followers out of the city.30 The Zealots were rapidly 
reinforced by the regency and they, along with regency governors on the 
acropolis, would remain in control of the city for the rest of the war. Little is 
known for certain about the motivations and composition of the Zealots, and 
that entirely from the pens of their critics, Kantakouzēnos and Grēgoras 
foremost among them.31 They claimed allegiance to Iōannēs V and were 
deeply hostile to Kantakouzēnos, even after his victory in 1347. While their 
power relied upon certain popular elements such as the city’s sailors, simple 
class-based analyses are inadequate since elements of the lower aristocracy 
and imperial bureaucracy were among the Zealot leaders.32 Kantakouzēnos 
claims the Zealots held the real power; the city’s governor Iōannēs 
Apokaukos, son of Alexios Apokaukos, attempted to break them in 1345/6, 
ultimately by negotiating to hand the city over to Kantakouzēnos. He was 
                                                 
27 Kant. I, 149.3-150.24, 267.4-272.22. 
28 On the city’s repeated episodes of complete or semi-independence from 
Constantinople from the thirteenth century onwards, see Barker, ‘Byzantine Thessalonike’. 
In the fourteenth century, it became the refuge for a number of strong-willed empresses; see 
Malamut, ‘Pouvoir et influence’. 
29 Kant. II, 213.21-214.2. 
30 Kant. II, 233.9-235.10. 
31 Ševčenko summarised, and invalidated, much older scholarship on the Zealots: see 
Ševčenko, ‘Anti-Zealot Discourse’; Ševčenko, ‘Postscript’. For more recent scholarship, see 
Congourdeau, Zélotes. 
32 Malatras, ‘Social Aspects’, 110-112. 
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killed for his efforts.33 The Zealot leaders finally lost popular support in 1349 
and Emperor Kantakouzēnos reclaimed the city in 1350.34  
 
4: Kantakouzēnos relates that the ‘Village (χωρίον) of the Cretans’ lay 
somewhere between Thessalonike and Rentina (almost at the opposite coast 
of the Chalkidikē peninsula), close to Lake Volvē, probably located near the 
Via Egnatia. He mentions it is ‘so-called because an army from Crete, having 
left their island for some reason, settled there’.35 Bartusis reasonably suggests 
that these soldiers were the Cretan veterans of Alexios Philanthrōpenos’ 
army, transferred from their original holdings around Anaia and Ephesos 
when Asia Minor was slipping from imperial control.36 
 
5: The following speech presents a manifesto for imperial renewal, 
which Kantakouzēnos reminds his reader was possible, had his enemies not 
warred against him. The scheme is ambitious, but not unbelievable. The offer 
of submission by the Franks of Achaia was a sign that the Empire had gained 
considerable prestige from incorporating the territories of Thessaly and 
Epiros without trampling on local interests.37 Although the abandonment of 
Anatolia meant the absolute increase in the Empire’s territory was relatively 
modest, reduction in the number of competing polities may have offered, in 
itself, significant benefits to its longer term security had the civil war not 
instead accelerated fragmentation.38  
 
                                                 
33 Kant. II, 568.14-582.3. For Iōannēs Apokaukos, PLP 1187. 
34 Kant. III, 104-5, 108-113, 117-8. 
35 Kant. I, 455, 8-10: ἐστρατοπέδευσεν ἐν χωρίῳ τινὶ τῶν Κρητῶν προσαγορευομένῳ, 
ὅτι στρατιὰ ἐκ Κρήτης αὐτὸ κατῴκουν δι´ αἰτίαν τινὰ ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἀναστάντες. 
36 Bartusis, Army, 74. 
37 For the annexation of Epiros and Thessaly, see Nicol, Last Centuries, 178-182. For Epiros 
specifically, see Nicol, Despotate, 107-122. See also Ch.1:13 and Ch.11:6. 
38 On the dangers posed by an environment of extreme political fragmentation, see Laiou, 
‘Neighboring Powers’. 
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6: The Catalan Duchy of Athens bordered the Empire’s recently 
acquired territory in Thessaly, with the boundary a little north of 
Neopatras.39 Although the Duchy was formerly a Frankish state established 
after the Fourth Crusade, the mercenaries of the Catalan Grand Company, 
assisted by Turks recruited from Anatolia, defeated Duke Gautier de Brienne 
in March 1311 and took possession of his principality.40 In view of 
Kantakouzēnos’ role in the eventual settlement of Turks in the Balkans, it is 
interesting to note that the Company invited its Turkish allies to settle in the 
Duchy, although the offer was declined at that time.41 The Catalan Company 
had originally been hired, for an exorbitant price, by Andronikos II to fight 
the Turks. He soon found he could neither afford nor control them and 
tensions turned to open war, with the Company ravaging imperial territories 
during 1305-9, perhaps the greatest disaster of Andronikos’ reign.42 Having 
exhausted ready sources of plunder in the Empire, the Company 
subsequently entered Brienne’s service for a short period before he also 
found himself fatally unable to control them. Once securely in possession of 
the Duchy, the Catalans continued to expand aggressively and engage in 
piracy, sometimes allied with the Turks of Menteshe and Aydin, until forced 
to desist largely owing to Venetian pressure.43 By 1341 they were without 
allies and were themselves subjected to Turkish raiding, particularly by 
Aydin. Kantakouzēnos’ assessment that, following any annexation of the 
Peloponnese, the Catalans would have been forced to submit to the Empire 
appears reasonable, had the civil war not destroyed his plans. The Empire 
would have surrounded the Duchy and possessed far greater resources. 
                                                 
39 Kant. II, 322.1-3; Nicol, Despotate, 101. For the history of the Catalan Duchy, which 
endured until 1388, see Setton, Catalan Domination; Lock, Franks, 112-127. 
40 For the establishment of Catalan rule, see Muntaner, Chronicle, 145-149; Setton, Catalan 
Domination, 6-15; Lock, Franks, 104-107. 
41 Muntaner, Chronicle, 150. 
42 Nicol, Last Centuries, 128-139; Laiou, Andronicus II, 131-229. 
43 See Zachariadou, ‘Catalans’.  
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Furthermore, Grēgoras claims the Catalans were weak, the offspring of the 
original soldiers having given themselves over to luxury and drunkenness.44 
 
7: Hoplites are heavily-armed infantrymen. Bartusis observes that 
Kantakouzēnos seems also to apply the term to dismounted cavalry and is 
particularly fond of it, as here, when troops are being transported by ship.45 
The latter usage is likely a conscious echo of Thucydides. 
 
8: Campaigning in winter was, for sound logistical reasons, unusual. 
However the Albanians practiced transhumance and were therefore easier to 
attack when they moved from the peaks to the valley floors, seeking 
protection from the elements. Kantakouzēnos explained, in an earlier 
encounter, ‘They feared lest, with winter coming, they would be destroyed 
by the Romans, seeing that they lived not in cities but spent their time in 
mountains and inaccessible places, retiring from them in winter because of 
the cold and snow, which falls like something beyond belief in their hills; 
they believed they would be vulnerable to attack.’46 The Albanians of Epiros 
whom Kantakouzēnos is proposing to campaign against here are 
presumably distinct from the rebellious groups previously mentioned, who 
were located in Thessaly.47 
 
9: Pogonianē lay near the source of the river Drinos, close to the 
modern Greece-Albania border.48 This was very much in the path of 
                                                 
44 Greg. II, 657.10-11. 
45 Bartusis, Army, 258. 
46 Kant. I, 474.14-19: Ἐδεδοίκεσαν γὰρ μὴ, χειμῶνος ἐπελθόντος, διαφθαρῶσιν ὑπὸ 
τῶν Ῥωμαίων, ἅτε πόλιν οἰκοῦντες οὐδεμίαν, ἀλλ´ ὄρεσιν ἐνδιατρίβοντες καὶ χωρίοις 
δυσπροσόδοις, ὧν ἀναχωροῦντες τοῦ χειμῶνος διὰ τὸ κρύος καὶ τὴν χιόνα, ἄπιστόν τινα 
ἐν τοῖς ὄρεσιν ἐκείνοις νιφομένην, εὐεπιχείρητοι ἔσεσθαι ἐδόκουν. 
47 See Ch.1:13. 
48 Soustal and Koder, Nikopolis, 240. 
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Albanian migration during this era. The town was promoted to an 
archbishopric in the fourteenth century, probably by Andronikos III, 
although the archdiocesan seat was likely at Depalitsa (modern 
Molyvdoskepastos) to the north-east.49 Modern Pōgōnianē is a later 
settlement but lays within much the same region. 
 
10: The town of Libisda is described as a theme in a problematic, 
possibly forged, fourteenth-century document.50 It has not been securely 
located, although it probably lay near modern Asprokklēsi, in Thesprotia. 
The name is of Slavic origin.51 Both Pogonianē and Libisda were positioned 
between Berat and the more southern cities, placing these regions within 
reach of the Albanian raiders. 
 
11: Balagrita is Berat in Albania, then more usually known in Greek as 
Bellegrada (Βελλεγράδα).52 Kantakouzēnos’ spelling, Βαλάγριτα, is 
sufficiently eccentric that some scholars have believed that he was referring 
to a separate town in the region of Mount Tomor/Berat.53 However the city in 
question must be Berat: the apparent importance of ‘Balagrita’ in 
Kantakouzēnos’ text does not accord with an otherwise unrecorded 
settlement; furthermore, it once appears in the intermediate form 
Βαλαγράδα.54 The city possessed a very strong fortress, substantial ruins of 
which still exist, located on a steep rocky hill above the river Osumi, near 
Mount Tomor; Grēgoras states that ‘the citadel of Bellegrada is so lofty, so to 
                                                 
49 Nicol, Despotate, 238. 
50 Nicol, Despotate, 220. 
51 FK III, 431, n. 106. See also Soustal and Koder, Nikopolis, 197-8. 
52 For a summary of its history, see Ducellier, Albanie, 20-21. In detail, Baçe, et al., Berat. 
53 E.g., Nicol, Despotate, 108, n. 5; Ducellier, Albanie, 349-50. 
54 Kant. I, 214.20-21: Βαλαγράδων. It is always plural. The identification of Balagrita as 
Berat is also made by FK III, 431, n. 107, and Nicol, Last Centuries, 180 (in contrast to Nicol, 
Despotate, 108). 
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say, as to be above the clouds’.55 Berat had been captured by Michaēl VIII’s 
forces in 1274 and thereafter was the centre of an administrative district.56 
The region around the city suffered from persistent raiding by the local 
Albanian population and Kantakouzēnos’ address to the reader is a 
reminder of the previous attacks. These resulted in Andronikos III’s punitive 
campaign of 1338, which he waged with Turkish assistance while basing 
himself in Berat.57 It also implies that the Albanians in this area had reacted 
to Andronikos’ death in a similar manner to those in Thessaly.58 Berat fell 
under Serbian possession, along with most of Albania, by summer 1343.59  
 
12: Ionia is an area of the western coast of Asia Minor, defined in 
Antiquity as roughly between Phōkaia and Milētos.60 Kantakouzēnos was 
using the term more loosely as much of this region belonged to the allied 
territory of Aydin. The intended target was most probably Sarukhan, which 
held sway in the region of Ionia north of Smyrna, following the attacks 
previously related in Chapters 9 and 10. 
 
13: Mehmed Bey Germiyanoglu, Emir of Germiyan (PLP 651).61 The 
name used by Kantakouzēnos is derived from Karim al-Din Ali Shir, the 
dynasty’s founder; Germiyan was the name of the tribe and later the 
principality. According to Grēgoras, the emirate occupied most of the region 
of ancient Phrygia, as far as Philadelphia, but lacked access to the sea.62 
                                                 
55 Greg. I, 73.10-11: τὸ τῶν Βελλεγράδων ὑψηλόν τε καὶ, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ὑπερνέφελον 
φρούριον. For the fortress, see Baçe, et al., Berat, 32-45. 
56 Maksimović, Provincial Administration, 64-5. 
57 Kant. I, 495.4-499.6. 
58 See Ch.1:13.  
59 Soulis, Serbs and Byzantium, 19; Nicol, Despotate, 128. 
60 Smith, Classical Dictionary, 446. 
61 See also Moravcsik, Byzantinoturcica II, 62-3. Note that the PLP errs in asserting that 
Germiyan was allying with Kantakouzēnos for an attack on the Ionian Islands.  
62 Greg. I, 214.15. 
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Germiyan was formerly the suzerain of Aydin, Karasi and Sarukhan, and 
remained hostile to them, so it appears Kantakouzēnos was attempting to 
ally with him against the latter state.63 Although Germiyan was prosperous 
under Mehmed’s rule, its power was rapidly overshadowed by the 
Ottomans and it would eventually be annexed by them in 1429.64 
 
14: Kotyaeion (modern Kütahya) was a city located on a major road 
junction in Phrygia, with an extensive and unusually strong fortress. The 
fortress possessed a double wall and substantial remains can still be seen.65 
The exact date of its occupation by the Seljuks is unclear but was most 
probably in the 1180s, following Manouēl I Komnēnos’ death.66 The 
Germiyanids appear to have declared independence of the Seljuk sultan in 
about 1300 and made Kotyaeion the capital of their state. Contemporary 
Muslim travellers praised the city’s wealth and the strength of its 
fortifications.67 Both city and fortress appear to have expanded substantially 
during the Germiyanid period.68 
 
15: The embassy was led by Iōannēs Gabalas, as becomes clear in 
Chapter 19.69 
 
16: Kantakouzēnos once again rebukes others for according him 
imperial prerogatives. Grēgoras states that, by the time Kantakouzēnos 
                                                 
63 See further Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, 29, n. 105. 
64 For the short but eventful history of this state, see I. Mélikoff, ‘Germiyan-Oghullari’, EI 
II, 989-990; Foss, Kütahya, 14-15. 
65 For Kotyaeion, see Belke and Mersich, Phrygien, 312-16; for the fortress in detail, see 
Foss, Kütahya. 
66 Belke and Mersich, Phrygien, 313. 
67 Foss, Kütahya, 14. 
68 Foss, Kütahya, 84-85. 
69 Kant. II, 118.21-119.1. 
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finally left the city in September, the senators accepted his authority and ‘all 
cowered in fear and obeyed him as if an emperor.’70 
                                                 
70 Greg. II, 604.19-20: πάντας γὰρ ὑπεπτηχέναι τῷ δέει, καὶ ὑπείκειν ἴσα τούτῳ καὶ 
βασιλεῖ. 
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Commentary on Chapter 13 
1: The presence of litigants is evidence that a law court operated in the 
Blachernai palace. Although it was presumably a higher court, nothing else 
is known about it. 
 
2: There was strict protocol associated with entering the palace 
courtyard on horseback.1 While Kantakouzēnos repeatedly claims to have 
been almost a colleague in the imperial office with Andronikos III,2 the latter 
apparently preserved ceremonial distance between them as he did not 
extend to Kantakouzēnos the privilege of riding into the courtyard. 
However, it was permitted to Patriarchs. Although, in the present passage, 
the Patriarch appears on foot when the fracas occurs, having presumably 
dismounted at his allocated position within the courtyard, it appears that 
Kantakouzēnos’ partisans took his entrance on horseback as a provocation, 
given that he was in open competition with Kantakouzēnos for control of the 
government.  
 
3: Grēgoras also reports a military protest in favour of Kantakouzēnos 
but places it as a response to Kantakouzēnos’ offer to resign (Chapter 3) and 
before his first campaign in Thrace.3 The disturbance is however calmed by 
Kantakouzēnos’ intervention, as it is here. 
 
4: Kantakouzēnos overturns protocol by escorting the Patriarch to his 
horse, an expression of deference that would not have been expected of a 
Grand Domestic. He portrays this as a rebuke to his partisans and a 
                                                 
1 As discussed above, Ch.11:22. 
2 E.g., Kant. II, 94.4-8, 113.21-114.1, 150.10-14. Also see the Introduction, Section 5.1.1. 
3 Greg. II, 586.4-598.1. 
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conciliatory gesture to the Patriarch although, by removing the Patriarch 
from the palace, it also functioned as a demonstration of dominance. 
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Commentary on Chapter 14 
1: Apokaukos’ insult of Kantakouzēnos is related in the following 
chapter.1 The extended narrative flashback which follows, describing 
Apokaukos’ career, ends only in Chapter 16.  
 
2: Although the Apokaukoi were not members of the high nobility, 
they are earlier attested in state service; Iōannēs Apokaukos was 
metropolitan of Naupaktos in the early thirteenth century and another 
individual of the same name is referred to as sebastopanhypertatos in a treaty 
issued by Michaēl VIII.2 The lineage, therefore, appears to have been 
respectable, if not notable. While Apokaukos’ personal circumstances are 
otherwise unknown, his parents were clearly able to provide him with a 
good education. Philotheos of Selymbria, writing somewhat later, in fact 
praised Apokaukos’ distinguished birth, albeit in the context of lauding 
Apokaukos’ patronage of a local saint.3 Kantakouzēnos’ disdain for 
Apokaukos’ origins was, rather more ironically, shared by Grēgoras who 
states Apokaukos was ‘hardly of noble birth’ and ‘descended from an 
obscure family’.4 However these comments should be seen in the context of 
both writers’ dislike of Apokaukos. The Palaiologan era still enabled able, 
educated, individuals to improve their social status5 and Kantakouzēnos 
elsewhere praises the military commander Manouēl Tagaris while noting his 
humble origins.6 He also does not mention Iōannēs Batatzēs’ background, 
                                                 
1 Kant. II, 99.19–101.9. 
2 See Magdalino, ‘Snobbery’, esp. 61-3. The sebastopanhypertatos (not a court title) Iōannēs 
Apokaukos (PLP 1188) is known only from MM III, 96. 
3 Magdalino, ‘Churches of Selymbria’, 311-313 (text, translation and commentary). 
4 Greg. I, 301.12-13: οὐ πάνυ τῶν εὐγενῶν ἦν; Greg. II, 577.20: γένους γὰρ τῶν ἀδόξων 
ὑπάρχων. 
5 Weiss, Kantakuzenos, 54-60; Malatras, Social Structure, 126-7, 331-2. 
6 Kant. I, 91.1-9. 
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which Grēgoras considered to be obscure.7 Apokaukos’ second wife came 
from the well-established clan of the Choumnoi, who clearly did not 
consider him beneath their dignity; Kantakouzēnos admits that Apokaukos’ 
rising social status meant that he was ‘not unworthy’ to those of noble birth.8  
 
3: Apokaukos’ career is later summarised again, where it is revealed 
that his first employer was a tax collector called Makrēnos9 and then an 
otherwise unidentified archōn named Nikolaos. His third employer is then 
identified as Stratēgos.10 Unless it is assumed that Nikolaos was an agent of 
Andronikos Asanēs, the two accounts of Apokaukos’ career are not entirely 
compatible. Matschke resolves this by suggesting that Apokaukos 
temporarily left Stratēgos’ service then returned to it again when Asanēs 
departed to govern the Peloponnese but the evidence is only circumstantial.11 
 
4: Andronikos Palaiologos Komnēnos Asanēs (PLP 1489). Andronikos 
was the second son of Eirēnē Palaiologina (a daughter of Michaēl VIII) and 
Tsar Ivan III of Bulgaria (r. 1279-1280).12 He was thus Andronikos III’s first 
cousin, once removed, and the nephew of Andronikos II, as well as 
Kantakouzēnos’ father-in-law.13 His title is unknown.14 Andronikos had been 
a successful governor in the Peloponnese during 1316-1321, winning 
significant victories over the Latins.15 Both Kantakouzēnos and Grēgoras 
                                                 
7 Greg. II, 741.6-7. 
8 Kant. II, 120.10-17. 
9 Probably Kōnstantinos Makrēnos, see PLP 16365.  
10 Kant. II, 279.1-5. 
11 Matschke, Fortschritt und Reaktion, 149, n. 73. 
12 PLP 21359; PLP 1501. 
13 Trapp, ‘Asanen’, esp. 163-4, 171; Božilov, ‘Asen’, 142-3. Papadopulos, Palaiologen, 28, 
no. 46, is superseded by Trapp. For Kantakouzēnos’ wife, Eirēnē Asanina Kantakouzēnē, see 
Ch.27:4. 
14 Guilland, Institutions I, 227, apparently misunderstanding Grēgoras, makes him 
prōtobestiarios. See also Trapp, ‘Asanen’, 163. 
15 Zakythenos, Morée I, 70-3. 
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regard him as skilled military commander.16 However he felt his 
achievements were not sufficiently recognised and seems to have backed the 
wrong side in the first civil war.17 He is mentioned only fleetingly during 
Andronikos III’s reign and does not appear to have held a significant 
position.18 It is probable, therefore, that he was tempted into joining the 
regency out of frustration with his career; he played a critical role in the 
initial conspiracy against Kantakouzēnos.19 In winter 1341 Asanēs was given 
command of the campaign in Thrace against his son-in-law but by early 1344 
he was in prison.20 The reason for his arrest is unknown but he may have 
favoured a negotiated settlement to the war; following Kantakouzēnos’ entry 
to Constantinople, Anna released him to act as a peace emissary, alongside 
Palamas.21 Kantakouzēnos claims to only have chided him gently for 
instigating the war and, by 1351, trusted him to keep an eye on Iōannēs V in 
Thessalonike. However he was soon tricked by Iōannēs’ partisans into 
fleeing to Constantinople.22 His death is unrecorded. 
 
5: Geōrgios Stratēgos (PLP 26902). In some scholarly literature he is 
misnamed as Stephanos.23 Kantakouzēnos re-tells his story again later, in 
stronger terms.24 Stratēgos is mentioned in a number of documents, still 
holding the same title, the latest of which is dated to 1330.25  
 
                                                 
16 Kant. II, 115.16-17; Greg. I, 131.3-4. 
17 Greg. I, 362-363. 
18 Kant. I, 367.20-21, 471.15. 
19 See Chapters 17-21. 
20 Kant. II, 421.10-12. 
21 Kant. II, 613.1-6. 
22 Kant. II, 613.21-614.1; III, 160.17-19, 202-204. 
23 Kaiserurkunden IV, 58, no. 2338, appears to be the source of this error, repeated by, e.g., 
FK III, 433, n. 122, and Weiss, Kantakuzenos, 26. The document discussed in Kaiserurkunden is 
clearly addressed Γεώργιε Στρατηγέ: see Guillou, Saint-Jean-Prodrome, 47. 
24 Kant. II, 279.4-10. 
25 Register I, 569-578, no. 101. 
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6: Domestikos tōn dysikōn thematōn, or ‘domestic of the western themes’, 
was a low ranking court title first attested under the Palaiologoi,26 concerned 
with fiscal affairs including tax collection.27 
 
7: The sale of salt was a valuable state monopoly. Unless alienated by 
privileges, salt pans and mines were state owned. The Genoese and 
Venetians were forbidden from unloading or selling Black Sea salt in 
Constantinople and Pera, and the Venetians were prohibited from buying or 
selling salt throughout the entire Empire.28 The management of the 
production and sale was apparently farmed out, i.e., in exchange for a 
specified sum provided to the emperor, the officeholder could retain any 
additional income gathered beyond the agreed amount. While this 
theoretically guaranteed revenue and shifted the risks of revenue shortfalls 
onto the tax farmers, it also gave them an incentive to overcharge, causing 
economic damage and popular resentment. However, there are also 
numerous documented cases of tax farmers who were ruined by their failure 
to collect the contracted sum.29 
 
8: Apokaukos owed money to the treasury as a result of his promise 
to double the salt revenues. Kantakouzēnos relates that Andronikos II was 
outraged that Apokaukos appropriated the revenues but he fled when he 
was discovered; Grēgoras notes Apokaukos’ possession of the salt monopoly 
but does not mention any embezzlement.30  
 
                                                 
26 Macrides, et al., Pseudo-Kodinos, 302. 
27 Ps-Kod., 115 and n. 264; Maksimović, Provincial Administration, 220-222. 
28 A. Laiou, ‘Salt’, ODB III, 1832-3. For the operation of the salt monopoly, see Maniatis, 
‘Salt Monopoly’ (sometimes rather speculative given the available evidence); Matschke, 
‘Salzmonopol’. 
29 Kyritses, Byzantine Aristocracy, 201. 
30 Kant. I, 118.4-7; Greg. I, 301.10-12. 
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9: Syrgiannēs Palaiologos Philanthrōpenos Komnēnos (PLP 27167).31 
Syrgiannēs was descended from Sytzigan, a Cuman noble who entered 
imperial service in the 1240s, baptised as Syrgiannēs.32 Kantakouzēnos 
describes the younger Syrgiannēs’ mother as his own aunt; it is possible she 
was Eugenia Palaiologina, a niece of Michaēl VIII.33 Kantakouzēnos and 
Syrgiannēs were trained in arms together and were clearly friends.34 
Syrgiannēs is first recorded as an aggressive governor of Berat in around 
1315, but was arrested and briefly imprisoned in Constantinople, on 
suspicion of sedition, before being given governorship of Thrace in 1320.35 
Shortly after, he took a leading role in Andronikos III’s revolt against his 
grandfather; Kantakouzēnos portrays him as the first to incite Andronikos to 
revolt. Grēgoras gives a similar account, although he claims Syrgiannēs was 
originally entrusted with the task of keeping Andronikos III under 
surveillance.36 His ruthlessness is demonstrated by his suggestion that the 
safest course of action would be to murder Andronikos II, although 
Kantakouzēnos typically, if unconvincingly, claims the suggestion originated 
with Apokaukos.37 Following the first peace agreement between the 
Andronikoi, he seems to have felt insufficiently rewarded, despite having 
been promoted from pinkernēs to megas dux, and defected to Andronikos II in 
August 1321, emboldening the old emperor to restart the conflict.38 The 
renewed war barely lasted a year and left Syrgiannēs in the service of the 
weakened party of Andronikos II. Shortly afterwards he was accused of 
                                                 
31 The most detailed study of his life, if outdated in some details, is Binon, ‘Prostagma 
inédit’, esp. 138-146 and 377-387. 
32 Kant. I, 18.11-16; PLP 27233.  
33 Kant. I, 333.23; Nicol, Family, 24-5, no. 17; PLP 21368. The evidence for Syrgiannēs’ 
parentage is inconclusive; see Van Dieten, Gregoras II, 117-23, n. 27, and, criticising Van 
Dieten, FK I, 217-8, n. 29.  
34 Kant. I, 334.5-10. 
35 Greg. I, 296.19-299.2; Nicol, Despotate, 77-9, 83-6, 89, 91. 
36 Kant. I, 18.10f.; Greg. I, 299.2-301.4. 
37 Kant. I, 42.16-43.12. 
38 Kant. I, 119.16-123.21; Greg. I, 351.15ff. 
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plotting to murder the elder emperor and to replace him on the throne, for 
which he was sentenced to loss of property and indefinite imprisonment in 
chains; Grēgoras adds that he was denounced by Andronikos Asanēs.39 
Syrgiannēs remained in prison until Andronikos III’s final victory over his 
grandfather, shortly after which Kantakouzēnos successfully petitioned to 
release him.40 During Andronikos’ serious illness of winter 1329/1330, 
Kantakouzēnos appointed Syrgiannēs as the chief military commander in the 
west, apparently displeasing Andronikos who nevertheless left him in 
place.41 However, Syrgiannēs was soon accused by Arsenios Tzamplakōn of 
building a treasonous conspiracy.42 In late 1333, unable to disprove the 
allegations, he fled, eventually making his way to the court of Stefan Dušan. 
From there, he led a Serbian army back into the Empire. Using his 
knowledge of the region and local contacts, he made rapid progress and 
soon threatened Thessalonike. Andronikos III immediately marched against 
him but also sent Sphrantzēs Palaiologos ahead, who posed as a defector to 
win Syrgiannēs’ confidence before assassinating him.43 He was killed on 23 
August 1334 and was buried with honours by Dušan.44  
Kantakouzēnos had kinship and friendship ties with Syrgiannēs and 
portrays himself as being instrumental in returning him to favour under 
Andronikos III. Yet, despite the obvious parallels of Syrgiannēs’ tumultuous 
life with the career of Apokaukos and an even greater willingness to resort to 
violence in pursuit of his own ambition, Syrgiannēs is never openly 
                                                 
39 Kant. I, 171.7-172.6; Greg. I, 362.11-364.2. 
40 Kant. I, 329.3-335.15; Greg. I, 432.22-433.3. 
41 Kant. I, 411.23-412.20. 
42 Kant. I, 436.10-446.18; Greg. I, 488.24-490.10; for Tzamplakōn, see Ch.11:20. Greg. I, 
440.5-441.2, states that this conspiracy was supported by the empress-mother Xenē; see 
Ch.14:14.  
43 Kant. I, 448.6-457.24; Greg. I, 495.12-501.11. Grēgoras emphasises how seriously the 
revolt was taken by Andronikos. For Sphrantzēs, see PLP 27282. 
44 Kant. I, 457.14-18; CBB I, 351, no. 49/1. For the reconstruction of the chronology and 
sequence of events generally, which is confused in Kantakouzēnos’ text, see Loenertz, 
‘Ordre et désordre’, 230-231. 
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condemned by Kantakouzēnos. He offers no explanation for Syrgiannēs’ 
actions, perhaps indicating there is truth in Grēgoras’ assertion that 
Syrgiannēs felt slighted by Andronikos III’s partiality to Kantakouzēnos over 
himself.45 It is probable that Kantakouzēnos was rather more implicated in 
Syrgiannēs’ falls from grace than he admits.46 Grēgoras ultimately judged 
that Syrgiannēs was most responsible for the first civil war and ‘the original 
root of all the successive tumults.’47 
 
10: Apokaukos is first mentioned near the beginning of Book I of the 
Histories when, following Syrgiannēs’ repeated requests, Kantakouzēnos 
recommends him to Andronikos III.48  
 
11: The phrase τὸ μεσάζειν τοῖς πράγμασι indicates the office of 
mesazōn, literally ‘mediator’.49 It was not an official dignity and held no rank 
in the lists of precedence but was rather a function, indicating the individual 
appointed to supervise the imperial chancery, which prepared imperial 
orders and correspondence, and who acted as intermediary between 
petitioners and the emperor.50 The mesazōn thus held great control over 
access to the emperor, with corresponding opportunities for influence and 
self-enrichment, and was often the emperor’s ‘chief minister’ – as was 
certainly the case for Theodōros Metochitēs under Andronikos II. 
Kantakouzēnos states that his mesazōn, Dēmētrios Kydōnēs, lived in the 
palace as ‘there was need for the mesazōn to be with the emperor always, 
                                                 
45 Greg. I, 351.16-20. 
46 For extended analysis of the differing account of Kantakouzēnos and Grēgoras, see 
Kyritses, Byzantine Aristocracy, 351-4. 
47 Greg. I, 498.21-2: ἡ ἀρχέγονος ῥίζα πάντων τῶν ἐφεξῆς θορύβων. 
48 Kant. I, 25.3-10. 
49 Kantakouzēnos does use the term μεσάζων on other occasions, e.g., Kant. II, 223.20-21; 
III, 285.8. On the variety of these circumlocutions, see Loenertz, ‘Chancelier impérial’, 283. 
50 Ps-Kod., 85. Also see Loenertz, ‘Chancelier impérial’; Verpeaux, ‘Mesazon’; Beck, 
‘Ministerpräsident’; Oikonomides, ‘Chancellerie’, 168-70. 
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night and day’.51 Doukas, in the following century, identified the office with 
the Turkish vezir.52 However, the mesazōn need not be the emperor’s chief 
minister, as is apparent from the appointment of two relatively unknown 
men to the office, related in the next chapter.53 Dual occupancy of the office is 
attested during Laskarid rule and became the norm in the fifteenth century.54 
Kantakouzēnos himself appears to have previously acted as mesazōn 
to Andronikos III during the first civil war, when he held extensive 
administrative responsibilities ‘and in particular for the imperial 
correspondence’, i.e., the chancery.55 In 1328, he claims Andronikos allowed 
him to appoint another to take responsibility for the treasury, tax collection, 
and the imperial correspondence, as long as the appointee was closely 
supervised, with Kantakouzēnos holding ultimate responsibility.56 
Apokaukos was duly appointed, and it is this incident that Kantakouzēnos 
alludes to in the present passage, although he does not previously mention 
any imperial disapproval. Kantakouzēnos of course wishes to demonstrate 
that he remained Andronikos’ chief minister while Apokaukos was 
concerned only with mundane matters. Given how frequently 
Kantakouzēnos was away campaigning with Andronikos, it is unlikely that 
Apokaukos would have been very closely supervised, and Andronikos 
would have known this. 
  
                                                 
51 Kant. III, 285.7-9: τοῖς πράγμασι μεσάζων ἀνάγκην εἶχεν ἀεὶ συνεῖναι βασιλεῖ 
νύκτωρ καὶ μεθ’ ἡμέραν. 
52 Doukas, History, XXII.10 (ed. Grecu, 165.12-13). 
53 Kant. II, 99.1-3. For arguments that the mesazōn was not always the leading minister, 
see Loenertz, ‘Chancelier impérial’. 
54 Angold, Government in Exile, 160; Kiousopoulou, Emperor or Manager, 85-6; Verpeaux, 
‘Mesazon’, 285-90. 
55 Kant. I, 337.24: δὴ καὶ τοῖς βασιλικοῖς γράμμασιν.  
56 Kant. II, 337.21-339.16. Nicol, Family, 37, n. 5, does not accept Kantakouzēnos was 
Andronikos’ mesazōn. However it is the clear implication of considering the present passage 
and Kant. I, 337-9, together; see also Loenertz, ‘Chancelier impérial’, 281-2.  
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12: Andronikos III’s first serious illness occurred in late 1329/early 
1330; Kantakouzēnos relates the entire incident at length.57 The date is 
known from a short chronicle which records Andronikos II became the monk 
Antōnios in January 1330.58 Kantakouzēnos states that the old emperor took 
the decision owing to fears for his own safety should his grandson die.59 
While Andronikos was incapacitated, he formally gave Kantakouzēnos 
control of the government as ‘leader and protector’ or more succinctly, 
‘regent’.60 Sovereignty was given to Anna and her then unborn child, if male, 
was to be emperor.61  
 
13: In Kantakouzēnos’ earlier account of this incident, he identifies the 
child as one of the couple’s daughters, Maria.62 It is worth noting that 
Kantakouzēnos’ statement, in the earlier passage, that Maria later married 
the heir of Ivan Alexander is not reconcilable with Grēgoras, calling the 
identities and ages of Andronikos’ daughters into question.63 However, in 
the present passage the point he wishes to impress is that Andronikos did 
not yet have any male heirs. 
 
14: Maria Doukaina Palaiologina, Empress of the Romans 1295-1333 
(PLP 21394). Born Rita of Armenia, she was sister of King Het’um II of Lesser 
                                                 
57 Kant. I, 391-411. Also see Greg. I, 439.12-442.15. 
58 CBB I, 29, no. 8/22. 
59 Kant. I, 399.11-20. 
60 Kant. I, 393.22-24: δὲ ἡγεμόνα καὶ προστάτην ἀντ’ ἐμοῦ τὸν μέγαν δομέστικον 
ἀφίημι ὑμῖν; Greg. I, 440.4: ἐπίτροπον δ’ εἶναι τὸν Καντακουζηνὸν τὸν μέγαν 
δομέστικον. 
61 Kant. I, 396.2-6; Greg. I, 439.25-440.3. 
62 Kant. I, 394.1-4. 
63 Greg. III, 557.20-23, calls her Eirēnē. Kantakouzēnos’ and Grēgoras’ chronologies for 
the marriage also conflict, creating uncertainty about the ages of the imperial daughters. 
Nicol, Byzantine Lady, 84, simply assumes Kantakouzēnos was mistaken. However there has 
been a great deal of inconclusive debate on the issue, see Van Dieten, Gregoras, II.2, 388-390, 
n. 497; FK II, 192, n. 105 and 239, n. 305; Kydōnēs, Letters, I.2, 560-562, n. 6 (Tinnefeld’s 
commentary).  
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Armenia. On her marriage to Michaēl IX Palaiologos in January 1295, she 
was crowned and took the name Maria.64 Following his death on 21 October 
1320, she became the nun Xenē.65 She thereafter mostly resided in 
Thessalonike, establishing a semi-formal court around her, retaining the title 
of empress despite her monastic status.66 She became the senior empress 
following the death of Andronikos II’s wife, Eirēnē of Montferrat, in 1317.67 
This primacy would have been taken by Anna after her arrival in 1326. 
Kantakouzēnos portrays Xenē as an innocent pawn in the struggles between 
the Andronikoi,68 but she seems to have become increasingly alienated from 
her son following the conflict, and Andronikos’ refusal to share authority 
with her during his illness strongly contributed to her disaffection. In a 
calculated affront to her son, she adopted Syrgiannēs during his 
governorship of Thessalonike, an act which Grēgoras states was due also to 
hostility to Kantakouzēnos and his mother.69 Xenē died in mid-summer 
1333.70 
 
15: Kantakouzēnos tells this story in considerably more detail in Book 
II. Andronikos is asked twice what arrangements he has made concerning 
Xenē and both times replies “none”. After being asked a third time, he 
explains that two, especially two women, cannot govern public affairs.71 
                                                 
64 Verpeaux, ‘Notes chronologiques’, 173. 
65 Recorded by a number of chroniclers, see CBB II, 227. 
66 See Malamut, ‘Pouvoir et influence’, esp. 69-71.  
67 Multiple empresses was not an unusual situation, see Herrin, ‘Empresses’, and for the 
high status of empress-mothers, Malamut, ‘L’impératrice’, 651-2. 
68 Kant. I, 150, 166, 260. 
69 Greg. I, 440.5-441.2. Kant. I, 335.3-15, does not however mention the adoption and 
portrays her as hostile to Syrgiannēs. On this discrepancy, see FK II, 172-3, n. 34.  
70 Kant. I, 473.10-12; Greg. I, 490.11-495.11 (including his consolatory oration to 
Andronikos III). For the dating of her death, see Loenertz, ‘Ordre et désordre’, 229. 
71 Kant. I, 395.17-24. 
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Grēgoras also confirms that Andronikos’ testament made no mention of 
Xenē or his grandfather.72  
 
16: Glabas (PLP 91682). He was one of the original four katholikoi kritai 
(often termed ‘Supreme Judges of the Romans’), appointed by Andronikos 
III in 1329. Following a bribery scandal, the judges were tried in Hagia 
Sophia in the presence of the Emperor and Patriarch, seemingly during 1337. 
Glabas and two of his colleagues were subsequently deposed and banished 
from the capital.73 He was a correspondent of Grēgoras who, however, does 
not name him in his history.74 Fatouros and Krischer plausibly suggest he is 
the (untitled) Michaēl Glabas addressed in Michaēl Gabras’ letters.75 
Although the present passage clearly relates to Andronikos’ first serious 
illness in 1330, it has frequently been read out of context and interpreted as 
referring to events in 1341, during Andronikos’ final illness. It therefore 
cannot be taken as evidence that Glabas had been restored to favour by 
1341.76 He must have been forgiven at some point though, probably by the 
regency: he is last mentioned as a party to a judgement in favour of 
Docheiariou Monastery in 1344, where his titles are given as logothetēs tōn 
oikeiakōn (a promotion from his previous rank) and once again as katholikos 
kritēs.77 His prominence in Thessalonike at this date indicates he was not a 
partisan of Kantakouzēnos and that the PLP’s suggestion that he may be 
                                                 
72 Greg. I, 440.5-8. 
73 On the institution and the scandal, see Lemerle, ‘Juge général’; Lemerle, ‘Documents et 
problèmes’. For the trial, see also Regestes, 135-6, no. 2177.  
74 Grēgoras, Letters, 112-113, ep. 90, 91. 
75 FK III, 434, n. 128; Gabras, Letters II, ep. 353, 366, 385 and 407.  
76 PLP 91682 states he was sent to Xenē in 1341, overlooking the fact that she died a 
number of years previously. Others also assume he had been recalled, e.g., Lemerle, ‘Juge 
général’, 309.  
77 Actes de Docheiariou, 170, no. 23.  
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identifiable with the skouterios Geōrgios Glabas, a commander in 
Didymoteichon later mentioned by Kantakouzēnos, is unsustainable.78 
 
17: Megas dioikētēs was a low dignity, ranked 55th by Pseudo-Kodinos, 
who lists no function, although dioikētai were historically fiscal officials.79 
Presumably Glabas was chosen for his mission on account of his personal 
qualities or relationship to the old empress, rather than on account of his 
rank. 
 
18: Although Kantakouzēnos has shown Xenē in a bad light, he 
characteristically tempers his criticism of a member of the imperial family by 
attributing her hostility to the malign influence of others, including, of 
course, Apokaukos. 
 
19: Michaēl IX Doukas Angelos Komnēnos Palaiologos (PLP 21529).80 
He was Andronikos II’s eldest son and was proclaimed co-emperor with his 
father in 1281, aged three. His father first sought to marry him to the titular 
heir of the Latin Empire, Catherine of Courtenay, but eventually had to settle 
for Maria/Xenē instead.81 He was finally crowned probably on 21 May 1294 
and thereafter he appears to have participated actively in public affairs, 
particularly in military matters.82 Michaēl was apparently a brave and 
determined general, albeit largely unsuccessful.83 He died in Thessalonike on 
12 October 1320, eight days after the accidental slaying of his younger son 
                                                 
78 Kant. II, 195, 401, 426; for Geōrgios see PLP 93348. 
79 Ps-Kod., 109; Maksimović, Provincial Administration, 217-8, n. 122. 
80 See also Papadopulos, Palaiologen, 36-7, no. 59; Polemis, Doukai, 159-160, no. 145. 
Kozanecka-Kozakiewicz, ‘Michael IX’, provides a reasonable survey of his life, albeit marred 
by excessively speculative analysis. 
81 Laiou, Andronicus II, 48-56.  
82 Verpeaux, ‘Notes chronologiques’, 170-3. 
83 Laiou, Andronicus II, 90, 145-8, 158-67, 232.  
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Manouēl by associates of Andronikos III. Both Grēgoras and Kantakouzēnos 
attribute his death, at least in part, to grief at the loss of his son, although 
Kantakouzēnos unsurprisingly omits all mention of Andronikos’ role in the 
scandal.84 
 
20: Anna had arrived in Constantinople in February 1326.85 As these 
events must have taken place when Andronikos was recovering in early 
1330, Kantakouzēnos rather exaggerates how recent her arrival was. 
                                                 
84 Kant. I, 13.16-14.4; Greg. I, 286.6-12. Kantakouzēnos provides the date, which is 
confirmed by a number of short chronicles: CBB II, 227. 
85 See Ch.1:5. 
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Commentary on Chapter 15 
1: As suggested by Fatouros and Krischer, this is an indication that 
Apokaukos approached Kantakouzēnos during Holy Week after Andronikos 
III’s recovery from his illness, so presumably April 1330.1 
 
2: Kantakouzēnos previously narrated that Apokaukos approached 
him, in winter 1340/1, for permission to assemble a fleet for defence against 
the Turks. He apparently requested the governorship and revenues of 
Constantinople and the islands, to which he would add his own resources, to 
pay the costs of the ships and crews. Kantakouzēnos lobbied Andronikos 
until he reluctantly gave permission and provided 100,000 hyperpyra towards 
expenses. Apokaukos took command of the new fleet, surrendering his other 
offices, and achieved a victory over nine Turkish ships off Chios in early 
1341. This action won Apokaukos great acclaim in Constantinople but he 
had previously suppressed any knowledge of the Emperor’s involvement in 
order to claim sole credit for himself. When Andronikos discovered this, he 
was furious at both Kantakouzēnos and Apokaukos. 2 
 
3: Epi tōn anamnēseōn was a low ranking court title which held no 
specific function. Pseudo-Kodinos explains that it originally designated the 
official who recorded which individuals distinguished themselves on 
campaign and elsewhere, so that the emperor could reward them 
appropriately.3 
 
                                                 
1 FK III, 434, n. 135. 
2 For the full story, see Kant. I, 535.1-541.13. See also Kaiserurkunden IV, 163, no. 2842; 
Matschke, ‘Flotte‘. 
3 Ps-Kod., 31, 111. 
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4: Spanopoulos (PLP 26456). Nothing else is known for sure about 
him. It is possible that he is the prōtobestiaritēs Geōrgios Spanopoulos, whom 
Kantakouzēnos later sent as an emissary to the Pope in 1347.4 If this is the 
case, he can be assumed to have remained loyal to Kantakouzēnos 
throughout the war as prōtobestiaritēs represents a considerable promotion 
from epi tōn anamnēseōn. 
 
5: Iōannēs Melitēniōtēs (PLP 17853). He appears earlier in the Histories 
as a confidant of Andronikos II during Andronikos III’s trial.5 He is probably 
the addressee of a single letter by Michaēl Gabras (requesting grain) but 
otherwise nothing else is securely known concerning him.6 He may be the 
same individual as the epi tou kanikleiou Iōannēs Gabras Melitēniōtēs, who is 
equally poorly documented.7 
 
6: The phrase τὴν ὑπηρεσίαν τοῦ μεσάζειν τοῖς δημοσίοις is another 
circumlocution for the office of mesazōn. Interestingly, Kantakouzēnos states 
two men replaced Apokaukos as mesazōn, apparently forgetting that he 
himself was supposed to be overseeing him.8 Perhaps Kantakouzēnos 
remained as overseer or perhaps Andronikos, in his fury, replaced both 
Kantakouzēnos and Apokaukos. It is of course open to question how real 
Kantakouzēnos’ supervision actually was. 
 
7: Geōrgios Pepagōmenos (PLP 22358).9 He is previously mentioned 
as an ambassador from Andronikos III to his grandfather during their 
                                                 
4 Kant. III, 53.13-15. 
5 Kant. I, 71.15-72.5. 
6 Gabras, Letters II, 244-5, ep. 142. 
7 PLP 17854; Bryer, et al., ‘Gabrades’, 42, adds nothing further. 
8 See Ch.14:11. 
9 For the Pepagōmenoi, see Schreiner, ‘Pepagomenoi’; for Geōrgios, 158-9. 
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conflict10 and a document of November 1334 refers to him as an oikeios of the 
Emperor Andronikos III.11 During the 1341-7 war he apparently sided with 
the regency as he is next mentioned as an unsuccessful ambassador to 
Kantakouzēnos in 1344.12 He may be the same person as the eunuch megas 
ekklesiarchēs Geōrgios Pepagōmenos (PLP 22357). His subsequent fate is 
unknown. 
 
8: Nikolaos Melitēniōtēs (PLP 17861). He is otherwise unattested. The 
kinship relationship between him and the aforementioned Iōannēs is 
unknown. 
                                                 
10 Kant. I, 297. 
11 MM I, 568-9. 
12 Kant. II, 444. The PLP errs in placing this embassy in 1343; it comes after the failed siege 
of Didymoteichon/Empythion which CBB I, 83, no. 8/42-8/43, dates to May-August 1344. 
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Commentary on Chapter 16 
1: Spalokotos (PLP 26447). He is otherwise unattested. Fatouros and 
Krischer suggest it is a nickname, playing on ἀλλόκοτος (‘odd’).1 
 
2: Apokaukos’ alleged plot against Iōannēs was narrated in Chapter 
10.2 The summary of Apokaukos’ previous misdeeds, which began in 
Chapter 14, also ends at this point.3 
 
3: Having recited Apokaukos’ misdeeds at such length, 
Kantakouzēnos is noticeably unforthcoming regarding the arguments he 
used to persuade the Empress, or why she accepted them, particularly in 
light of his alleged plot against her son. Grēgoras claims that many of 
Kantakouzēnos’ followers urged him to arrest Apokaukos and take him with 
him to Didymoteichon.4 Kantakouzēnos suggests that he intended 
Apokaukos to be pardoned but to remain under house-arrest until some 
unspecified future point, but apparently took no measures to enforce this. 
 
4: Phōkas (PLP 30216). He is otherwise unattested. 
 
5: Theodōros Dexios (PLP 5194).5 A friend of Grēgoras, who praises 
him for his reason and virtue.6 Dexios was a prominent anti-Palamite and 
participated in the councils of 1341 and 1351.7 He is not recorded as having 
held office and by 1351 was certainly a monk, in which role he oversaw 
Grēgoras’ own tonsure. Several of his theological writings survive, including 
                                                 
1 FK III, 436, n. 144. 
2 Kant. II, 70.17-71.14; see also Ch.10:7. 
3 I.e., Kant. II, 88.17-102.14. 
4 Greg. II, 604.23-605.1. 
5 On his life, see Dexios, Opera omnia, esp. LX-LXIX (Polemis’ introduction). 
6 Greg. II, 894.1-5. 
7 Kant. III, 168.20-24. For his role in these councils, see Meyendorff, Palamas, 58, 93-4. 
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a lengthy invective against Kantakouzēnos’ conduct during the council of 
1351, which condemned the anti-Palamites.8 
 
6: Iōannēs Ampar (PLP 800). Nothing else is known of his activities 
until after the civil war, although it can be assumed he remained in 
Constantinople for its duration. He was a clergyman and scholar; he signed 
the pro-Palamite tomos of 1351 in his capacity as megas chartophylax and 
hypatos tōn philosophōn.9 He was deposed in 1355 for allowing marriages 
forbidden by the canons.10 
 
7: Dēmētrios Kasandrēnos (PLP 11315). He appears once more later 
when he is sent, in early 1342, with the megas chartoularios Laskaris, on an 
embassy to Guy de Lusignan, governor of Serres, whose daughter was 
betrothed to Kantakouzēnos’ second son, Manouēl. Lusignan, however, was 
an active partisan for the regency and both emissaries were imprisoned.11 
Kasandrēnos survived imprisonment and remained loyal to the 
Kantakouzēnoi after the war, travelling to the Peloponnese with Matthaios. 
He died in Mistra as the monk Daniēl, after April 1362.12 
 
8: Grēgoras does not mention the emissaries sent to Apokaukos at all 
but alleges that the Patriarch wrote to Apokaukos at Epibatai and continued 
to plot with him. In his account, it is the Patriarch who persuades the 
Empress to recall Apokaukos.13 
 
                                                 
8 Dexios, Opera Omnia, 3-63. 
9 PG, vol. 151, col. 763 (where he signs as Ἔμπαρις). 
10 Darrouzès, Regestes, 311-313, no. 2375. 
11 For the entire incident, see Kant. II, 191.24-193.3. 
12 Zakythenos, Morée II, 321. 
13 Greg. II, 603.17-604.10; Darrouzès, Regestes, 171, no. 2215. 
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9: The phrase ὀγδόῃ φθίνοντος Σεπτεμβρίου has been understood to 
indicate either 2314 or 28 September 1341.15 The former assumes 
Kantakouzēnos followed Attic dating conventions, as seems likely.16 The 
chronicle of 1352 places Kantakouzēnos’ departure to Didymoteichon in 
October, along with his visit to Epibatai en route and the subsequent tumult 
that arises in Constantinople.17 The chronicler’s confused grouping of the 
whole series of events in October may perhaps support the later date 
although Loenertz suggests the chronicler confused the date of 
Kantakouzēnos’ departure with that of his arrival in Didymoteichon.18 
Kantakouzēnos clearly recorded the date because of its personal significance: 
he was not to enter the capital again until the night of 2/3 February 1347.19 
 
10: The marriage of Helenē Kantakouzēnē to Iōannēs V was agreed as 
part of the peace at the end of the civil war, yet Kantakouzēnos’ statement 
that the Empress proposed such a match before the war has attracted 
surprisingly little comment other than by Parisot, who appeared unsure 
what to make of it.20 Grēgoras, conversely, relates that it was Kantakouzēnos 
who requested Iōannēs V be betrothed to one of his daughters, claiming that 
Andronikos had wished it.21 Although, in Grēgoras’ account, his request is 
not explicitly refused, it is not accepted and it becomes forgotten among the 
disputes which follow. Later, Doukas presented Kantakouzēnos as 
                                                 
14 Loenertz, ‘Chronique’, 62; Nicol, Family, 46. 
15 I.e. ‘the eighth day of the ending month’: Parisot, Cantacuzène, 172; CBB III, 252.  
16 FK III, 435-6, n. 151. This would make the 27/28 August date for Kantakouzēnos’ 
previous expedition more unlikely (see Ch.9:17). For explanation of the various dating 
conventions, see Van Dieten, Gregoras III, 247. 
17 CBB I, 81, no. 8/35. 
18 Loenertz, ‘Chronique’, 62. 
19 CBB I, 84, no. 8/46b, 681, no. 113/3; Greg. II, 775.1. Kantakouzēnos does not give the 
date of his return but his account tallies with the others. 
20 Parisot, Cantacuzène, 170. Nicol, Family, 47, notes the offer without comment but Nicol, 
Reluctant Emperor, 52, apparently follows Grēgoras instead. 
21 Greg. II, 580.11-14. 
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requesting the marriage but being spurned.22 It is impossible to reconcile 
these accounts. Although Kantakouzēnos would certainly have had reasons 
to distort the record, his subsequent actions make his version of the story 
more probable. If he had requested the marriage and been rebuffed, it would 
have been clear that his leading role was far from accepted and, 
consequently, that leaving Constantinople without taking more careful 
precautions to protect his position would have been foolhardy. If the 
Empress feared Kantakouzēnos’ power and intentions, the marriage 
proposal would have been a logical step to ensure he had an interest in her 
son’s survival and eventual succession, formalising his role as basileopater, 
‘father of the emperor’. Conversely, his procrastination over the matter 
would have been an ominous sign. Kantakouzēnos recognises this by later 
making his response central to Andronikos Asanēs’ argument which 
persuades Anna to turn against him.23 However it is believable that, in his 
overconfidence, he feared the consequences of announcing the betrothal 
without having consulted the western governors – who apparently warned 
him against such a move explicitly24 – more than he feared whatever the 
Empress might do. If the governors had felt he was ignoring their interests, 
they could readily have sought Serbian aid to revolt against him. 
 
11: Selymbria, which appears as both Σηλυβρία and Σηλυμβρία, is 
modern Silivri. It lay on the Via Egnatia and the Propontis coast, about 55km 
west of Constantinople, controlling the approach to the capital. Like 
Byzantion it was originally a colony of Megara although founded earlier, 
between 700 and 660 BC.25 It seems to have been strongly fortified; 
Chōniatēs, who fled there after the conquest of Constantinople, commented 
                                                 
22 Doukas, History, V.2 (ed. Grecu, 41.21-43.4; trans. Magoulias, 64). 
23 Kant. II, 134.19-135.5. 
24 Kant. II, 78.1-4. 
25 For Selymbria’s long history, see Külzer, Ostthrakien, 635-643. 
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on the strength of its situation and walls.26 Michaēl VIII Palaiologos, who 
was widely detested at the time of his death, was laid to rest in a monastery 
here; his body was never moved to the capital.27 Kantakouzēnos mentions 
the town very frequently. In Book I it features as a base and prize during the 
civil wars between the Andronikoi, for example marking the eastern 
boundary of the appanage temporarily conceded to Andronikos III in 1321.28 
Apokaukos was appointed governor of the town in late 1327.29 He clearly 
became a major patron of it and was commemorated as founder of at least 
one church there.30 During the second civil war, Kantakouzēnos seized 
Selymbria in late 1344 or early 1345.31 Grēgoras mentions that ‘he constructed 
a very strong tower to secure the acropolis.’32 A later counterattack by the 
regency was defeated by one of Kantakouzēnos’ commanders.33 From here, 
he exerted pressure on the capital, and he was stationed at Selymbria when 
the final offer to betray Constantinople to him arrived.34 Kantakouzēnos also 
celebrated the marriage of his daughter Theodōra to Orhan here.35 The city 
remained part of the Empire until its end. 
 
                                                 
26 Chōniatēs, History, 631.96-98 (trans. Magoulias, 346). For a study of the walls, see 
Dirimtekin, ‘Selymbria’. Note, however, that Dirimtekin misapplies Kantakouzēnos’ 
comments concerning Epibatai’s lack of fortification in the 1320s to Selymbria (Kant. I, 
166.16-17); his resulting assumption that the walls were built by Kantakouzēnos is incorrect. 
27 Magdalino, ‘Churches of Selymbria’, 314-315; Greg. I, 159.21-22. 
28 Kant. I, 115.12-19. 
29 Kant. I, 258.22-24. 
30 Eyice, ‘Église de Sélymbria’. For the possibility of multiple endowments: Magdalino, 
‘Churches of Selymbria’, esp. 313-314. 
31 Kant. II, 518.16-17. 
32 Greg. II, 762.10: πύργον εἰς ἀκροπόλεως ἀσφάλειαν ᾠκοδομήσατο πάνυ τοι ὀχυρόν. 
33 Kant. II, 585.3-6. 
34 Kant. II, 598.19-602.8. 
35 Kant. II, 587.16-588.16. 
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12: As previously mentioned in Chapter 9.36 It can be inferred from 
this visit that Theodōra Kantakouzēnē was minding her son’s interests in the 
capital while he was away.  
                                                 
36 Kant. II, 68.23-69.2. 
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Commentary on Chapter 17 
1: Grēgorios Palamas (PLP 21546).1 Palamas was of a similar age to 
Kantakouzēnos and Andronikos III; his father had been the latter’s tutor. He 
was raised at the imperial court after his father’s death and would likely 
have been destined for office had he not taken the habit along with his 
siblings and mother.2 Owing to his education and connections, he emerged 
as a leading theologian when he began to write in the mid-1330s and rapidly 
became the foremost opponent of Barlaam of Calabria’s attacks on the 
monastic practice of hesychasm.3 The hesychasm controversy escalated to 
such a level that Andronikos III agreed to call a council in Constantinople to 
settle the matter; it met in June 1341 and resulted in the condemnation of 
Barlaam.4 However Andronikos died days later and a series of theological 
objections to Palamas’ formulations were subsequently raised by the monk 
Akindynos.5 Another council was called to decide on this new challenge, 
presided over by Kantakouzēnos.6 Although Akindynos’ consequent 
condemnation was initially accepted by the Patriarch Kalekas, Palamas’ 
passive approval of Kantakouzēnos and support for peace negotiations 
during the war ensured that, owing to his immense prestige, Kalekas saw 
him as a threat.7 Palamas was imprisoned in 1343 and Kalekas gave a free 
                                                 
1 There is a vast bibliography concerning Palamas and his theology. The most 
authoritative introduction to both aspects remains Meyendorff, Palamas (itself a revised but 
redacted translation of Meyendorff, Grégoire Palamas). Philotheos, Logos, although an 
encomium, is the major source on his life. For a review of the sources, see Stiernon, 
‘Bulletin’.  
2 Kant. I, 545.8-13, 545.23-546.2; Meyendorff, Palamas, 28-32.  
3 Meyendorff, Palamas, 39-40. 
4 Kant. I, 550.8-555.21. 
5 PLP 495; Akindynos, Letters, ix-xxxiii (Hero’s introduction). 
6 Kant. I, 556.3-557.9. 
7 Meyendorff, Palamas, 64-67. Joannou, ‘Unedierte Rede’, 41, protests that Meyendorff 
denigrates Kalekas’ skills as a theologian and suggests that Kalekas made a principled 
objection to Palamas; Stiernon, ‘Bulletin’, 254, is sceptical of Joannou’s revisionism. 
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hand to his theological opponents, led by Akindynos.8 It was only following 
Kalekas’ deposition on 2 February 1347 that the Empress finally released 
Palamas, sending him as a peace emissary to Kantakouzēnos after he had 
entered Constantinople. Kantakouzēnos praised him for his adherence to the 
truth despite persecution.9 Akindynos and Kalekas were excommunicated, 
Palamite doctrine was now reaffirmed and a synodal tomos issued to this 
effect.10 However, opposition to Palamas’ theology had become firmer 
during the war; instead of withering away, it was taken over by Nikēphoros 
Grēgoras. Kantakouzēnos called a final synod in May-July 1351, which once 
again upheld Palamas.11 Grēgoras was condemned as a heretic, marking the 
irrevocable breech between him and Kantakouzēnos. Palamas himself, 
contrary to some expectations, was not made Patriarch in 1347 but was 
instead appointed Metropolitan of Thessalonike. However the Zealots, still 
in charge of the city, refused to allow such a close associate of 
Kantakouzēnos entry and he instead retreated to Lemnos.12 He finally took 
up his see in 1350. In early 1354, Palamas was asked by Iōannēs V to mediate 
with Kantakouzēnos regarding their ongoing conflict. On the way to 
Constantinople, he was captured by the Ottomans and held for a year until 
ransomed. He eventually returned to Thessalonike and died of an illness 
there on 14 November, in 1357 or 1359.13 He was canonised in 1368. 
The politicisation of the dispute over Palamas’ theology has led to 
scholarly attempts to identify Kantakouzēnos’ party as Palamite and the 
regency as anti-Palamite, even characterising Kantakouzēnos as representing 
                                                 
8 Kant. II, 602.9-604.22; Meyendorff, Palamas, 69-78; Akindynos, Letters, xxii-xxx. See also 
Ch.1:16. 
9 Kant. II, 613.1-614.5. 
10 Meyendorff, ‘Tome Synodal’. 
11 Kant. III, 166.2-171.14; Meyendorff, Palamas, 94-101. 
12 Kant. III, 104.5-105.12. 
13 Philotheos, Logos, 564.1-2, places his death twelve and a half years after his 
appointment as archbishop (i.e., 1359), at odds with several chronicles; see CBB II, 288-9. 
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the interests of the great landowning monasteries in opposition to a regency 
‘popular’ party.14 While the dispute undoubtedly acquired political 
overtones, it is not amenable to such reductive reasoning; hesychasm tended 
towards asceticism rather than concern for monastic property and there were 
opponents and supporters of Palamas in both parties. For example, 
Apokaukos and the Empress made efforts to defend Palamas against the 
Patriarch, Grēgoras was a closet Kantakouzēnist during the war, and 
Dēmētrios Kydōnēs, Kantakouzēnos’ later mesazōn, was an anti-Palamite.15  
 
2: As previously mentioned, unusually for a Patriarch, Kalekas had 
two children.16 The identities of the betrothed couple are otherwise 
unknown, as is whether the marriage ever took place. 
 
3: Enkolpia are pendants displaying Christian imagery, sometimes 
containing relics, worn around the neck and resting on the chest.17 Being 
highly intimate devotional objects, they were used to seal solemn 
agreements, particularly of marriage.18 Apokaukos later gives further enkolpia 
as tokens of good faith, although without receiving reciprocal gifts.19 By 
highlighting the enkolpia, Kantakouzēnos emphasises Apokaukos’ readiness 
to blaspheme in furthering his schemes.  
 
4: Iōannēs Asanēs (PLP 91373). For his imprisonment, see below. The 
brothers were released following the start of hostilities and were thereafter 
                                                 
14 Originally suggested by Tafrali, Thessalonique, 203. 
15 For further examples, see Meyendorff, Palamas, 80-85. For more recent criticism of this 
idea, see Malatras, Social Structure, 256-259. 
16 See Ch.1:16. 
17 S.D. Campbell and A. Cutler, ‘Enkolpion’, ODB I, 700. There is not yet a definitive 
study of enkolpia but see Pitarakis, Croix-Reliquaires. 
18 Koukoules, Βυζαντινῶν βίος III, 370; IV, 80. 
19 Kant. II, 120.6-10, 124.22-125.1. 
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among Kantakouzēnos’ closest supporters. When Kantakouzēnos left 
Didymoteichon in early 1342, he took Iōannēs with him and left Manouēl in 
overall command of the city’s defence.20 As a loyal ally, Kantakouzēnos gave 
Iōannēs key commands: Melnik in 1342, Morrha in 1343, and the left division 
in the battle against the outlaw army of Momčilo in 1345.21 Following 
Kantakouzēnos’ victory in 1347, both brothers were honoured as 
sebastokratōres, ranking below only Kantakouzēnos’ sons and Iōannēs V.22 
Shortly afterwards, Iōannēs married a daughter of Alexios Apokaukos, 
widowed during the war.23 Grēgoras portrays him as the leader of 
Kantakouzēnos’ discontented veterans who persuaded Matthaios 
Kantakouzēnos to revolt against his father in 1347.24 Yet, following Iōannēs 
VI’s abdication, he sided with Iōannēs V against Matthaios and was made 
governor of Peritheōrion.25 It is possible that Iōannēs and Manouēl are the 
Asanēs brothers satirised in an anonymous pamphlet for their persecution of 
a certain pinkernēs who, if Hunger’s identification is correct, was 
Syrgiannēs.26 Iōannēs’ opportunism and his many changes of allegiance 
during his political career are not unusual among the fourteenth century 
aristocracy. 
 
5: Manouēl Komnēnos Rhaoul Asanēs (PLP 1506).27 He held the high 
title of megas primmikērios and, before his imprisonment, appears to have 
                                                 
20 Kant. II, 195.16f. 
21 Kant. II, 232.6-7, 404.11-12, 532.20-22. 
22 Kant. III, 33.9-10; Greg. II, 797.2-6; Ps-Kod., 44.4-7, 249.5-8.  
23 Greg. II, 797.6-10. Concerning this marriage, see Van Dieten, Gregoras III, 383-4, n. 511. 
24 Greg. II, 798.18f. Kantakouzēnos omits the identities of the conspirators but mentions 
they were relatives of his wife: Kant. III, 49.12-13. See also Ch.22:3. 
25 Kant. III, 314.8-11. Kantakouzēnos refers to him as despotēs at this point although it is 
unclear when he was granted the title; possibly it was bestowed by Matthaios as was the 
case for his brother. 
26 Hunger, ‘Pamphlet’.  
27 See also Fassoulakis, Raoul-Ral(l)es, 73-5, no. 61; Asdracha, ‘Rhodopes au XIVe siècle’, 
193. 
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commanded the emperor’s military escort.28 As well as being 
Kantakouzēnos’ brother-in-law, he was cousin to Andronikos III and 
married to Synadēnos’ daughter, Anna.29 While he was imprisoned, 
Kantakouzēnos acted as ward to their young son Andronikos, who rather 
surprisingly accompanied Kantakouzēnos west in 1342 rather than 
remaining at Didymoteichon with his father. When his situation seemed 
bleak, Kantakouzēnos later entrusted the child to Synadēnos.30 Manouēl was 
in overall command of the defence of Didymoteichon during the critical 
early years of the war and, in 1344, Kantakouzēnos appointed him governor 
of Bizyē out of consideration for his connection to the Synadēnoi, who were 
the local magnates.31 He retained the city thereafter, and provided loyal 
service throughout Kantakouzēnos’ reign, having been promoted to despotēs 
before the 1351 war with Genoa.32 He is finally attested as an ally of 
Matthaios Kantakouzēnos during his last campaign against Iōannēs V in 
1356.33 He and his wife are portrayed on MS Lincoln College gr. 35 f. 5r.34 
  
6: The Asanai brothers were imprisoned for treason. While 
Andronikos III and Kantakouzēnos were campaigning against Lesbos and 
Phōkaia in 1335,35 certain of the aristocracy attempted an uprising, with 
Genoese support. Kantakouzēnos makes little of this incident and does not 
name any of the conspirators, although he admits they wished to destroy the 
                                                 
28 Kant. I, 353.2-3, 466.19-21; Kyriakidis, Warfare, 84-5. 
29 Kant. I, 125.9-12. For Anna, PLP 1524; for Synadēnos, Ch.11:14. 
30 Kant. II, 248.21-249.14; for Andronikos, PLP 91369. 
31 Kant. II, 195.16-17, 491.17-24. 
32 Kant. III, 196, 211. 
33 Kant. III, 320. Greg. III, 510.16-19 states that Manouēl was invested as despotēs by 
Matthaios, rather than by his father. 
34 Spatharakis, Illuminated Manuscripts, 196-7. 
35 Owing to conflicting evidence, this campaign may be dated to 1335 or 1336, see Van 
Dieten, Gregoras, II.ii, 358-366, n. 451. However, Kantakouzēnos and Grēgoras give the 
impression there was a rapid response to the Genoese seizure of Lesbos, so 1335 is most 
probable.  
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Emperor.36 Grēgoras is more forthcoming, claiming that the conspirators 
intended to murder the Empress and the infant Iōannēs V, and implies that 
their ultimate goal was to place despotēs Dēmētrios Palaiologos, the youngest 
son of Andronikos II, on the throne.37 The scheme was however uncovered 
and thwarted by Theodōra Kantakouzēnē and the Empress.38 The Emperor 
staged a public trial following his return, during which he mercifully forgave 
all participants except ‘the sons of Asanēs who were imprisoned humanely 
and without shackles’.39 Harsh punishments of aristocrats were unusual, so 
Andronikos Asanēs (or indeed, Kantakouzēnos) may be exaggerating his 
sons’ sufferings; he probably felt they were unfairly scapegoated while 
Dēmētrios went free, although their guilt is not questioned. The gravity of 
their plot and their close relationship to Kantakouzēnos explains why he 
refuses to release them without first obtaining the Empress’ consent. 
 
7: Bēra is modern Pherai (or Feres) in southern Thrace. The town lies 
on a hill overlooking fertile plains close to the west bank of the Hebros river, 
about 25km inland, forming a crossroads with the Via Egnatia and the north-
south land route following the river.40 The settlement developed around the 
Kosmosōteira Monastery, established in 1152 by Isaakios Kōmnenos, of 
which the katholikon remains standing today.41 It had an eventful history, 
and Emperor Isaakios Angelos was blinded there in 1195.42 Kantakouzēnos 
mentions that Michael III Šišman raided Thrace ‘as far as Bēra’ in 1323 and 
that a Turkish force plundered the surrounding area in 1329 before being 
                                                 
36 Kant. I, 481.18-482.6. 
37 Greg. I, 530.1-17, 531.10-534.6. For Dēmētrios, PLP 21456. 
38 Greg. I, 530.8-17; Kant. I, 483.23-484.2. For Theodōra, see Ch.9:18. 
39 Greg. I, 534.3: τοὺς τοῦ Ἀσὰν υἱοὺς ἐν ἀδέσμῳ καὶ φιλανθρώπῳ κατεῖχεν εἱρκτῇ. 
40 Asdracha, Rhodopes, 128. 
41 Soustal, Thrakien, 200-201; Asdracha, Rhodopes, 124-130. On the monastery and its 
remains, Ousterhout and Bakirtzis, Monuments, 48-85; Ševčenko, ‘Kosmosoteira’. 
42 Chōniatēs, History, 452 (trans. Magoulias, 248). 
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defeated by Andronikos III.43 Although Kantakouzēnos took control of Bēra 
shortly before his acclamation,44 he soon lost possession of this fortress; the 
garrison and archōn were overcome by a trick and sent to Constantinople in 
chains.45 It was subsequently his first target in his conspicuously 
unsuccessful campaign of March 1342 but his efforts were thwarted by 
Iōannēs Batatzēs.46 The Asanēs brothers were presumably imprisoned in the 
fortified monastery complex. Kantakouzēnos indicates that it was still 
functioning as a monastery, as well as a fortress, in 1342.47 By early 1355, 
however, he states it was still a very strong fortress but no longer inhabited 
by monks.48 
                                                 
43 Kant. I, 179.14-15, 390. 
44 Kant. II, 161.20-162.1. 
45 Kant. II, 196.23-197.1. 
46 Kant. II, 196.9-197.9.  
47 Kant. II, 196.16-17. 
48 Kant. III, 310.17-19. 
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Commentary on Chapter 18 
1: ‘Absolute master’ is autokratōr; Kantakouzēnos here employs the 
word in its general sense, as he does elsewhere, rather than as an imperial 
title.1 Apokaukos implies that Kantakouzēnos aimed for control of the 
government without making himself basileus, thereby freeing himself from 
the customary limitations of the imperial office, such as the need to exhibit 
justice or philanthropy.2 
                                                 
1 E.g., Kant. I, 189.8; II, 421.14: στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ (supreme commander of a 
military force). 
2 See Angelov, Ideology, 134-155. 
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Commentary on Chapter 19 
1: Kōnstantinos Palaiologos Asanēs (PLP 1504). During the first civil 
war, he was a partisan of Andronikos II, in which role he was captured in 
March 1328 after his army was routed by Synadēnos.1 Although he sided 
with the regency, Kōnstantinos was placed under house-arrest in 1342,2 
along with his unnamed son, for sympathising with Geōrgios Choumnos’ 
proposal to make peace with Kantakouzēnos.3 Any title he held is 
unrecorded. He is not attested again after 1342, so may have died during the 
course of his captivity. 
 
2: Isaakios Palaiologos Asanēs (PLP 1494). Kantakouzēnos does not 
mention him earlier, so his sympathies in the first civil war are unknown. He 
was promoted to panhypersebastos following Iōannēs V’s coronation, making 
him one of the most senior of the regency’s partisans.4 Kantakouzēnos 
alleges that he later tried and failed to bribe Süleyman Karasi to ally with the 
regency.5 The Empress entrusted him with Apokaukos’ administrative 
responsibilities immediately following the latter’s death, in which capacity 
he neglected to release Kantakouzēnos’ imprisoned partisans, who had 
killed Apokaukos, before they were massacred in revenge. Kantakouzēnos 
claims Isaakios was too busy and forgot to free them, an excuse so unlikely 
that it is presumably an attempt to preserve Isaakios’ reputation.6 Isaakios 
was clearly instrumental in restoring the situation in Constantinople, and is 
mentioned as one of the main figures leading regency resistance before 
                                                 
1 Kant. I, 285.23-286.9. The date is indicated by Greg. I, 415. 
2 He was still in favour in March, when he witnessed an agreement with Venice; see MM 
III, 114.  
3 Kant. II, 336.7-14. 
4 Kant. II, 218.8-9; CBB I, 82, no. 8/36. 
5 Kant. II, 507.15-18. 
6 Kant. II, 544.11-17. 
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Kantakouzēnos’ final victory.7 He was allowed to retain his title but 
Kantakouzēnos may have demoted its rank in the court hierarchy to slight 
him.8 He died before October 1351.9 
 
3: The megas doux was theoretically in charge of the navy.10 It was one 
of the highest honours available: before the order of precedence was changed 
to the benefit of the megas domestikos, the title ranked 6th; even thereafter it fell 
only one place.11 The Catalan Muntaner, whose commander Roger de Flor 
was appointed to the office, believed the office gave lordship of the islands 
and coasts as well.12 In practice, actual operational responsibility for fleets 
was often entrusted to others; notably Apokaukos successfully commanded 
a fleet as parakoimōmenos in 1341 and there is no surviving evidence that 
Isaakios Asanēs ever commanded ships.13 Apokaukos commanded the fleet 
after his promotion to megas doux in November 1341 but the primary 
intention would have been to honour his commitment to the regency. 
 
4: Iōannēs Gabalas (PLP 93286). Gabalas’ selection for the diplomatic 
mission to Serbia, and his subsequent temporary flight from the city with 
Kantakouzēnos’ supporters,14 suggests that he was one of Kantakouzēnos’ 
oikeioi. If so, his treachery was rewarded: he was promoted to prōtosebastos, 
following Iōannēs V’s coronation in November.15 Grēgoras states Gabalas 
                                                 
7 Kant. II, 559.17-19. 
8 Macrides, et al., Pseudo-Kodinos, 288. 
9 Register III, no. 184, at 70.59-62.  
10 Ps-Kod., 71-3. For the history of the office, see Guilland, Institutions I, 542-551. On the 
navy, Ch.9:10. 
11 Ps-Kod., 455. See also Ch.1:9.  
12 Muntaner, Chronicle, 40.  
13 For Apokaukos’ naval victory, Kant. I, 540.23-541.2; Ch.15:2. In the 13th century the 
megas doux rarely commanded the fleet, see Kyriakidis, ‘Megas Domestikos’, 254. 
14 See Chapter 22. 
15 Kant. II, 218.12-13. 
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had a naturally persuasive tongue16 and he soon became an influential figure 
within the regency as mesazōn to the Empress and ‘co-ruler’ (συνάρχων) 
with Apokaukos.17 Later he was given the rank of megas logothetēs.18 
Apokaukos seems to have left the civil administration in his hands while 
away from the city.19 However in 1344 Gabalas seemingly turned against the 
destructive futility of the war and was the leader of a peace party in 
Constantinople. Apokaukos went to great lengths to quash this movement 
and bought Gabalas off by once more promising the hand of his daughter 
(his failure to honour the previous pledge is not commented on).20 The 
marriage never took place, however, as the two men fell out later in the same 
year; Gabalas fled to Hagia Sophia and then underwent tonsure. He was 
subsequently imprisoned after attempting to flee from the Pammakaristos 
Monastery and is not attested again.21 Kantakouzēnos remarks that he 
contributed greatly to the war against him. Loenertz plausibly suggests that 
he died in the massacre of prisoners following Apokaukos’ death.22 Gabalas 
has been identified with Iōannēs Palaiologos Rhaoul (PLP 24126), an uncle of 
Iōannēs V, who is also attested as both prōtosebastos and megas logothetēs 
during the war.23 This identification is however not conclusively 
demonstrable and rests partly on the assumption that dual occupancy of 
offices was very unusual.24 
 
                                                 
16 Greg. II, 696.22-24. 
17 Kant. II, 223.19-21. 
18 Kant. II, 441.14; Loenertz, ‘Chancelier impérial’, 284-5. 
19 Greg. II, 702.3-4. 
20 Kant. II, 437-442; Greg. II, 696-701. 
21 Kant. II, 493-498, tells a long and darkly comical tale of his downfall, reflecting his 
bitterness towards him. Greg. II, 726, offers briefer confirmation. 
22 Loenertz, ‘Lettres de Acindyne’, 128. 
23 For the original suggestion, Loenertz, ‘Lettres de Acindyne’, 129. 
24 See Loenertz, ‘Chancelier impérial’, 285; Kyritses, Byzantine Aristocracy, 36-37. The 
identification is doubted by Lappa-Zizikas, ‘Chrysobulle inconnu’, 261-2, followed by the 
PLP. Fassoulakis, Raoul-Ral(l)es, 46-48, no. 31, remains undecided. For examples of dual 
occupancy, see Ch.14:11. 
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5: Gabalas was megas droungarios tēs stolou.25 This title was ranked 32nd 
by Pseudo-Kodinos, who mentions that the holder stood in the same 
relationship to the megas doux as the megas droungarios tēs viglas did to the 
megas domestikos.26 As the droungarios tēs viglas was responsible for 
establishing a watch on military camps, he presumably meant that the holder 
assisted the megas doux in naval matters.27 There is no record of Gabalas’ 
involvement in naval affairs; it is likely the title was honorific. 
 
6: This is a slip by Kantakouzēnos, as he states Choumnos was given 
the dignity of megas stratopedarchēs later, at the celebration of Iōannēs V’s 
coronation.28 Choumnos would still have been epi tēs trapezēs at this point. 
 
7: Disypatos (PLP 5526). He is probably Leōn Disypatos (PLP 5539), 
known by his signature on the patriarchal circular of December 1357 but 
otherwise unattested.29 The names of Apokaukos’ wives and the dates of 
their marriages are also undocumented. 
 
8: Ἀνεψιᾷ could indicate niece or cousin. Her name and identity are 
otherwise unknown. 
 
9: Isabella de la Rochette (PLP 6446). Kantakouzēnos states that she 
arrived with Anna and stayed on with her sons (of whom only Artōtos is 
known) after Anna’s marriage to Andronikos in October 1326. 
Kantakouzēnos relates that ‘the Empress Anna came from Savoy to 
Byzantion bringing a large royal retinue of men as well as women. For she 
                                                 
25 The megas droungarios tēs viglas was Dēmētrios Tornikios Palaiologos; see Ch.2:27. 
26 Ps-Kod., 97. 
27 Ps-Kod., 207. 
28 Kant. II, 218.10. 
29 MM I, 375; Darrouzès, Regestes, 332-3, no. 2402. 
 409 
brought from there many of those called knights and squires by the Latins 
and other nobles amongst them’.30 Among the ladies he claims Isabella 
‘excelled the others in wisdom and was clearly fitted to live in the imperial 
palace because of her education and other qualities’.31 It can be assumed she 
was a close confidante of Anna and that she remained Catholic.32 Isabella 
stayed with Anna until after the war, when she returned to the west. She 
apparently gave a favourable report of Kantakouzēnos’ clemency to the 
Pope, who praised his reconciliation with his defeated enemies.33  
 
10: Artōtos (PLP 1447). He is otherwise unattested. Muratore calls him 
Edoardo but then recognises the Greek is probably a rendering of Artaud.34 
His father is unknown.  
                                                 
30 Kant. I, 204.5-9: ἐκ τῆς Σαβωΐας εἰς Βυζάντιον ἧκεν Ἄννα ἡ βασιλὶς, πολλὴν 
ἐπαγομένη καὶ βασιλικὴν θεραπείαν ἔκ τε ἀνδρῶν ὁμοίως καὶ γυναικῶν. ἔκ τε γὰρ τῶν 
παρὰ Λατίνοις καβαλλαρίων καὶ σκουερίων λεγομένων ἦγε πολλοὺς καὶ τῶν ἄλλως 
παρ’ αὐτοῖς εὐπατριδῶν. 
31 Kant. I, 205.6-8: φρονήσει τε ὑπερέχουσα τὰς ἄλλας, καὶ βασιλικοῖς οἴκοις διά τε 
παιδείαν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἐπιτηδειότητα πρέπουσα ἐνδιατρίβειν. 
32 For Pope Clement VI’s correspondence with her in 1343, see Lemerle, Aydin, 184, n. 3. 
33 Kant. III, 54-5 (trans. Miller, Cantacuzenus, 189-90).  
34 Muratore, Principessa Sabauda, 345 and 346, n. 1. 
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Commentary on Chapter 20 
1: Manouēl Kantakouzēnos Stratēgopoulos (PLP 10982).1 Manouēl 
appears to have sided with his wife’s family, the Choumnoi, in the civil war. 
If he is the same Manouēl Kantakouzēnos as mentioned later in the Histories, 
as an emissary in 1352 from Kantakouzēnos to Iōannēs V,2 then he was a 
nephew of Kantakouzēnos and possibly the son of Nikēphoros 
Kantakouzēnos.3 A nobleman named Manouēl Kantakouzēnos is mentioned 
in a short chronicle dated to 1362/3 and may well be the same man.4 
 
2: The actual expression here rendered as ‘the last hope’ is ‘as if 
someone had dropped a sheet anchor’, i.e., an attempt to escape ruin at the 
last moment.5 
                                                 
1 Nicol, Family, 146. 
2 Kant. III, 251. 
3 See Ch.22:9. 
4 Wirth, ‘Manuel Kantakuzenos Strategopulos’. 
5 Kant. II, 127.24: ὥσπερ ἄγκυράν τινα καθεῖναι ἱερὰν. On this expression, see FK III, 
441, n. 187. 
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Commentary on Chapter 22 
1: Andronikos Kantakouzēnos (PLP 10954).1 Andronikos was the 
youngest of Kantakouzēnos’ and Eirēnē’s three sons, born 1334. He was 
transferred from house arrest to imprisonment in 1342 and died in the first 
outbreak of plague in summer 1347, shortly after the war ended.2 His father 
paid him a short but poignant tribute.3 
 
2: Eirēnē Palaiologina Kantakouzēnē (PLP 21357).4 She was a daughter 
of the despotēs Dēmētrios Palaiologos, the youngest son of Andronikos II, and 
remained in detention throughout the war. She married Matthaios only in 
the winter of 1340/41.5 Her husband crowned her as empress at his own 
coronation6 in February 1354, and she presumably laid down this title at his 
abdication. They had two sons and three daughters together but little is 
recorded regarding her independently of her husband.  
 
3: Matthaios Asanēs Kantakouzēnos (PLP 10983).7 Matthaios’ date of 
birth is uncertain but was probably around 1325: Kantakouzēnos states that 
he was ‘not yet beyond adolescence’ at the start of the war.8 However he 
already had command of an army detachment and was absent from 
Constantinople on campaign.9 Matthaios and his younger brother, Manouēl, 
                                                 
1 Nicol, Family, 129, no. 26. 
2 Kant. III, 49.15-16. For the date of this outbreak, see Nicol, Family, 129, n. 3. 
3 Kant. III, 52.19-53.1. 
4 Papadopulos, Palaiologen, 41, no. 64; Nicol, Family, 108-122, no. 24 (with husband). 
5 Kant. I, 534.19-24. For the date see Nicol, Family, 108, n. 2. Fatouros and Krischer’s 
contention that it took place in 1339 (FK I, 295, n. 361) is corrected by FK II, 248-9, n. 350. 
6 Kant. III, 276.1. 
7 Nicol, Family, 108-122, no. 24. His political career is traced in Asdracha, ‘Rhodopes au 
XIVe siècle’, 199-201; see also Weiss, Kantakuzenos, 46-52. 
8 Kant. II, 359.7: μήπω τὴν μειρακικὴν ὑπερβάντες ἡλικίαν. See also Nicol, Family, 108, 
n. 1. 
9 Kant. II, 161.9-17. 
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accompanied their father west following his acclamation.10 Matthaios is not 
mentioned often during the war but, owing to his father’s need for trusted 
commanders, he was given the governorship of the Thracian Chalkidikē 
following its acquisition in 1343 and, subsequently, command of an army in 
Thrace.11 However their relationship was inevitably strained by 
Kantakouzēnos’ stated intention to protect the succession of Iōannēs V; as 
the oldest son of the ruling emperor, Matthaios not unsurprisingly expected 
to be the imperial heir and Iōannēs V naturally suspected his ambition. Some 
of Kantakouzēnos’ supporters, disaffected by his perhaps excessive efforts to 
reconcile his opponents, attempted to push him to proclaim Matthaios at his 
own coronation in 1346.12 After the war, Matthaios was accorded a nameless 
rank above despotēs but below emperor,13 but, believing himself slighted, he 
subsequently seized Didymoteichon and Adrianople to rule as an appanage 
in late 1347. His mother, Eirēnē, negotiated a reconciliation but he effectively 
got his appanage.14 Matthaios seems to have been satisfied with this 
arrangement, and continued to support his father, until the latter upset the 
settlement by creating an appanage for Iōannēs V in 1351, intended to 
prevent him turning to Stefan Dušan.15 This new appanage was to include 
certain territories transferred from Matthaios. Open war between Matthaios 
and Iōannēs soon ensued; Kantakouzēnos sided with his son, bringing Turks 
to oppose Iōannēs V’s Serbian allies, and in early 1353 Iōannēs was banished 
to Tenedos.16 Iōannēs subsequently attempted to force his way back into 
Constantinople, forcing Kantakouzēnos to acknowledge political reality and 
                                                 
10 Kant. II, 232.21-3. Kantakouzēnos later praises the intelligence and martial virtues of 
his sons: Kant. II, 359.5-17.  
11 Kant. II, 415.11-14, 582.4-13. For the Chalkidikē, see Ch.26:3. 
12 Kant. II, 565.7-568.13. 
13 Kant. III, 33.4-9. Miller, Cantacuzenus, 287, suggests Matthaios was permitted to wear 
elements of imperial garb not usually allowed to a despotēs. 
14 Kant. III, 47.1-49.15; Greg. II, 798.18-819.15 (in much greater detail). 
15 Kant. III, 200.16-209.2.  
16 Kant. III, 238-253. Grēgoras implicates Iōannēs Asanēs in this revolt, see Ch.17:4. 
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proclaim Matthaios as emperor, probably in April 1353.17 His coronation 
eventually followed in February 1354.18 Such a move might have been 
successful in the first flush of victory in 1347, but it now led only to renewed 
conflict, ultimately resulting in Kantakouzēnos’ own abdication. The 
abdication settlement left Matthaios with his appanage, which Iōannēs V did 
not tolerate for long. After repeated bouts of warfare, Matthaios was 
captured in spring 1356 and ransomed by his rival. Kantakouzēnos writes 
gratefully concerning Iōannēs’ refusal to blind Matthaios19 and, after a period 
in prison, he was convinced to finally abandon his claims and retire to the 
Peloponnese, where he ruled following the death of his younger brother in 
1380, and died shortly before his father in 1383.20 
 
4: The Monacensis and Laurentianus manuscripts read ὀγδόῃ 
ἀρχομένου, i.e., 8th October. 
 
5: Δῆμος is usually translated as ‘common people’ or simply ‘the 
people’. The word does not denote a precisely or consistently identifiable 
social group, in general or within the Histories, although it always indicates 
urban, not rural, dwellers.21 Usually, as in the present passage, 
Kantakouzēnos refers to people of lower social status in the context of their 
involvement in politics, distinguishing them from the social elite, usually 
identified as archons or dynatoi. He generally considers clergy and soldiers22 
to be distinct from the demos and sometimes distinguishes wealthier groups 
                                                 
17 Kant. III, 255-268; Greg. III, 187.19-189.2; CBB II, 282-3. 
18 Kant. III, 270-276; Greg. III, 204.10-22; for the date, see Nicol, Family, 114, n. 16. 
19 Kant. III, 336.5-340.22. 
20 Nicol, Family, 117-120. For the date, see CBB I, 69-70, no. 7/24, and Schreiner’s 
commentary, II, 325-6. 
21 For a survey of its use in the sources in this period, see Kontogiannopoulou, ‘ΔΗΜΟΣ’. 
See also Malatras, Social Structure, 53-6. 
22 E.g., Kant. III, 34.7-10. 
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as mesoi tōn politōn (‘middle-class’).23 However demos can simply indicate the 
entire population of a town.24 Numerous incidents of popular urban unrest 
are mentioned in the Histories; the uprising of the Zealots in Thessalonike 
and the revolt in Adrianople are particularly well-known examples.25 There 
were undoubtedly extreme economic inequalities in Palaiologan society, 
vividly dramatised by Kantakouzēnos’ contemporary, Alexios 
Makrembolitēs,26 and the plight of the poor is acknowledged by 
Kantakouzēnos himself, although accepted as a simple fact of life. He also 
recognises that the desperation of the poor made them susceptible to 
manipulation for political purposes, particularly if provided with 
opportunity or encouragement to enrich themselves from others’ property, 
as occurs in the present passage.27  
However, Kantakouzēnos presents other popular attacks on his 
followers as being more spontaneously initiated by the elements within the 
demos itself, and these have attracted serious socio-economic analysis by 
scholars. Such analytical approaches have often considered Kantakouzēnos 
to be the representative of an aristocratic class dominated by large ‘feudal’ 
landowners, in opposition to the more populist regency which, through the 
agency of Apokaukos in particular, sought support from the lower orders, 
and is sometimes considered to be aligned with the interests of a ‘bourgeois’ 
class of low-born bureaucrats, entrepreneurs and merchants.28 However, this 
                                                 
23 Kant. II, 179.5, 334.10. 
24 Kant. III, 278.12 (the inhabitants of Kallioupolis), as noted by Malatras, Social Structure, 
53. 
25 Regarding the Zealots, see Ch.12:3; for the revolt in Adrianople, see Chapter 28. For a 
recent survey of fourteenth-century revolts and the problems posed by the evidence, see 
Kyritses, ‘Revolts’. 
26 Makrembolitēs, ‘Dialogue’. 
27 See also Kant. II, 177.13-178.1. 
28 E.g., Ostrogorsky, Byzantine State, 514-6; Nicol, Last Centuries, 191-5. The most detailed 
and rigorous analysis along these lines is Matschke, Fortschritt und Reaktion. See also the 
brief historiographical surveys in Kyritses, ‘Revolts’, 266-8; Malatras, ‘Social Aspects’, 99-
101. 
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analysis has obscured the lack of evidence for any clear class-based political 
programme by the regency or the popular movements and the regency’s 
apparent support among the majority of the aristocracy.29 Consequently, 
although the war undoubtedly heightened and exploited social tensions, it is 
more easily understood as a confrontation between two rival, often fluid, 
groups within the ruling elite, and their associated patronage networks. 
Moreover, the emotional power of dynastic loyalty and popular sympathy 
for the young Iōannēs V should not be dismissed; just as popular expressions 
of loyalty to the Laskarids had been a feature of early resistance to the 
Palaiologoi,30 Kantakouzēnos’ opponents among the demos justify themselves 
as defenders of the young Iōannēs V.31 Popular sentiment appears to have 
remained in favour of Iōannēs V throughout Kantakouzēnos’ reign and he 
admits, in 1353, that ‘the demos, not only in Byzantion but also the other 
cities, bore particular favour for the young emperor.’32 Conversely, there 
appear to have been no expressions of popular support for Iōannēs V in 
western provinces; Kantakouzēnos states that Thessaly and Epiros, which 
had long resisted the imposition of Palaiologan rule, supported him and 
awaited his arrival.33  
 
6: The ‘gate of the Porphyrogennētos’ is also mentioned in regard to 
this incident by the chronicle of 1352.34 It is not securely identified but is 
                                                 
29 Malatras, ‘Social Aspects’ (a revision of Malatras, Social Structure, 241-290), makes 
sustained and persuasive refutation of the class-based interpretations of the war. The class 
interpretation is also criticised by Kyritses, Byzantine Aristocracy, 358-387, and Maksimović, 
‘Regency of Apocaucus’, 187-8.  
30 Shawcross, ‘Palaiologan Usurpation’, esp. 209-211, 216-217. 
31 Kant. II, 177.9-178.2. 
32 Kant. III, 255.9-11: ἦσαν γὰρ οὐ Βυζαντίου μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων οἱ 
δῆμοι μάλιστα πρὸς τὸν νέον βασιλέα εὔνως ἔχοντες. 
33 Kant. II, 239.10-12. 
34 CBB I, 81, no. 8/35: πόρταν τοῦ Πορφυρογεννήτου. 
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often associated with the building generally identified as the Palace of the 
Porphyrogennitos in Istanbul.35 
 
7: Grēgoras numbers the fugitives over sixty but tells a similar tale.36 
 
8: Apelmene (PLP 1151). He is known only from the Histories. He was 
of humble origins; his education was sponsored by Kantakouzēnos who 
recognised his potential and arranged for him to be given an education in 
oratory and military matters.37 When Kantakouzēnos’ cause seemed in 
imminent danger of defeat in 1342, Apelmene defected to Apokaukos.38 
Kantakouzēnos’ bitter reproaches are testament to the trust he had invested 
in his protégé. His subsequent career is unknown. Kantakouzēnos later 
mentions an individual named Apelmene being captured by his enemies but 
it seems highly unlikely it was the same man.39 
 
9: Nikēphoros Kantakouzēnos (PLP 10986).40 Nikēphoros was a first 
cousin of Kantakouzēnos.41 He presumably remained in prison for the 
duration of the war. Afterwards he was awarded the title sebastokratōr and 
remained loyal to his family, assisting Matthaios against Iōannēs V in 1352 
and 1355 (latterly also as governor of Adrianople).42 He was possibly the 
father of Manouēl Kantakouzēnos Stratēgopoulos.43  
 
                                                 
35 CBB II, 253, n. 39.  
36 Greg. II, 608.19. 
37 Kant. II, 247. See also Weiss, Kantakuzenos, 30, 147. 
38 Kant. II, 247-8. 
39 Kant. II, 432. 
40 See also Nicol, Family, 141-3, no. 34. 
41 He had sometimes been mistakenly considered a brother of Kantakouzēnos, which was 
disproven by Nicol, Family, 142, n. 15-16. 
42 Kant. III, 242-243, 310. 
43 Suggested by Nicol, Family, 146. For Manouēl, see Ch.20:1. 
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10: Fatouros and Krischer identify the Gabalas of this and the next 
chapter as Manouēl Gabalas, later Metropolitan of Ephesus. However, he is 
clearly the abovementioned Iōannēs Gabalas, who had simply avoided 
publicising his new loyalty to Apokaukos’ faction.44 Although 
Kantakouzēnos identifies him henceforth only by title, Grēgoras confirms 
that this is Iōannēs.45 
                                                 
44 FK III, 442, n. 203; PLP 3309. For Iōannēs Gabalas, see Ch.19:4. 
45 Greg. II, 696.22, 701.19. 
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Commentary on Chapter 23 
1: The Gaura Monastery, presumably in the environs of 
Didymoteichon, and its hēgoumenos are otherwise unknown.1 It may have 
been endowed by a member of the Gabras family and/or have been 
dedicated to Saint Theodōros Gabras.2 
 
2: Dēmētrios Sgouropoulos (PLP 25015). His first name is known from 
Chapter 29, where he heads another luckless embassy. He is otherwise 
unattested.3 
 
3: For these oaths, see Chapter 6.4 
                                                 
1 FK III, 442, n. 204. 
2 For Theodōros, see Bryer, ‘Gabrades’, 175, no. 3. 
3 FK III, 442, n. 205, incorrectly identifies him as Stephanos Sgouropoulos (PLP 25034), 
who was active in Trebizond. 
4 Kant. II, 47.8-12. 
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Commentary on Chapter 24 
1: Tzyrakēs (PLP 28154). Apparently one of Anna’s oikeioi; he later 
reappears, ‘pitying the great misfortune of the Romans’,1 as the organiser of 
the conspiracy which allows Kantakouzēnos to re-enter Constantinople, 
ending the war.2 Tzyrakēs is briefly mentioned in the anti-Palamite tomos of 
July 1347, which reveals little more than that he had a daughter.3 He is 
otherwise unattested. Moravcsik suggests he may have been of Turkish 
origins, his name a rendering of Čïraq.4 However several other individuals 
with this name are known, so any direct Turkish descent probably belongs to 
previous generations.5 
 
2: Even in such small matters, Kantakouzēnos takes the opportunity 
to present Apokaukos as the true villain and the Empress as a moderating 
influence or reluctant participant. 
 
3: Kantakouzēnos’ precise meaning is unclear but he appears to refer 
to territories that he possessed as private property and others he held as 
‘gifts’ from Andronikos III, possibly by appointment as their 
governor/kephalē.6 He apparently invested his own resources in improving 
(probably fortifying) these territories,7 possibly without receiving their (full) 
fiscal income, and apparently without any guarantee of their continued 
possession, as the office of kephalē could theoretically be re-allocated by the 
Emperor. If Kantakouzēnos had been granted these territories as pronoia, he 
                                                 
1 Kant. II, 598.22-3: τὴν τοσαύτην Ῥωμαίων οἰκτείρων κακοπραγίαν. 
2 Kant. II, 598-600. 
3 PG vol. 150, col. 881. On the tomos, see Meyendorff, Palamas, 89; Regestes, 227-8, no. 2281. 
4 Moravcsik, Byzantinoturcica II, 315. 
5 PLP 28155-28159. 
6 For this office, see Maksimović, Provincial Administration, 117-66. 
7 One of which appears to have been the town of Polystylon (ancient Abdēra): Kant. II, 
226.16-22; Greg. II, 626.10-11. 
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would have received their full fiscal income for life, in addition to any other 
benefit he obtained. 
 
4: For God being truth, cf. John 14:6. 
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Commentary on Chapter 25 
1: Andronikos’ previously stated last words fall far short of urging 
Kantakouzēnos to become emperor.1 Regarding the political relationship 
between Kantakouzēnos and Andronikos, see above, Section 5.1.1.  
 
2: While the speech of Kantakouzēnos’ supporters is clearly self-
serving and written with hindsight, most of his oikeioi and partisans would 
undoubtedly have favoured his acclamation.2 The attacks on his supporters 
and their property in the capital made it clear that they had little to gain and 
much to lose if the other faction triumphed. Their threat to wage war even 
without his approval is not far-fetched; the competitive politics of the 
Balkans gave many opportunities for soldiers and landowners to seek the 
protection and gifts of other rulers: Syrgiannēs and Chrelja offer two 
examples.3  
 
3: Kantakouzēnos recognises that elements of the army did not 
support him; by inviting them to leave at the outset, he was undoubtedly 
hoping to minimise disaffection and desertions later. He also appears to 
suggest that those who take advantage of his offer to depart in search of 
plunder will suffer exemplary punishment. 
                                                 
1 Kant. II, 35.19-36.3. 
2 Kantakouzēnos has already stated that his young partisans among the army officers and 
nobility, who had offended the Patriarch and Empress, were accompanying him to 
Didymoteichon (see Chapter 13). 
3 For Syrgiannēs, Ch.14:9; for Chrelja, Ch.11:15. 
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Commentary on Chapter 26 
1: Morrha was the contemporary name for a province surrounding the 
lower and middle Arda valley in the central Rhodopes, to the west of 
Adrianople.1 The Arda joins the Hebros just above Adrianople. The region 
was known as Achridos in earlier centuries. Asdracha provides a gazetteer of 
the settlements in this region, which were generally small.2 Only the most 
important, albeit outlying, town of Tzernomianou is mentioned by 
Kantakouzēnos in the present translation.3 It is likely that Morrha’s 
inhabitants were experienced in warfare owing to its status as a border 
region; in 1323/4 Andronikos III chased a Tatar raiding force from this area.4 
It suffered heavily in the civil war; after being secured relatively quickly by 
Kantakouzēnos in 1343, the Bulgarians attempted to seize it but were forced 
out.5 Later Apokaukos ravaged the area, burning many of the villages.6  
 
2: Rhodopē is the mountainous district delimited roughly by the 
Hebros in the north and east, the Nestos in the west, and the narrow Aegean 
coastal plain in the south.7 Settlements within this region tended to be small 
and the larger cities at its fringes, such as Didymoteichon and Philippopolis, 
are mentioned as separate entities by Kantakouzēnos. It is impossible to be 
certain of the precise extent of Roman, Serbian, or Bulgarian authority in this 
era but the majority must have been under Roman control in 1341, as 
Philippopolis, on the upper Hebros, had been captured by Andronikos III’s 
                                                 
1 Asdracha, Rhodopes, 10; Soustal, Thrakien, 368-9. 
2 Asdracha, Rhodopes, 148-154. Kant. II, 404.7-8, refers to them as πολίχνια (small towns). 
3 See Ch.30:5. 
4 Kant. I, 191.10-193.10. 
5 Kant. II, 404.7-10, 426.20-427.21. 
6 Kant. II, 436.16-21. 
7 See Asdracha, Rhodopes, passim; Soustal, Thrakien, 427-8. Asdracha, ‘Rhodopes au XIVe 
siècle’ offers a tighter administrative and political focus, particularly for the civil wars. 
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general Bryennios in 1323.8 Rhodopē is a geographical rather than an 
administrative identity and Kantakouzēnos refers to the provinces 
Stenimachos and Tzepainē, as well as Morrha, being parts of it.9 He clearly 
distinguishes the region from Thrace and Macedonia.10 Kantakouzēnos 
campaigned in the area with Umur during 134311 and it was later briefly 
assigned to Matthaios Kantakouzēnos as an appanage under the short-lived 
agreement with Iōannēs V which attended his father’s abdication.12  
 
3: The ‘Chalkidikē in Thrace’ is an area that is referred to repeatedly 
by Kantakouzēnos, often simply as ‘Chalkidikē’.13 It appears to be 
synonymous with the old theme of Boleron,14 a name still used by Grēgoras.15 
The region is defined by Lemerle as the part of Thrace between the sea and 
the mountains (the Rhodopes), of which Xantheia (modern Xanthi) and 
Koumoutzēna (modern Komotini) were the principal towns besides 
Gratianoupolis.16 Kantakouzēnos describes the latter as the ‘metropolis of the 
Chalkidikē’.17 Matthaios remained strongly associated with the area, later 
being given command of it during the civil war and seemingly remaining as 
its governor until it was later transferred to Iōannēs V as part of his 
appanage.18 
 
                                                 
8 Kant. I, 178.15-179.1. 
9 Kant. I, 135.19-20: τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ῥοδόπην ἐπαρχιῶν Στενιμάχου καὶ Τζεπαίνης 
πόλεων; Kant. II, 404.24-5. 
10 Kant. II, 180.14-20. 
11 Kant. II, 404-5. 
12 Kant. III, 292.16-21. 
13 E.g., Kant. I, 437.16-17 (τὴν Χαλκιδικὴν τῆς Θρᾴκης); II, 422.6, 427.7, 433.8 
(Χαλκιδική). 
14 Soustal, Thrakien, 214; Asdracha, Rhodopes, 259. 
15 Greg. III, 564.10. The designation of this region as the Chalkidikē is not encountered in 
literary sources other than Kantakouzēnos. 
16 Lemerle, Aydin, 170, n. 6. 
17 Kant. II, 422.9: μητρόπολιν οὖσαν τῆς Χαλκιδικῆς. 
18 Kant. II, 427.5-7; Kant. III, 208.14-18. 
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4: The imprisonment of the brothers was related in Chapter 17.19 
Fatouros and Krischer believe their liberator to have been an unnamed and 
otherwise unknown sister of Kantakouzēnos’ wife rather than Eirēnē herself 
(i.e., understanding τὴν ἀδελφήν here as Kantakouzēnos’ sister-in-law).20 
However, Grēgoras confirms that it was Eirēnē herself who went to them 
‘with all haste, and providing firm guarantees to her brothers on her own 
account, returned as quickly as possible’.21 As Kantakouzēnos had 
conspicuously failed to secure the brothers’ release before this date, the 
mission probably required Eirēnē’s diplomacy to persuade them to be 
become dedicated partisans of Kantakouzēnos, rather than siding with their 
father and uncles, a possibility which Grēgoras alludes to.22 However, 
Grēgoras mistakenly places their prison in Abdera rather than Bēra, and 
their release after Kantakouzēnos’ acclamation,23 while Kantakouzēnos states 
they were present at the festivities.24  
 
5: The monastery of the Theotokos Gorgoepēkoos (‘swift-hearing’) 
was founded by Andronikos II’s mesazōn, Nikēphoros Choumnos, in the late 
thirteenth century. Laurent located it on the south side of the city, towards 
the Propontis, in the Vlanga district.25 It was presumably a reasonably well-
                                                 
19 Kant. II, 111-2. 
20 FK III, 445, n. 243. 
21 Greg. II, 625.23-626.1: ἁπάσῃ δραμοῦσα σπουδῇ, καὶ δι’ ἑαυτῆς αὐτὴ βεβαίας 
παρασχομένη τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς τὰς ἐγγύας, τάχιστα ἐπανῆκε. 
22 Greg. II, 625.4-7. 
23 Greg. II, 624.23-625.4. 
24 Kant. II, 167.1-3. Kantakouzēnos may reasonably be assumed to have been better 
informed on these details and his account is generally preferred over Grēgoras’: see Van 
Dieten, Gregoras III, 274, n. 126; Fassoulakis, Raoul-Ral(l)es, 74; PLP 1506. Fatouros and 
Krischer surprisingly accept Grēgoras’ implied date of 1342 without commenting 
Kantakouzēnos’ conflicting testimony: FK III, 438, n. 162. 
25 Laurent, ‘Théotokos Gorgoépikoos’. Laurent’s designation of this region as the 
Heptaskalon, however, is no longer accepted: see Magdalino, ‘Maritime Neighborhoods’, 
221. 
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known landmark when Kantakouzēnos was writing. The large quantities of 
agricultural produce may have been intended for sale on the export market.26 
 
6: This proverbial expression indicates a multitude of misfortunes.27 
                                                 
26 Matschke, ‘Commerce’, 801. 
27 Kant. II, 165.21: κακῶν Ἰλιάς. See D. Whitehead (trans.), ‘Ἰλιὰς κακῶν’, Suda On Line, 
<http://www.stoa.org/sol-entries/iota/314>, 18 October 2004, last accessed 21 October 2014. 
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Commentary on Chapter 27 
1: The date of Kantakouzēnos’ acclamation is recorded as 26 October 
1341. This is confirmed by Grēgoras, who states it took place on the feast of 
St. Dēmētrios.1 
 
2: The presence of senators is cited by Asdracha as evidence for the 
existence of a municipal senate which represented local interests in 
Didymoteichon.2 Weiss considers the possibility of a local senate but 
speculates that Kantakouzēnos may instead have been emphasising his 
acclamation by the traditional triad of Senate, People and Army.3 The role of 
‘the people’ seems to be rather downplayed here though. Although some 
form of municipal council may have existed, as it possibly did in 
Thessalonike,4 it seems that Kantakouzēnos is simply referring to the 
members of the imperial court serving with the army, whom he has 
previously mentioned.5 
 
3: The word pilos is a generic term for a hat worn at court. By the 
fourteenth century, hats had become one of the main insignia of court 
hierarchy.6 Although the exact form of the imperial pilos is unknown, it is not 
a crown. When Kantakouzēnos’ son Matthaios was proclaimed in 1353, he 
placed on his head a pilos ‘decorated with pearls and gems, just as is the 
custom for emperors’.7 
                                                 
1 CBB I, 82, no. 8/35; Greg. II, 661.18-20. 
2 Asdracha, Rhodopes, 134. 
3 Weiss, Kantakuzenos, 40. 
4 Maksimović, Provincial Administration, 252-6. In contrast, Kyritses, Byzantine Aristocracy, 
63, dismisses all provincial senates as a ‘persisting historiographical fiction’. For Kyritses’ 
interpretation of local assemblies, see Kyritses, ‘Revolts’, 270-272. 
5 Kant. II, 69.5. 
6 Macrides, et al., Pseudo-Kodinos, 323-4. 
7 Kant. III, 269.11-12: λίθῳ τε κεκοσμημένον καὶ μαργάροις, ὥσπερ ἔθος βασιλεῦσι. 
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4: Eirēnē Asanina Kantakouzēnē, Empress of the Romans 1341-1354 
(PLP 10935).8 She was a daughter of Andronikos Asanēs and thus 
granddaughter of Bulgarian Emperor Ivan III Asanēs. Her birth date is 
unknown, but she married before 1320; Nicol suggests 1318.9 Kantakouzēnos 
rarely mentions her before the civil war but her acclamation as Empress 
thrust her into the centre of events. When her husband departed on 
campaign, in March 1342, he was accompanied by both his adult sons as well 
as her brother Iōannēs Asanēs; she was left to secure Didymoteichon along 
with her remaining brother Manouēl.10 In this role she secured the loyalty of 
the forces in Didymoteichon in the face of Kantakouzēnos’ early reversals,11 
attempted to secure Bulgarian support – an effort which nevertheless 
backfired – and negotiated with Umur of Aydin who arrived to offer 
assistance in winter 1342/3.12 Kantakouzēnos crowned her as Empress on 21 
May 1346 and again, following his victory, on 21 May 1347.13 Thereafter she 
continued to act as his deputy when he was away from Constantinople, 
organising the defence of the city against the Genoese in 1348 and against 
Iōannēs V and his partisans in 1353.14 She was also involved in efforts to 
reconcile her son Matthaios with her son-in-law Iōannēs V, with mixed 
success.15 After her abdication, she took the monastic name of Eugenia on 11 
December 1354.16 She subsequently spent time in both Constantinople and 
the Peloponnese; the date of her death is unknown but occurred between 
                                                 
8 See also Nicol, Family, 104-108, no. 23; Nicol, Byzantine Lady, 71-81. 
9 Nicol, Family, 104. 
10 Kant. II, 195.4-196.3. 
11 Kant. II, 281-7. 
12 Kant. II, 336.17-346. 
13 Kant. II, 564.10-20; Kant. III, 29.1-7; Greg. II, 787.9-788.15. 
14 Greg. II, 845.9ff.; Kant. III, 255.5-22. 
15 Kant. III, 48.16-49.15, 238.22-241.19. 
16 Failler, ‘Chronologie’, 123. 
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1363 and 1379.17 Given that Kantakouzēnos makes no mention of it, it 
probably took place after he completed the Histories. Kantakouzēnos praised 
her for ‘demonstrating greater spirit than is accorded to women’ and for her 
intelligence.18 He clearly relied upon female members of his oikos as loyal 
guardians of his political interests, despite his avowal of traditional attitudes 
regarding the incapacity of women for politics.19 Grēgoras, who considered 
her a potential ally against her husband’s Palamism, also praised her 
generously.20 
 
5: The church of Geōrgios Palaiokastritēs is no longer extant but a 
nineteenth century Armenian church dedicated to Hagios Geōrgios stands 
on what is probably the same site, within the walled acropolis of 
Didymoteichon.21 
 
6: The emperor would perform proskynēsis only before holy objects 
and persons.22 It is not known what form it took in this case but 
Kantakouzēnos probably venerated and kissed the icon of the saint. 
 
7: The origins of the term kavallarioi are described by Bartusis.23 He 
suggests the phrase ‘doing everything that was customary for them’ (πάντα 
ἐπ´ αὐτοῖς τὰ εἰθισμένα πράττων) indicates that Kantakouzēnos gave these 
new knights pronoia grants.24 This seems plausible, given the bond between 
                                                 
17 Nicol, Family, 107. 
18 Kant. II, 336.20: μεῖζον ἐπιδειξαμένη ἢ κατὰ γυναικεῖον φρόνημα; Kant. III, 49.5-7. 
19 See Ch.6:4.  
20 Greg. II, 625.10-18, 692.21-693.16. 
21 Giannopoulos, Didymoteichon, 160, n. 277; Ousterhout and Bakirtzis, Monuments, 142. 
For possible origins of the name, see FK II, 446, n. 252. 
22 Macrides, et al., Pseudo-Kodinos, 386. 
23 See Bartusis, ‘Kavallarioi’. 
24 Bartusis, ‘Kavallarioi’, 344-5; Bartusis, Land and Privilege, 325-6. Concerning pronoia, see 
Ch.8:2. 
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knighthood and landholding. Nicol’s assertion that ‘the Latin troops then 
conferred on John the western order of knighthood’ is not supported by the 
Greek text.25 
 
8: Pseudo-Kodinos provides a protocol for an imperial coronation but 
not an acclamation, as is being described here; Kantakouzēnos’ coronation 
followed at Adrianople on 21 May 1346 and was repeated at Constantinople 
on 21 May 1347.26 Pseudo-Kodinos’ description of the coronation protocol 
includes that the imperial couple feast after the ceremony while the court 
title holders stand by and the most distinguished serve them at the table.27 In 
this context it would have been Angelos’ duty as pinkernēs, the imperial cup-
bearer, to serve them.28 A similar banquet appears to be taking place here. 
 
9: Pseudo-Kodinos confirms that emperors wore white garments as a 
sign of mourning, although he reserves them for ‘when an emperor’s father 
or mother or wife dies, or a son or grandson’; the colour he prescribes for 
mourning a brother is yellow.29 However, Kantakouzēnos must have been 
following a known tradition for his gesture to have meaning but it remains 
unknown how well established this practice was. Kantakouzēnos apparently 
continued to wear white until he entered Constantinople again, justifying 
this by reference to the death of his friend Andronikos, followed by the death 
                                                 
25 Nicol, Reluctant Emperor, 56. 
26 Kant. II, 564.10-22; Kant. III, 29.1-14. Kantakouzēnos incorrectly records the date as 13 
May for the latter; see Greg. II, 788.10-13; CBB I, 85, no. 8/48b. Kantakouzēnos must be 
mistaken since the new Patriarch, who crowned him, was appointed only on 17 May: see 
CBB II, 270-1; Miller, Cantacuzenus, 269. 
27 Ps-Kod., 237-9. 
28 Ps-Kod., 157. 
29 See Ps-Kod., 263 (trans. Macrides). See ibid., n. 769, for the conflicting evidence on how 
well established this practice actually was. 
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of his own mother, and finally the inappropriateness of spending money on 
lavish garments while his own supporters were in want.30 
 
10: Cf. John 15:20. 
 
11: Hilariōn, Metropolitan of Didymoteichon (PLP 8169). 
Kantakouzēnos elsewhere refers to him as ἀρχιερεύς (translated as 
‘Archbishop’) and μετροπολίτης (Metropolitan) interchangeably. 
Kantakouzēnos was likely partly responsible for his appointment, which 
may have taken place as late as 1341.31 Kantakouzēnos was greatly 
impressed by the Metropolitan’s prophetic powers, attested also by 
Philotheos of Selymbria, and mentions his (invariably correct) predictions on 
a number of occasions.32 In an autograph marginal note to a MS of his 
Antirrhetika against Prochoros Kydōnēs, Kantakouzēnos wrote that Hilariōn 
was one of the three saints he had witnessed in his lifetime.33 Despite chiding 
Kantakouzēnos here, Hilariōn clearly remained favourably disposed, staying 
in Didymoteichon throughout the war until he died, apparently of natural 
causes, in mid-1344.34 He did not prevent Kantakouzēnos conscripting the 
local clergy into digging a defensive ditch around the suburbs, although he 
                                                 
30 Greg. II, 612.5-17. 
31 Nicol, ‘Hilarion’, 193-4. The evidence offered for the date is inconclusive, however. 
32 Kant. II, 289.7-289.2, 340.1-341.9, 343.1-344.4, 401.20-402.8. Regarding Philotheos’ 
biography of Hilariōn, see Nicol, ‘Hilarion’, 191-199. 
33 Meyendorff, Grégoire Palamas, 34, n. 33 (not reproduced in the English edition). The 
other two were the Patriarch Athanasios and an otherwise unknown Gabriēl, archimandrite 
of the Pantokrator Monastery in Didymoteichon. The Antirrhetika was composed in 1368/9; 
see Nicol, Family, 99. 
34 Kant. II, 426. Kantakouzēnos mentions Hilariōn’s death shortly after the crusader 
victory over the Turks at Longos (Kant. II, 422-3), which can be dated from Latin sources to 
13 May 1344 (see Carr, Motivations and Response, 192). Nicol, ‘Hilarion’, 199, also supports 
1344. The PLP and Regestes, 152, no. 2196, offer no evidence for placing his demise in 1343. 
The PLP also misdates the tenure of his successor, Theolēptos (PLP 7506), as running 
concurrently from 1341. 
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typically offered a prophetic comment that it would never be needed.35 
Furthermore Hilariōn apparently wrote to the prōtostratōr Andronikos 
Palaiologos and to Apokaukos himself at different times, advising them not 
to resist Kantakouzēnos as God had determined he would ultimately be 
victorious.36 
 
12: The ordeal by hot iron, here suggested by the anonymous 
husband, is not identified as a Byzantine legal practice before 1204, although 
a number of cases are documented after this date.37 Ordeal was generally 
employed in cases where the truth could not otherwise be determined owing 
to lack of evidence. Macrides suggests that the practice may have pre-dated 
Latin influence, but this is not securely established.38 Although this incident 
does not take place in a formal judicial context, Kantakouzēnos offers no 
comment on any foreign origin of the ordeal, or upon its obvious lack of 
reliability, in marked contrast to Akropolitēs who famously condemned it as 
a barbarian practice.39 
 
13: Kantakouzēnos’ assertion that the adulterous woman faced death 
is surprising. Historically, adulterers had faced harsh punishment under 
Roman law: both men and women probably faced a death sentence under 
the laws of Constantine and, under Justinian, the penalty was death until 
556, when only the male had to be executed and the female confined to a 
monastery.40 However, subsequent emperors tended to reduce the use of 
capital punishment on philanthropic grounds and both Blastarēs’ 1335 
                                                 
35 Kant. II, 289.9-23. 
36 Kant. II, 305, 341-2. 
37 For a recent summary and review of the literature, see Macrides, ‘Trial by Ordeal’. 
38 Ibid., 43-6. 
39 Akropolitēs, History (trans. Macrides), 260-263; ibid., 267, n. 28, for commentary on 
origins of the practice. 
40 Arjava, Women and Law, 193-202.  
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compilation of canon and civil law, the Syntagma, and Harmenopoulos’ 1345 
handbook of civil law, the Procheiron tōn Nomōn (better known as the 
Hexabiblos), detail only non-lethal punishments, such as nose-slitting, tonsure 
and loss of property.41 Most cases of adultery would never have reached 
court and private vengeance probably remained common, but 
Kantakouzēnos does not appear to suggest that the context was extra-
judicial. So either he relates customary judicial practice, as opposed to legal 
theory, or deliberately exaggerates the dangers faced by the woman to 
heighten the sanctity of Hilariōn, whose miracle saves the woman from 
death. Kantakouzēnos’ approval of Hilariōn’s intervention does not 
contravene imperial notions of justice, as non-observance of harsh laws, in 
the name of philanthropy, was considered a virtue in emperors.42 
 
14: In an ecclesiastical context, the skimpous is a portable bishop’s seat, 
similar to an ancient curule chair.43 Although the development of the fixed 
synthronon made it obsolete in larger Orthodox churches, it remained in use 
in smaller churches. Kantakouzēnos earlier mentions a skimpous (although 
not described as ‘holy’) provided for Andronikos III’s use when receiving 
judgement from his grandfather so similar portable seats may have been 
regular court furniture.44 
 
15: For these further miraculous prophecies, see Ch.27:11, above. 
                                                 
41 Syntagma, 374-379; Hexabiblos, VI, ii, 14-17; ii, 23-25 (trans. Freshfield, 23-26). 
42 Angelov, Ideology, 140-143. 
43 The author is indebted to the Right Revd. Archimandrite Dr Hieronymos Nikolopoulos 
for this information (pers. comm.). The Souda simply defines it as a bed or cot: W. Hutton 
(trans.), ‘Σκίμπους’, Suda On Line, <http://www.stoa.org/sol-entries/sigma/607>, 21 February 
2014, last accessed 31 December 2014. 
44 Kant. I, 65.3, 67.4-5. 
 433 
Commentary on Chapter 28 
1: The Melas (Black) River is the modern Karasu. The river took its 
name from the dark, fertile earth it cuts through before emptying into a 
lagoon (Athyra Kolpos/Büyükçekmece Gölü) approximately 30km west of 
Constantinople. Forces stationed in this region could intercept military 
movements from Constantinople into Thrace. The river was not considered 
to be an obstacle in summer but was prone to sudden flooding in winter, 
most spectacularly in 1147 when it caused significant damage to Conrad III’s 
crusading army.1 The river is mentioned a number of times throughout the 
Histories.2 Kinnamos stated that the area provided good pasture, 
corresponding with Kantakouzēnos’ account of herds of horses being reared 
near the river in 1321;3 naturally it would have been an attractive bivouac for 
cavalry. The other Melas River in Thrace, known from antiquity, drains into 
the Gulf of Saros at the west side of the Gallipoli peninsula, therefore also 
west of Selymbria, so cannot be the one referred to here.4 
 
2: Peirinthos (or Perinthos), today Marmara Ereğlisi, is elsewhere 
always called Hērakleia, the name it was given when refounded in the late 
third century.5 Grēgoras prefers the older name but notes that they are 
interchangeable.6 Hērakleia lay on the north coast of the Propontis on the Via 
Egnatia, about 90km west of Constantinople and roughly 35km west of 
Selymbria. Following this proposed coastal route would therefore bring 
Kantakouzēnos’ force to meet up with the army on the Melas and, having 
                                                 
1 Chōniatēs, History, 64.56-65.93 (trans. Magoulias, 37-38); Kinnamos, History, 73.18-74.10 
(trans. Brand, 63). 
2 See Külzer, Ostthrakien, 527-8. 
3 Kinnamos, History, 73.20-21; Kant. I, 90.10-12. 
4 For this river, Külzer, Ostthrakien, 528. 
5 Külzer, Ostthrakien, 399; for the town’s history, ibid., 398-408. 
6 Greg. III, 78.14-15: τὴν Πείρινθον τὴν καὶ Ἡράκλειαν καλουμένην. 
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thus secured its rear, permit an advance on the capital. Kantakouzēnos, 
acknowledging Hērakleia’s strategic location on the main western approach 
to Constantinople, mentions it frequently. In the first civil war it was held by 
Syrgiannēs and briefly besieged by Andronikos III.7 Following the uprisings 
in the Thracian cities, it clearly declared for the regency and Kantakouzēnos 
later mentions it as a mustering point for regency forces.8 Iōannēs V fell ill 
there, while accompanying Apokaukos’ army, and had to return to the 
capital.9 It was subsequently the site of an abortive peace negotiation 
between Kantakouzēnos and Apokaukos.10 It is unknown when the city 
defected to Kantakouzēnos, but was probably in his hands by the time he 
took Selymbria in 1344/5. Hērakleia cannot have been taken by storm 
because Kantakouzēnos states, when the Genoese plundered it in 1351, that 
it was wealthy as it had not been captured since the time of Andronikos II, 
referring to the Catalan sack of 1305.11 It is a demonstration of the Empire’s 
insecurity in the fourteenth century, that a city could be considered wealthy 
if it had not been sacked in the previous 46 years.  
 
3: Dynatoi, literally ‘the powerful’ and translated elsewhere as ‘leading 
men’, broadly refers to the upper class in the provincial cities, embracing the 
wealthiest local landholders and members of the local administration. The 
latter are occasionally distinguished as archons, ‘rulers’,12 although the 
distinction is generally artificial.13 The high aristocracy tended to live in 
                                                 
7 Kant. I, 126, 133. 
8 Kant. II, 421, 433, 479. 
9 Kant. II, 432.20-23. Kantakouzēnos probably mentions this incident to show he never 
took the field against Iōannēs V in person. 
10 Kant. II, 479-482. 
11 Kant. III, 212.3-7; Muntaner, Chronicle, 76. 
12 E.g., Kant. II, 180.17-18: τούς τε ἄρχοντας αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν συλλαμβάνοντες 
τοὺς δυνατοὺς. 
13 See Angold, ‘Archons and Dynasts’, esp. 237. For extended examination of these 
groups, and the difficulties of terminology, see Malatras, Social Structure, 47-9, 56-79. 
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Constantinople, unless holding office as provincial governors. 
Kantakouzēnos generally refers to members of the imperial aristocracy as 
εὐγενεῖς (‘nobles’ or ‘well-born’) when talking about those related to the 
leading families – particularly to the imperial family – and συγκλητικοί 
(‘senators’) for court title holders, who were often, but not necessarily, from 
the leading families. However, the high aristocracy can also be referred to as 
archons. Any formal definition of the aristocracy is elusive; in contrast to the 
situation in parts of Western Europe, there was no legally defined noble 
caste.14 
 
4: Branos (PLP 3186), Mougdouphēs (PLP 19414) and Phrangopoulos 
(PLP 30086). These individuals are known only from the Histories. 
Kantakouzēnos probably exaggerates Branos’ lowly status as he was 
subsequently appointed phylax of Adrianople by Anna, in which role he 
foiled another attempt to hand over the city to Kantakouzēnos.15 
Subsequently, all three were still alive and apparently at liberty in 1345, after 
Adrianople finally transferred its allegiance. Phrangopoulos subsequently 
joined the train of Kantakouzēnos’ army where, somewhat ironically, he was 
rewarded by Kantakouzēnos for foiling an attempt to poison him.16 
 
5: Aristoi, as discussed above (Ch.28:3), is not Kantakouzēnos’ usual 
term for the upper classes although it is employed frequently in the context 
of civic unrest to indicate Kantakouzēnos’ supporters. It is likely that he was 
partly influenced by his use of Thucydides in his descriptions of the revolts17 
but also deliberately sought to make a moral distinction: his supporters were 
                                                 
14 Laiou, ‘Aristocracy’, esp. 131-3. In detail, see Kyritses, Byzantine Aristocracy. For an 
overview of recent scholarship on the Palaiologan aristocracy, see Stathakopoulos, 
‘Expansion and retraction’. 
15 Kant. II, 485-6. 
16 Kant. II, 557-9. 
17 See the Introduction, Section 4.3.3. 
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the ‘best’ people, not only in terms of wealth but virtue, while his enemies 
relied upon the poor, the vulgar, and the criminal. Grēgoras even more 
explicitly divides the general population into wise and foolish, rich and poor, 
educated and ignorant, moderate and seditious, and states ‘All the best 
aligned themselves to him [Kantakouzēnos], while all the worst went to 
those in Byzantion.’18 In fact, it is reasonably clear from analysis of 
individuals named by Kantakouzēnos and Grēgoras that most of the 
aristocracy rapidly fell in behind the regency.19 However the idea that the 
‘best’ supported Kantakouzēnos has been remarkably successful as a piece of 
propaganda, leading to widespread acceptance by scholars that 
Kantakouzēnos represented an aristocratic party.20 
 
 
                                                 
18 Greg. II, 613.10-614.1, esp. 613.16-17: καὶ τὰ μὲν βελτίω πάντα πρὸς ἐκεῖνον 
μετεῤῥύηκότα· τὰ δὲ χείρω πάντα πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Βυζαντίῳ. 
19 Kyritses, Byzantine Aristocracy, 365-9; Malatras, ‘Social Aspects‘, 101-108.  
20 As discussed in Ch.22:5. 
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Commentary on Chapter 29 
1: Iōannēs Batatzēs (PLP 2518).1 At this time, he held the rank of 
prōtokynēgos.2 Kantakouzēnos calls him ‘a worthy man of reason, not only in 
his intelligence but also in his experience and daring concerning battles.’3 
Grēgoras criticises his low birth and states that he became rich from his office 
as an apographeus.4 Like Apokaukos and Kantakouzēnos, he had used his 
considerable wealth to build himself a private fortress.5 His desertion clearly 
suggests that, following Kantakouzēnos’ initial setbacks, many thought his 
cause was doomed. Batatzēs returned to the field the following spring as a 
military leader for the regency, in which role he apparently offered to 
negotiate peace with Kantakouzēnos, although the effort came to nothing.6 
By October 1342, Batatzēs had been promoted to megas chartoularios,7 
although Kantakouzēnos continues to style him prōtokynēgos.8 He had strong 
links with the inner circle of the regency, having married a son to the 
Patriarch’s daughter and a daughter to one of Apokaukos’ sons.9 In mid-1344 
he nevertheless changed sides again, bringing a number of cities and the 
support of his family with him; Kantakouzēnos rewarded him with the title 
                                                 
1 The PLP entry includes a number of mistakes, including confusion with an unrelated 
Batatzēs mentioned by Kant. II, 282, 285. 
2 Actes de Docheiariou, 148-158, no. 20 (dated April 1341). 
3 Kant. II, 554.9-11: ἦν γὰρ λόγου ἄξιος ὁ ἀνὴρ, οὐ συνέσει μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ 
καὶ τόλμῃ τῇ κατὰ τὰς μάχας. 
4 Greg. II, 741.6-8. For an example of his activities in this role see the praktikon issued by 
him, Bartusis, Land and Privilege, 620-23. For apographeis, see Ch.8:7. 
5 See Ch.10:9. 
6 Kant. II, 197-9, 213.19-21. 
7 Guillou, Saint-Jean-Prodrome, 118-9, no. 36. If the dating is correct, the emperor who 
issued the document must have been Iōannēs V, despite Guillou’s uncertainty, as 
Kantakouzēnos would not at this time have described Batatzēs as οἰκείου τῆς βασιλείας 
μου. 
8 Kant. II, 475.2-3. 
9 Kant. II, 475.22-24. It is likely Kantakouzēnos would have mentioned if either or both of 
these marriages pre-dated the war, so they probably followed his defection. 
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megas stratopedarchēs and gifts to his relatives.10 While Kantakouzēnos, who 
was achieving military dominance by this time, presents him as an 
ideological convert, Grēgoras relates that Batatzēs fell out with Apokaukos 
when, having purchased the governorship of Thessalonike from the 
Empress, he was removed from the post in favour of Apokaukos’ son, 
Iōannēs.11 In the meantime Batatzēs had acquired Turkish allies of his own, 
by marrying another daughter to Süleyman Karasi.12 After some service to 
Kantakouzēnos, he was tempted into betraying him again in late 1345. 
Grēgoras places the initiative for this with the Empress, Kantakouzēnos with 
Batatzēs himself.13 In either case it was clear he intended to occupy the role 
left vacant by Alexios Apokaukos’ demise. Kantakouzēnos took this threat 
extremely seriously as Batatzēs’ alliance with Karasi potentially 
counterbalanced his own with the Ottomans. However Batatzēs was 
murdered by his allies before any battle took place; Kantakouzēnos 
attributes this to divine favour and Turkish respect for him, Grēgoras to the 
Turks’ disappointment that Kantakouzēnos’ scorched earth tactics had left 
them nothing to plunder.14 His career is a monument to the fragility of 
political loyalties among the aristocracy. 
 
2: This military unit is not otherwise attested. Bartusis plausibly 
suggests that the name was attached to a company of soldiers originating 
                                                 
10 Kant. II, 475-6. Much of the literature (including PLP) dates Batatzēs’ appointment as 
megas stratopedarchēs to 1343. However Kantakouzēnos relates his return among the events 
of 1344. 
11 Greg. II, 741.9-19. 
12 Greg. II, 741.19-23. For Karasi and the identification of Süleyman, see Ch.9:8. 
Kantakouzēnos does not mention the marriage, probably because he does not wish to 
highlight the uncertain benefits of such agreements, in light of his own alliance to Orhan 
and of Batatzēs’ subsequent fate. 
13 Greg. II, 742.5-6: γράμματα ἐφοίτα συχνὰ πρὸς τῆς βασιλίδος Ἄννης αὐτῷ; Kant. II, 
552.15-16: πέμψας πρὸς βασιλίδα διελέγετο περὶ συμβάσεων. 
14 Kant. II, 553-6; Greg. II, 742.14-743.6. For an analysis of the great significance and 
consequences of this conflict from a Turkish perspective, see Zachariadou, ‘Karasi’, 231-4.  
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from Achyraous in Anatolia, which was occupied by the Turks at some point 
following 1304.15 Therefore it is possible these men were the sons of the 
original Achyraïtai. Officials with the surname Achyraïtēs are attested in the 
1320s and 1350s in Zichnai in Macedonia so they may have settled around 
this area.16 The nature of such named companies of native soldiers, whether 
mercenary or pronoiar, is not known.17 
 
3: The River Hebros (today, the Evros or Meriç) was more generally 
known by its Slavic name, the Maritza, which is used by Pachymerēs and 
occasionally by Akropolitēs.18 Kantakouzēnos and Grēgoras both prefer the 
classical designation. Its source lies in the Rila Mountains in Bulgaria and it 
terminates in the Ainos delta; at 472km it is the longest river that flows 
entirely within the Balkans.19 By the point it entered the Empire, it was 
sizeable enough to form an obstacle to east-west travel and also to be 
navigable by larger boats at least as far as Adrianople, thus constituting an 
important north-south route within Thrace.20 There were some bridges, and 
ferries across the river at multiple points, but a crossing could pose a major 
difficulty in adverse weather conditions.  
 
4: Kantakouzēnos’ rather feeble arguments regarding legitimacy 
attempt to justify his pragmatic decision to ignore the Bulgarian provocation, 
owing to the weakness of his political and military position. He probably 
also wanted to leave open the possibility of an alliance; Grēgoras states that 
letters from Kantakouzēnos to both Ivan Alexander and Stefan Dušan were 
                                                 
15 Bartusis, Army, 203. 
16 PLP 1719, 1720. 
17 Kyriakidis, Warfare, 110-111. 
18 E.g., Pach. IV, 615.12; Akropolitēs, History I, 51.18. 
19 Soustal, Thrakien, 347-8. 
20 Asdracha, Rhodopes, 45-7; Ousterhout and Bakirtzis, Monuments, 9-15. 
 440 
intercepted by regency loyalists during the winter.21 Grēgoras’ testimony 
undermines the impression Kantakouzēnos generally fosters, that he only 
involved foreigners in the conflict reluctantly, after the regency had first 
taken the initiative. 
 
5: Iōannēs Pothos (PLP 23447). Little else is known about him other 
than he was later in the service of despotēs Manouēl Kantakouzēnos in 1352, 
when Dēmētrios Kydōnēs wrote to him.22  
 
6: Syralēs (PLP 27160). He is not otherwise attested. Kantakouzēnos 
probably sent him to secure Chios, and its wealth, for his cause. 
 
7: The island of Chios prospered from its monopoly on the production 
of mastic and involvement in the trade in alum, mined around the cities of 
New and Old Phōkaia on the nearby mainland.23 This wealth made the 
island a strongly contested prize in the fourteenth century and 
Kantakouzēnos shows great concern for it. Chios had come to be ruled by 
the Genoese Zaccaria family, who were previously granted the lordship of 
Phōkaia by Michaēl VIII, probably between mid-1305 and 1307 and 
definitely by 1309.24 Kantakouzēnos claims that it was taken by force and 
that Andronikos II subsequently recognised the seizure by a periodically 
renewed treaty in order to retain nominal sovereignty.25 The Zaccaria 
prospered through their control of the island, striking their own coins and 
                                                 
21 Greg. II, 616.2-6. 
22 Kydōnēs, Letters I, 227-230, ep. 34. 
23 Koder, Aigaion, 143-150; Laiou, Andronicus II, 152-3.  
24 The surviving sources are unclear and occasionally contradictory, for details see Carr, 
‘Zaccaria’, 118-9, n. 18. The most thorough study of the entire Genoese occupation of Chios, 
despite occasional mistakes in understanding the Greek sources, is Argenti, Chios. 
25 Kant. I, 370.10-21. 
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maintaining substantial forces to defend it against the Turks;26 
Kantakouzēnos states its annual tax revenues amounted to 120,000 gold.27 In 
1329, Kantakouzēnos’ mother was approached by Leōn Kalothetos, a Chiote 
notable and oikeios of the Kantakouzēnoi, who urged an imperial expedition 
to displace the Zaccaria.28 Equally importantly, Benedetto II Zaccaria, who 
had been forced from power by his younger brother Martino, appealed to 
Andronikos III.29 Andronikos and Kantakouzēnos seized the opportunity by 
launching a naval expedition which quickly forced Martino’s surrender.30 
Benedetto, although offered appointment as its governor, felt slighted at the 
restoration of imperial sovereignty and, shortly afterwards, tried to take 
possession of Chios with a fleet from Genoa but was defeated.31 During the 
civil war, Apokaukos ensured Chios’ loyalty to the regency by driving out 
Kalothetos.32 However a Genoese expedition took advantage of the conflict 
to seize the island in 1346, eventually overcoming local resistance. The 
Empress was outraged although she could do little to prevent it.33 After 
Kantakouzēnos’ victory, he negotiated with Genoa and won some 
concessions including a promise of eventual withdrawal by 1357; however 
those actually holding the island never assented to the agreement. A 
rebellion by Tzybos, a local notable, succeeded in returning Old Phōkaia to 
imperial control in 1349 but he was killed during his invasion of the island.34 
Chios remained under Genoese rule until the mid-16th century. 
                                                 
26 Carr, ‘Zaccaria’, esp. 127-8. 
27 Kant. I, 371.23-24, 380.1-3. 
28 Kant. I, 371.12-372.20; for Kalothetos, PLP 10617; Weiss, Kantakuzenos, 37. 
29 Kant. I, 374.23-375.7. 
30 Kant. I, 375-379; Greg. I, 438.7-439.10; Argenti, Chios I, 60-68; Bosch, Andronikos III, 112-
118. 
31 Kant. I, 379-388, 390.15-391.6. 
32 Kant. III, 84.16-20. 
33 Kant. II, 583.8-584.12. See also Carr, ‘Crusade of Smyrna’, 242-5; Argenti, Chios I, 94-103. 
34 Kant. III, 81.9-85.2 (trans. Miller, Cantacuzenus, 214-18); Argenti, Chios I, 117-123, but 
also Miller, Cantacuzenus, 358-361 (Miller’s commentary). 
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Commentary on Chapter 30 
1: Pamphilon (modern Uzunköprü) lay about 17km south-east of 
Didymoteichon. It is often mentioned in passing in narrative sources but 
little detail is provided; its importance paled beside Adrianople and 
Didymoteichon.1 Grēgoras refers to it as both a small town and a city.2 
Kantakouzēnos goes on to recount that it possessed a fortified acropolis 
although the rolling terrain of the area provides no particularly strong 
natural sites. The town’s loyalty was ensured only by the presence of a large 
garrison. Although it was soon lost, neither Kantakouzēnos nor Grēgoras 
mention further conflict over it or its eventual recapture. 
 
2: Koprinos is otherwise unattested.3 It was clearly not a major 
settlement and may have defected shortly afterwards; Kantakouzēnos states 
that by spring the Thracian towns ‘had all revolted in favour of the Empress, 
except the fortress of Empythion’.4 Modern Kyprinos, to the north-west, 
seems too distant to be the same location.  
 
3: Empythion’s impressive remains stand on a bluff above the Hebros, 
bordered by the modern village of Pythio (also Grēgoras’ name for the 
fortress), about 10km north-east of Didymoteichon.5 Grēgoras, contrary to 
Kantakouzēnos, suggests that there was a pre-existing fortress, writing that 
‘having become ruined, the Emperor Kantakouzēnos, restoring it greatly by 
                                                 
1 For a summary of its history, see Külzer, Ostthrakien, 560-562.  
2 Greg. II, 621.3: τὸ Παμφίλου πολίχνιον. Greg. II, 805.7: Πάμφιλον ἐγεγόνει τὴν πόλιν. 
3 Külzer, Ostthrakien, 470, has little to add, being derived from this passage. 
4 Kant. II, 195.18-19: πρὸς βασιλίδα συναπέστησαν, πλὴν τοῦ Ἐμπυθίου φρουρίου. 
5 For this fortress generally, see Ousterhout and Bakirtzis, Monuments, 144-154; 
Hetherington, ‘Pythion’; Soustal, Thrakien, 419-420. 
 443 
great expenditure of money, fortified it’.6 However no trace of a previous 
building has yet been found and dendrochronological analysis indicates the 
earliest current construction was around 1330-1331.7 Kantakouzēnos states 
‘the fortress was extremely strong owing to the construction of its walls’,8 
which for the largest tower are nearly 2.5 metres thick.9 Sections of the 
curtain wall survive, incorporated into the structures of the modern village. 
The north tower incorporates stone machicolations, usually a hallmark of 
western European architecture, making the fortress ‘unique among 
Byzantine fortifications and at the cutting edge of military technology in the 
fourteenth century’.10 Hetherington could not find any strategic rationale in 
the position of the fortress position relative to Didymoteichon.11 However it 
is notable that it is well situated to shield the city from attacks directed from 
Constantinople; it may have been conceived during the first civil war or as a 
response to it. Grēgoras states that Kantakouzēnos placed his treasury there 
and it is likely it was located within his own estates.12 Thus it seems to have 
been intended to serve a more private than public purpose.13 Empythion 
remained loyal throughout the war and survived two attempted sieges by 
Apokaukos; the first, in 1342, was foiled by a Tatar raid while the longer 
siege of 1344 failed to overcome its defences.14 The fortress eventually fell 
into Ottoman hands around 1359. 
 
                                                 
6 Greg. II, 708.14-16: γεγονὸς ἐρείπιον, ἐκ πολλοῦ Καντακουζηνὸς ἀνειληφὼς ὁ 
βασιλεὺς πολλαῖς χρημάτων δαπάναις ὠχύρωσε. 
7 Hetherington, ‘Pythion’, 308. Some parts were constructed slightly later, perhaps 
following its capture by the Ottomans in 1359; see Ousterhout and Bakirtzis, Monuments, 
144-154. 
8 Kant. II, 433.16-17: ἦν γὰρ καρτερώτατον τὸ φρούριον ἐκ τῶν τειχῶν τῆς 
κατασκευῆς. 
9 Korres, ‘Pythion Castle’, 276. 
10 Ousterhout and Bakirtzis, Monuments, 151. 
11 Hetherington, ‘Pythion’, 312. 
12 Greg. II, 708.17-18. 
13 See above, Ch.10:9. 
14 Kant. II, 302, 433-5. 
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4: This famous passage is often cited as an example of the extreme 
concentrations of private wealth during this period. Even among the 
aristocracy, Kantakouzēnos was undoubtedly an unusually rich man; his 
apparent lack of siblings meant that he had not been obliged to divide his 
patrimony as would be usual under a system of partitive inheritance.15 Weiss 
calculates, from the little comparative data available, that these holdings 
represented perhaps 100km2 of land and roughly 1,900 able-bodied men, a 
total which does not seem unreasonable.16 Although Kantakouzēnos’ 
enumeration of his losses is accompanied by a characteristic disclaimer that 
they did not distress him, Kazhdan demonstrated that Kantakouzēnos’ 
vocabulary reveals a constant preoccupation with wealth;17 his pretended 
disinterest is somewhat undercut by giving specific figures in the first place. 
  
5: Tzernomianou lay roughly 29km west-north-west of Adrianople, at 
a ford on the Hebros River.18 Kantakouzēnos mentions the town a number of 
times, most notably for an alliance between Andronikos III and Michael III 
Šišman concluded there in 1327.19 At 52km as the crow flies from 
Didymoteichon, it is further than Kantakouzēnos’ οὐ πόῤῥω implies. The 
distance suggests the raiders were mounted and, given that the town finally 
declared for Kantakouzēnos only when Adrianople defected to him in 1345,20 
the marauders were probably the loyalist garrison of the fortress. In any case, 
the distinction between soldiers and brigands was not always very 
pronounced.21  
 
                                                 
15 On inheritance practices, see Kyritses, Byzantine Aristocracy, 184-192. 
16 Weiss, Kantakuzenos, 21-2. 
17 Kazhdan, ‘L’Histoire de Cantacuzène’, 294-7. 
18 Soustal, Thrakien, 489. See also Asdracha, Rhodopes, 149. 
19 Kant. I, 191, 208. 
20 Kant. II, 526. 
21 Bartusis, ‘Brigandage’, passim. 
 445 
6: Grēgoras states that Angelos was accompanied by eighty cavalry. 
His account of this episode is rather different: Kantakouzēnos’ path is barred 
by the river being whipped up into a torrent rather than freezing. When 
Kantakouzēnos retreated, the river calmed and then raged again when he 
returned, demonstrating that God’s will was against Kantakouzēnos’ 
enterprise.22 Grēgoras’ story oddly echoes Kantakouzēnos’ later account of 
his inability to cross the Axios (River Vardar) in 1342 because of deluge; 
eventually he turned back, accepting it as a sign of God’s will, which causes 
him to reflect on the dire consequences of his failure to cross the Hebros 
too.23 
 
7: The exact situation being described is slightly unclear but 
Kantakouzēnos appears to have been concerned with unifying his own and 
Angelos’ forces, since Didymoteichon is located on the west bank of the 
Hebros and Pamphilon on the east bank.24 In any case, he appears not to 
have contemplated dismounting the soldiers to facilitate their crossing over, 
whether from military or social concerns,25 or simply fear of losing the 
horses. While it was clearly unusual for the river to freeze during winter, it 
was not unprecedented: the army of Henry of Flanders marched across the 
ice near Kypsela (somewhat downstream of Kantakouzēnos’ location) in 
1208/9.26 Enveri states that Umur was unable to travel by ship in the winter 
of 1342/3 because of ice on the Hebros;27 Kantakouzēnos does not mention 
                                                 
22 Greg. II, 620.21-622.1. 
23 Kant. II, 242.13-243.9. For his comparison with the Hebros incident, see 243.2-7. 
24 Kant. II, 188.3, speaks of the cavalry ἐπ’ αὐτὸν περαιουμένους, apparently indicating 
himself. 
25 On the low prestige of infantry, see Kyriakidis, Warfare, 216-7. 
26 De Valenciennes, Histoire, 58, n. 566.  
27 Enveri, Düstūrnāme, 95-6, verses 1395-1400. 
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any ice but records that Umur’s troops travelled by foot from the mouth of 
the river.28  
While Soustal describes the freezing of the Hebros as being frequent, 
he does not substantiate this; Asdracha argues that it is the very rarity of 
these events that leads to their prominence in the sources.29 Kantakouzēnos’ 
lack of preparedness similarly implies freezing was an infrequent event, as 
do his previous comments regarding the harshness of the winter. Grēgoras 
similarly reports that the weather was unusually bad.30 The hard winters 
which both report are possibly an indication of regional climatic change, the 
beginning of the so-called ‘Little Ice Age’.31 
 
8: One of Pamphilon’s archons, Michaēl Bryennios (PLP 3262), is 
subsequently mentioned as having being severely beaten in prison before 
escaping to re-join Kantakouzēnos, then later falling in battle while shielding 
his emperor.32 
 
9: Kantakouzēnos refers to the promotion of the conspirators which 
took place at Iōannēs V’s coronation on 19 November 1341.33 The needs of 
the two competing parties to reward their supporters resulted in the 
appointment of two rival court hierarchies and the consequent denial of 
appointments made by the other party. Furthermore, instead of receiving a 
new title, individuals could be rewarded by raising the precedence of their 
existing title, as the Andronikoi had done for Kantakouzēnos.34 Seven other 
                                                 
28 Kant. II, 345. 
29 Soustal, Thrakien, 348; Asdracha, Rhodopes, 22. 
30 Greg. II, 615.23-616.2. 
31 For an introduction to climate in Byzantine sources and its relation to other climatic 
evidence, see Telelis, ‘Climatic Fluctuations’, esp. 188-9 for the ‘Little Ice Age’ and the 
tendency of authors only to record extreme events. 
32 Kant. II, 343.3-344.3. 
33 Kant. II, 218.  
34 See Ch.1:9. 
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court precedence lists of the fourteenth century have survived which, among 
other differences, all place megas domestikos in 7th rank, in contrast to 4th in 
Pseudo-Kodinos. It appears that Pseudo-Kodinos’ list is a partisan 
document, reflecting the order of precedence as revised after 
Kantakouzēnos’ victory. Kantakouzēnos apparently left his opponents in 
possession of their titles, if awarded by Andronikos III, but adjusted the 
titles’ precedence to demote regency loyalists and promote his own 
supporters.35 The regency itself presumably followed a precedence list dating 
from before Kantakouzēnos’ promotion, placing the megas doux, Apokaukos, 
above the megas domestikos. Despite Kantakouzēnos’ statement that he 
rejected the new titles awarded to his enemies, his narrative soon employs 
them. In the case of Apokaukos, Kantakouzēnos henceforth calls him 
parakoimōmenos and megas doux interchangeably.36 
                                                 
35 For further discussion, see Macrides, et al., Pseudo-Kodinos, 280-289. 
36 E.g., Kant. II, 281.22 (megas doux); II, 282.20 (parakoimōmenos). 
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Appendix I: Conclusion of the Histories 
 
The final peroration of the Histories (Kant. III, 363.24-365.8): 
 
So these are the things /364/ that happened to the Romans, in our own 
times in years past; at the time when the war of the emperors Andronikos 
[the younger and elder] against each other began, and later that which was 
ignited between the Empress Anna and the Emperor Kantakouzēnos and 
then the conclusion of these, including the young Emperor Iōannēs’ quarrel 
with Matthaios, the brother of his wife, and the Emperor, his father-in-law, it 
is as has been related. And nothing of what we have said has either from 
favour or hatred departed from the truth, but we have inquired precisely 
into what happened, on one hand from those who were present, involved in 
these matters at the time and participants in these events, on the other hand 
from those who heard these deeds first-hand from them.  
If this history encompasses any person in particular who planned in 
secret to begin war against the Emperor Kantakouzēnos, it is no wonder. For 
the majority of them, even after he came to possess complete power, were 
still alive and benefited from much solicitude by him; they told him 
everything accurately, marvelling at his generosity and endurance of their 
terrible deeds, pitying themselves because not only had they produced so 
many misfortunes for the Romans but also because they had enjoyed many 
great and wonderful benefactions from him, both before and after. Because 
of this, having being deceived by the schemes and villainies of the megas 
doux, they were seen as culpable for producing many difficulties and were 
utterly ungrateful. Above all, the brothers of the megas doux, Iōannēs and 
Nikēphoros, /365/ related those of his secrets about which they knew more 
than the others.  
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So your command, dear Neilos, is accomplished to the best of our 
ability, and it is possible for you – reading through what has been written, 
and examining the lives and actions and the character of men in general – to 
praise the magnanimity of some and their love of good deeds in all, or most, 
things and to despise the villainy of others, as they have been responsible for 
many evils, not only to others but also to themselves. 
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Appendix II: Transliteration Scheme 
 
Where Greek words are transliterated, the following scheme has been 
adopted: 
α, ἀ, ἁ a, a, ha 
Β b 
γ, γγ, γκ, γξ g, ng, nk, nx 
Δ d 
ε, ἐ, ἑ e, e, he 
ζ z 
η, ἠ, ἡ ē, ē, hē 
θ th 
ι, ἰ, ἱ i, i, hi 
κ k 
λ l 
μ, μπ- m, b 
ν, ντ- n, d 
ξ x 
ο, ὀ, ὁ o, o, ho 
π p 
ρ, ῥ r, rh 
σ, ς s 
τα t 
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